



Global Democracy for Europeans: A Demographic Story

John Gerring
Brendan Apfeld

November 2018

Working Paper

SERIES 2018:81

THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualization and measurement of democracy. The headquarters – the V-Dem Institute – is based at the University of Gothenburg with 17 staff. The project includes a worldwide team with six Principal Investigators, 14 Project Managers, 30 Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 3,000 Country Experts. The V-Dem project is one of the largest ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.

Please address comments and/or queries for information to:

V-Dem Institute

Department of Political Science

University of Gothenburg

Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711

SE 40530 Gothenburg

Sweden

E-mail: contact@v-dem.net

V-Dem Working Papers are available in electronic format at www.v-dem.net.

Copyright © 2018 by authors. All rights reserved.

Global Democracy for Europeans: A Demographic Story*

John Gerring

Professor

Department of Government

University of Texas at Austin

Brendan Apfeld

PhD Candidate

Department of Government

University of Texas at Austin

* This research project was supported by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Grant M13-0559:1, PI: Staffan I. Lindberg, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; by Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation to Wallenberg Academy Fellow Staffan I. Lindberg, Grant 2013.0166, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; as well as by internal grants from the Vice-Chancellor's office, the Dean of the College of Social Sciences, and the Department of Political Science at University of Gothenburg. We performed simulations and other computational tasks using resources provided by the Notre Dame Center for Research Computing (CRC) through the High Performance Computing section and the Swedish National Infrastructure for Computing (SNIC) at the National Supercomputer Centre in Sweden, SNIC 2017/1-407 and 2017/1-68. We specifically acknowledge the assistance of In-Saeng Suh at CRC and Johan Raber at SNIC in facilitating our use of their respective systems.

Abstract

Insofar as democracy is a product of long-term diffusion, scholars generally focus on colonialism (especially English) or religion (especially Protestant). Here, we focus on a third pathway from Europe – *Europeans*. We show that there is a persistent relationship between the share of Europeans in a society and its regime type. We conjecture that this is because Europeans viewed democracy as a basic right – for themselves. It was a club that produced club goods (excludable goods such as property rights and civil liberties). Hence, where Europeans were in the majority they were democrats. Where they were the minority they were indifferent or hostile, or they embraced a restricted form of democracy that excluded non-Europeans. And where Europeans were entirely absent there was no one – at least initially – to carry the democratic torch. To test this argument we assemble an original dataset measuring the diffusion of Europeans across the world from 1600 to the present. This is employed to predict democracy in a series of analyses that focus on various indicators of democracy and a variety of samples, specifications, time-periods, and estimators, including fixed effects and instrumental variables. The evidence offers strong support for the thesis.

Introduction

Democracy is often viewed as a product of diffusion, understood loosely as the adoption of norms and institutions from other states. Studies of diffusion typically focus on proximal relationships, where an event at year t affects another event at $t+1$ (e.g., Brinks, Coppedge 2006).

Long-term diffusion – taking place over decades or centuries – has received less attention, perhaps because it is harder to assess. One line of work focuses on *colonialism*, where studies indicate that a wide variety of factors associated with colonialism, and British rule in particular, made democratic outcomes more likely in years following independence (Bernhard et al. 2004; Hariri 2012; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Another line of work focuses on *Protestantism*, where researchers find a positive association between the spread of Protestant sects and the rise of democracy in the contemporary era (Anderson 2004; Brown 1944; Bruce 2004; Tusalem 2009; Woodberry 2012). Both factors may be regarded as emanations of Europe.

In this study, we focus on a third pathway from Europe – *Europeans*. The presence of Europeans is a widely recognized factor in economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Glaeser et al. 2004; Mahoney 2010; Putterman, Weil 2010). However, its possible role in democratization has not been systematically assessed.

Beginning about 1500, with the advent of sailing vessels capable of circumnavigating the globe, Europeans began to populate the distant abroad. By 1900, they could be found virtually everywhere, in varying proportions. We argue that the resulting ratio of Europeans/non-Europeans structured the fate of democracy around the world. Where Europeans were numerous (relative to indigenes and migrants from elsewhere), they championed some form of popular sovereignty, though often with restrictions limiting suffrage or office-holding to those of European heritage. Where they were in the minority they were more reticent and often actively resisted democratization. And where Europeans were entirely absent there was no one – at least initially – to carry the democratic torch. We argue that this demographic mechanism was probably the most powerful pathway of democratic diffusion from Europe to the world and one of the more enduring causes of regime-type in the modern era.

Section I lays out the argument. Section II presents an original dataset measuring the spread of Europeans throughout the world from 1600 to the present. Section III offers a series of analyses that test the argument with qualitative historical data and also quantitative measures of democracy and European ancestry. Appendices (on-line) present sources (A), codings of European ancestry for each territory (B), maps of the world illustrating European ancestry at

various points in time (C), convergent validity tests for the key variable of theoretical interest (D), descriptions of each variable used on all analyses (E), robustness tests (F), and alternative accounts (G).

I. Argument

The outcome of theoretical interest is democracy, a term encapsulating a wide range of meanings in the modern era. At the most abstract level, democratic principles include representation, consent, accountability, political equality, individual liberty, and popular sovereignty. At a more disaggregated level, attributes associated with democracy include the sovereignty of elective bodies (vis-à-vis unelective bodies), competitive multi-party elections, universal suffrage, constitutional constraints on the exercise of power, civil liberties, and citizenship (for all those born within the boundaries claimed by a state who subsequently live out their lives subject to its laws). All of these attributes are implied by the concept of democracy, as we use the term here.

When we make statements about the democratic or autocratic nature of a polity at some point in history we invoke an implicit comparison-set of other societies existing *at that time*. We recognize that no societies were fully democratic (by today's standards). Indeed, prior to the twentieth century "democracy" was not an especially popular term. (Preferred terms included freedom, liberty, self-government, representative government, responsible government, republican government, and political rights.) Even so, at any given point in time some societies were more democratic than others. It is this difference of degrees that we wish to explain.

Our argument builds upon three facts about the modern world that we take for granted and do not attempt to explain. First, Europe was the birthplace of democracy. Second, Europeans adopted a racialized view of society, defining their identity and interests separate from non-Europeans. Third, Europeans were globally dominant – militarily, politically, and to some extent culturally.

With this as background, democracy may be viewed as a method of governance whose feasibility and payoffs (to Europeans) depended upon the demographic balance of Europeans and non-Europeans within a society. Where Europeans composed a majority of the population, democracy offered a convenient system for monopolizing political power. Rule by the people meant rule by white people, and they had the infrastructure (education, wealth, etc.) to make it work. Where Europeans composed a substantial minority they could still achieve this result, but to do so they needed to prevent the majority from participating or to successfully coerce/coopt their political opponents, a precarious feat that (it turned out) could not be sustained indefinitely.

Where Europeans composed a tiny fraction of the population, establishing a democratic system of rule was neither practicable nor necessary, as European interests could be coordinated through informal channels within a small (and presumably tightly-knit) community. Regime types therefore evolved from the intersection of European ideas and interests with varying demographic realities. In the following sections, we elaborate on this thesis.

Democracy for Europeans

Europeans were the first to develop representative institutions, to hold elections for public office, and to constrain the use of political power by constitutional rules. Exactly why democracy arose in Europe and not elsewhere is a conundrum that we shall not attempt to unravel (for varying perspectives see Cartledge 2016; Schulz et al. 2018; Stasavage 2016). We know that it was a long, slow, and halting development, with many reversals and many shifts of course across the continent. Nonetheless, democracy has deep roots in Europe, which remains the most democratic region of the world today.

Europe also developed into the world's first global hegemon, inaugurating an age of imperialism (Abernethy 2000). As Europeans conquered the world, they brought their ideas about political organization with them. Democracy in English colonies was viewed by colonists as an extension of the rights of Englishmen, a clear instance of intellectual diffusion (Greene 2010; Kammen 1969; Ward 1976). Representative institutions in Spanish and Portuguese America developed later and might be viewed as a reaction against the authoritarianism of the colonizer. However, constitutional thought and the Latin American constitutions that resulted were modeled on European exemplars – ancient Greece and Rome, Renaissance Italy, contemporary England, revolutionary France, the Netherlands, the short liberal episodes of Spain (1812, 1820-1823), the long history of local government (*cabildos*) in Spain, and the former English colony to the North, the United States (Demélas-Bohy, Guerra 1996; Graham 1994: 73; Guerra 1994; Rodríguez O. 1998; Sabato 2018: 5). Democracy in French colonies was directly linked to France insofar as *colonnes* participated in elections to the *Assemblée Nationale* and often viewed themselves as children of the French Revolution (Choi 2016; Johnson 1971; Southworth 1931). Wherever they happened to be situated, Europeans tended to view themselves as rights-bearers – inheritors of the legacy of the Classical age, the Enlightenment, and the age of Revolution (Armitage, Subrahmanyam 2009; Simon 2017).

Europeans also developed and carried with them other features that might be regarded as forming the *infrastructure* of democracy, e.g., written languages, educational systems, advanced transport and communication systems, urban patterns of settlement, nuclear family structures,

nation-states, property rights, capitalist economies, and wealth (comparatively speaking). We do not know which of these features (often associated with the process of modernization) is most important for democracy (Knutsen et al. 2018; Murin, Wacziarg 2014; Schulz et al. 2018). But we do know that they developed in tandem and were closely interconnected.

Because democracy was valued by Europeans, and because they possessed the infrastructure required for sustaining democratic forms of government, it is not surprising that democracy arose first in areas inhabited by Europeans. In this respect, as in many others, colonies in the New World were a continuation of the Old – “Neo-Europes” (Crosby 1986).

However, democracy was not viewed by Europeans as a nostrum suitable for all peoples everywhere. Even within Europe, there were limitations on who could participate in politics (Goldstein 2013). Outside Europe, it was generally assumed that non-whites were incapable of self-government, or that they would need many years of apprenticeship before developing that capacity (Fieldhouse 1966; Fradera 2018; Huttenback 1976; Lynch 1973; Reinsch 1906: 197; Ross 1982; Ward 1976; Waterhouse 2010: 240-45; Wight 1946).

This belief had a number of underpinnings. It drew on a vision of democracy in which citizens must possess property (signaling their independence) and education (signaling their capacity for rational thought). It drew on a Euro-centric vision of the world in which non-Europeans were savage (uncivilized, ungodly) or servile (in thrall to despots or masters), and hence unable to govern themselves in a responsible manner. In a much-quoted passage, J.S. Mill (1862) articulates the enlightened opinion of the day...

It is now a fixed principle of the policy of Great Britain...that her colonies of European race, equally with the parent country, possess the fullest measure of internal self-government...But there are others which have not attained that state, and which, if held at all, must be governed by the dominant country, or by persons delegated for that purpose by it. This mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement. There are, as we have already seen, conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilization...The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs, guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms, and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the

more advanced nation. Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi-barbarous one.¹

Abstract considerations of political theory intermingled with overt racism in European thought.

We must also consider how defining democratic capacities in this exclusive fashion may have served the interests of Europeans. “Democracy” (along with associated ideals of equality, representation, and so forth) provided a convenient mechanism for binding together members of the European community, overcoming class antagonisms and monopolizing power in heterogeneous societies around the world. While the economic interests of a European worker and large landowner might differ, they were both granted civil and political rights and in this fashion differentiated themselves from those who fell on the wrong side of the color line (Morgan 1975). Insofar as the exercise of democratic rights was reserved for Europeans it also served as a mechanism of political control – useful for the passage of discriminatory property rights laws and measures of “self-defense” that displaced indigenous peoples and made room for European settlers (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 259; Lützelshwab 2013; Woollacott 2015: 99).

Thus did values and interests combine to make democracy (for Europeans) a popular ideal (among Europeans). Avid proselytizers of property rights and Christianity, Europeans were not keen to spread the gospel of democracy among indigenes, transplanted migrant workers, and slaves. Political freedom meant freedom for whites – more precisely, white men (Foner 1994; Greene 2010; Huttenback 1976; Lake 2012; Morgan 1975).

To be sure, Europeans *sometimes* extended civil and political rights to non-Europeans. However, emancipation, enfranchisement, and qualification for public office for indigenous people came about with greatest alacrity in places where Europeans predominated. Here, the extension of rights posed little threat to European hegemony. By contrast, where Europeans were in the minority, fear of popular uprisings or popular rule prompted Europeans to resist democratization, or to resist independence from the metropole wherever that seemed destined to inaugurate mass democracy (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 139, 332; Dippel, Carvalho 2015; Greene 2010: 76; Lynch 1973: 20, 51, 127, 158, 163, 190, 265, 325; Williams 1970: ch 22).

Democracy as a Club

From a longer perspective our narrative suggests a historical model in which democracy serves as a coordinating device for group interests.

Beginning in the medieval period, communes, guilds, parties, fraternities, companies, churches, and universities in Europe were formally incorporated based on models drawn from

¹ For a review of recent work on liberalism and empire see Sartori (2006).

Roman and/or canon law. They also developed methods of governance – consultative and decisionmaking bodies, judicial bodies, formal limits on the exercise of executive power, methods of leadership selection and de-selection, protected rights for all members, and so forth – that presage contemporary democratic institutions (Berman 1997; Bilder 2006; Black 1984; Ciepley 2017; Greif 2006; McLaughlin 1932: 50; Maitland 2003; Post 1943; Runciman 2000; Tierney 1982).

Over time, these corporations “acquired a legal personality and began to perform functions of a semi-public nature” (Najemy 1979: 49-50). However, they remained corporate bodies with strictly limited memberships whose purpose was focused primarily on advancing the interests of their members. It is not surprising, therefore, that when forming new political communities Europeans regarded themselves as owners of corporations that performed acts of governance, primarily for their own benefit. This legacy can be found in colonial charters (Lutz 1988) and in municipal charters (Weinbaum 2010). Indeed, municipalities continued to function as the property of their shareholders, i.e., ratepayers, into the twentieth century in cities like Chicago (Einhorn 2001).

Of course, the governance of a political community involved spillover effects to the rest of society since some policies are non-excludable. However, the distinction between members (citizens) and non-members generated an exclusivist polity in which only members (conventionally defined as those with suffrage rights) enjoyed full civil rights and property rights. These policies were (and are) strictly excludable.

From this perspective, democracy began as a *club* and its policies may be regarded as *club goods*. Since club membership was defined primarily by race (a marker of European origin), the extent to which this club was inclusive or exclusive (relative to the community in which it was situated) depended upon the demographic heritage of a society. Where the population was predominantly non-European, club membership was restrictive and democracy accordingly limited. Where the population was predominantly European, club membership was expansive and club goods were indistinguishable from public goods. In this fashion, demography structured regime outcomes.²

Summary and Implications

Our main thesis is that prospects for democracy in the modern era vary with the share of Europeans in a society. Of course, this does not imply that regime types are *solely* a product of the beliefs and actions of Europeans. Many other factors come into play – not the least of which are

² This schema bears resemblance to selectorate theory (Buono de Mesquita et al. 2003). Note, however, that the latter intends to explain the quality of governance while our goal is to explain regime types.

the preferences and actions of non-Europeans. Nonetheless, there is good reason to imagine that Europeans had considerable influence on the course of regimes over the past two centuries.

We argue, second, that European influence flowed mostly through demographic channels. Other channels such as religion (e.g., Protestantism) and colonialism (formal control by a European hegemon) were less important.

We argue, third, that limitations on democratic development were manifested by the exclusion of non-Europeans from the franchise (suffrage) and from the privilege of holding public office. The racial line dividing Europeans and non-Europeans was reflected in the institutions Europeans created.

We argue, fourth, that non-Europeans were more likely to be included as full (or partial) members of the political community where they were few in number – and hence, less threatening to European hegemony.

We argue, finally, that the relationship between European demography and regime type changed over time. It follows from our previous arguments that this relationship was apt to be strongest at a point in history (a) when the ideal of democracy was widely embraced by Europeans but before it diffused widely among non-Europeans, (b) when racial distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans were pervasive and invidious, and (c) when Europeans exercised greatest influence in the world. It seems plausible that these factors reached their apogee sometime in the twentieth century. By the end of that century, ideas and practices associated with democracy diffused to such an extent that it could no longer be regarded as a European patrimony. Additionally, ideas about national identity and race evolved such that the color line separating Europeans and non-Europeans blurred or become less consequential. Finally, the global hegemony of Europeans waned – including the termination of virtually all overseas colonies – such that Europeans could no longer impose their preferred political institutions on the rest of the world. These trends seem likely to continue. Thus, although the legacy of the European era persists, its effects seem likely to weaken as time goes on.

In summary, our arguments suggest one main hypothesis and several ancillary hypotheses:

H_t European ancestry (the share of people in a territory whose ancestors hail from Europe) is a distal cause of democracy.

H_a Other pathways from Europe such as religion and colonial control are more weakly correlated with democracy.

H_b Civil and political rights are allocated so as to exclude non-Europeans, de jure or de facto.

H_c The inclusion of non-Europeans is more likely where they are fewer in number.

H_d The relationship between European demography and democracy peaked in the mid-twentieth century, declining thereafter.

These propositions will be explored in Section III. We do not intend to demonstrate the causal mechanisms at work in this explanatory sketch as these factors are hard to measure and difficult to distinguish.

II. The Diffusion of Europeans

European out-migration began with the age of exploration and continued on a sizeable scale through the early twentieth century.³ During this period, an estimated 60-65 million Europeans left the continent for points abroad (Etemad 2007: 18). After World War One, migration slowed to a trickle due to the demographic transition in Europe as well as improvements in European economies and the growth of welfare states, relieving pressure on potential emigrants. The following discussion therefore focuses on the era of mass European migration, circa 1500-1914, and especially on early waves of emigration (prior to 1850). Later migrants generally followed in the footsteps of their predecessors – typically, members of their family or village – and were responsive to economic and demographic realities that earlier settlers had established.

For European emigrants some destinations were preferred to others. Distance appears to have been a minor factor. To be sure, North America was closer to Europe than South America, and ocean passage was accordingly cheaper and less onerous. This may account for the higher rate of immigration to the US (especially among poor emigrants) relative to other destinations in the Americas. These are marginal differences, however. Central Europe, the Mediterranean, and Africa, the areas closest to Western Europe, received very few emigrants, while New Zealand and Australia, at the other end of the world, became “Little Englands.” Instead of distance, European migration choices were structured primarily by geography and disease. Healthful climates were generally located away from the equatorial zone, where malaria and other dangers lurked. Of equal concern was the ready availability of land that was fertile and cheap.

Our concern, however, is not with European migration per se but rather with the resulting demographic balance between European and non-European populations. Regardless of how many

³ The thumbnail sketch in this section of the paper draws on a large body of work on European migration and colonialism (Abernethy 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001; Belich 2009; Canny 1994; Curtin 1989, 1998, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Etemad 2007; Fieldhouse 1966; Hatton, Williamson 2005; Hoerder, Moch 1996; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Mahoney 2010; Moch 2003; Nugent 1989).

Europeans entered a society, where indigenous people were densely settled they were unlikely to lose their demographic predominance. This describes much of Asia, some parts of Africa (in the tropical regions), and the equatorial region of the Americas (from southern Mexico to Peru). Demography played an especially important role in the New World, where indigenes were susceptible to the scourge of European diseases (smallpox, influenza et al.). Where populations were densely settled, they tended to recover quickly as resistances built up; where populations were diffusely settled, they might never recover and were in any case easy to displace.

A second factor affecting demographic balance were the commodities encouraged by a region's geography. Family farming was not as remunerative as labor-intensive cash crops (sugar, tobacco, cotton, coffee, tea, cocoa, sisal, oil seeds, oil palms, rubber, or fruit) or mining (e.g., for gold or silver). Thus, where soil and climate resources allowed, or where natural resources were discovered underground (alluvial deposits could be harvested by individual miners working for themselves on the model of the California and Alaska gold rushes), these industries proliferated. To be profitable in a low-technology environment, plantations and mines required a large labor force that would do hard and dangerous work under close supervision for little or no remuneration. Europeans would not abide by these conditions except under temporary arrangements of indentured servitude. Consequently, plantation and mining economies came to be dominated by non-European workers – indigenes, slaves imported from Africa, or migrant workers from Asia.

In summary, where climate and soil were suitable for European emigration and the establishment of family farms and where indigenous populations were diffuse, Europeans usually became a sizeable ethnic group. This describes the Americas (especially away from the equator), Australasia, and the southern tip of Africa. Where geographic and demographic conditions were not propitious, Europeans may have operated trading posts, mines, plantations, or missions; they might have also controlled the levers of political, military, and economic power; and they might have established colonies that endured for centuries. However, their demographic presence was slight.

Europe

We turn now to problems of conceptualization and measurement. The region known today as Europe is a cultural construction, open to varying interpretations that change over time (Pagden 2002). As a rough-and-ready definition, we shall say that a country is a part of the European cultural area if its principal or official language was Latinate or Germanic in the modern era. This decision-rule generates a list of contemporary states including Andorra, Austria, Belgium,

Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. For present purposes, “Europeans” are those whose ancestors lived in this region in 1500.

Of course, Europe could be defined differently. One might mark its territory by the furthest extent of the Roman Empire or by the spread of Roman Catholicism (prior to the Reformation). One might extend its borders to include more of Central Europe or Southern Europe, or shrink its borders to exclude the Celtic fringe. One might include countries like the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia that are commonly regarded as European. However, these minor adjustments would have negligible impact on our analysis, as out-migration from different parts of Europe tended to follow in the footsteps of migrations from the core states of Western Europe.

European Ancestry

The variable of theoretical interest, *European ancestry*, is the share of people living in a society who are European by ancestry. It is an open question how to define a European, given the mixed ancestry of most people in the modern era. The same problem besets work on ethnicity and race (Lieberman, Singh 2012; Simon, Piché, Gagnon 2015). Lines were drawn differently at different times and places, and where populations inter-mixed over long periods these lines were especially blurry.

We adopt a constructivist definition of ancestry. A European is what people – specifically, surveyors and enumerators – understand to be European, an understanding that is likely to change over time and is especially elastic in places with high rates of intermarriage such as Latin America. Having said this, we expect that group categories are never constructed out of whole cloth. An individual classified by surveyors or enumerators as European is likely to have a substantial genetic tie to people living in Europe in 1500.

In treating Europeans as a corporate group we do not mean to suggest that all Europeans were the same. Differences in cultures and institutional practices across countries were considerable, and we assume that this mattered for economic development and the spread of democracy (Bernhard et al. 2004; Lange, Mahoney, Vom Hau 2006; Olsson 2009). Yet, there is reason to suppose that differences attenuated over time as settlers from different countries assimilated the ideals of the Enlightenment and began to think of themselves as inheriting a common European culture rather than a specifically British, Dutch, French, et al. culture.

Relatedly, we treat Europeans *within* each colony or country as a unitary group, overlooking cleavages based on country of origin, language, religion, and ideology. Of course, every European settlement generated its own intra-European conflicts, and these gradations of status and power were consequential. However, when it came to establishing basic rules and norms about who could vote, hold office, or enjoy civil rights, distinctions among Europeans were less relevant than distinctions between Europeans and non-Europeans. In constitutional matters, race trumped nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, and party (Fredrickson 2002: 68; Gann, Duignan 1962: 69; Giliomee, Elphick 1979: 359-60; Mills 1997). In this respect, we feel justified in treating Europeans as a category.

Precisely why race came to predominate over other identities is a question that we leave in abeyance, though we presume that the encounter between Europeans and the wider world that occurred during the age of imperialism was of critical importance. In an age before passports, distinctive skin pigmentation allowed Europeans to readily distinguish themselves from natives, migrant laborers, and slaves, facilitating the perpetuation of a hierarchical order (Allen 1994; Belich 2009: 5; Fanon 1970; Fradera 2018; Kennedy 1987; Mohanram 2007; Pagden 2009; Ross 1982).

Counting Europeans

Measuring the number of Europeans who were present in societies around the world across the past several centuries is not an easy matter, and not one that modern demographers have attended to. Consequently, there is no standard database that one might draw upon.

In some respects, historical data on Europeans is apt to be more accurate than data on non-Europeans. After all, Europeans were responsible for most surveys and censuses during the colonial period and one can be fairly confident that they counted themselves. The fact that they tended to have sedentary lifestyles and often lived in cities meant that they were easily accessible. By contrast, counting indigenous people in the bush was more difficult, and one might assume that enumerators were less motivated to do so. Thus, in many situations our numerator (number of Europeans) may be regarded as more accurate than our denominator (total population).

The numerator suffers from a serious problem of definition, however. It is never easy to distinguish those with European ancestry from everyone else, especially where inheritances are mixed. Surveys might classify respondents by country (e.g., “English”), by continent (e.g., “European”), or by race (e.g., “white”). Consistent with our constructivist approach, we assume that local practices governed how these categories were defined and operationalized, that there were differences across polities and across colonizers (McNamee 2018), and that definitions of who was “white” or “European” changed over time (Carvalho 2004; Loveman 2014). To deal with

cross-regional heterogeneity we include regional dummies and conduct sub-sample analyses focused on specific colonizers – British, Spanish, and French. To deal with cross-temporal heterogeneity we include year dummies and sub-sample analyses focused on particular eras.

Even so, the question of ancestry was not entirely fluid – especially during the pre-contemporary era. Prior to the twentieth century, the color line was strictly monitored and policed in most societies throughout the world. At any given time, most people had a clear sense of where they stood and could do little about it. The rigidity of race makes it a harder, more exogenous category than it is today. However noxious, race-consciousness undergirds our statistics. Indeed, a primary purpose for gathering demographic data in which people are classified by origin or pigmentation was presumably to reinforce these invidious distinctions (Loveman 2009; Nobles 2000). Thus, despite the weaknesses of census/survey methodology we have greater confidence in the numerator in historical eras – when it had a clear meaning – than in the contemporary era, when its meaning seems increasingly ambiguous and when the categories sometimes disappear entirely from censuses and surveys. Historians and social scientists – not to mention, contemporaries – discuss the presence of Europeans as if there was something real out there. Likewise, studies of ethnicity, religion, and other ascriptive categories assume that these culturally defined categories were, and are, meaningful. We shall do the same, with the usual caveats.

To maximize coverage, minimize stochastic error, and to get a sense of convergent validity, we collect data from as many sources as possible. We begin with the most recent global dataset compiled by Easterly, Levine (2016) from thirty-nine secondary sources. This is supplemented by our own collection, integrating data from over fifty secondary sources (a few of which overlap with Easterly, Levine). These secondary sources, listed in Appendix A, cull innumerable primary sources, i.e., censuses, surveys, and informal estimates.

Statistics of interest include (a) number of Europeans, (b) total population, and (c) European share of population. Where only one of these elements is missing it is calculated by the authors. Where total population is missing we draw upon Fariss et al. (2017), which aggregates a number of primary datasets. From these sources, we assemble 2,193 data points representing the demographic histories of 237 countries and colonies from 1600 to 2017. (Twenty-three percent of these data points are drawn from Easterly and Levine.)

Aggregation and Missingness

To aggregate estimates across multiple sources and to generate a continuous dataset with estimates for each territory-year (back to 1600) we take several additional steps. For territories outside Europe (as defined), we mark the date of the first recorded European settlement or (if the latter is


unknown) the first European contact. This is coded as zero (no Europeans), forming the first data point in the series. For territories within Europe, we record the number of Europeans as 100% in 1950. This estimate is extended back to 1600 under the assumption that the share of Europeans within a territory did not change greatly during a period when in-migration (from outside Europe) was limited.

For the remaining time-period (after the point of first European contact for non-European territories and after 1950 for European territories), we estimate yearly data points across available data using a loess smoother that regresses population on year with smoothing parameter $\alpha=0.85$. The quadratic function is appropriate for data patterns with a single curvature, as is the case for most territories under observation – where the share of Europeans increases to a peak and then decreases, forming an inverted-U shape. For European countries, the share of Europeans tends to decrease in a monotonic fashion after 1950, also nicely captured by the quadratic function.

To give readers a sense of the data, our sources, and our method of interpolating missing values, we produce graphs for each territory, shown in Appendix B. We also produce maps of the world at century-long intervals, shown in Appendix C. Reassuringly, our measure of European ancestry is highly correlated with other attempts to measure this concept, as shown in Table D.1.

A histogram of the European ancestry variable, in Figure 1, shows bimodal peaks located at each end of the scale. Most polities have little or no Europeans, a handful have lots of Europeans, and the rest fall somewhere in between. This suggests that most of the variation in our outcome may be driven by the polar extremes. Helpfully, measurement error at the extremes is less likely than measurement error in the middle. Yet, we do not regard European ancestry as a binary variable in disguise. Indeed, we show that the relationship of theoretical interest is robust even when each mode is excluded from the analysis (see Table 3).

Figure 1: Histogram of European Ancestry



III. Analysis

To test our main hypotheses along with various sub-hypotheses listed at the end of Section I, we begin by exploring the relationship between European ancestry and democracy in the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras, drawing on a vast library of historical work. Next, we conduct a series of wide-ranging tests in which an indicator of democracy is regressed against our measure of European ancestry. To probe robustness, we employ various indicators of democracy and a variety of samples, specifications, time-periods, and estimators, including fixed effects and instrumental variables.

The Colonial and post-Colonial Experience

If Europeans affected the rise of democracy around the world we ought to see this relationship manifested during the colonial and immediate post-colonial eras, when European power was at its apex. In this section, we focus on sets of colonies/countries that were under the control of a single colonizer. This allows us to hold constant important background features while focusing on factors of theoretical interest. We are also able to exploit within-unit (within-colony or within-country)

variation. Note, however, that due to space-constraints we are limited to a very schematic account of complex historical realities. Readers may refer to the cited literature for more depth and detail.

Across British colonies in the Americas, European settlers were often a substantial minority and sometimes an outright majority. In these settings, settlers usually won rights of self-government, thereby establishing some of the oldest legislatures and the earliest examples of contested elections in the world. Vibrant assemblies were founded throughout the region, e.g., in Virginia (1619), Bermuda (1620), Massachusetts Bay (1634), Maryland (1638), Connecticut (1637), Plymouth (1639), New Haven (1639), Barbados (1639), St Kitts (1642), Antigua (1644), Rhode Island (1647), Montserrat (1654), Nevis (1658), Jamaica (1664), North Carolina (1665), South Carolina (1671), East Jersey (1668), West Jersey (1681), New Hampshire (1680), Pennsylvania (1682), and New York (1683) (Kammen 1969: 11-12). These assemblies continued to thrive where the demographic balance tilted toward Europeans. But where the black population outstripped the European population, threatening revolt or majority rule, Europeans and their descendants generally resisted independence or relinquished rights to self-governance by transitioning to a Crown colony (Dippel, Carvalho 2015). The only case of persisting self-government and ongoing democratic institutions in a colony without a white majority occurred in Barbados, where European colonists and their descendants comprised a substantial minority of the population, sufficient to maintain political control until near the end of the colonial era (Beckles 1990).

Within the British colonies that became the United States the development of democracy was contingent upon solving the so-called race problem (Myrdal 1944). Marked differences could be found in the ratio of whites/blacks across regions, with African Americans constituting a substantial minority (and occasionally a majority) of the population in the South and in smaller numbers elsewhere. Consistent with our hypothesis, African Americans generally enjoyed greater civil and political rights in parts of the country (initially colonies, later states) where they were least numerous as a share of the general population (Acharya, Blackwell, Sen 2018; Klinkner, Smith 1999). Accordingly, subnational authoritarianism survived in regions where black Americans were persistently excluded – by slavery, Jim Crow, or other, more subtle maneuvers (Key 1949; Mickey 2015).

In the southern tip of Africa, European settlers never gained the demographic hegemony they enjoyed in North America. However, the demographic balance was quite different across the various British colonies. Europeans were a much higher share of the population in Cape Colony than in Natal, Transvaal, and Orange Free State (Curtin et al. 1995: 293). Consistent with the patterns found in the US, Cape Colony established the most liberal suffrage laws, a (formally) race-blind policy that was maintained for several decades after independence within the rubric of the

Union of South Africa (Curtin et al. 1995: 437-8; Edgecombe 1978; McCracken 1967). As in the US, blacks were allowed to play a role in politics only where their role was subordinate, and this, in turn, was a product of demography.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Jews – mostly Ashkenazi, originating in areas controlled by the Holy Roman Empire – settled in Palestine, forming the social base of what would become a British Mandate (1922-) and eventually a Jewish state (1948-). This small area of predominantly European settlers has been the most democratic region of the Middle East throughout the twentieth century, despite the exclusion of many of the original inhabitants. Here, as elsewhere, “Democracy is constituted and functions as ‘a defensive democracy,’ a political system designed to deter and to outlaw highly menacing groups” (Smootha 2002: 478).

The connection between race and responsible government was also apparent in British colonial *policy* throughout the era (Albertini, Wirz 1982; Ward 1976; Wight 1946). Fieldhouse (1966: 261-2) comments: “The greater part of the new British Empire has been excluded from ‘responsible government’ on the principle that non-Europeans could not run a parliamentary system, partly because they were uneducated, partly because they were not European.” That said, there was considerable variation across the colonies. If, based on the demography of a colony, London viewed it as “white man’s country” the colony was likely to be granted a legislature and a high degree of self-governance. If, however, there were few white settlers London was likely to maintain direct control. Southern Rhodesia, with a sizeable white settler community, followed the first route while Kenya, with a much smaller settler community, followed the second (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 454, 467). Likewise, rights of political participation for non-Europeans were extended quickly in societies with few non-Europeans (e.g., to the Maori in New Zealand), more slowly in societies with larger numbers of minorities (e.g., in the United States), and slowest of all in societies with majority non-European populations (e.g., Rhodesia, South Africa, and the Caribbean).

French colonialism featured direct rule, which prohibited self-government. However, those colonies with the highest concentrations of French settlers were integrated into the metropole as departments with full rights of suffrage and representation – at least, for those with French citizenship, which in practice was generally reserved for those with European heritage. This was the practice in Algeria (Choi 2016), Cochinchina (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 199), and in the four historic communes of Senegal (Johnson 1971). In the latter, whites did not compose a majority of the electorate but were nonetheless able to monopolize power through most of the colonial period with the assistance of Creole allies (Ibid.).

Portuguese imperial rule was also highly centralized, and colonists had even less power over their own affairs. However, whatever semblance of representation existed – often taking the

form of municipal councils (Boxer 1965) – existed primarily for whites (Newitt 1981: 171-74). Albertini, Wirz (1982: 422) report that “wherever there was a white colonial population of any size, it was organized as a council (*concelho*), having representative organs and some administrative autonomy.” The situation was similar within the small German Empire (Townsend 1966: 277). Again, the colony with the most settlers – Southwest Africa – enjoyed the greatest measure of self-governance (Albertini, Wirz 1982: 411-2).

Spanish colonies in the New World did not allow for extensive political rights until the waning years of the colonial era, though local governments (*cabildos*) gave representation to those who could claim Spanish heritage (Halperin 1981: 51-55, 84-92). Once the heavy hand of the Spanish crown was lifted, one finds a strong association between European-ness and early suffrage. Within Argentina, Buenos Aires, where European settlers were most heavily concentrated (Moya 1998), was the only province to recognize universal male suffrage in 1821 and to maintain that practice in subsequent decades (Alonso 1996: 182; Sabato 2001). Across nation-states, Argentina, the most European in demographic composition, was the first to adopt universal male suffrage (in 1856), preempting other Latin American countries by many decades (though Colombia briefly recognized the practice from 1853-1886).⁴ Likewise, throughout most of the past two centuries democracy has been more robust in the European-dominated Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay) and in the one country in Central America with a large European inheritance (Costa Rica).

In summary, across the colonial and post-colonial eras, one finds few signs of democracy anywhere except in the presence of European colonists (Fieldhouse 1966; Reinsch 1906: chs 11-12; Ward 1976; Wight 1946). This was a product of directives from the metropole as well as pressure from the colonies. The latter, of course, became dominant once colonies gained independence, but played a role – often a dominant role – throughout the life of a colony. Although these two forces sometimes came into conflict with each other with respect to the appropriate treatment of non-whites, there was general agreement on the question of democracy. Whites (Europeans) were capable of it while non-whites were not. Consequently, the metropole’s perspective hinged upon demographic realities on the ground, just as it did for settlers. The logic of empire was not so different on this particular point from the logic of independence.

⁴ We do not mean to suggest that Argentina in the nineteenth century was a model democracy. Restrictive naturalization procedures disqualified recent immigrants from suffrage and elections were by no means free and fair (James 1995).

Regression Analyses

The narrative analysis presented above indicates a strong relationship between European demography and democracy during the colonial and immediate post-colonial periods. In the following sections, we explore this relationship over a longer period of time and with larger samples.

Our principal measure of regime type is the Electoral democracy (“polyarchy”) index developed by Teorell et al. (2018) as part of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al. 2018). Other measures are employed in subsequent tests to demonstrate robustness and to illuminate different dimensions of democracy. To facilitate comparisons, all indices are transformed to a 0-100 scale.

Specifications used in the following analyses vary in order to probe different assumptions about the data generating process. A few background variables are treated alternately as potential confounders and potential instruments. This follows from our ignorance about the data generating process, which so far as we can tell is open to different interpretations. While there is no obviously “correct” specification, we believe that there are a limited number of plausible specifications, most of which can be tested. To conserve space, detailed descriptions of each variable employed in the following analyses are placed in Table E.1 and descriptive statistics in Table E.2.

Time-periods extend from 1789 to the present. All models include year or decade dummies, a convenient way to control for time-effects of no theoretical interest. Standard errors are clustered by polity, an important feature given the high degree of temporal auto-correlation.

We include both colonies and independent countries, wherever possible. However, since measures of democracy usually focus on independent states these polities dominate most of our samples.

While most studies of European diffusion focus on the non-European world we include Europe in our benchmark sample, motivated by the assumption that whatever factors might be at work elsewhere ought to apply to Europe as well. Europe constitutes a small part of the sample so its impact on the analysis is not great. To make sure, we construct sub-sample tests focused exclusively on the non-European world.

Initial Analyses

Table 1 presents an initial set of tests. In Model 1, democracy is regressed against European ancestry along with year dummies. In Model 2, we add several geographic covariates that have been shown to be strong predictors of democracy and economic development: harbor distance (Gerring et al. 2018b) and latitude (La Porta et al. 1998). In Model 3, we add a measure of early

(pre-modern) democracy based on data gathered in the Ethnographic Atlas (Giuliano, Nunn 2013), measures of the share of the population that is Muslim and Protestant, and an index measuring the duration of English colonial rule (Olsson 2009). Model 4 includes all previous variables along with oil income per capita (Haber, Menaldo 2011), GDP per capita (Farris et al. 2017), and a vector of nine regional dummies.

Coefficient estimates for European ancestry are fairly stable across these specifications and t statistics are well above the usual thresholds for statistical significance. Granted, estimates attenuate somewhat as covariates are added to the model, and standard errors increase in Model 4, presumably because of the smaller sample (due to list-wise deletion of missing observations). We regard Model 2 as a “spare” benchmark and Model 3 as a “full” benchmark, to be replicated in subsequent tests. Model 4 is less satisfactory by virtue of missing data and probable endogeneity among the covariates. Note, in particular, that if the presence of Europeans contributes to economic development, as many researchers have argued (op. cit.), then per capita GDP must be treated as a downstream factor whose inclusion in the model runs the risk of post-treatment bias.

The variable of theoretical interest, European ancestry, changes slowly through time for most countries and is unlikely to be affected by the outcome (democracy). Nonetheless, it is important to establish that the findings are robust to different lags of the predictor. In Model 5, right-side variables are lagged 100 years behind the outcome. In Model 6, we maintain the 100-year lag while restricting the outcome to a single year (2000). Note that if European identity was more clearly defined and operationalized in historical eras (Section II), one may have more confidence in these estimates than in models where right- and left-sides of the model are measured contemporaneously.

In Model 7, we adopt a fixed-effect approach to estimation, which should help to overcome specification problems inherent in cross-sectional analyses. Here, democracy is regressed against European ancestry (lagged by two decades) along with country and year dummies. This model presents a similar estimate and is highly significant. We regard this as a robustness test, not a benchmark model, as changes in European ancestry are infrequent and heavily trended and thus less appropriate for a mode of analysis focused entirely upon within-country variation.

Model 8 returns to the “full” specification (Model 3), this time with standardized coefficients (and unclustered standard errors). The goal here is to compare, albeit in a somewhat arbitrary fashion, the impact of various factors on democracy. We are especially interested in alternate paths of long-term diffusion from Europe, namely Protestantism and English colonial rule – both of which have garnered a great deal of attention from scholars (op. cit.). It will be seen

that a one-standard deviation change in European ancestry has a much larger apparent impact on regime type than either of these alternate pathways. It should also be noted that neither pathway is robust (at standard thresholds of statistical significance) in previous tests shown in Table 1.


Table 1: Initial Analyses

<i>Lag (years)</i>	0	0	0	0	100	100	20	0
<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
European ancestry (%)	0.38*** (11.99)	0.32*** (6.92)	0.21*** (5.00)	0.11** (2.50)	0.24*** (3.73)	0.28*** (3.40)	0.25** (2.00)	0.31*** (45.00)
Harbor distance		-9.15e-3*** (-3.26)	-6.35e-3** (-2.52)	-2.56e-3 (-0.83)	-0.01* (-1.93)	-0.01** (-2.08)		-0.08*** (-14.97)
Latitude		21.68*** (3.05)	15.96*** (2.84)	-2.56 (-0.29)	6.53 (0.59)	7.14 (0.46)		0.11*** (19.06)
Early democracy			6.09** (2.15)	7.50** (2.47)	10.36** (2.29)	8.67 (1.54)		0.10*** (17.76)
Protestant (%)			0.20*** (3.31)	0.21*** (3.31)	0.24*** (3.09)	0.11 (1.13)		0.17*** (29.18)
Muslim (%)			-0.12*** (-5.30)	-0.07 (-1.44)	-0.16*** (-4.59)	-0.25*** (-4.07)		-0.15*** (-29.40)
English colonial duration			6.68e-3 (0.84)	4.63e-3 (0.55)	0.01 (1.07)	2.36e-3 (0.21)		0.04*** (7.41)
Oil income per cap				-1.21e-3*** (-5.13)				
GDP per cap (ln)				9.68*** (6.70)				
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region dummies				✓				
Country dummies							✓	
<i>Countries</i>	180	174	166	159	132	125	180	166
<i>Years</i>	1789-2017	1789-2009	1789-2009	1800-2006	1789-1917	2000	1770-1997	1789-2009
<i>N</i>	23,106	18,185	17,586	12,454	8,375	125	23,108	17,586
<i>R2</i>	.5524	.5588	.6233	.6291	.6017	.5482	.5166	.6233

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors – except Model 8, which employs standardized coefficients and unclustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

To get a sense for what the coefficient estimates for European ancestry might mean in the real world, we estimate predicted values for democracy as the share of Europeans changes based on the spare benchmark specification. These estimates, surrounded by 95% confidence intervals, are shown in Figure 2. It will be seen that a country whose share of Europeans increases from 0 to 100 is estimated to gain about 35 points on our 100-point index of democracy.

Figure 2: Predicted Values from Benchmark Model




Predicted values of democracy (measured by the Polyarchy index) as European ancestry changes, based on estimates from Model 2, Table 1, with covariates set at their sample means. The gray area surrounding the point estimate corresponds to the 95% confidence interval

Temporal Relationships

To explore how the relationship between European ancestry and democracy might change over time we execute a series of rolling regressions. Here, the sample is restricted to a 30-year moving window starting in 1800 and continuing to the end of the period. As an outcome measure we employ the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015), whose coverage is superior to Polyarchy and thus more representative of the population of interest. We again adopt a sparse specification, including only geographic covariates and annual dummies.

Figure 3 graphs the coefficients for European ancestry over time, showing that the relationship peaks, as hypothesized, in the twentieth century, with a dip in the interwar years (corresponding to the breakdown of democracy in continental Europe), a recovery in the postwar years, and a steep decline at the end of the century during the third wave of democratization.

Figure 3: Rolling Regressions



Rolling regressions in which the Lexical index of electoral democracy is regressed against European ancestry, geographic covariates (latitude and harbor distance), and annual dummies in a moving 30-year window. Coefficients for European ancestry, flanked by 95% confidence intervals, are graphed for each year (the end-point of each 30-year window).

Alternate Measures of Democracy

In Table 2, we test alternate measures of democracy. This includes a few composite indices along with measures intended to capture particular dimensions of democracy. A secondary objective is to expand the time-horizons of the analyses so as to include colonies and semi-sovereign countries, which we attempt to follow back to the late eighteenth century. For each outcome, we test two specifications (based on the sparse and full models in Table 1).

Models 1-2 in Table 2 focus on male suffrage, the approximate percentage of enfranchised male adults older than the minimal voting age, as measured by V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018) for the twentieth century and by Bilinski (2015) for the nineteenth century. These analyses are restricted to years prior to 1920, when there was considerable variation in suffrage laws.

Models 3-4 focus on the presence of elections based on the V-Dem electoral regime index, which measures whether regularly scheduled national elections are on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent (Coppedge et al. 2018). Where possible, we extend this variable to cover colonies in the nineteenth century.

Models 5-6 focus on electoral contestation as measured by a contestation index developed by Gerring et al. (2018a). For each year, a polity receives a score calculated as the incumbent share

of votes in national elections (parliamentary and/or presidential) minus the share received by the largest challenger, subtracted from 100. A score of zero is assigned if there are no elective offices at the national level or if elections are interrupted.

Models 7-8 utilize the Lexical index of electoral democracy (Skaaning et al. 2015). Models 9-10 focus on the wellknown Polity2 index from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers 2016).

Estimation is by ordinary least squares except Models 5-6, which utilize a tobit model appropriate for outcomes that are bounded at zero. Year dummies are included in all models except Models 5-6, where they are replaced by decade dummies.

These tests show a strong and robust relationship between European ancestry and democracy. Indeed, virtually all coefficient estimates are higher than those estimated with the Polyarchy index (Table 1). Again, we find non-robust results for alternate measures of European diffusion – Protestantism and English colonialism.

Table 2: Alternate Measures of Democracy

<i>Outcome</i>	Male Suffrage		Elections		Contestation		Lexical index		Polity2	
	<i>Estimator</i> OLS		OLS		Tobit		OLS		OLS	
<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
European ancestry (%)	0.32*** (4.24)	0.27*** (3.22)	0.49*** (8.59)	0.38*** (6.20)	0.46*** (7.75)	0.33*** (5.39)	0.44*** (7.74)	0.33*** (5.29)	0.35*** (5.05)	0.20*** (3.00)
Harbor distance	-0.02** (-2.69)	-0.02** (-2.53)	-0.01*** (-3.30)	-0.01** (-2.41)	-0.02*** (-3.66)	-0.01** (-2.29)	-0.01*** (-3.84)	-0.01*** (-2.90)	-0.02*** (-3.22)	-0.01** (-2.50)
Latitude	3.05 (0.21)	10.79 (0.70)	20.07* (1.86)	26.06*** (2.52)	20.60* (1.80)	21.39** (2.07)	17.55* (1.88)	17.88** (2.20)	11.24 (0.98)	2.57 (0.26)
Early democracy		-1.66 (-0.30)		1.27 (0.28)		5.45 (1.24)		5.19 (1.43)		8.26 (1.56)
Protestant (%)		4.06e-3 (0.03)		0.09 (1.19)		0.08 (1.11)		0.14* (1.80)		0.22** (2.15)
Muslim (%)		-0.29*** (-4.41)		-0.21*** (-4.61)		-0.27*** (-5.29)		-0.18*** (-5.70)		-0.22*** (-4.83)
English colonial duration		-0.02*** (-2.79)		0.01 (0.93)		0.01* (1.85)		0.01 (1.69)		0.03* (1.74)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓	✓
Decade Dummies					✓	✓				
<i>Countries</i>	140	132	191	180	191	180	191	180	168	160
<i>Years</i>	1789-1919		1789-2009		1800-2009		1789-2009		1800-2009	
<i>N</i>	4,518	4,380	25,176	23,734	21,698	20,496	23,348	22,026	13,780	13,349
<i>R2</i>	.3592	.4271	.4293	.4459	.1366	.1456	.5404	.5710	.3227	.4088

Outcome: democracy, measured in various ways and transformed to a 0-100 scale (with the exception of Elections, which is binary). *Estimators:* as indicated, t statistics in parentheses, clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Sub-Sample Analyses

In Table 3 we explore various sample restrictions. Models 1-2 are limited to non-European cases. Here, the causal factor of interest can operate *only* by diffusion. Model 1 adopts the full specification while Model 2 adds several additional variables intended to measure stateness, which may serve as an impediment to European conquest – and also, perhaps, to democratization (Hariri 2012).

The next tests focus on the distribution of the data for European ancestry. Recall that this distribution is bimodal (Figure 1), so it is important to establish that our results are not contingent upon a set of extreme cases. Model 3 is restricted to cases where Europeans composed less than eighty percent of the population, eliminating Europe as well as neo-Europes in the New World from the sample. Model 4 is restricted to cases where Europeans composed greater than ten percent of the population, eliminating cases (many of them in Asia and Africa) where Europeans were a slight presence.

The final set of tests focus on colonizers with largest numbers of ex-colonies: Britain (Model 5), France (Model 6), and Spain (Model 7). These are important comparisons since they hold constant the colonizer – and also, to some extent, the period of colonization and the regions of the world that were colonized. (British colonization spanned the centuries and most parts of the world, while Spanish and French colonization was somewhat more focused.)

Estimates for European ancestry from all tests in Table 3 are robust and comparable to (indeed, somewhat stronger) than the corresponding benchmark models in Table 1. Although standard errors are reduced wherever there is a significant reduction in sample size, t statistics surpass usual thresholds of statistical significance.

In additional tests we remove each region of the world, seriatim. The relationship between European ancestry and democracy is remarkably stable in these sub-sample tests, as shown in Table F.1.

Table 3: Sample Restrictions

<i>Sample</i>	Non-European politics	Non-European politics	European ancestry <80%	European ancestry >10%	British hegemony	French hegemony	Spanish hegemony
<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
European ancestry (%)	0.29*** (5.05)	0.46*** (7.27)	0.34*** (4.97)	0.26*** (3.22)	0.52*** (4.98)	0.41*** (9.06)	0.37*** (3.33)
Harbor distance	-0.01*** (-2.82)	0.01** (-2.69)	-0.01*** (-3.32)	0.01 (0.93)	1.58e-3 (0.30)	-2.08e-3 (-0.60)	0.02* (1.92)
Latitude	13.16** (2.42)	-3.25 (-0.34)	21.72*** (4.13)	-10.39 (-0.74)	-2.90 (-0.19)	18.71 (1.05)	-36.11 (-1.51)
Early democracy	6.77** (2.57)	3.60 (1.04)	7.99*** (2.98)	5.55 (0.92)	-2.38 (-0.40)	-0.86 (-0.20)	1.44 (0.11)
Protestant (%)	0.21** (2.62)	0.19 (1.60)	0.30*** (4.04)	0.27*** (3.02)	0.09 (0.97)	0.17 (1.58)	0.13 (0.36)
Muslim (%)	-0.10*** (-4.08)	-0.08* (-1.84)	-0.09*** (-3.98)	-0.17** (-2.10)	-0.13** (-2.40)	-0.01 (-0.37)	2.01*** (3.36)
English colonial Duration	0.02 (1.58)	0.02* (1.60)	0.01 (1.22)	7.66e-3 (0.88)			
State history		10.97** (2.01)					
State formation, years since (ln)		-0.38 (-0.58)					
Independence, years since (ln)		-0.42 (-0.83)					
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	146	86	148	44	49	28	21
<i>Years</i>	1789-2009	1830-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009
<i>N</i>	14,430	9,934	14,232	6,491	4,966	2,922	3,198
<i>R2</i>	.5658	.6533	.5576	.6611	.6828	.7032	.5763

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Instrumental Variable Analysis

In Table 4, we take a different approach to the problem of causal identification, modeling assignment to treatment with exogenous instruments. These analyses are limited to non-European cases, as the instrument attempts to model the spread of Europeans beyond Europe.

As a principal instrument we rely on *population density in 1500*, which served as a barrier to European migration and – more importantly – to demographic dominance, as discussed in Section I. Model 1 offers a minimal specification with only the IV and decade dummies. Model 2 adds geographic covariates. Model 3 adds additional covariates, following the full specification in Table 1 with the addition of pre-colonial *state history* (drawn from Putterman, Weil 2010) and *years since*

independence (a proxy measure of stateness). Estimates for European ancestry are robust across all three models and consistent with the corresponding benchmark models in Table 1.

In common with all non-randomized instruments, it is impossible to verify the assumptions underlying our IV analysis. Nonetheless, it is plausible to suppose that the exclusion restriction has been satisfied conditional on observed covariates. Note that population density may proxy for state strength, which could also serve as a deterrent to European influence (Hariri 2012) and to democratization (Andersen et al. 2014). With this confounder in mind, we condition on two factors intended to measure state strength in Model 3.

Reassuringly, other possible instruments show similar results. In Appendix F, we replicate Model 2 with a variety of other geographic or pre-modern historical variables commonly viewed as influences on European settlement – distance from London (squared), settler mortality, malaria, years since agricultural transition, and state history. The relationship between European ancestry is robust with each of these alternate instruments, as shown in Table F.2. No matter what instrument is chosen, European ancestry predicts higher levels of democracy. While assumptions required for any single model may be questioned, the aggregate set of results seems to offer strong support for our thesis.

Table 4: Instrumental Variable Analysis

<i>Models</i>	1		2		3	
	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
European ancestry (%)		0.32** (2.06)		0.37*** (2.95)		0.32** (2.23)
Population density, 1500 (ln)	-7.83*** (-4.02)		-8.76*** (-5.16)		-7.59*** (-4.79)	
Harbor distance			-0.02*** (-4.18)	-0.01** (-2.51)	-0.01** (-2.37)	-0.01** (-2.45)
Latitude			31.05** (2.22)	17.03* (1.91)	47.41*** (3.08)	14.31 (0.92)
Independence, years since (ln)					2.96*** (3.28)	-0.20 (-0.31)
State history					-15.30** (-2.18)	2.36 (0.32)
Early democracy					5.35 (0.93)	8.14 (1.71)
Protestant (%)					-0.05 (-0.21)	0.08 (0.56)
Muslim (%)					-0.10** (-2.15)	-0.11** (-2.10)
English colonial duration					2.97e-3 (0.25)	0.02 (1.52)
Decade dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>		128		128		78
<i>Years</i>		1800-2009		1800-2009		1800-2009
<i>N</i>		11,921		10,626		7,310
<i>R2</i>	.2468	.4661	.3851	.4926	.6534	.6216

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. *Samples:* non-European cases. *Estimator:* two-stage least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

IV. Conclusions

As a form of governance at the state level democracy was a European innovation. It spread to the rest of the world during the colonial era, leaving a legacy that persists (in attenuating form) to the present day. In that racialized era, we argue that political outcomes depended upon a numbers game. The greater the ratio of Europeans to non-Europeans, the greater the likelihood that the latter would be granted full (or at least partial) political rights and the greater the likelihood that a democratic system of rule would materialize. We have shown that similar patterns obtained across colonies, across regions within countries, across countries, and through time.

We conjecture that this is because Europeans viewed democracy as a basic right – for themselves. It was a club good. Hence, where Europeans were in the majority they were democrats.

Where they were not they were indifferent or hostile, or they embraced a restricted form of democracy that excluded non-Europeans.

We argue that this demographic relationship peaked in the twentieth century and declined thereafter as a result of waning European power and prestige, the global diffusion of the democratic ideal, and the blurring or obsolescence of racial identities. If current trends continue (see Figure 3), regime outcomes may have little to do with European demography in the coming century.

This argument is relevant to ongoing work on the long-term diffusion of European ideas and institutions. Specifically, our analyses suggest that demography may be a stronger, more robust predictor of democracy than other potential pathways from Europe such as religion and colonialism. (Alternative accounts and alternative measures are explored in greater detail in Appendix G.)

Our argument is also relevant to ongoing work on the intersection of race and liberalism (Centeno 2007; FitzGerald, Cook-Martin 2014; Horton 2005; Rana 2011; Smith 1997). We have shown that the spread of democratic norms coincided with, and to some extent presumed, the norm of racial exclusion.

References

- Abernethy, David B. 2000. *The dynamics of global dominance: European overseas empires, 1415-1980*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. 2001. "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation." *American economic review* 91.5: 1369-1401.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. 2002. "Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution." *Quarterly journal of economics* 117.4: 1231-1294.
- Acharya, Avidit, Matthew Blackwell, Maya Sen. 2018. *Deep Roots: How Slavery Still Shapes Southern Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Allen, Theodore W. 1994. *The invention of the white race*. Verso.
- Alonso, Paula. 1996. "Voting in Buenos Aires (Argentina) before 1912." In Eduardo Posada-Carbo (ed), *Elections Before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America* (London: Palgrave Macmillan) 181-199.
- Andersen, David, Jørgen Møller, Lasse Lykke Rørbæk, Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2014. "State capacity and political regime stability." *Democratization* 21, 7: 1305-1325.
- Anderson, John. 2004. "Does God matter, and if so whose God? Religion and democratization." *Democratization* 11, 192-217.
- Annino, Antonio. 1995. *History of the elections in Ibero-America, 19th century: of the formation of the national political space*. Fondo de Cultura Economica El.
- Armitage, David, Sanjay Subrahmanyam (eds). 2009. *The age of revolutions in global context, c. 1760-1840*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Beckles, Hilary. 1990. *A history of Barbados: From Amerindian settlement to Nation-State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Belich, James. 2010. "How much did institutions matter? Cloning Britain in New Zealand." In Jack P. Greene (ed), *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas: 1600-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 248-68.
- Belich, James. 2009. *Replenishing the earth: The settler revolution and the rise of the Angloworld*. Oxford University Press.

- Berman, Harold. 1997. *Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." *International Studies Quarterly* 48, 225-50.
- Bilder, Mary Sarah. 2006. "The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review." *The Yale Law Journal* 116, 502–66.
- Black, Antony. 1984. *Guild and state: European political thought from the twelfth century to the present*. Methuen.
- Bonnett, Alastair. 1998. "Who was white? The disappearance of non-European white identities and the formation of European racial whiteness." *Ethnic and racial studies* 21.6: 1029-1055.
- Boxer, Charles Robbins. 1965. *Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The municipal councils of Goa, Macao, Babia, and Luanda, 1510–1800*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Breunig, Christian, Xun Cao, Adam Luedtke. 2012. "Global migration and political regime type: A democratic disadvantage." *British Journal of Political Science* 42.4: 825-854.
- Brinks, Daniel, Michael Coppedge. 2006. "Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 39:4, 463-89.
- Brown, G. Gordon. 1944. "Missions and cultural diffusion." *American Journal of Sociology* 50.3: 214-219.
- Bruce, Steve. 2004. "Did Protestantism create democracy?" *Democratization* 11.4: 3-20.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson. 2003. *The logic of political survival*. Cambridge: MIT press.
- Canny, Nicholas (ed). 1994. *Europeans on the move: studies on European migration 1500-1800*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Cartledge, Paul. 2016. *Democracy: A life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Carvalho, Jose Alberto Magno de, Charles H. Wood, Flavia Cristina Drumond Andrade. 2004. "Estimating the Stability of Census-based Racial Classifications: The Case of Brazil." *Population Studies* 58:331–43.
- Cavanagh, Edward, Lorenzo Veracini (eds). 2016. *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*. Taylor, Francis.
- Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2007. "Liberalism and the good society in the Iberian world." *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* no. 610 (1):45–72.

- Choi, Sung. 2016. "French Algeria, 1830–1962." In Edward Cavanagh, Lorenzo Veracini (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism* (Taylor, Francis) 201-14.
- Ciepley, David. 2017. "Is the US government a corporation? The corporate origins of modern constitutionalism." *American Political Science Review* 111.2: 418-435.
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staas I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jerrey Staton, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yiting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
- Crosby, Alfred. 1986. *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Curtin, Philip D. 1989. *Death by migration: Europe's encounter with the tropical world in the nineteenth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Curtin, Philip D. 1998. *Disease and empire: The health of European Troops in the Conquest of Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Curtin, Philip D. 2002. *The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Curtin, Philip D., Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, Jan Vansina. 1995. *African History: From Earliest Times to Independence, 2d Ed.* London: Longman.
- Demélas-Bohy, M. D., François-Xavier Guerra. 1996. "The Hispanic Revolutions: The Adoption of Modern Forms of Representation in Spain and America, 1808–1810." In Eduardo Posada Carbó (ed), *Elections before democracy: the History of Elections in Europe and Latin America* (London: Macmillan) 33-60.
- Dippel, Christian, Jean Paul Carvalho. 2015. "Elite Competition and the Iron Law of Oligarchy: A Tale of 14 Islands." Unpublished paper, Anderson School of Business. Downloaded (11/09/2018): http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/christian.dippel/BWI_cc_paper.pdf
- Easterly, William, Ross Levine. 2016. "The European origins of economic development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 21.3: 225-257.
- Edgecombe, D.R. 1978. "The non-racial franchise in Cape politics, 1853–1910." *Kleio* 10:1-2, 21-37.
- Einhorn, Robin L. 2001. *Property Rules: Political Economy in Chicago, 1833-1872*. Chicago: University

- of Chicago Press.
- Eltis, David. 1993. "Europeans and the rise and fall of African slavery in the Americas: an interpretation." *The American Historical Review* 98.5: 1399-1423.
- Engerman, Stanley L., Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2012. *Economic development in the Americas since 1500: endowments and institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Etemad, Bouda. 2007. *Possessing the World: Taking the Measurements of Colonisation from the 18th to the 20th Century*. Berghahn Books.
- Fanon, Frantz. 1970. *Black skin, white masks*. London: Paladin.
- Fariss, C. J., C. D. Crabtree, T. Anders, Z. M. Jones, F. J. Linder, J. N. Markowitz. 2017. "Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources." URL: <http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.01099>
- Fieldhouse, D.K. 1966. *The Colonial Empires: A Comparative Study from the Eighteenth Century*. London: Macmillan.
- FitzGerald, David Scott, David Cook-Martin. 2014. *Culling the masses*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Foner, Eric. 1994. "Slavery and freedom in nineteenth-century America." *Anos 90* 7.11.
- Fradera, Josep. 2018. *The Imperial Nation: Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish, and American Empires*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fredrickson, George M. 2002. *Racism: A short history*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gann, Lewis H., Peter Duignan. 1962. *White settlers in tropical Africa*. Penguin books.
- Gerring, John, Allen Hicken, Daniel Weitzel, Lee Cojocar. 2018a. "Electoral Contestation: A Comprehensive Polity-Level Analysis." University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 73.
- Gerring, John, Tore Wig, Andreas Forø Tollefsen, Brendan Apfeld. 2018b. "Harbors and Democracy." University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 70.
- Giliomee, Hermann, Richard Elphick. 1979. "The structure of European domination at the Cape, 1652-1820." *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820* (Cape Town: Longman) 359-90.
- Giuliano, Paola, Nathan Nunn. 2013. "The transmission of democracy: from the village to the nation-state." *American Economic Review* 103.3: 86-92.
- Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do institutions cause growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 9(3), 271-303.

- Goldstein, Robert Justin. 2013. *Political repression in 19th century Europe*. Routledge.
- Graham, Richard. 1994. *Patronage and politics in nineteenth-century Brazil*. Stanford University Press.
- Greene, Jack P. (ed). 2010. *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Greene, Jack P. 1988. *Pursuits of happiness: the social development of early modern British colonies and the formation of American culture*. University of North Carolina Press.
- Greif, Avner. 2006. “Family Structure, Institutions, and Growth: The Origins and Implications of Western Corporations.” *American Economic Review* 96 (2): 308–12.
- Guerra, François-Xavier. 1994. “The Spanish-American Tradition of Representation and its European Roots.” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26 (1), 1-35.
- Haber, Stephen, Victor Menaldo. 2011. “Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse.” *American political science Review* 105.1: 1-26.
- Halperin Donghi, Tulio. 1981. *Historia contemporanea de America Latina*, 9th ed. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
- Hariri, Jacob. 2012. “The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood.” *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 471–94.
- Hatton, Timothy J., Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2005. *Global migration and the world economy: Two centuries of policy and performance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT press.
- Hoerder, Dirk, Leslie Page Moch (eds). 1996. *European migrants: global and local perspectives*. Boston: Northeastern University Press.
- Horton, Carol A. 2005. *Race and the making of American liberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Huttenback, Robert A. 1976. *Racism and empire: White settlers and colored immigrants in the British self-governing colonies, 1830-1910*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- James, Daniel. 1995. “Uncertain Legitimacy: The Social and Political Restraints Underlying the Emergence of Democracy in Argentina, 1890–1930.” In George Reid Andrews, Herrick Chapman (eds), *The Social Construction of Democracy, 1870–1990* (London: Palgrave Macmillan) 56-70.
- Johnson, G. Wesley. 1971. *The emergence of Black politics in Senegal: The struggle for power in the four communes, 1900-1920*. Stanford University Press.
- Kammen, Michael G. 1969. *Deputies, liberties: the origins of representative government in colonial America*. Knopf.

- Kennedy, Dane Keith. 1987. *Islands of white: settler society and culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939*. Duke University Press.
- Key, Valdimer Orlando. 1949. *Southern politics in state and nation*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Klinkner, Philip A., Rogers M. Smith. 1999. *The unsteady march: The rise and decline of racial equality in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Knutsen, Carl Henrik, John Gerring, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, Matthew Maguire, Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg. 2018. "Economic Development and Democracy: An Electoral Connection." *European Journal of Political Research* (forthcoming).
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1998. "Law and finance." *Journal of political economy* 106, 6: 1113-1155.
- Lake, Marilyn. 2012. "The Gendered and Racialised Self who Claimed the Right to Self-Government." *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 13:1 (Spring).
- Lange, Matthew, James Mahoney, Matthias Vom Hau. 2006. "Colonialism and development: a comparative analysis of Spanish and British colonies." *American Journal of Sociology* 111.5: 1412-1462.
- Lange, Matthew. 2004. "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development." *World Development* 32:6, 905-22.
- Lieberman, Evan S., Prerna Singh. 2012. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Ethnic Politics: An Institutional Complement to Demographic, Behavioral, and Cognitive Approaches." *Studies in Comparative Political Development* 47:255-86.
- López-Alves, Fernando. 2000. *State formation and democracy in Latin America, 1810-1900*. Durham: Duke university press.
- Loveman, Mara. 2009. "Whiteness in Latin America: measurement and meaning in national censuses (1850-1950)." *Journal de la Société des Américanistes* 95.95-2: 207-234.
- Lutz, Donald. 1998. *Colonial Origins of the American Constitution: A Documentary History*. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Press.
- Lützelschwab, Claude. 2013. "Settler colonialism in Africa." In Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzger, Richard Sutch (eds), *Settler Economies in World History* (Leiden: Brill): 141-168.
- Lynch, John. 1973. *The Spanish American Revolution, 1808-1826. Revolutions in the Modern World*. New York: WW Norton, Company.
- Mahoney, James. 2010. *Colonialism and Postcolonial Development: Spanish America in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Maitland, F.W. 2003. *State, Trust and Corporation*, eds. David Runciman and Magnus Ryan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Marshall, Monte G., Keith Jagers. 2016. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015." URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
- McCracken, John Leslie. 1967. *The Cape Parliament 1854-1910*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- McLaughlin, Andrew C. 1932. *Foundations of American Constitutionalism*. New York: ??.
- McNamee, Lachlan. 2018. "Colonialism, Path Dependency, and Comparative Racial Identification in the Americas." Working paper, Stanford University. Downloaded (11/09/2018): <https://people.stanford.edu/lmcnamee/colonialism-path-dependency-and-comparative-racial-identification-americas>
- Mickey, Robert. 2015. *Paths Out of Dixie: The Democratization of Authoritarian Enclaves in America's Deep South, 1944-1972*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1862. "On the Government of Dependencies by a Free State." In *Considerations on Representative Government* (London) 322-3.
- Mills, Charles Wade. 1997. *The racial contract*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Moch, Leslie Page. 2003. *Moving Europeans: migration in western Europe since 1650*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
- Mohanram, Radhika. 2007. *Imperial White: Race, Diaspora, and the British Empire*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Morgan, Edmund S. 1975. *American slavery, American freedom*. New York: WW Norton, Company.
- Moya, Jose C. 1998. *Cousins and strangers: Spanish immigrants in Buenos Aires, 1850-1930*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Murtin, Fabrice, Romain Wacziarg. 2014. "The democratic transition." *Journal of Economic Growth* 19.2: 141-181.
- Myrdal, Gunnar. 1944. *An American dilemma; the Negro problem and modern democracy*. New York: Harper, Bros.
- Najemy, John. 1979. "Guild republicanism in Trecento Florence: the successes and ultimate failure of corporate politics." *American Historical Review* 84:53-71.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2000. *Shades of Citizenship*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Nugent, Walter. 1989. "Frontiers and empires in the late nineteenth century." *The Western Historical Quarterly* 20.4: 393-408.
- Olsson, Ola. 2009. "On the Democratic Legacy of Colonialism." *Journal of Comparative Economics*

37:4, 534-51.

- Pagden, Anthony (ed). 2002. *The idea of Europe: From antiquity to the European Union*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pagden, Anthony. 2009. "The Peopling of the New World: Ethnos, Race and Empire in the Early-Modern World." In Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin H. Isaac, Joseph Ziegler (eds), *The Origins of Racism in the West* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 292-312.
- Pemstein, Daniel, Kyle L. Marquardt, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Joshua Krusell, and Farhad Miri. 2017. "The V-Dem Measurement Model: Latent Variable Analysis for Cross-National and Cross-Temporal Expert-Coded Data." *Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 21*.
- Post, Gaines. 1943. "Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies: A Study in Romano-Canonical Procedure and the Rise of Representation, 1150-1325." *Traditio* 1: 355–408.
- Putterman, Louis, David Weil. 2010. "Post-1500 population flows and the long run determinants of economic growth and inequality." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4), 1627–1682.
- Rana, Aziz. 2011. *The two faces of American freedom*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Reid, John Phillip. 1988. *The concept of liberty in the age of the American revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Reinsch, Paul Samuel. 1906. *Colonial Government: An Introduction to the Study of Colonial Institutions*. Macmillan.
- Rodríguez O., Jaime E. 1998. *The Independence of Spanish America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ross, Robert (ed). 1982. *Racism and Colonialism*. Leiden: Leiden University Press.
- Runciman, David. 2000. "Is the State a Corporation?" *Government and Opposition*, 90–104.
- Russell, Lynette (ed). 2001. *Colonial frontiers: Indigenous-European encounters in settler societies*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Sabato, Hilda. 2001. *The Many and the Few: Political Participation in Republican Buenos Aires*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Sabato, Hilda. 2018. *Republics of the New World: The Revolutionary Political Experiment in Nineteenth-Century Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sartori, Andrew. 2006. "The British Empire and its liberal mission." *The Journal of Modern History* 78.3: 623-642.
- Schulz, Jonathan, Duman Barahmi-Rad, Jonathan Beauchamp, Joseph Henrich. 2018. "The Origins of WEIRD Psychology." *PsyArXiv*. June 22. doi:10.17605/OSF.IO/D6QHU.

- Simon, Joshua. 2017. *The Ideology of Creole Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Skaaning, Svend-Erik, John Gerring, Henrikas Bartusevičius. 2015. "A lexical index of electoral democracy." *Comparative Political Studies* 48.12: 1491-1525.
- Smith, Rogers M. 1997. *Civic ideals: Conflicting visions of citizenship in U.S. History*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Smooha, Sammy. 2002. "The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." *Nations and nationalism* 8.4: 475-503.
- Southworth, Constant. 1931. *The French colonial venture*. London: P.S. King, Son.
- Stasavage, David. 2016. "Representation and Consent Why They Arose in Europe and Not Elsewhere." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19, 145-62.
- Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2018. "Measuring Polyarchy Across the Globe, 1900–2017." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1-25.
- Tierney, Brian. 1982. *Religion, Law and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-1650*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Townsend, Mary Evelyn. 1966[1930]. *The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire, 1884-1918*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Tusalem, Rollin F. 2009. "The role of Protestantism in democratic consolidation among transitional states." *Comparative Political Studies* 42.7: 882-915.
- Wacziarg, Romain, Enrico Spolaore. 2018. "Ancestry and Development: New Evidence." *Journal of Applied Econometrics*. Forthcoming.
- Ward, John Manning. 1976. *Colonial self-government: the British experience, 1759–1856*. Springer.
- Waterhouse, Richard. 2010. "Liberty and Representative Government in Australia, 1788–1901." In Jack P. Greene (ed), *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas: 1600-1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 220-47.
- Weinbaum, Martin (ed). 2010. *British borough charters 1307-1660*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wight, Martin. 1946. *The Development of the Legislative Council, 1606-1945*. Faber, Faber.
- Williams, Eric Eustace. 1970. *From Columbus to Castro: the history of the Caribbean, 1492-1969*. New York: Vintage.
- Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 106:2 (May) 244-74.

Woollacott, Angela. 2015. *Settler Society in the Australian Colonies: Self-government and imperial culture*.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Appendix A: Additional Sources

Colonialism, Settler Societies, Race, European Migration, Democratization

- Adelman, Jeremy. 1994. *Frontier development: land, labour, and capital on the wheatlands of Argentina and Canada, 1890-1914*. Oxford University Press.
- Albertini, Rudolf von, Albert Wirz. 1982. *European Colonial Rule, 1880-1940: The Impact of the West on India, Southeast Asia, and Africa*. Praeger.
- Albertone, Manuela, Antonino De Francesco (eds). 2009. *Rethinking the Atlantic world: Europe and America in the age of democratic revolutions*. Springer.
- Appelbaum, Nancy P., Anne S. Macpherson, Karin Alejandra Roseblatt (eds). 2003. *Race and nation in modern Latin America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Atkinson, Alan. 1997. *The Europeans in Australia: Volume One-The Beginning*. UNSW Press.
- Atkinson, Alan. 2016. *The Europeans in Australia: Volume Two-Democracy*. UNSW Press.
- Austin, Gareth. 2008. "The 'reversal of fortune' thesis and the compression of history: perspectives from African and comparative economic history." *Journal of International Development* 20.8: 996-1027.
- Bailyn, Bernard. 1986. *Voyagers to the West: A passage in the peopling of America on the eve of the Revolution*. New York.
- Banton, Michael. 1998. *Racial theories, 2d ed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bateman, Fiona, Lionel Pilkington (eds). 2011. *Studies in settler colonialism: Politics, identity and culture*. Springer.
- Bayly, Christopher Alan. 2008. "Indigenous and colonial origins of comparative economic development: the case of colonial India and Africa." Policy Research Working Paper 4474. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Bennoune, Mahfoud. 2002. *The making of contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bhandar, Brenna. 2018. *Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership*. Duke University Press.
- Boxer, Charles Robbins. 1965. *Portuguese Society in the Tropics. The municipal councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
- Buckner, Phillip Alfred. 1985. *The transition to responsible government: British policy in British North America, 1815-1850*. Praeger.

- Burroughs, Peter. 1984. "Colonial Self-government." In C.C. Eldridge (ed), *British imperialism in the nineteenth century* (London: Palgrave) 39-64.
- Butcher, John G. 1979. *The British in Malaya, 1880-1941: The social history of a European community in colonial South-East Asia*. Oxford University Press.
- Canny, Nicholas, Anthony Padgen (eds). 1987. *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Christopher, Anthony John. 1984. *The Crown Lands of British South Africa, 1853-1914*. Limestone Press.
- Craton, Michael. 1997. *Empire, enslavement, and freedom in the Caribbean*. Markus Wiener.
- Doukakis, Anna. 2006. *The Aboriginal People, Parliament and "protection" in New South Wales, 1856-1916*. Federation Press.
- Elkins, Caroline, Susan Pedersen (eds). 2005. *Settler colonialism in the twentieth century: Projects, practices, legacies*. New York: Routledge.
- Elkins, Caroline. 2012. "Race, citizenship, and governance: Settler tyranny and the end of empire." *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century*. (Routledge) 217-236.
- Findlay, Ronald, Mats Lundahl (eds). 2017. *The Economics of the Frontier: Conquest and Settlement*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Finley, Moses I. 1976. "Colonies – An Attempt at Typology." *Transactions of the royal Historical Society* Fifth Series 26, 167-88.
- Fisher, Andrew B., Matthew D. O'Hara (eds). 2009. *Imperial Subjects: Race and Identity in Colonial Spanish America*. Duke University Press.
- Ford, Lisa. 2010. *Settler Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788–1836*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Graham, Richard (ed). 2010. *The idea of race in Latin America, 1870-1940*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Greene, Jack P. 1986. *Peripheries and Center: constitutional development in the extended politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Harper, Marjory, Stephen Constantine. 2010. *Migration and empire*. Oxford University Press.
- Hartz, Louis (ed). 1969. *The founding of new societies: studies in the history of the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
- Hirst, John. 1988. *The Strange Birth of Colonial Democracy: New South Wales 1848–1884*. Crows Nest: Allen, Unwin.

- Hoerder, Dirk. 2014. *Migrations and belongings*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Irving, Terry. 2006. *The Southern Tree of Liberty: The Democratic Movement in New South Wales before 1856*. Sydney: The Federation Press.
- Ittmann, Karl, Dennis D. Cordell, Gregory H. Maddox (eds). 2010. *The demographics of empire: the colonial order and the creation of knowledge*. Columbus: Ohio University Press.
- Keegan, Timothy. 1996. *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order*. Leicester University Press.
- Kennedy, Dane Keith. 1987. *Islands of white: settler society and culture in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1939*. Duke University Press.
- Keppel-Jones, A. 1983. *Rhodes and Rhodesia: the White Conquest of Zimbabwe, 1884-1902*. McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Kirk, Tony E. 1972. *Self-government and self-defence in South Africa: the inter-relations between British and Cape politics, 1846-1854*. PhD Dissertation.
- Kirk-Greene, AHM. 1980. "The thin white line: the size of the British colonial service in Africa." *African Affairs* 79(314): 25–44.
- Klíma, Jan. 2014. "The Evolution of the Political Representation of African Communities in DSWA/SWA/Namibia." *Modern Africa: Politics, History and Society* 2 (1): 7–30.
- Laidlaw, Zoë, Alan Lester (eds). 2015. *Indigenous communities and settler colonialism: land holding, loss and survival in an interconnected world*. Springer.
- Lamar, Howard Roberts, Leonard Thompson (eds). 1981. *The frontier in history: North America and Southern Africa compared*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lloyd, Christopher, Jacob Metzger, Richard Sutch (eds). 2013. *Settler economies in world history*. Brill.
- Madden, A. F. (ed). 1985-2000. *Select documents on the constitutional history of the British Empire and Commonwealth: the foundations of a colonial system of government, 8 vols*. Westport: Greenwood.
- Mann, Michael. 2004. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McFarlane, Anthony. 1994. *The British in the Americas 1480-1815*. Routledge.
- McLaren, John, Andrew Richard Buck, Nancy E. Wright (eds). 2005. *Despotic dominion: property rights in British settler societies*. University of British Columbia Press.
- Meinig, Donald William. 1986. *The Shaping of America: Atlantic America, 1492-1800*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

- Moseley, Paul. 1983. *The settler economies: Studies in the Economic History of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1963*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mutambirwa, James A C. 1980. *The Rise of Settler Power in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), 1898-1923*. Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press.
- Newitt, Malyn D.D. 1973. *Portuguese settlement on the Zambezi: Exploration, land tenure and colonial rule in East Africa*. London: Africana.
- Nugent, Walter. 1995. *Crossings: the great transatlantic migrations, 1870-1914*. Indiana University Press.
- Peloso, V. C., B. A. Tenenbaum. 1996. *Liberals, politics, and power: State formation in nineteenth-century Latin America*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Pétre-Grenouilleau, Olivier. 2009. "Maritime Powers, Colonial Powers: The Role Of Migration (C. 1492-1792)." *Migration, Trade, and Slavery in an Expanding World* (Brill) 45-72.
- Poliakov, Leon. 1977. *The Aryan myth: A history of racist and nationalist ideas in Europe*. Plume.
- Richards, Eric. 2004. *Britannia's children: emigration from England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland since 1600*. A&C Black.
- Rosenthal, Albert J., Louis Henkin. 1990. *Constitutionalism and rights: The influence of the U.S. Constitution abroad*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Russell, Alan Gladney. 1944. *Colour, race, and empire*. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd.
- Russell, Lynette (ed). 2001. *Colonial frontiers: Indigenous-European encounters in settler societies*. Manchester University Press.
- Shaw, A. G. L. (ed). 1970. *Great Britain and the Colonies 1815–1865*. London: Methuen.
- Smith, Zachary. 2018. *Colonial Accumulation: Institutions and Ideologies in Settler Societies*. PhD dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania (in process).
- Sorrenson, Maurice Peter Keith. 1968. *Origins of European settlement in Kenya*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stasiulis, Daiva, Nira Yuval-Davis (eds). 1995. *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity, and Class*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Steele, Ian K. 1998. "The Anointed, the Appointed, and the Elected: Governance of the British Empire, 1689–1784." In *The Oxford History of the British Empire Volume II the Eighteenth Century*, edited by P J Marshall and Alaine Lowe, 105–27. Oxford.
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 2012. *The Portuguese empire in Asia, 1500-1700: a political and economic history*. John Wiley, Sons.

- Tarko, Vlad, Kyle W. O'Donnell. 2018. "Escape from Europe: A Calculus of Consent Model of the Origins of Liberal Institutions in the North American Colonies." *Constitutional Political Economy*, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199452>
- Thompson, Leonard Montearth. 2001. *A history of South Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Tignor, Robert L. 2015. *Colonial Transformation of Kenya: The Kamba, Kikuyu, and Maasai from 1900-1939*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tuck, Richard. 2016. *The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of Modern Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Veracini, Lorenzo. 2010. *Settler Colonialism*. London: Springer.
- Wade, Peter. 2017. *Degrees of Mixture, Degrees of Freedom: Genomics, Multiculturalism, and Race in Latin America*. Duke University Press.
- Weaver, John C. 2003. *Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900*. McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP.
- Weitzer, Ronald. 1990. *Transforming Settler States: Communal Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wolfe, Patrick. 2016. *Traces of History*. London: Verso Books.
- Zertal, Idith, Akiva Eldar. 2009. *Lords of the Land*. New York: Nation Books.

Census Data, Racial Classifications

- Anderson, Benedict, Michel Charlot. 1997. "Recensement et politique en Asie du Sud-Est." *Genèses* 55-76.
- Andrews, George Reid. 2016. *Afro-Latin America. Black Lives, 1600-2000*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Behar, Cem. 1998 "Qui compte?: 'Recensements' et statistiques démographiques dans l'Empire ottoman, du XVI e au XX e siècle." *Histoire, Mesure* 135-145.
- Christopher, Anthony J. 2005. "Race and the Census in the Commonwealth." *Population, Space and Place* 11.2: 103-118.
- de Matos, Paulo Teodoro. 2016. "Counting Portuguese colonial populations, 1776–1875: a research note." *The History of the Family* 21.2: 267-280.
- Harris, Marvin. 1970. "Referential Ambiguity in the Calculus of Brazilian Racial Identity." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 26(1).

- Hirschmann, Charles. 1987. "The meaning and measurement of ethnicity in Malaysia." *Journal of Asian Studies* 46.3: 552-82.
- Jobling, Mark A., Rita Rasteiro, John H. Wetton. 2016. "In the blood: the myth and reality of genetic markers of identity." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39(2).
- Kertzer, David I., Dominique Arel (eds). 2002. *Census and identity: The politics of race, ethnicity, and language in national censuses*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Loveman, Mara. 1999. "Making race and nation in the United States, South Africa, and Brazil: Taking making seriously." *Theory and Society* 28(6):903–927.
- Loveman, Mara. 2014. *National Colors: Racial Classification and the State in Latin America*. Oxford University Press.
- Loveman, Mara, Jeronimo O. Muniz. 2007. "How Puerto Rico Became White: Boundary Dynamics and Intercensus Racial Reclassification." *American Sociological Review* 72:915–939.
- Saperstein, Aliya. 2006. "Double-Checking the Race Box: Examining Inconsistency between Survey Measures of Observed and Self-Reported Race." *Social Forces* 85(1):57–74.
- Simon, Patrick, Victor Piché, Amélie A. Gagnon (eds). 2015. *Social statistics and ethnic diversity*. IMISCOE: Springer.
- Telles, Edward. 2014. *Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, race, and color in Latin America*. UNC Press Books.
- Twinam, Ann. 2015. *Purchasing Whiteness: Pardos, Mulattos, and the Quest for Social Mobility in the Spanish Indies*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Data Sources for European Ancestry Variable

- Acemoglu, Daron. Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. 2000. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." NBER Working Paper 7771.
- Ady, Peter H., A. H. Hazlewood. 1965. *Oxford regional economic atlas: Africa*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Albertini, Rudolf von, Albert Wirz. 1982. *European Colonial Rule, 1880-1940: The Impact of the West on India, Southeast Asia, and Africa*. Praeger.
- Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, Romain Wacziarg. 2003. "Fractionalization." *Journal of Economic growth* 8:2, 155-194.
- Annuaire général*. 1927-. Paris: Larousse.
- Barrett, David B. 1982. *World Christian Encyclopedia*. London: Oxford University Press.

- Bender, Gerald Jacob. 1978. *Angola under the Portuguese: the myth and the reality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bosma, Ulbe. 2007. "Sailing through Suez from the South: The Emergence of an Indies-Dutch Migration Circuit, 1815-1940." *International Migration Review* 41:2 (Summer), 511-536.
- Clark, Grover. 1936. *The balance sheets of imperialism: facts and figures on colonies*. Columbia University Press.
- Coghlan, Timothy. 1902. *Statistical Abstract for the Seven Colonies of Australasia*. Government of the State of New South Wales.
- Curtin, Philip D., Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, Jan Vansina. 1995. *African History: From Earliest Times to Independence, 2d Ed*. London: Longman.
- Easterly, William, Ross Levine. 2016. "The European origins of economic development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 21.3: 225-257.
- Etemad, Bouda. 2007. "Pour une approche démographique de l'expansion coloniale de l'Europe." *Annales de démographie historique*, 2007/1, 113, 13-32.
- Etemad, Bouda. 2015. "Populations coloniales (XVIe-XXe siècles): une pesée globale." In Guy Brunet (ed), *Mariage et métissage dans les sociétés coloniales* (Bern, Peter Lang) 27-46.
- Gann, Lewis H., Peter Duignan. 1962. *White settlers in tropical Africa*. Penguin books.
- Giliomee, Hermann, Richard Elphick. 1979. "The structure of European domination at the Cape, 1652-1820." In Hermann Giliomee, Richard Elphick (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820* (Cape Town: Longman), 359-90.
- Great Britain. 1864. *Census of the British Empire 1861*. London: Harrison.
- Great Britain. 1906. *Census of the British Empire 1901*. London: HMSO.
- Groupe de demographie africaine. 1982. *L'évaluation des effectifs de la population des pays africain, Tome 1*. Paris: ORSTOM.
- Groupe de demographie africaine. 1984. *L'évaluation des effectifs de la population des pays africain, Tome 2*. Paris: ORSTOM.
- Guelke, Leonard. 1988. "The anatomy of a colonial settler population: Cape Colony 1657-1750." *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 21.3: 453-473.
- Hailey, William Malcolm Hailey Baron. 1945. *An African survey: a study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Hailey, William Malcolm Hailey Baron. 1957. *An African survey, revised 1956: a study of problems arising in Africa south of the Sahara*. London: Oxford University Press.

- Haines, Michael R., Richard H. Steckel (eds). 2000. *A population history of North America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hancock, W. Keith. 1942. *Survey of British Commonwealth affairs. Vol. II: problems of economic policy 1918-1939. Parts 1-2*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Henderson, William Otto. 1962. *Studies in German colonial history*. Quadrangle.
- International Labour Office. 1936. *World statistics of aliens: a comparative study of census returns, 1910-1920-1930*. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Kateb, Kamel. 1998. "La gestion statistique des populations dans l'empire colonial français. Le cas de l'Algérie, 1830-1960." *Histoire, mesure* 77-111.
- Knight, Franklin W. 1978. *The Caribbean: The genesis of a fragmented nationalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kruijtzter, Gijs. 2008. "European Migration in the Dutch Sphere." In Gert Oostindie (ed) *Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage* (Leiden: Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, ISBN 90-6718-317-8) 97-154.
- Kuczynski, Robert René. 1937. *Colonial population*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Kuczynski, Robert René. 1948. *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire, Volume I: West Africa*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Kuczynski, Robert René. 1949. *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire, Volume II: East Africa*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Kuczynski, Robert René. 1953. *Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire, Volume III: West Indian and American Territories*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Lutzelschwab, Claude. 2007. "Populations et économies des colonies d'implantation européenne en Afrique (Afrique du Sud, Algérie, Kenya et Rhodésie du Sud)." *Annales de Démographie Historique*, 1(113), 33-58.
- Lützelschwab, Claude. 2013. "Settler colonialism in Africa." In Christopher Lloyd, Jacob Metzger, Richard Sutch (eds), *Settler Economies in World History* (Leiden: Brill): 141-168.
- Maddison, Angus. 2001. *The world economy: a millennial perspective*. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Maddison, Angus. 2003. *The world economy historical statistics: historical statistics*. Development Centre Studies, OECD Publishing.
- Martin, John Angus. 2013. *Island Caribs and French Settlers in Grenada*. Grenada National Museum Press.

- McCracken, John Leslie. 1967. *The Cape Parliament 1854-1910*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- McEvedy, C., R. Jones. 1978. *Atlas of world population history*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Ministère des Colonies. 1944. *Annuaire Statistiques des Possessions Françaises: Années Antérieure à la Guerre*. Paris: Edition Provisoire.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2000. *Shades of Citizenship*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
- Owolabi, Olukunle P. 2015. "Literacy and Democracy Despite Slavery: Forced Settlement and Postcolonial Outcomes in the Developing World." *Comparative Politics* 48.1: 43-78.
- Penvenne, Jeanne Marie. 2005. "Settling against the tide: the layered contradictions of twentieth-century Portuguese settlement in Mozambique." In Caroline Elkins, Susan Pedersen (eds), *Settler colonialism in the twentieth century: Projects, practices, legacies* (New York: Routledge) 93-108.
- Putterman, Louis, David Weil. 2010. "Post-1500 population flows and the long run determinants of economic growth and inequality." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4), 1627–1682.
- Reid, Andrews George. 2004. *Afro-Latin America, 1800–2000*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rosenblat, Angel. 1945. *La población indígena de América desde 1492 hasta la actualidad*. Vol. 3. Buenos Aires: Institución cultural española.
- Services des Statistiques d'Outre-Mer, Outre-Mer, 1958: *Tableau Économique et Social des États et Territoires d'Outre-Mer à la veille de la mise en place des nouvelles institutions* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960).
- Southworth, Constant. 1931. *The French colonial venture*. London: P.S. King, Son.
- Townsend, Mary Evelyn. 1966[1930]. *The rise and fall of Germany's colonial empire, 1884-1918*. New York: Howard Fertig.
- Urquhart, Malcolm Charles, Kenneth AH Buckley (eds). 1983. *Historical statistics of Canada, 2d ed.* Ottawa: Statistics Canada.
- US Bureau of the Census. 1975. *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Parts I-II*. US Government Printing Office.
- Watts, David. 1987. *The West Indies: patterns of development, culture and environmental change since 1492*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Worsfold, William Basil. 1897. *South Africa: a study in colonial administration and development*. Methuen, Company.

Data Sources for Easterly, Levine (2016)'s European Ancestry Variable

- Castro, Rodolfo Baron. 1942. *La poblacion de El Salvador*. Instituto Gonzalo Fernandez De Oviedo
- Bender, Gerald J. 1978. *Angola under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Caceres, Rina. 2000. *Negros, Mulatos, esclavos y libertos en la Costa Rica del Siglo XVII*. Mexico City: Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia.
- Constantino, Renato. 1975. *A History of the Phillipines*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Cook, Sherburne F., Woodrow Borah. 1974. *Essays in population history Vol 2*, chapter II: "Racial groups in the Mexican Population since 1519." California.
- Curtin, Philip, Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, Jan Vansina. 1995. *African History: From Earliest Times to Independence*. London: Longman.
- Dawson, William Harbutt. 1925. *South Africa: People, places and problems*. Longmans, Green and co.
- Deerr, Noel. 1950. *The History of Sugar*. London: Chapman and Hall.
- Dunn, Richard. 1973. *Sugar and Slaves: the Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Eisner, Gisela. 1961. *Jamaica, 1830-1930, A Study in Economic Growth*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Engerman, Stanley. 2000. "Population History of the Caribbean." In Haines, Steckel (eds), *A population History of North America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Figueroa, Federico Brito. 1961. *La estructura social y demográfica de Venezuela colonial*. Universidad Central de Venezuela.
- Gann, Lewis H., Peter Duignan. 1962. *White settlers in tropical Africa*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
- Gootenberg, Paul. 1991. *Between Silver and Guano: Commercial Policy and State in Post-independence Peru*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haines, Michael, Richard Steckel (eds). 2000. *A population History of North America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hourani, Albert. 1992. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Warner Books.
- Jones, Oakah L., Jr. 1994. *Guatemala in the Spanish Colonial Period*. University of Oklahoma Press.
- Kay, G.B. 1972. *The Political Economy of colonialism in Ghana: a collection of documents and statistics 1900-1960*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kuczynski, Robert Rene. 1953. *Demographic survey of the British Colonial Empire, Vol III: West Indian and American Territories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mamalaki, Markos. 1980. *Historical Statistics of Chile, vol.2*. Greenwood Press.
- McAlister, Lyle N. 1984. *Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492-1700*. University of Minnesota Press.
- McEvedy, Colin, Richard Jones. 1978. *Atlas of World Population History*. Viking.
- Merrick, Thomas, Douglas Graham. 1979. *Population and Economic Development in Brazil, 1800*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mosley, Paul. 1983. *The settler economies: Studies in the economic history of Kenya and Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1963*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ominde, Simeon. 1968. *Land and population movements in Kenya*. Northwestern University Press.
- Ominde, Simeon. 1975. *The population of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda*. Nairobi: Heinemann.
- Rivarola, Domingo, G. Heiseke. 1969. *Poblacion, Urbanizacion y Recursos Humanos en el Paraguay*. Centro Paraguayo de Estudios Sociologicos.
- Sosa, Roberto. 1999. *Documentos para la historia de Honduras*. Honduras, Imagen y Palabra.
- Rogers, Cyril A., Sir Robert C. Tredgold. 1962. *Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The attitudes and behavior of the white population*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rogozinski, Jan. 1994. *A brief history of the Caribbean*. Penguin Books
- Rosenblat, Angel. 1954. *La Poblacion Indigena y el Mestizaje en America*. Editorial Nova.
- Sanchez-Albornoz, Nicolas. 1973. *La Poblacion de America Latina*. Alianza.
- Sanchez-Albornoz, Nicolas. 1974. *The population in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Toussaint, Auguste. 1977. *History of Mauritius*. Macmillan.
- UN Bulletin. 1965. *UN Economic Bulletin for Africa*. New York: United Nations.
- Universidad de Costa Rica. 1976. *La Poblacion de Costa Rica*. Universidad de Costa Rica.
- Vazquez-Rial, Horacio. 1999. *La Formacion del pais de los Argentinos*. Vergara.
- Vergara Velasco, Francisco Javier. 1892. *Nueva Geografia de Colombia*. Imprenta de Vapor
- Wells, Robert V. 1975. *The population of the British Colonies in America before 1776*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Appendix B: European Ancestry, Territory Graphs

This appendix includes data on European ancestry (as described in the text) for 237 territories that enjoyed some degree of self-rule (not necessarily formal independence) at some point from 1600 to the present. Note that these territories are excluded from analyses if there is no corresponding data for the outcome of interest, democracy. This means that data points for years prior to 1789 and for many non-sovereign territories and micro-states are excluded. Note also that territory names used in the following graphs are those currently attached to these entities. Many territories have historic names that we do not reproduce here.

Territories here are defined according to modern boundaries. Every effort was made to match historical definitions of countries and territories from the original sources to these modern definitions. In cases where multiple territories were combined into a single country, population estimates (both European and total) were also combined. In cases where a single territory was split into multiple countries, the calculated European ancestry (European population as a percentage of total population calculated prior to smoothing) was duplicated for each resulting territory. In a handful of cases where modern boundaries were not the result of either a join or split, it was necessary to both aggregate and split.

Table B1: Source Key

Source	ID
Ady & Hazlewood (1965: 10)	1
Albertini & Wirz (1982: 153)	2
Albertini & Wirz (1982: 202)	3
Albertini & Wirz (1982: 299)	4
Albertini & Wirz (1982: 409)	5
Albertini & Wirz (1982: 428)	6
Alesina et al. (2003)	7
Andrews (2004: 155)	8
Andrews (2004: 207)	9
Andrews (2004: 41)	10
Belich (2009: 26)	11
Belich (2009: 28)	12
Bender (1978: 20-21)	13
Bosma (2007: 526), data received from the author via personal communication	14
CIA World Factbook	15
Clark (1936: 34-5)	16
Coghlan (1902: 530)	17
Curtin et al (1995: 293)	18
Curtin et al (1995: 435)	19
Easterly & Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 234;	20
Easterly & Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 254;	21
Easterly & Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 273;	22
Easterly & Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 453; the author does not trust these numbers, which were constructed by John Galindo for the Royal Geographical Society and which were used by Squier. Both authors agreed that the percentage of whites was too high.	23
Easterly & Levine: Baron Castro (1942) -- p. 527; one has to be careful here, since white could be born in SLV and not europeans	24
Easterly & Levine: Cáceres (2000) -- p. 3;	25
Easterly & Levine: Census -- web	26
Easterly & Levine: Constantino (1975) -- p.122; """"by the middle of the 19 century""""	27
Easterly & Levine: Cook and Borah (1974) -- p. 197;	28
Easterly & Levine: Cook and Borah (1974) -- p. 208-209; exludes West region; totals taken from table A, others from column 5 in B,C,D	29
Easterly & Levine: Cook and Borah (1974) -- p. 214-215; Totals constrcted from data in A column 2 and B column 4;	30
Easterly & Levine: Dawson (1925) -- p.27	31
Easterly & Levine: Deerr (1950) -- Vol. II, p. 279;	32
Easterly & Levine: Dunn (1973) -- p. 155;	33
Easterly & Levine: Dunn (1973) -- p.88; from census 1680	34
Easterly & Levine: Eisner (1961) -- p.153;	35
Easterly & Levine: Engerman (2000) -- p.498;	36
Easterly & Levine: Engerman (2000) -- p.499;	37
Easterly & Levine: Engerman (2000) -- p.499; includes indians	38
Easterly & Levine: Gann and Duignan (1962) -- p.160; Appendix	39


Easterly & Levine: Gann and Duignan (1962) -- p.165; Appendix	40
Easterly & Levine: Gootenberg (1991) -- p. 111; database uses total pop from p. 11, which is slightly different; euroshare in that case 0.126565812	41
Easterly & Levine: Haines and Steckel (2000) -- p. 306	42
Easterly & Levine: Hourani (1992) -- p.270	43
Easterly & Levine: Iliffe (1995) -- p.169; Population from Maddison	44
Easterly & Levine: Iliffe (1995) -- p.224	45
Easterly & Levine: Iliffe(1995) -- p.225	46
Easterly & Levine: Jones (1994) -- p;. 166-167; Estimated by author; Whites is really Spaniards and Ladinis	47
Easterly & Levine: Jones (1994) -- p;. 166-167; Estimated by author; Whites is really Spaniards, blacks and mulattos	48
Easterly & Levine: Mamalakis (1980) -- p. 8;	49
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 291-293;	50
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 291;	51
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 300; African component 100%	52
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301 (African Component, 80%)	53
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 33%	54
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 66%	55
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 75%	56
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (1978) -- p. 301; African component 90%	57
Easterly & Levine: McEvedy and Jones (78) -- p.337; Population from Maddison	58
Easterly & Levine: Merrick (1979) -- p. 29;	59
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1968) -- p.85	60
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1975) -- p. 41, table 3.1	61
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1975) -- p. 48, table 3.7; this figures are only for citizens	62
Easterly & Levine: Ominde (1975) -- p.4, total; p.45, europeans	63
Easterly & Levine: Rivarola and Heiseke (1969) -- p. 13; the year is not determined with 100% assurance	64
Easterly & Levine: Roberto Sosa (1999) -- p. 395	65
Easterly & Levine: Rogers (1962) -- p. 12; Table 1; total populations are estimates, although European shares are given by author.	66
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 114;	67
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 186	68
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 186;	69
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p. 87;	70
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.;201;	71
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.112; only Antigua	72
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.117	73
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.120; only Trinidad	74
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.163;	75
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.186;	76
Easterly & Levine: Rogozinski (1994) -- p.68	77


Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 20; Total and non-white population given, whites assumed to be others not reported	78
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 20; Total and non-white population given, whites assumed to be others not reported; use reported values of panama plus canal area	79
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 36; the author gives a total of 4000000, but this is not equal to the sum of the values he gives for the decomposition	80
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 36; the author gives a total of 800000, but this is not equal to the sum of the values he gives for the decomposition	81
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 37;	82
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 59	83
Easterly & Levine: Rosenblat (1954) -- p. 59;	84
Easterly & Levine: Sanchez-Albornoz (1973) -- p. 135; Quito only	85
Easterly & Levine: Sanchez-Albornoz (1974) -- p. 139;	86
Easterly & Levine: Time (1942) -- web	87
Easterly & Levine: Toussaint (1977) -- p. 96	88
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p. 48-49	89
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p. 48-49; Whites and Mixed	90
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p.48-49	91
Easterly & Levine: UN Bulletin (1965) -- p.48-49; Whites, Mixed and Asian	92
Easterly & Levine: Vazquez Rial (1999) -- p. 59; Only population of Buenos Aires	93
Easterly & Levine: Vazquez Rial (1999) -- p. 60; Number of foreigner per each 100 natives during the era of immigration	94
Easterly & Levine: Vergara Velasco (1892) -- p. DCLXII-DCLXIII	95
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 173; total population and % white and blacks from census	96
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 173; total population and % white and blacks from census. In database used for 1769.	97
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 183; total population and % white and blacks	98
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 196;	99
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 212; only Antigua	100
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p. 253; Only percentages given	101
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p.238 (all male between 20-30 years)	102
Easterly & Levine: Wells (1975) -- p.253; only Tobago	103
Encyclopedia Britannica	104
Etemad (2015: 41)	105
Gann & Duignan (1962: Appendix)	106
Giliomee, Elphick (1979: 360)	107
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 178)	108
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 188)	109
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 3)	110
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 328)	111
Groupe de demographie africaine (1982: 8)	112
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 235)	113
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 240)	114
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 245)	115
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 301)	116


Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 336)	117
Groupe de demographie africaine (1984: 6)	118
Hailey (1945: 108-09)	119
Hailey (1957: 144)	120
Haines, Steckel (2000: table 5.1)	121
Haines, Steckel (2000: table 9.1)	122
Haines, Steckel (2000: table A.4)	123
Haines, Steckel (2000: tables 11.3, 11.4)	124
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/ivory-coast-population/	125
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/united-states-virgin-islands-population/	126
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Yemen.html	127
https://www.infoplease.com/ethnicity-and-race-countries	128
https://www.worldstatesmen.org	129
Kateb (1998: 92)	130
Knight (1978: 238-39)	131
Kruijtzer (2008: 132)	132
Kruijtzer (2008: 137)	133
Kuczynski (1937: 13)	134
Kuczynski (1937: 17-21)	135
Kuczynski (1937: 22-23)	136
Kuczynski (1948, 1949, 1953)	137
Last Observation Carried Forward	138
League of Nations (1941: 24)	139
Lützel Schwab (2013: 149)	140
Maddison (2001: 235)	141
Maddison (2001: 87)	142
Maddison (2003: 71)	143
Maddison (2003: 76)	144
Martin (2013: Appendix III)	145
McCracken (1967: 1)	146
Nobles (2000: 105)	147
Penvenne (2005: 86)	148
Putterman and Weil (2010)	149
Robinson, Glenn (Personal communication with authors dated October 9, 2018)	150
See Section II in text	151
Southworth (1931: 26)	152
US Census	153
Watts (1987: 311)	154
Watts (1987: 313)	155
Watts (1987: 316)	156
Watts (1987: 318)	157
Watts (1987: 320)	158
Watts (1987: 321)	159
Wikipedia	160
Wikipedia (https://en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_settlement#Demographics)	161


Wikipedia (Original source: http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_VISF_P3&prodType=table)	162
Wikipedia (Original source: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/pdf/CS_Colombia.pdf , http://www.schwartzman.org.br/simon/coesion_etnia.pdf)	163
Wikipedia (Original source: http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20110505060445/http%3A//www%2Ecensus%2Egov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br%2D02%2Epdf)	164
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.anguillanews.com/enews/index.php/permalink/4936.html)	165
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.barstats.gov.bb/files/documents/PHC_2010_Census_Volume_1.pdf)	166
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Publications/NCR%20Reports/BVI.pdf)	167
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.caricomstats.org/Files/Publications/NCR%20Reports/TCI.pdf)	168
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au/ABSNavigation/prenav/ViewData?action=404&documentproductno=0&documenttype=Details&order=1&tabname=Details&areacode=0&issue=2006&producttype=Census%2BTables&javascript=true&textversion=false&navmapdisplayed=true&breadcrumb=POTLD&&collection=Census&period=2006&productlabel=Ancestry%2B(Region)%2Bby%2BCountry%2Bof%2BBirth%2Bof%2BParents&producttype=Census%2BTables&method=Place%2Bof%2BUusual%2BResidence&topic=Ancestry& , http://kids.britannica.com/comptons/article-258656/Australia)	169
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/servers/redatam/htdocs/CPV2007S/Docs/RESULTADOS_FINALS.pdf)	170
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.eluniverso.com/2011/09/02/1/1356/poblacion-pais-joven-mestiza-dice-censo-inec.html)	171
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/censo2010/caracteristicas_da_populacao/tabelas_pdf/tab3.pdf)	172
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.ine.gov.gt/sistema/uploads/2014/02/26/5eTCcFHErnaNVeUm3iabXHaKgXtw0C.pdf)	173
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.ine.gov.ve/CENSO2011/documentos/pdf/ResultadosBasicosCenso2011.pdf)	174
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.ine.gub.uy/enha2006/flash/Flash%20Ascendencia.pdf)	175
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.isec.nc/population/recensement/communautes)	176
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.namibia-travel.net/namibia/people/whites.html)	177
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.nmhcgov.net/resources/files/NMHC%202015%20AI%20-%20Public%20Review.pdf)	178
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.soencouragement.org/forms/CENSUS2010084903300.pdf)	179
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.stats.gov.vc/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jSipdTnsXwM%3d&tabid=60)	180


Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census_2011/census_products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf)	181
Wikipedia (Original source: http://www.zimstat.co.zw/sites/default/files/img/National_Report.pdf)	182
Wikipedia (Original source: https://guardian.co.tt/sites/default/files/story/2011_DemographicReport.pdf)	183
Wikipedia (Original source: https://web.archive.org/web/20080920172933/http://convergencia.uaemex.mx/rev38/38pdf/LIZCANO.pdf , https://books.google.com/books?id=uwirv3VV6cC&pg=PA313&dq=argentina+ethnic+groups&hl=es&ei=g5_QTOrLL4SU4AbUhuTMBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=argentina%20ethnic%20groups&f=false , https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ar.html)	184
Wikipedia (Original source: https://web.archive.org/web/20080920172933/http://convergencia.uaemex.mx/rev38/38pdf/LIZCANO.pdf)	185
Wikipedia (Original source: https://web.archive.org/web/20110531035849/http://2010.census.gov/2010census/data/)	186
Wikipedia (Original source: https://web.archive.org/web/20130228051323/http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sources/census/2010_phc/bermuda/Bermuda_new.pdf)	187
Wikipedia (Original source: https://web.archive.org/web/20140714165128/http://m.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats-about-national-highlights/cultural-diversity)	188
Wikipedia (Original source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/dr.html#People)	189
Wikipedia (Original source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gq.html)	190
Wikipedia (Original source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nu.html#People)	191
Wikipedia (Original source: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pm.html#People)	192
Wikipedia (Original source: https://www.cultura.gob.pe/concursobpi/sites/default/.../concursobpi.pdf , https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pe.html#People)	193
Wikipedia (Original source: https://www.eldia.com.bo/mobile.php?cat=1&pla=7&id_articulo=137187)	194
Worsfold (1897: 257)	195



























































































Appendix C: European Ancestry, Maps


1600




1700




1800




1900



1950



2000



Appendix D: European Ancestry, Convergent Validity Tests

Table D.1: Correlations among Indices

Alternate index	Years	Countries	Obs	Pearson's r correlation	Included in European Ancestry
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001	1900	157	157	0.66	N
Easterly, Levine 2016	1600-1800	12	132	0.74	Y
Easterly, Levine 2016	1800-1900	32	3232	0.84	Y
Putterman, Weil 2010	2000	164	164	0.86	N

Pearson's r correlation of European ancestry (authors) with alternate indices, focusing on the year(s) in which the alternate index is measured.

Appendix E: Data Description

Table E.1: Variable Descriptions

Agricultural Transition. Estimated years in thousands since the transition to an agricultural society. *Source:* Woodberry (2012). *agritran*

Biogeography. Measure of availability of storable crops and domesticated animals during the prehistoric era. *Source:* Easterly, Levine (2016) drawing on Hibbs, Olsson (2004). *Scale:* interval. *biogeography*

Contestation. Incumbent-challenger formula of electoral contestation, calculated as the incumbent (the party with the largest share of votes in the previous election) share of votes in a national legislative or presidential election minus the share of the largest challenger, subtracted from 100. *Source:* Gerring et al. (2018a). *Scale:* interval. *inc_chall_combined*

Distance to London. Distance in kilometers (logged) from country capital to London. *Source:* Gleditsch (2002). *dist_to_london_km_ln*

Early democracy. A measure of early democratic characteristics in societies prior to the arrival of Europeans. The variable is calculated by the authors as the sum of the values of two variables: “election or other formal consensus” and “informal consensus.” *Source:* Giuliano, Nunn (2013) drawing on Murdock (1967). *Scale:* interval. *murdock_dem*

Elections. The electoral regime index (*v2x_elereg*) is coded 1 from when there was a presidential or parliamentary election, if it was not aborted, until there was an interruption through the executive or legislature. An electoral interruption is i) an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected body executive or parliament or ii) an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be subject to election in the future. Typically, an interruption is the product of a coup, declared state of emergency, or military defeat. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election occurs. An executive and a legislative electoral regime cannot be separated since they form an integral part, where an aborted legislature is interpreted as a signal that also the executive is not standing for election any longer, and vice versa. *Source:* V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016), supplemented by the authors. *Scale:* binary. *v2x_elecreg_jg*

English colonial duration. Number of years of English colonial rule. *Source:* Olsson (2009), supplemented by the authors. *Scale:* interval. *durbritain_new*

European ancestry. European share of the population as calculated by the authors based on multiple sources. For territories outside continental Europe, we mark the date of the first recorded European settlement or (if the latter is unknown) the first European contact (discovery). This is coded as zero (no Europeans), forming the first data point in the series. For territories within continental Europe, we record the number of Europeans as 100% in 1950. This estimate is extended back to 1789. For the remaining time-period (after the point of first European contact for non-European territories and after 1950 for European territories), we use a quadratic function to estimate yearly data points across available data points. *Source:* see Appendix A. *Scale:* interval. *eur_pct_est_smooth*

European ancestry, Easterly, Levine. European share of the population. *Source:* Easterly, Levine (2016). *Scale:* interval. *euro1900*

European ancestry, Putterman, Weil. European share of the population. *Source:* Putterman and Weil (2010). *Scale:* interval. *pct_eur_ancestors*

European colonial duration. Number of years of European colonial rule. *Source:* Olsson (2009). *Scale:* interval. *duration_global*

Early state history (pre-1500). State antiquities index up to 1500. *Source:* Brockstette and Putterman (2007) provided in dataset from Hariri (2012). *statehist_pre1500*

Early state history (pre-1750). State antiquities index up to 1750. *Source:* Brockstette and Putterman (2007) provided in dataset from Hariri (2012). *statehist_pre1750*

GDP per cap. Gross domestic product per capita in constant 1990 dollars, based on data from the Maddison Project (Bolt, van Zanden 2014), supplemented by estimates from Bairoch (1976), Broadberry (2015), Broadberry/Klein (2012), Gleditsch (2002), and the WDI (World Bank 2016), which are combined

in a dynamic, three-dimensional latent trait model. *Source*: Fariss et al. (2017). *Scale*: logarithmic. *Maddison_gdppc_1990_estimate_ln*

Harbor distance. Mean distance in kilometers within a territory to the nearest natural harbor. Natural harbors are considered one of four types (coastal natural, river natural, river basin, or lake/canal) as defined by the World Ports Index (NGIA 2017). *Source*: Gerring et al. (2018b). *Scale*: interval. *portdist_natural_km*

Indigenous mortality. Binary variable indicating high rates of indigenous mortality from European diseases. *Source*: Easterly, Levine (2016) drawing on McEvedy, Jones (1978), McNeil (1976), Karlen (1995), Oldstone (1998). *Scale*: binary. *el_indigmort*

Indirect rule. Ratio of colonially recognized court cases to all court cases in 1955. *Source*: Lange (2004), extended by Hariri (2012). *Scale*: interval. *indirect_rule*

Inequality. Distribution of income expressed as a Gini coefficient (aka Gini index, Gini ratio). Missing data is imputed, as follows, using linear models (a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given the stickiness of the variable of interest). Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated. Step 2: Missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases) is filled by repeating the last observation. Measure is based on data from UNU-WIDER (2017). *Source*: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016). *Scale*: interval. *e_peginiwi*

Latitude. The absolute value of the latitude of the capital city, divided by 90 (to take values between 0 and 1). *Source*: La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, Vishny (1997). *Scale*: interval. *lp_lat_abst*

Lexical index of electoral democracy. An ordinal index measuring the electoral components of democracy in a cumulative fashion. That is, to qualify for a given level (0-6) all previous conditions must be satisfied. 0 = No elections. (Elections are not held for any policymaking offices. This includes situations in which elections are postponed indefinitely or the constitutional timing of elections is violated in a more than marginal fashion.) 1 = Elections with no parties or only one party. (There are regular elections but they are non-partisan or only a single party or party grouping is allowed to participate.) 2 = Multi-party elections for legislature. (Opposition parties are allowed to participate in legislative elections and to take office.) 3 = Multi-party elections for executive. (The executive is chosen directly or indirectly – by an elected legislature – through elections. 4 = Minimally competitive elections for both executive and legislature. (The chief executive offices and the seats in the effective legislative body are – directly or indirectly – filled by elections characterized by uncertainty, meaning that the elections are, in principle, sufficiently free to enable the opposition to win government power.) 5 = Male or female suffrage. (Virtually all adult male *or* female citizens are allowed to vote in elections.) 6 = Universal suffrage. (Virtually all adult citizens are allowed to vote in elections.) *Source*: Skaaning et al. (2015) and extended by the authors. *Scale*: ordinal. *lexical_index*

Malaria ecology. Measure of the stability of malarial transmission in a given territory. *Source*: Easterly, Levine (2016), drawing on Kiszewski et al. (2004). *Scale*: interval. *el_ME*

Male suffrage. A measure that covers *de facto* enfranchised adults and not *de jure*. For example, the scores reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. If an electoral regime is interrupted, male suffrage may still be 100. *Source*: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016) and extended by the authors with data from Bilinski (2015). *Scale*: interval. *v2msuffrage_JG*

Muslim. Share of population that is muslim by heritage (%). *Source*: authors. *Scale*: interval. *Muslim*

Neolithic transition. Years prior to 2000 in which Neolithic transition is estimated to have occurred. *Source*: Putterman and Trainor (2006) as provided by Hariri (2012). *agri_transition*

Oil income per capita. The aggregated real value of a country's petroleum production, as a share of total population. *Source*: Haber, Menaldo (2011). *Scale*: interval. *e_Total_Oil_Income_PC*

Polity2. A weighted additive aggregation procedure across five sub-components: competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness and regulation of political participation, and constraints on the chief executive. *Source*: Polity IV database (Marshall, Jaggers 2016). *Scale*: ordinal. *e_polity2*

Polyarchy. Electoral democracy index. *Source*: V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2018; Teorell et al. 2018). *Scale*: interval. *v2x_polyarchy*

Population density, 1500. *Source:* Michalopoulos (2012), drawing on McEvedy, Jones (1978).

Precious metals. Binary variable indicating if a given country produced any silver or gold in 1999. Originally reported in Easterly (2007). *Source:* Easterly, Levine (2016). *Scale:* binary. *el_gold_silver*

Protestant. Percentage of population belonging to a Protestant Christian denomination. To complete the time series, countries were assigned a value of 0 in the year prior to the arrival of the first Christian missionaries and then filled using linear interpolation. Observed data points come from the Correlates of War Project (Maoz 2013) and Woodberry (2012). *Source:* Calculated by authors. *Scale:* interval. *chrstprotpct*

Regions. A vector of dummies: Europe (Western and Eastern), America, Caribbean, MENA, sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, South-East Asia, South Asia, Pacific. *Source:* Authors. *Scale:* nominal. *e_regionpol2*

Settler mortality. Historical deaths per 1000 European settlers per year. Originally reported in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). *Source:* Easterly, Levine (2016). *Scale:* interval. *el_settlemort*

Soil suitability. Measure of the suitability of soil for agriculture based on soil carbon density and pH. Originally reported in Ashraf and Galor (2013). *Source:* Easterly, Levine (2016). *Scale:* interval. *el_soilsuit*

State history. History of stateness calculated at 100-intervals from 0 AD to the present with one percent depreciation rate. *Source:* Bockstette, Chanda, Putterman (2002). *Statehistn01*

Year. Calendar year.

Years since independence. Number of years since independence (de facto or de jure) or 1000 (whichever comes later). *Source:* Calculated by authors. *Scale:* Logarithmic. *indep_yrs_since_ln*

Years since state formation Number of years since state formation. *Source:* authors. *Scale:* logarithmic. *state_early_yrs_since_ln*

Table E.2: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
European ancestry	54,271	17.48	32.96	0.00	100.00
Polyarchy	24,002	26.53	26.22	0.73	94.00
Harbor distance	26,137	322.56	302.55	4.13	1986.00
Latitude	44,047	0.28	0.19	0.00	0.72
Early democracy	44,306	0.26	0.40	0.00	1.00
Protestant	42,618	9.22	19.00	0.00	99.01
Muslim	43,848	23.29	35.98	0.00	99.90
English colonial duration	55,288	65.85	148.05	0.00	952.00
Oil income per capita	14,729	343.04	2645.72	0.00	78588.80
GDP per capita	27,306	7.61	1.14	3.87	14.40
Region	45,698	4.49	2.63	1.00	10.00
Male suffrage	21,171	51.71	48.64	0.00	100.00
Elections	40,645	40.19	49.03	0.00	100.00
Contestation	35,814	11.93	20.29	0.00	100.00
Lexical	37,441	22.51	35.88	0.00	100.00
Polity 2	16,427	47.75	35.51	0.00	100.00
State history	19,234	0.38	0.28	0.01	0.98
Years since state formation	44,312	1.82	2.33	0.00	7.72
Years since independence	43,111	1.57	2.26	0.00	7.57
Population density, 1500	16,611	0.91	1.49	-3.82	3.84
Settler mortality	17,787	4.70	1.17	2.15	7.99
Malaria ecology	25,320	5.04	7.22	0.00	31.55
Indigenous mortality	27,710	0.33	0.47	0.00	1.00
Soil suitability	23,795	0.53	0.19	0.16	0.95
Precious metals	27,710	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Biogeography	18,453	-0.01	1.31	-1.02	3.79
Inequality	7,366	40.67	10.23	15.90	74.30
European ancestry, Easterly, Levine	36,424	28.29	40.91	0.00	100.00
European ancestry, Putterman, Weil	38,150	0.21	0.35	0.00	1.00
Distance to London	44,418	8.40	1.03	0.00	9.84
Agricultural transition	33,869	4.85	2.36	0.4	10.5

Appendix F: Robustness Tests

Table F.1: Excluding Regions

<i>Excluded region</i>	Americas	MENA	Sub-Saharan Africa	Europe	East Asia	South-East Asia	South Asia	Pacific	Caribbean
<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
European ancestry (%)	0.29*** (5.46)	0.28*** (5.92)	0.31*** (6.48)	0.42*** (7.92)	0.32*** (6.74)	0.31*** (6.83)	0.31*** (6.87)	0.32*** (6.94)	0.32*** (6.98)
Harbor distance	-0.01** (-3.30)	-0.01*** (-4.44)	-0.01** (-2.45)	-4.97e-3* (-1.91)	-0.01*** (-3.01)	-0.01*** (-3.21)	-0.01** (-2.96)	-0.01*** (-3.11)	-0.01** (-2.82)
Latitude	27.26*** (3.39)	25.74*** (3.55)	19.72** (2.33)	2.42 (0.29)	21.71*** (2.93)	21.50*** (3.02)	22.90*** (-2.96)	21.95*** (3.07)	23.20*** (3.22)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	152	153	126	125	168	163	166	170	169
<i>Years</i>	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009
<i>N</i>	14,596	15,996	13,908	13,494	17,477	17,127	17,348	17,780	17,754
<i>R2</i>	.5599	.5806	.5406	.5144	.5646	.5581	.5652	.5598	.5651

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Table F.2: Alternate Instruments

<i>Models</i>	1		2		3		4		5	
<i>Estimator</i>	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
European ancestry (%)		0.56*** (3.95)		0.82*** (5.13)		0.56* (1.70)		0.61*** (3.69)		0.42*** (4.00)
Distance to London (ln, squared)	199.38 (1.57)									
Settler mortality			-7.13*** (-2.90)							
Malaria transmission					-0.36* (-1.66)					
Agricultural transition							-3.45*** (-3.27)			
State history									-43.74*** (-4.74)	
Harbor distance	-0.01** (-2.20)	-4.87e-3 (-1.53)	-0.01* (-1.59)	-2.04e-3 (-0.43)	-0.01** (-2.37)	-2.99e-3 (-0.49)	-0.01*** (-3.01)	-3.82e-3 (-0.98)	-0.01** (-2.03)	-0.01*** (-2.87)
Latitude	64.22*** (2.85)	3.64 (0.37)	74.79** (2.73)	-39.06 (-1.83)	54.37* (1.87)	-5.89 (0.26)	53.28** (2.59)	2.39 (0.22)	93.03*** (4.35)	5.46 (0.52)
Decade dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	150		77		111		128		86	
<i>Years</i>	1800-2009		1800-2009		1800-2009		1800-2009		1800-2009	
<i>N</i>	14,790		8,964		12,288		12,849		9,989	
<i>R2</i>	.2455	.4589	.3927	.5082	.2134	.5221	.2332	.4511	.4135	.6054

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. *Samples:* non-European cases. *Estimator:* two-stage least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Appendix G: Alternative Accounts

Having set forth a European-ancestry account of democratization it is time to consider several alternatives.

In attempts to explain long-run economic development political institutions often play an intermediary role. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (“AJR” 2001, 2002) argue that the contribution of Europeans to economic development operates through “good institutions,” operationalized with an indicator of property rights measured in the late-twentieth century. This argument runs parallel to our own, but is conceptually (and empirically) distinct.

A second argument hinges upon labor supply. Engerman, Sokoff (2012: ch 4) distinguish between labor-poor and labor-rich societies, arguing that in the former political institutions are apt to be more inclusive so as to attract migrants. It seems evident that in some settings governments grant suffrage and other political and civil rights and landowners offer enhanced wages in order to encourage immigration. However, in other settings labor scarcity is dealt with by restricting labor mobility (serfdom) or forced migration (slavery). Divergent experiences may be found in Europe after the Black Death (where Western Europe followed the a liberalizing strategy and Eastern Europe a coercive strategy [Engerman 2014: 37]) and in the Americas during the 17th-19th centuries (where labor-poor areas away from the equator followed a liberalizing strategy and labor-poor areas near the equator followed a coercive strategy). This seems to be a case of extreme causal heterogeneity, where – due to some unidentified moderator – a single causal factor has contrary effects. In any case, we find no discernible relationship between population density and democracy when tested in a crossnational sample (results available upon request).

A third issue concerns the role of geography in conditioning global migration and mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson 2001, 2002; Easterly, Levine 2016; Engerman, Sokoloff 2012; Glaeser et al. 2004; Mahoney 2010; Putterman, Weil 2010). These factors are featured in our theoretical account (Section I) and represented in our empirical models by *latitude*, *harbor distance*, and a vector of regional dummies (Table 1). However, “geography” is a complex of causes and there are many ways it might affect the variables of theoretical interest, perhaps serving as a confounder.

To mitigate this concern we include a battery of additional factors in tests shown in Table G.1. These include settler mortality, malaria ecology, indigenous mortality, soil suitability, precious metals, and biogeography. We also test inequality (proxied by the gini coefficient of income inequality), which appears as a key intermediary variable in many accounts of long-term development (e.g., Engerman, Sokoloff 2012). Results demonstrate that few of these factors has an appreciable impact on the outcome of interest in the full specification. More important, for present purposes, these covariates do not attenuate the estimated effect of European ancestry on

democracy. Thus, although we cannot discount the possibility that some unmeasured geographic factor might serve as a confounder, we cannot readily identify what this factor might be.

Table G.1: Geography and Inequality

<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
European ancestry (%)	0.43*** (8.12)	0.37*** (6.60)	0.31*** (4.75)	0.38*** (6.24)	0.35*** (6.24)	0.41*** (6.46)	0.24*** (4.27)
Harbor distance	-5.18e-3* (-2.12)	-4.66e-3 (-1.73)	-3.15e-3 (-1.21)	-2.93e-3 (-1.08)	-4.43e-3 (-1.80)	-5.30e-3** (-1.98)	-0.01*** (-3.03)
Latitude	-10.19 (-1.31)	4.52 (0.49)	6.92 (0.82)	-0.74 (0.08)	0.39 (0.05)	6.09 (0.56)	22.29** (2.47)
Early democracy	-1.86 (-0.71)	4.18 (1.42)	5.41* (1.84)	5.19* (1.66)	3.90 (1.46)	2.00 (0.56)	9.29** (2.18)
Protestant (%)	0.29*** (2.89)	0.29*** (2.75)	0.29*** (2.69)	0.36*** (2.64)	0.32*** (3.15)	0.22* (1.99)	0.17** (2.60)
Muslim (%)	-0.01 (-0.37)	-0.06** (-2.10)	-0.05 (-1.63)	-0.04 (-0.98)	-0.06** (-2.13)	-0.04 (-1.10)	-0.15*** (-3.28)
English colonial duration	0.02 (1.41)	0.01 (1.23)	0.01 (1.16)	0.01 (1.04)	0.01 (0.90)	0.02 (1.21)	0.01 (1.35)
Settler mortality	-1.51 (-1.56)						
Malaria ecology		0.01 (0.09)					
Indigenous mortality			5.56** (2.48)				
Soil suitability				9.20 (1.35)			
Precious metals					4.97*** (2.79)		
Biogeography						0.42 (0.45)	
Inequality							0.02 (0.12)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Countries</i>	77	110	113	105	113	81	154
<i>Years</i>	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1789-2009	1900-2009
<i>N</i>	8,978	12,210	12,504	11,744	12,504	9,451	5,800
<i>R2</i>	.6955	.6157	.6224	.6156	.6266	.6674	.5558

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to 0-100 scale. *Estimator:* ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

A final issue to consider are the many and various alternate pathways from Europe to the world that might have served to diffuse concepts and practices of democracy. We argue that the demographic pathway was more potent than other potential pathways including those based on religion (Protestantism) or colonial control (British). We choose British colonial duration because this variable out-performs other measures of colonialism in tests conducted by Olsson (2009). We choose Protestants as share of the population because this variable, unlike others provided by Woodberry (2012), is measurable across the period of observation and across the world (not merely outside Europe), and hence is congruent with our research design. We supplement coding of both of these variables so as to be testable across a global sample that extends back to 1789 (see variable descriptions in Table E.1). Importantly, the differential performance of these factors

remains in narrower tests, e.g., when the sample is restricted to the non-European world (Table 3) or when the outcome is measured only in the contemporary era (Model 6, Table 1).

Granted, these complex causal factors might be operationalized differently. To further probe alternate pathways from Europe we conduct additional tests focused on other variables drawn from recent work on these subjects. This includes an indicator of colonial rule that measures the duration of colonial control for all European powers, not just England (Olsson 2009), and a measure of indirect rule constructed by Lange (2004) and extended by Hariri (2012).

For each variable, we adopt two specifications – one based on Model 2, Table 1, and the other based on Model 4, Table 1 (excluding Protestantism and British colonial rule so as to avoid problems of collinearity). All tests are restricted to non-European cases, in conformance with conventional formats.

These tests show that alternate pathways from Europe carry the expected signs – colonial rule is positively associated with democracy and indirect rule negative associated with democracy. However, neither relationship is especially strong judging from t statistics. By contrast, the relationship between European ancestry and democracy retains strength in all tests and estimates are comparable to corresponding models in Table 1.

To be clear, we are not arguing that other pathways of European influence are irrelevant to the fate of democracy. However, the crossnational evidence suggests that demography is probably a more important – or at any rate, a more consistent and long-lived – factor in conditioning regimes in the modern era.

Table G.2: Alternate Measures of European Influence

<i>Model</i>	1	2	3	4
European ancestry (%)	0.33*** (4.14)	0.24*** (3.09)	0.38*** (4.22)	0.27*** (2.95)
Colonial rule	0.02** (2.28)	0.03** (2.13)		
Indirect rule			-3.71 (-1.56)	-2.45 (-0.80)
Harbor distance	-0.01** (-2.21)	-1.89e-3 (-0.69)	-2.29e-3 (-0.81)	-3.22e-5 (-0.01)
Latitude	16.92** (2.53)	1.92 (0.19)	3.29 (0.35)	3.86 (0.31)
Early democracy		10.11*** (3.37)		4.75 (1.44)
Muslim		-0.09* (-1.85)		-0.04 (-0.69)
Resource income		-8.37e-4*** (-4.02)		-6.91e-4 (-0.87)
GDP per capita (ln)		6.73*** (4.36)		4.67*** (3.43)
Year dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Region dummies		✓		✓
<i>Countries</i>	154	142	87	86
<i>Years</i>	1789-2009	1800-2006	1789-2009	1800-2006
<i>N</i>	15,029	9,896	9,900	6,643
<i>R2</i>	.4986	.5510	.5743	.5921

Outcome: democracy, measured by the Polyarchy index, transformed to a 0-100 scale. Ordinary least squares regression, t statistics in parentheses, with clustered standard errors. ***p<.01 **p<.05 *p<.10

Appendix H: References

- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson. 2001. "The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation." *American economic review* 91.5: 1369-1401.
- Ashraf, Q., Oded Galor. 2013. "The 'Out of Africa' hypotheses, human genetic diversity, and comparative economic development." *American Economic Review*, 103(1), 1-46
- Bairoch, Paul. 1976. "Europe's gross national product, 1800-1975." *Journal of European Economic History* 5 (2), 273-340.
- Bilinski, Adam. 2015. *Paths to success, paths to failure: Historical trajectories to democratic stability*. PhD Dissertation, University of Florida.
- Bockstette, Valerie, Areendam Chanda, and Louis Putterman. 2002. "States and Markets: The Advantage of an Early Start." *Journal of Economic Growth* 7:4 (December) 347-369.
- Bolt, Jutta, Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2014. "The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts." *The Economic History Review* 67:3, 627-651.
- Broadberry, S. 2015. "Accounting for the great divergence." Online. <https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/users/Broadberry/AccountingGreatDivergence6.pdf>, accessed 23 November 2016.
- Broadberry, S., A. Klein. 2012. "Aggregate and per capita GDP in Europe, 1870-2000: Continental, regional and national data with changing boundaries." *Scandinavian Economic History Review* 60 (1), 79-107.
- Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, Agnes Cornell, M. Steven Fish, Haakon Gjerløw, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jerrey Staton, Aksel Sundtröm, Eitan Tzelgov, Luca Uberti, Yiting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. "V-Dem Codebook v8." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
- Easterly, William. 2007. "Inequality does cause underdevelopment." *Journal of Development Economics*, 84(2), 755-776.
- Easterly, William, Ross Levine. 2016. "The European origins of economic development." *Journal of Economic Growth* 21.3: 225-257.
- Engerman, Stanley L. 2014. "Slavery, serfdom and other forms of coerced labour: Similarities and

- differences.” In Michael Laccohee Bush (ed), *Serfdom and slavery: Studies in legal bondage* (Routledge): 18-41.
- Fariss, C. J., C. D. Crabtree, T. Anders, Z. M. Jones, F. J. Linder, J. N. Markowitz. 2017. “Latent Estimation of GDP, GDP per capita, and Population from Historic and Contemporary Sources.” URL: <http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.01099>
- Gerring, John, Allen Hicken, Daniel Weitzel, Lee Cojocar. 2018a. “Electoral Contestation: A Comprehensive Polity-Level Analysis.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 73.
- Gerring, John, Tore Wig, Andreas Forø Tollefsen, Brendan Apfeld. 2018b. “Harbors and Democracy.” University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute: Working Paper No. 70.
- Giuliano, Paola, Nathan Nunn. 2013. “The transmission of democracy: from the village to the nation-state.” *American Economic Review* 103.3: 86-92.
- Gleditsch, Kristian S. 2002. “Expanded trade and GDP data.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (5), 712–724.
- Haber, Stephen, Victor Menaldo. 2011. “Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse.” *American political science Review* 105.1: 1-26.
- Hibbs, D. A, Jr., Ola Olsson. 2004. “Geography, biogeography, and why some countries are rich and others are poor.” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 101(10), 3715–372.
- Karlen, A. 1995. *Man and microbes: Disease and plagues in history and modern times*. New York: Simon, Schuster.
- Kiszewski, A., Mellinger, A., Spielman, A., Malaney, P., Sachs, S. E., Sachs, J. 2004. “A global index representing the stability of malaria transmission.” *American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene*, 70(5), 486–498.
- Lange, Matthew. 2004. “British Colonial Legacies and Political Development.” *World Development* 32:6, 905-22.
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny. 1998. “Law and finance.” *Journal of political economy* 106, 6: 1113-1155.
- Marshall, Monte G., Keith Jagers. 2016. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015.” URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>
- McEvedy, Colin, Richard Jones. 1978. *Atlas of world population history*. New York: Facts on File.
- McNeill, William. (1976). *Plagues and peoples*. New York: Anchor Press.

- Michalopoulos, Stelios. 2012. "The Origins of Ethnolinguistic Diversity." *American Economic Review*, 102(4): 1508-1539.
- Maoz, Zeev, Errol A. Henderson. 2013. "The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends." *International Interactions* 39: 265-291.
- Murdock, George Peter. 1967. "Ethnographic atlas: a summary." *Ethnology* 6(2), 109-236.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGIA). 2017. *World Port Index 2017, 26th ed.* Springfield, VA: United States Government.
- Oldstone, M. 1998. *Viruses, plagues, and history.* USA: Oxford University Press.
- Olsson, Ola. 2009. "On the Democratic Legacy of Colonialism." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 37:4, 534-51.
- Putterman, Louis, and Cary Anne Trainor 2006. "Agricultural Transition Year. Country Data Set", Brown University. http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Louis_Putterman/agricultural%20data%20page.htm.
- Putterman, Louis, David Weil. 2010. "Post-1500 population flows and the long run determinants of economic growth and inequality." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4), 1627–1682.
- Teorell, Jan, Michael Coppedge, Staffan Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2018. "Measuring Polyarchy Across the Globe, 1900–2017." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 1-25.
- Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein. 2011. "The quality of government dataset." Göteborg: The Quality of Government Institute University of Göteborg.
- UNU-WIDER. 2017. "World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4)." URL: <https://www.wider.unu.edu/database/world-income-inequality-database-wiid34>
- Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 106:2 (May) 244-74.
- World Bank. 2016. *World Development Indicators 2016.* Washington, DC: World Bank.