



COUNTRY BRIEF

FIJI

Marina Povitkina
Valeriya Mechkova

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Country Brief

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THE VARIETIES OF DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE



UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG
DEPT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Please address comments and/or queries for information to:

V-Dem Institute

Department of Political Science

University of Gothenburg

Sprängkullsgatan 19, PO Box 711

SE 40530 Gothenburg

Sweden

E-mail: contact@v-dem.net

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About V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. V-Dem's multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges the complexity of the concept of democracy. The V-Dem project distinguishes among five high-level principles of democracy: *electoral*, *liberal*, *participatory*, *deliberative*, and *egalitarian*, which are disaggregated into lower-level components and specific indicators.

Key features of V-Dem:

- Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-level components of democracy such as regular elections, judicial independence, direct democracy, and gender equality, consisting of more than 400 distinct and precise indicators;
- Covers all countries and dependent territories from 1900 to the present and provides an estimate of measurement reliability for each rating;
- Makes all ratings public, free of charge, through a user-friendly interface.

With four Principal Investigators, two Project Coordinators, fifteen Project Managers, more than thirty Regional Managers, almost 200 Country Coordinators, several Assistant Researchers, and approximately 2,600 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science data collection projects with a database of over 15 million data points. The database makes highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects of democracy in a country, while also allowing for summary comparisons between countries based on aggregated indices for different dimensions of democracy. Users from anywhere are able to use the V-Dem online analysis tools which can be found at the project's website. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs can benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such as selecting country program priorities, informing program designs and monitoring impact of their programs.

Methodology:

Unlike extant data collection projects, which typically use a small group of experts who rate all countries or ask a single expert to code one country, the V-Dem project has recruited over 2,600 local and cross-national experts to provide judgments on various indicators about democracy. The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factual information from existing data sources about constitutional regulations and de jure situation with expert coding for questions that require evaluation. Experts' ratings are aggregated through an advanced statistical model that takes into account the possibilities that experts may make mistakes and have different scales in mind when coding. In addition, bridge-coders - experts who code multiple countries - are recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates cross-nationally¹.

¹ For further details and information about the V-Dem methodology, see <http://v-dem.net>.

Fiji

Introduction

This V-Dem data brief illustrates the democratic development of Fiji from 1900 to 2014. The purpose is to provide a concise overview of the V-Dem data collected for Fiji. The historical development of the five V-Dem principles of democracy - *electoral, liberal, egalitarian, deliberative and participatory* - is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of the *female rights index*. In addition, the brief delves further into the different components and detailed indicators of the main principles of democracy². We anticipate that this brief will be a useful resource for policy-makers, practitioners and citizen-led democracy assessments.

Fiji is a former British colony. The country gained independence in 1970 when a constitution establishing parliamentary democracy with the British monarch as head of state was adopted. General elections have been taking place throughout the time period explored although with limited suffrage up to 1963.

Since independence, periods of more democratic developments have alternated with instability, including coups and constitutional crises. The democratic process was first interrupted by military coups in May and September 1987 when the Parliament was dissolved. Fiji was declared a Republic and a new constitution was adopted in 1990. Political instability occurred again in early 2000 when armed men occupied Parliament and the Prime Minister and other deputies were held hostage. This led to the military taking over control of the country and installing an interim administration. A fourth coup after independence was led by the military in 2006 and resulted in an eight-year period of transition up to 2014 when elections were held.


Principles of Democracy

The radar chart in **Figure 1**, gives an overview of the five V-Dem indices of democracy for Fiji at four different points in time: 1905, 1950, 1995 and 2014. All indices in the figure range from 0 to 1, where a score of 0 suggests that a country did not evince the characteristics of democracy relevant to this particular index at this point in time, while 1 corresponds to the best possible situation for this index, according to the V-Dem measures.

In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental and understood as an essential element of the other principles of representative democracy - *liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian*; without it, we cannot call a regime “democratic”. However, we recognize that countries can have “democratic qualities”, without being democracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for *all* high-level principles of democracy include the measure of electoral democracy. Thus, for example, “Participatory Democracy” is a composite score of the electoral and in the participatory components.

² All indicators and indices can be found in Glossary of Terms in Appendix I. For an overview of the structure of the indices, please see Appendix II.

Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices




As can be seen in the figure, the level of democratic development in colonial Fiji is sparse and reflected in the ratings for 1905 and 1950 which vary from .05 for the lowest scoring principle - participatory democracy, to .19 for the highest - electoral democracy. 25 years after independence, substantial democratic gains have been made in the areas of *electoral*, *egalitarian* and *deliberative democracy*. This means that there has been some advancement in terms of the following aspects of democracy: rulers being held responsible by citizens through electoral competition and political and civil society organizations' ability to operate freely in an environment of freedom of expression (electoral democracy); achieving equality among social groups in terms of representation, agenda-setting power, protection by the law, and influence over policymaking (egalitarian democracy); and finally, having wide deliberation when important policy changes are being considered (deliberative democracy). However, electoral democracy is the only principle for which Fiji crosses the upper half of the scale.

More modest democratic improvement during this period takes place in terms of both *liberal* and *participatory* democracy principles, which are also the poorest performing principles in 2014. The liberal and participatory principles focus on the protection of individual and minority rights, rule of law and balance of power; and achieving direct rule and citizen participation in the political process.

In Fiji the democratic levels are approximately on the same levels in 2014 as they were in 1995 with the exception for the deliberative component which shows slightly lower scores in 2014 than it did in 1995. In 2014, among all principles, Fiji scored the highest in *electoral democracy* and the lowest in terms of the *participatory* principle of democracy.

In **Figure 2** below, we look further into the aforementioned indices and graph the components that go into the five higher level principle indices of democracy: the electoral, liberal, egalitarian, participatory and deliberative aspects. The development of these components in Fiji over more than one hundred years is displayed together with the female rights index³.

³ The scale of each index and indicator is specified within parentheses in the legend of each graph. In all indicators and indices graphed, a lower score corresponds to a less democratic level, while a higher score suggests a more democratic level. Please see Appendix I for more information on each of the indicators and indices.



From the beginning of the time series up to independence, Fiji receives more or less constant scores on all democracy components with four measures around the middle of the scale and two close to the bottom. This could be interpreted as suggesting that colonial rule provided Fiji with some democratic qualities, especially in terms of the liberal aspects, but also including a fair share of gender equality, deliberative qualities and egalitarian aspects. Electoral qualities and participatory aspects were particularly suppressed.

The fluctuating scores in the post-independence period reflect the volatile political history of the country as described in the introduction. Following the first 17 years of somewhat democratic progress, coups in 1987, 2000 and 2006, as well as the constitutional crisis in 2009, caused significant drops in several of the indices. This is especially true for the *electoral* and the *liberal indices*. Because they constricted liberal aspects, the power-holders post-independence have differed from the colonial governors.

The two areas that were the least affected by military interventions were female rights and the egalitarian aspects of democracy. Both of these areas increased around 1965 and came close to the same score of .7 in 2014.


The *deliberative component* is the first one to develop more substantially historically, reaching a score of around .8 in 1970. However, on this measure Fiji currently scores around .6 after experiencing a number of hits that coincide with the political disruptions which have occurred in the country, although an increase can be noted in the last years of the time series. Similarly, in terms of *electoral* and *liberal components*, Fiji ends up with a score of .6, a bit above the middle of the index scale indicating an improvement in terms of the democratic qualities across these three areas.

In the following section we further explore each of the six components of democracy by graphing the indicators and indices which constitute them in order to identify more specific aspects within these various democratic developments.

The Electoral Component

The V-Dem electoral democracy component index measures the core value of achieving responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive and periodic elections that are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic

irregularities; whether political and civil society organizations can operate freely; and whether the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections. **Figure 3** displays the four sub-indices that constitute the electoral component index.



The *freedom of association* index in **Figure 3** receives consistent scores above .6, although drops are noted, especially after 2006. This reflects that Fijian parties have been allowed to form and participate in elections and that, to some extent, civil society organizations have been able to operate freely since the beginning of the 20th century. The relatively high scores for these issue-areas could indicate that these are not the main areas that colonial and subsequent non-democratic rulers have restricted.

When it comes to *clean elections*, and, thus, to the extent to which registration fraud, systematic irregularities and vote buying are absent, colonial rulers have kept elections under moderate authoritarian control as the scores around .5 suggest. However, the drops to the very bottom of the scale after independence reflect the three interruptions on the electoral regime in Fiji. Recently, the situation has improved as is reflected in the .6 rating for cleanliness of elections, although the quality of elections could still be improved.

As portrayed by the suffrage indicator, the elections in Fiji up to the 1960s were highly exclusive. In 1963 indigenous Fijians were granted the right to vote, women's suffrage was introduced, income and property rights were abolished. However, literacy qualifications remained.

The *elected executive index* measures whether the chief executive is elected through popular elections. The scores during the colonial rule reflect the fact that the executive is not held responsive through electoral competition for this period. The volatile history of the country and the occurring coups are also reflected in this indicator by drops of the data to 0. In 2014, however, after new elections were held, this indicator reached its highest score of 1.

It should also be noted that Fiji adopted a new constitution in 2013, which is reflected in the steep increases for the three of the four indicators.

The Liberal Component

The liberal dimension of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights from a potential “tyranny of the state and the majority.” This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties and strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances by the judiciary and the legislature that limit the use of executive power.




Figure 4 shows similar developments for the indices *equality before the law and individual liberty* and *legislative constraints on the executive* over time, while the index for *judicial constraints on the executive* demonstrates a downward trend, particularly with the coup in 1987.

The levels of *equality before the law and individual liberty*, with a score for Fiji of just under .7 in 2014, demonstrate that, to some degree, laws are transparent and rigorously enforced, the public administration is impartial and that citizens can generally enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and/or freedom of religion.

The *legislative constraints on the executive index*, measures the extent to which the legislature and government agencies are capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive. The increase from .4 to .6 came with independence in 1970, and the same level is sustained for the periods during which the legislature exists. The missing data during the electoral interruptions reflects the fact that, during those periods, legislature is either closed down or aborted, which is why no legislative oversight could be exercised.

The extent to which the executive respects the constitution and complies with rulings, as well as the extent to which the judiciary is able to act independently are measured in the index of *judicial constraints on the executive*. In this index, Fiji ends up on a level of .4 in 2014, leaving significant room for improvement in this aspect of liberal democracy.

The Participatory Component

The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and active participation by citizens in all political processes; it emphasizes non-electoral forms of political

participation through such channels as civil society organizations and through the mechanisms of direct democracy.





Figure 5 displays the four sub-indices that go into the participatory democracy component, which had the lowest values of all the dimensions in **Figure 2**. The present graph suggests that the situation in Fiji, with regards to participatory aspects, is best in terms of *civil society participation*. This variable measures, among other things, whether policymakers consult civil society organizations. The score of slightly above .5 suggests that while there is room for improvement in this aspect of participatory democracy, the situation has moved in an upward trend since independence.

It is worth noting that for Fiji, *direct popular vote*, which refers to a process by which citizens can register their opinion on a certain issue through referendums or plebiscites, and *regional government*, which measures whether regional governments exist and are able to operate without interference from unelected bodies, are both close to the bottom on the V-Dem measures. The low scores for the *regional government index* suggest that the country does not have elected regional governments. Hence, the ideal of elected and autonomous regional governments, with the ability to act without interference from unelected regional bodies is far from achieved. The absence of a line for *local government* is unfortunately due to missing data on this index for Fiji during the period.

The Deliberative Component

The *deliberative component of democracy* captures the core value that political decisions are guided by the pursuit of the public good and should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion.



Note, that the indicators displayed in **Figures 6, 7 and 8** have different scales, which are specified in parentheses in the legend of each figure.

Figure 6 shows that the five variables constituting this component follow a common trend marked primarily by an increase with independence in 1970 and the coups interrupting more democratic rule in the following period.

The indicator for *reasoned justification* (green line), ranging from 0 to 3, measures whether the political elites provide public justifications for their positions when important policy changes are considered. In 2014, Fiji has achieved a level where qualified justification takes place, meaning that elites tend to offer at least a simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. The same level, around 2, is sustained throughout the whole period graphed, with significant drops occurring in conjunction with the military coups.

Similar values in the middle of the range are measured by the *common good* indicator (purple line), which captures the extent to which political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good. According to the V-Dem data as of 2014, justifications made by elites to the citizens, policy choices are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/ group interests and on appeals to the common good.


The *respect counterarguments* indicator (orange line) examines the extent to which political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments. The score for Fiji is just above 2 in 2014, on the scale ranging to 5. This suggests that elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them. Hence, this aspect of political deliberation needs to receive more attention in order to achieve a higher level of respect for counterarguments within the public debate.

The indicators *engaged society* (blue line) and *range of consultation* (red line) both recorded a drop from 2005, but have experienced slight increases again in recent years. The *engaged society* indicator captures how widespread and independent public deliberations are. The score in 2014 suggests that, to some extent, public deliberation does take place and can even be encouraged at times, but it is nevertheless quite infrequent. In addition, as the red line shows, the consultation on important policy changes could be expanded to include a wider range of actors like leaders of opposition parties, independent representatives of different society groups, as the scores around 2 reveal.

The engaged society (blue line) captures the breadth of public deliberations when important policy changes are being considered, which plays an essential role in a deliberative democracy. In 2014 the indicator is moving towards a 3 on the scale, a rating which would suggest an improved situation in which public deliberations about major policy decisions are actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but this is confined to a small portion of specialized groups.

The Egalitarian Component

The *egalitarian* idea is that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties; hence a more equal distribution of resources, education, and health across socioeconomic groups should enhance political equality.



In **Figure 7** several of the variables display flat lines across the century on the medium level values around 2 and 3, while others experience more dramatic changes.

The *power distributed by socioeconomic position* indicator (red line) has not changed much over time, except for an increase after independence. According to the data, wealthy people have more political power than others. People of average and low income, however, appear to have significant influence, as well.

As shown in the graph, *power distributed by social group* (black line) has improved dramatically during the past two years after a decrease around 2005, in which the score dropped to the same level as during colonial rule in the beginning of the 20th century. Between 2006 and 2013 political power was monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. Following the increased score in 2013, however, all social groups now possess some political power, although some groups have more power than others.

The variable measuring political *power distributed by gender* (green line) reflects improvements with independence in 1970 and then again in 1990. However, Fiji ends up between 2-3 in 2014, indicating that men still have more political power than women. This is thus an area that requires attention in Fiji.

The indicator *social group equality for civil liberties* (orange line) shows how civil liberties across social groups have been at a constant level of 2 throughout the century, suggesting that

members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population. This still leaves room for substantial improvement in this aspect of democracy.


The level of *health equality* (purple line, almost hidden) in Fiji has been on the same level throughout the century with a score of around 2.5. *Educational equality* (dark blue line), on the other hand, was at a significantly lower level in the beginning of the century, but has, after gradual improvement in the 1960s and 70s, reached the same level as health equality. These levels tell us that both health and education are becoming relatively equal. However, due to poor-quality healthcare and education, ten to 25% of Fijians' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens has been undermined in more recent years.

Particularistic or public goods (yellow line) refer to how spending is targeted in the national budget. Particularistic spending targets a certain group or sector, while public-goods spending is meant to benefit all. The graph reflects a constant score just above 2 throughout the period. This implies that the spending is evenly divided between the two types of goods.

The indicator *means-tested vs. universalistic* (light blue line) captures how welfare programs are targeted, namely whether they target underprivileged constituents only (through cash-transfer programs, for example) or whether they can potentially benefit the entire population (e.g. free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, welfare programs that benefit everyone and do not stigmatize certain unprivileged groups, such as poor people, are more democratic from an egalitarian perspective than means-tested programs which target solely these particular groups. When looking at the data, one can see that a large change took place with independence in 1970. The colonial welfare state policies are means-tested, whereas after independence, most of these policies became universalistic, although a portion is still means-tested.

Female Rights

Equality between women and men is indivisible from democracy at all levels, and is broadly recognized as a pre-condition for truly representative and responsive governments. The V-Dem *female rights index* focuses on the ability of women to participate in open discussion of political issues, to take part in civil society organizations, to have an equal share in the overall distribution of power, the freedom of movement, the right to private property, access to justice, and freedom from forced labor. **Figure 8** displays the seven indicators that constitute this index for Fiji.



As portrayed in **Figure 8**, Fiji scores relatively high on many of the indicators, some of which have not changed much over time. The variable *CSO women's participation* (red line) suggests that women are rarely prevented from participating in civil society organizations. With a score of 3, *the freedom of discussion for women indicator* (purple line) tells us that women's ability to take part in political debates in the public and private sphere of Fiji, has been accepted to a certain degree throughout the century, without any dramatic changes.

The variable *property rights for women* (yellow line), with an almost constant level of 3 throughout the period of analysis, indicates that more than half of the women in Fiji enjoy most property rights, however, a smaller share of women still have much more restricted rights in this sense.

The distribution of power between women and men is depicted by the variable *power distributed by gender* (light blue line). It starts off at quite low levels of close to 1, indicating that, until independence in 1970, men had a dominant hold on political power and women had only marginal influence. Since the beginning of the 90s, however, the situation has improved so that men have only slightly more political power than women.

The freedom of domestic movement for women (black line) was on a relatively high level even during colonial rule. Since independence the variable has been at the top of the scale, which tells us that, to a great extent, virtually all women are able to move freely across the country and establish residency.

The freedom of forced labor indicator (orange line) reflects a colonial and independent Fijian society where forced labor has been virtually non-existent.

The score just below 3 on the *access to justice* indicator (green line), tells a story of relatively secure and effective access to justice for women which is usually observed. Hence, women of Fiji can, to a great extent, bring cases before the courts without risking their personal safety. They usually have access to fair trials, and they have the effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights. This is another positive aspect in terms of democratic qualities in Fiji.

Concluding Remarks

Based on data from key V-Dem indices and indicators, this brief provides an overview of the democratic development of Fiji from 1900 to 2014.

Fiji's independence from Britain and adoption of the new constitution in 1970 generally brought about democratic enhancement which is reflected with higher scores on a number of graphs. Major political events after independence, such as the three coups and the recent constitutional crisis in 2009, on the other hand, have barred further development of democracy.

Generally, the *female rights index* and the *egalitarian component index* are the areas of democracy which are least affected by political turmoil from more recent years. As a result, these indices and some of the indicators constituting them score higher than the other measures. Thus, for example, women's right to freely move in the country, participate in civil society organizations and their freedom from forced labor have been largely protected in recent years. Another interesting positive development worth noting is that there has been an increase in *power distributed by social group* in recent years, after big deficits in this area during previous periods.

The *participatory component* is the poorest performing component which suggests that citizens' political participation and direct rule in Fiji is an area that requires more focused attention. The graphs have also revealed that the deliberative process could be further expanded to include a wider range of representatives of the society offering diverse opinions. In addition, securing free and fair elections and an effective balance of powers by providing oversight of the judiciary and legislature on the executive could be further enhanced.

Appendix I. List of variables.

This is a list of all the indices and indicators included in the country brief. It contains the question and the question alternatives as well as information of aggregation, scale, data release and citation. These can also be found in the V-Dem codebook.

Variables included in Figure 1.

Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing "compensation" in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the "weakest link" argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahls sub-components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is aggregated using this formula:

v2x_polyarchy=

$$.1*v2x_suffr + .1*v2xel_frefair + .1*v2x_accex + .1*v2x_frassoc_thick + .1*v2x_freexp_thick + .5*v2x_suffr * v2xel_frefair * v2x_accex * v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_freexp_thick.$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_freexp_thick v2x_EDcomp_thick

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal *democracy*, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

v2x_libdem=

$$.25*v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} + .25*v2x_liberal + .5*v2x_polyarchy^{1.6}*v2x_liberal$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_liberal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x_partipdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory *democracy*, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{v2x_partipdem} = \\ .25 * \text{v2x_polyarchy}^{1.6} + .25 * \text{v2x_partip} + .5 * \text{v2x_polyarchy}^{1.6} * \text{v2x_partip} \end{aligned}$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_polyarchy v2x_partip

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x_delibdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{v2x_delibdem} = \\ .25 * \text{v2x_polyarchy}^{1.6} + .25 * \text{v2x_delib} + .5 * \text{v2x_polyarchy}^{1.6} * \text{v2x_delib} \end{aligned}$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4, 5.

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x_egaldem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under

the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality. To make it a measure of egalitarian *democracy*, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_egaldem = .25 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} + .25 * v2x_egal + .5 * v2x_polyarchy^{1.6} * v2x_egal$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 2.

Electoral component index (D) (v2x_EDcomp_thick)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

$$v2x_EDcomp_thick = v2x_frassoc_thick * v2x_suffr * v2xel_refair * v2x_accex.$$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_refair v2x_accex

Data release: 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Participatory component index (D) (v2x_partip)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec), and elected regional government power (v2xel_regelec).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_iccpart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x_egal)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position (v2pepwrse), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq), equal access to health (v2pehealth), power distribution according to gender (v2pepwrngen), share of budget allocated to public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-tested benefits (v2dlunivl).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2pepwrse v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrngen v2dlencmps v2dlunivl

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Liberal component index (D) (v2x_liberal)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl_delib)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2dlreason v2dlcommon v2dlcountr v2dlconslt v2dlengage

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Female rights index (D) (v2x_gender)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: To what extent are women's political rights protected?

Clarifications: Political rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in discussions of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, freedom of movement, the right to private property, access to justice, freedom from forced labor, representation in the ranks of journalists, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO women's participation (v2csgender), female journalists (v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrngen).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw v2pepwrngen

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 3.

Freedom of association (thick) index (D) (v2x_frassoc_thick)

Project manager: Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Clean elections index (D) (v2xel_frefair)

Project managers: Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are elections free and fair?

Clarifications: Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg)

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x_suffr)

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as of January 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or 'economic independence'), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very poor information – the conditions in similar countries or colonies.

Aggregation: v2elsuffrage/100

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Source: v2elsuffrage

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Elected executive index (de jure) (D) (v2x_accex)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected ($a=1$) or not ($a=0$). Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected (b), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state ($c1=1$, otherwise 0). Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government ($c2=1$, otherwise 0). Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state ($d=1$) or not ($d=0$). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected ($e=1$) or not ($e=0$). Define *hosw* as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government ($v2exhoshog=1$), $hosw=1$. If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then $hosw=1$; if the reverse is true, $hosw=0$. If they share equal power, $hosw=.5$. Define the weight for the head of government as $hogw=1-hosw$. The formula is:

$v2x_acex =$

$hosw * [\max(a1, b * c1)] + hogw * [\max(a1 * d, b * c1 * d, a2, b * c2)]$

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2lgello v2lgelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcbhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 4.

Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) (v2xcl_rol)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmovew), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmovew v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg_legcon)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x_jucon)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 5.

Civil society participation index (D) (v2x_cspart)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarifications: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection – national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtpt), and CSO women's participation (v2csgender).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csprtctpt v2csgender

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Local government (D) (v2xel_locelec)

Project managers: Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected local governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.)

Aggregation: First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_dd)

Project manager: David Altman

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy. The term does *not* encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

Aggregation: This index measures how easy it is to initiate and approve a direct popular vote and how consequential that vote is (if approved)? Ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level of government (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbndci), (c) supermajority (v2ddspmjci), and (d) district majority (v2dddctci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlegci), and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past (v2ddciniyr).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtlci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbndci v2ddthreci v2ddspmjci v2dddctci v2ddlegci v2ddciniyr

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Regional government (D) (v2xel_regelec)

Project managers: Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.)

Aggregation: First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 6.

Reasoned justification (C) (v2dlreason, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cut spending.”
- 1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, “We must cut spending. The state is inefficient.” [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]
- 2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs.”
- 3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation.”

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
- 1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
- 2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
- 3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
- 4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
- 5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

Responses:

- 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
- 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
- 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.
- 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
- 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.
- 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Common good (C) (v2dlcommon, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

- 0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.
- 1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.
- 2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.
- 3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.
- 4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconstl, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation *at elite levels*?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

Responses:

- 0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
- 1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
- 2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
- 3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
- 4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
- 5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 7.

Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C) (v2pepwrse, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

Responses:

- 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
- 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
- 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
- 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
- 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C) (v2clsocgrp, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:

- 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Health equality (C) (v2pehealth, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

Responses:

- 0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork," "clientelistic," or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

Responses:

- 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
- 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$) is public-goods.
- 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
- 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$) is particularistic.
- 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwrsoc, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Responses:

- 0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another - but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
- 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

Responses:

- 0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

- 3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrngen, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

- 0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
- 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
- 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
- 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
- 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean I)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

Responses:

- 0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
- 1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
- 2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
- 3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
- 4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) are means-tested.
- 5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 8.

CSO women's participation (C) (v2csgender, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Clarification: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

Responses:

- 0: Almost always.
- 1: Frequently.
- 2: About half the time.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Almost never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

Responses:

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
- 4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
- 5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrngen, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

- 0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
- 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
- 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
- 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
- 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovew, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
- 1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
- 2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
- 3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
- 4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2clslavew, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

Responses:

- 0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
- 1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
- 2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
- 3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
- 4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjstw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.

Responses:

0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.

1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.

2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.

3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.

4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.

Structure of Aggregation – Indices and Indicators

Democracy Indices Names	Mid-Level Democracy and Governance Indices Names	Lower-Level Democracy and Governance Indices Names	Names Indicators	v2_tag Indices and Indicators
Electoral Democracy Index				v2x_polyarchy
	Freedom of expression index			v2x_freexp
			Government censorship effort - Media	v2mecenefm
			Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn
			Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen
			Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm
			Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw
			Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree
	Alternative source information index			v2xme_altinf
			Media bias	v2mebias
			Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit
			Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange
	Electoral Component Index			v2x_EDcomp_thick
		Freedom of association index (thick)		v2x_frassoc_thick
			Party Ban	v2psparban
			Barriers to parties	v2psbars
			Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut
			Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar
			CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs
			CSO repression	v2csreprss
		Share of population with suffrage		v2x_suffr
			Percent of population with suffrage	v2elsuffrage
		Clean elections index		v2xel_frefair
			EMB autonomy	v2elembaut
			EMB capacity	v2elembcap

			Election voter registry	v2elrgstry
			Election vote buying	v2elvotbuy
			Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg
			Election government intimidation	v2elintim
			Election other electoral violence	v2elpeace
			Election free and fair	v2elrfair
		Elected executive index (de jure)		v2x_accex
			Lower chamber elected	v2lgello
			Upper chamber elected	v2lgelecup
			Legislature dominant chamber	v2lgdomchm
			HOS selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphos
			HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs
			HOG selection by legislature in practice	v2exaphogp
			HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg
			HOS appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdfcbhs
			HOG appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdjcbhg
			HOS dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdmhs
			HOG dismisses ministers in practice	v2exdfdshg
			HOS appoints cabinet in practice	v2exdfcbhs
Liberal Democracy Index				v2x_libdem
	Electoral Democracy Index			v2x_polyarchy
	Liberal Component Index			v2x_liberal
		Equality before the law and individual liberty index		v2xcl_rol
			Rigorous and impartial public administration	v2clrspct
			Transparent laws with predictable enforcement	v2cltrnslw
			Access to justice for men	v2clacjstm
			Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw
			Property rights for men	v2clprptym
			Property rights for	v2clprptyw

			women	
			Freedom from torture	v2cltort
			Freedom from political killings	v2clkill
			Freedom from forced labor for men	v2clslavem
			Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef
			Freedom of religion	v2clrelig
			Freedom of foreign movement	v2clfmove
			Freedom of domestic movement for men	v2cldmovem
			Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew
		Judicial constraints on the executive index		v2x_jucon
			Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon
			Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp
			Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp
			High court independence	v2juhcind
			Lowercourtindependence	v2juncind
		Legislative constraints on the executive index		v2xlg_legcon
			Legislature questions officials in practice	v2lgqstexp
			Executive oversight	v2lgotovst
			Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp
			Legislature opposition parties	v2lgoppart
Deliberative Democracy Index				v2x_delibdem
	Electoral Democracy Index			v2x_polyarchy
	Deliberative Component Index			v2xdl_delib
			Reasoned justification	v2dlreason
			Common good	v2dlcommon
			Respect counterarguments	v2dlcountr
			Range of consultation	v2dlconst
			Engaged society	v2dlengage

Egalitarian democracy Index				v2x_egaldem
	Electoral Democracy Index			v2x_polyarchy
	Egalitarian Component Index			v2x_egal
			Power distributed by socioeconomic position	v2pepwrse
			Power distributed by social group	v2pepwrsoc
			Social group equality in respect for civil liberties	v2clsocgrp
			Educational equality	v2peedueq
			Health equality	v2pehealth
			Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrngen
			Encompassing-ness	v2dlencmps
			Means-tested vs. universalistic	v2dlunivl
Participatory Democracy Index				v2x_partipdem
	Electoral Democracy Index			v2x_polyarchy
	Participatory Component Index			v2x_partip
		Civil society participation index		v2x_cspart
			Candidate selection-- National/local	v2pscnslnl
			CSO consultation	v2cscnsult
			CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt
			CSO womens participation	v2csgender
		Direct Popular Vote Index		v2xdd_dd
			Initiatives permitted	v2ddlegci
			Initiatives signatures %	v2ddsigcip
			Initiatives signature-gathering time limit	v2ddgrtlci
			Initiatives signature-gathering period	v2ddgrgpci
			Initiatives level	v2ddlevci
			Initiatives participation threshold	v2ddbndci
			Initiatives approval threshold	v2ddthreci
			Initiatives administrative threshold	v2dddistsci
			Initiatives super majority	v2ddspmjci

			Occurrence of citizen-initiative this year	v2ddciniyr
		Local government index		v2xel_locelec
			Local government elected	v2ellocelc
			Local offices relative power	v2ellocpwr
			Local government exists	v2ellocgov
		Regional government index		v2xel_regelec
			Regional government elected	v2elsrgel
			Regional offices relative power	v2elrgpwr
			Regional government exists	v2elreggov
	Core Civil Society Index			v2xcs_ccsi
			CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs
			CSO repression	v2csreprss
			CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt
	Party Institutionalization index			v2xps_party
			Party organizations	v2psorgs
			Party Branches	v2psprbrch
			Party linkages	v2psprlnks
			Distinct party platforms	v2psplats
			Legislative party cohesion	v2pscohesv
	Female rights index			v2x_gender
			CSO womens participation	v2csgender
			Percent (%) Female Journalists	v2mefemjrn
			Freedom of domestic movement for women	v2cldmovew
			Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw
			Freedom from forced labor for women	v2clslavef
			Property rights for women	v2clprptyw
			Access to justice for women	v2clacjstw
			Power distributed by gender	v2pepwrngen

	Electoral Regime Index			v2x_elecreg
		Legislative or constituent assembly election		v2xel_elecparl
			v2eltype	v2eltype_0
			v2eltype	v2eltype_1
			v2eltype	v2eltype_4
			v2eltype	v2eltype_5
		Legislature closed down or aborted		v2xlg_leginter
			Legislature bicameral	v2lgbicam
		Presidential election		v2xel_elecpres
			v2eltype	v2eltype_6
			v2eltype	v2eltype_7
		Chief executive no longer elected		v2x_hosinter
			HOS = HOG?	v2exhoshog
			HOG appointment in practice	v2expathhg
			HOS appointment in practice	v2expathhs