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# What Were the Political Effects of Decolonization?

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## Abstract

Considerable research argues that European colonial rule profoundly influenced political and economic outcomes. One potential implication of this argument is that territories should exhibit different outcomes during and after colonial rule. We test this hypothesis for four outcomes—democracy, internal conflict, government revenues, and economic development—using unit fixed effects models. Democracy levels increased sharply in colonial autonomy years immediately prior to independence. However, conflict, revenue, and income levels exhibit no systematic differences before or after independence. The results are similar when taking into account varieties of colonial institutions and the endogenous timing of independence. Except for a novel result on the timing of democratic gains, the overall findings suggest that gaining independence was less politically consequential than heterogeneous long-term effects of colonial rule on institutions and social patterns.

**Keywords:** Colonialism, Civil war, Democracy, Economic development, Fiscal capacity, State capacity

Western European empires ruled the majority of the world’s population for considerable portions of the 19th and 20th centuries. A vibrant political economy literature examines long-term effects of European colonialism by comparing outcomes across countries that experienced different colonial “treatments”—European settlers, Protestant missionaries, directness of rule, land tenure policies, and many others. (De Juan & Pierskalla 2017), (Lindberg & Smith 2014), and (Nunn 2014) review the vast political economy literature on the effect of colonialism on democracy and growth. Colonial legacies for other important political outcomes such as internal warfare and fiscal capacity have received less attention in quantitative studies, but considerable attention from area specialists (Herbst 2014) (Reid 2012). The appendix discusses these literatures at length.

By comparing contemporary outcomes across different types of colonized regions, this literature does not directly address how being governed by an external state influenced outcomes relative to a counterfactual independent country. Contemporary participants were intensely interested in and divided on this question, stressing either the political necessities and benefits of European governance (Lugard 1922), or its exploitative and undemocratic nature (Naoroji 1901). Both groups thought that ending European rule would exert profound effects—either positive or negative—on governance and development, and expectations about these effects were central to debates surrounding decolonization. This contention is also implicit in the literature on the causes of decolonization (Pepinsky 2015) (Gartzke & Rohner 2011).

This short article examines this important—but previously untested—question: What was the effect of gaining political independence from Western Europe? We examine variation *within* countries between the colonial and post-colonial eras to assess the consequences of one of the most impactful macro policy decisions of the 20th century. More broadly, we examine whether changes in political arrangements at the top affected key political and economic outcomes, or whether continuities between the colonial on post-colonial are sufficiently strong to outweigh changes in who rules.<sup>1</sup>

To answer this question, we compare four key outcomes within countries before and after gaining independence: democracy, internal conflict, government revenue, and economic development. To account for confounding effects of global historical changes and heterogeneity across territories, our main models country and year fixed effects. The main results use data between 1945 and 1989, although the results are similar when using the a longer colonial period. We also assess heterogeneity across colonial institutions and the endogeneity

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<sup>1</sup>We do not address another, potentially interesting counterfactual comparison. Because we focus on within-country comparisons in the 20th century, we cannot observe what countries would be like if they had never been colonized. We compare the colonial to the post-colonial, rather than the non-colonial.

of independence timing.

Democracy levels increased sharply during the period of increased autonomy that preceded independence in most countries. Although the colonial era as a whole was authoritarian (Mamdani 1996), colonizers appear to have made a concerted effort to promote elections and democratic rule in their colonies immediately prior to granting independence. This finding holds not only in the core sample, but also when disaggregating types of colonial rule and when focusing only on small and dependent colonies that gained independence “exogenously” because their larger neighbors decolonized. This is, to our knowledge, a new finding about the timing of democratic gains, as only recently have democracy data become available via the Varieties of Democracy project that enable systematic comparisons involving the colonial era (Coppedge & Zimmerman. 2016), and provides considerable insight into the so-called “second wave” of democracy that followed World War II.

By contrast, gaining independence does not exhibit a systematic relationship with internal war, revenue, or development. These null results contrast with existing arguments that extol or condemn colonial rule, but support arguments that stress continuities between colonial and post-colonial policy (Mamdani 1996) (Herbst 2014). Overall, while variation in policy across colonies generated may have generated durable long-term legacies, the effects of gaining independence and of changing leadership only exerted a systematic effect on short-term trends in democracy.

## 1 Effects of Gaining Independence: Existing Arguments

Existing theories do not provide clear guidance regarding whether colonial extrication should tend to be beneficial, harmful, or largely inconsequential for macro political and economic outcomes. Arguments focus either on the negligence of European rulers, on the new internal security dilemma faced by post-colonial rulers, or on long-term impediments to stable rule. Appendix Section A.1 provides a more extensive discussion of these literatures.

**Conflict.** Although many authors have emphasized the social disruption and inherent violence involved with creating colonial states, whether colonies would be more or less conflict-prone after gaining independence is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the combination of light European presence on the ground, the frequent unpopularity of foreign rule, and coercive-intensive policies would seem to create ripe conditions for rebellion. Furthermore, colonial resistance to granting independence could trigger “liberation” wars, as transitions from empire often involve violence (Wimmer & Min 2006).

On the other hand, examining differences in internal security constraints between colonial and post-colonial rule yields more pessimistic expectations for independence. Despite occasional military uprisings, European colonial militaries staffed by European generals re-

mained overwhelmingly loyal to rulers from the metropole. This situation changed shortly after independence when leaders faced the very real threat of military insubordination and coups. The absence of an external guarantor of internal security created incentives to pursue socially undesirable policies to achieve political survival. In reaction to these conditions, militaries in many ex-colonies have proved less effective at maintaining internal peace than colonial militaries (Reid 2012), echoing claims by colonial administrators about the *Pax Britannica* caused by their superior ability to maintain internal peace.

**Democracy.** European colonial rule was, almost axiomatically, undemocratic. Outside a handful of self-governing settler colonies, European rulers relied heavily on coercion and were not politically accountable to the colonial population as a whole, since this population did not share their political goals or desire their presence. In many colonies, these governance patterns created despotic local leaders (Mamdani 1996). However, many of these policies began to change in the lead-up to independence (Young 1970). European colonizers granted expanded political representation to natives, and Britain in particular attempted to achieve an “honourable exit” from its colonies via democracy promotion (482). If these arguments are correct, then we should expect democratic gains in the late decolonization period, despite the authoritarian character of many post-colonial states. Considering the multitude of problems that post-colonial countries have faced to establishing and maintaining democratic regimes, the late decolonization period may have promoted democracy more strongly than post-colonial regimes.

**State revenue.** Herbst’s ((2014)) widely influential argument associates colonialism with state weakness. Colonizers faced few incentives to invest in public goods or to collect difficult-to-obtain tax revenues. They instead tended to construct bureaucratically minimal states that sought minimal revenues simply to balance the budget, and relied on local elites for many core functions (Mamdani 1996). After independence, states facing greater needs to provide goods like education may be expected raise greater revenues.

However, despite the shortcomings of colonial rule, (Herbst 2014) and (Mamdani 1996) also consider the colonial and post-colonial periods in Africa as two episodes in a region plagued by deeper structural impediments to projecting political power. This suggests that low fiscal capacity should persist after independence, a point echoed in quantitative work on Africa (Thies 2009).

**Economic growth.** Problems of colonial neglect and weak states might also influence economic growth. Most colonies enjoyed little investment by the metropole, although investments tended to have large beneficial impacts on development where they occurred (Huillery 2009). Therefore, perhaps post-colonial rulers with stronger incentives for pub-

lic goods investments could generate positive effects. Colonialism instead tended to be associated with resource transfers from the colony to the metropole, including direct fiscal transfers and trading rules that favored European over local interests. The centerpiece of Naoroji’s ((1901)) critique of colonialism was the “drain of wealth” to Britain that cost India 36 million rupees a year (336).

However, colonial rule may have provided alternative development benefits. (Ferguson 2012) argues that “the British empire acted as an agency for imposing free markets, the rule of law, investor protection and relatively incorrupt government.” Independence may have undermined the state as a neutral arbiter, as post-colonial rulers have often favored co-ethnics in public good provision despite causing economic distortions. Short-term political survival concerns could also encourage fiscally irresponsible policies.

## 2 Data and Models

This section describes the main variables and models. Appendix Section A.2 provides additional information and Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics.

### 2.1 Sample

The unit of analysis is the territory-year, where territories can be either colonized or independent countries. Our main interest is in comparing independent years to post-World War II colonialism, and our estimation strategy incorporates unit fixed effects. Therefore, we focus only on countries that were once colonized by a Western European power and became independent between 1945 and 1989, implying that we observe colonized and independent years for every territory in the sample. We include all years between 1941 and 1989, with 1941 chosen to allow five years before independence for the first countries in our sample that gained independence. Appendix Table A.2 demonstrates similar results when instead restricting the temporal sample to the decade before and after each country’s independence year. Table A.3 includes results for the 1919 to 1989, over which we have consistent coverage for most of the variables, and Table A.4 includes results for the entire 1815 to 1989 period.

### 2.2 Dependent Variables

V-Dem’s polyarchy variable measures democracy (Coppedge & Zimmerman. 2016). Unlike other commonly used democracy measures, V-Dem has extensive coverage of territories even under colonial rule. To code “internal war” onset, we combine Correlates of War’s intra-state and extra-state war data (Sarkees & Wayman 2010). Extra-state wars usually entail a colony fighting against a European colonizer, and these are coded as occurring in the colony where fighting occurs. To measure fiscal intake, we use the log of per capita central



government revenue in ounces of gold, taken from (Mitchell 1998) and converted to gold by (Lee & Paine 2017). Territory-years with inconvertible currencies are excluded. For economic development, we use Maddison’s ((2007)) dataset, which has broad global coverage starting in 1950 and scattered coverage before that, to measure log income per capita. Appendix Table A.5 assesses the robustness of the findings to alternative measures of available dependent variables.

### 2.3 Independence and Autonomous Colonial Rule

We code independence as the granting of complete formal sovereignty by the colonial power. Formal independence was often a gradual process. In many colonies, the granting of complete independence was preceded by a period where local leaders (elected or not) had complete control over their internal affairs but allowed the colonial power to control their foreign and defense policy. In some countries (such as Bhutan) this level of autonomy had been enjoyed throughout the colonial period, but in most others it represented a transitional phase, with independence clearly planned (as in Ghana during the 1954-57 period).

### 2.4 Statistical Models

Identifying the effect of becoming independent is complicated by various possible confounding effects. Cross-country differences related to the various outcomes could affect the timing of independence. African countries, for instance, generally gained independence later than Asian countries. To address this issue, every model contains territory fixed effects. Furthermore, secular trends in the outcomes imply that time effects may confound identifying decolonization effects, which we address by including year fixed effects in almost every model. Section 4.2 addresses concerns about countries’ independence year being endogenous to country-specific time trends.

For the three continuous outcomes, we estimate linear models with a lagged dependent variable and a fixed effect for whether the territory is independent or not:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta \cdot \text{Independent}_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{it}$  is the outcome variable,  $\beta$  is coefficient estimate for independence,  $\gamma_i$  is a vector of territory fixed effects, and  $\delta_t$  is a vector of year fixed effects.

To assess the effect of internal self-rule (as distinct from full independence) we include a measure of colonial autonomy in some models.

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Autonomy}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{Independent}_{i,t} + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (2)$$

which leaves colonized years with no internal autonomy as the omitted basis category. Be-

cause internal war onset is a binary measure (ongoing war years are set to missing), we use a logit model and replace the lagged dependent variable with peace years and cubic splines. Although the relatively long time sample implies that models of this form should yield less bias than Arellano-Bond estimators, Appendix Table A.6 shows the results are largely similar when assessing robustness to possible Nickell bias concerns. All models cluster standard errors by territory.

### 3 Main Patterns

Figure 1 depicts trends in levels for the four outcomes during the last decade of colonial rule and first decade of independence.<sup>2</sup> The figures present local polynomial regressions with 95% confidence intervals and demonstrate heterogeneous patterns. Most striking, democracy levels increase dramatically in the decade leading up until independence before stabilizing (although declining somewhat) after independence. Average polyarchy scores nearly double from 0.151 five years before independence to 0.295 at independence, and then decreasing slightly to 0.276 in the next ten years. Internal warfare onset similarly spikes in the decade before independence before dropping, only to tick up again later in the post-independence period. Revenue and GDP both grow continuously throughout the period, with no break around independence. The confidence intervals, however, suggest relatively imprecise estimates for internal war onset, revenue growth, and income growth.

Panel A of Table 1 provides initial insight into the differences between post- and pre-independence by estimating Equation 1. Only democracy level differs significantly before and after independence, yielding a negative independence coefficient estimate. Even this coefficient estimate is small in magnitude. The estimated negative long-run effect of gaining independence is  $-0.12$ ,<sup>3</sup> which is larger in magnitude than average polyarchy level in our sample in 1945 but within one standard deviation of that level.


The figures and some theories suggest that we may gain further insight by disaggregating the period immediately before independence, when actors may have begun to anticipate it. Panel B of Table 1 estimates Equation 2, which distinguishes autonomous colonial rule from the remainder of the colonial period.

The period of autonomy immediately prior to independence was indeed a golden age for democratic gains. The estimated long-run effect of the gains during this period relative to the rest of the colonial era is 0.33, which is more than three standard deviations greater than mean polyarchy level in 1945. To provide some sense of the invariance of this finding to omitted variables (in addition to the many robustness checks presented below), a common metric

<sup>2</sup>Figure A.1 shows growth rates for these variables.

<sup>3</sup>The long-run effect equals the coefficient estimate for colonial autonomy divided by 1 minus the coefficient estimate for the lagged dependent variable.

Figure 1: Political Outcomes and the Timing of Independence



Note: Figure 1 shows a local polynomial and 95% confidence interval of the distribution of the outcomes with respect to the number of years before or after independence.

is to compare coefficient estimates in models with and without covariates. The coefficient estimate for colonial autonomy on democracy is in fact larger in the model with country and year fixed effects than when excluding those controls (results available upon request), which implies that to explain away the result, the bias would have to go in the opposite direction of the bias from omitting the unit and time dummies, and large in magnitude. Additionally, isolating colonial autonomy accounts for the statistically significant negative coefficient estimate for independent country-years in Column 1 of Table 1. The post-independence years exhibit a positive relationship with democracy relative to the pre-autonomous colonial years, although the difference is not significant.

## 4 Additional Results

### 4.1 Varieties of Colonialism

Colonial rule varied in many ways across territories that may affect the relationship between gaining independence and the outcome variables. In fact, much of the existing colonialism literature focuses on assessing effects of heterogeneous colonial institutions. Appendix Tables A.7 through A.11 re-run Equation 2 using a series of interaction models that correspond to prominent conditioning factors suggested the literature: Sub-Saharan Africa,

Table 1: Post-1945 Colonial Rule vs. Independence: Panel Models

<b>Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.00910* (0.00516)	-0.344 (0.645)	0.0312 (0.0403)	0.000590 (0.00677)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.954		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel B. Distinguishing autonomous colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0307*** (0.00547)	-0.918 (0.630)	0.0192 (0.0469)	-0.00614 (0.00939)
Independent	0.00606 (0.00545)	-0.829 (0.786)	0.0394 (0.0522)	-0.00217 (0.00745)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.955		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Panel A of Table 1 estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

British colonies, length of colonial rule, size of European settler population, and whether the colony was occupied during World War II. Appendix Section A.4 provides a lengthier discussion of the posited theoretical importance of these colonial varieties.

The estimated pro-democratic effect internal self-rule is remarkably robust. All ten marginal effect estimates for colonial autonomy that correspond to different values of these five conditioning variables are positive and statistically significant. Thus, for the purposes of assessing democratic gains in the late colonial period, pooling together colonies indeed reveals a meaningful trend. By contrast, there are no consistent patterns for the other outcomes, although the handful of statistically significant relationships could offer useful directions for future research. For example, non-British colonies gained significantly more in state revenues during the late colonial and independence periods compared to earlier periods of colonial rule.

## 4.2 “Exogenous” Independence

A specific confounding concern is that, for some colonies, internal social and political events affected independence timing. Colonizers could calibrate the timing of independence to colonies’ level of economic and political development or to military and political pressure within the colony.

One way to mitigate this confounding concern is to restrict the sample to colonies for which the timing of independence was not directly tied to internal events within the colonies.

We identify two plausible sets of colonies. First, in 1960, France granted independence to all 13 of its remaining Sub-Saharan African colonies with populations exceeding one million people. This move arose from changes in French domestic politics in reaction to problems caused by the Algerian war (Young 1970), rather than changes in the colonies themselves. In fact, just two years earlier all 13 of these colonies had voted to remain within the French empire. Second, “minor” colonies situated nearby larger colonies governed by the same European power tended to gain independence because the colonizer reacted to events in the “major” colony, rather than to local conditions in the minor colonies. We define a minor colony as one with either total population or European population less than half that of another colony in the same geographic region colonized by the same European power. The appendix lists the 16 minor colonies.

Whether pooling both sets of colonies (Panel A of Appendix Table A.12) or analyzing them separately (Panels B and C), the findings are largely similar to those in Table 1. The colonial autonomy period is more democratic, whereas most other relationships are null.

Another strategy for addressing endogeneity is to separate out the colonies which generate the starkest concerns about endogenous timing of independence: countries in which a guerrilla regime inherited the regime at independence following a major decolonization war. In the eight countries in our sample for which that happened, independence was essentially an exercise in military surrender rather than constitutional transfer. Appendix Table A.13 shows that the positive relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy remains among non-guerrilla countries. Unsurprisingly, there is no relationship for the guerrilla regimes because colonial autonomy was either exclusive to whites and contributed to decolonization struggles (Zimbabwe) or autonomy was only granted in reaction to major guerrilla movements (Indonesia).

Related, the varieties of colonialism findings in Tables A.7 through A.11 also address confounding concerns. By showing the relationship between colonial autonomy and democracy holds across various colonial institutions, this minimizes concerns that the aggregate result is driven by any particular subsample for which confounding concerns might be especially acute.

Therefore, although granting independence was inherently an endogenous process of conscious policy choice, various ways of subsetting the results yield the same conclusion: the colonial autonomy era was associated with considerable democratic gains (except in the few cases where autonomy was endogenous to conflict). Admittedly, these strategies for dealing with confounding are less convincing for understanding the relationship between political independence and internal warfare, although we do get to observe colonial and post-colonial years even for the guerrilla countries where the exact timing of independence was endoge-

nous to this dependent variable. A potentially useful observation for future research is that the overall null findings for internal warfare exist even among among the guerrilla decolonization cases (see the marginal effect estimate in Appendix Table A.13) because many of these countries immediately experienced a post-independence internal war that was essentially a continuation of the decolonization struggle (Algeria, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, Zimbabwe).

## 5 Discussion and Conclusion

Whereas many colonial administrators believed independence would subject their territories to chaos and decay, elites of the new countries saw independence as a golden opportunity to rectify the political problems created by colonialism. The time series evidence shows that neither expectation was realized. The immediate lead-up to independence generated strong democratic gains, but there is no systematic evidence that either autonomy or independence systematically affected any of democracy, conflict, taxation, or development. These results support the contentions of scholars who emphasize the institutional continuities between the colonial and post-colonial states (Mamdani 1996) (Herbst 2014), and scholars who emphasize the relationship between colonialism and democracy (Young 1970). Juxtaposed with the existing literature, these findings suggest that although decolonization was associated with regime changes (and thus changes in democracy levels), it tended not to alter the fundamental structure of states and economies. Changes in the ruling personnel have therefore been insufficient to remove legacies of colonialism—negative or positive.

We also produce a new finding about the timing of democratic gains. Whereas conventional accounts of democratization after World War II—the so-called “second wave” of democracy—focus on Western Europe and U.S.-transplanted regimes in occupied Germany and Japan, we show that the period immediately preceding independence was also associated with considerable democratic gains. More broadly, the colonial era provides a useful large-N laboratory for understanding the efficacy of external rule, and provides evidence that it can contribute to democratization, at least in the short term.

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# Online Appendix

## A.1 Research on Long-Term Legacies of Colonialism

Social scientists share a broad agreement on the importance of colonialism for affecting political and economic development in many parts of the world, although a recent literature has also emphasized the importance of precolonial factors, either in their own right or for their role in conditioning colonial effects (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013, Englebert 2000, Foa 2016). Countless country-level accounts have emphasized that colonialism was associated with dramatic changes in political institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002), social stratification (Lee 2017, Melcalfe 1969), and economic organization (Tignor 2015).

Complementing this literature on short-term effects of colonialism, the majority of political economy accounts have focused on showing how the effects of colonialism persisted after independence. Most of these authors assume that the effects of colonialism worked by altering social and political institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002, Engerman and Sokoloff 2011) although alternate mechanisms such as social inequality (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005) and trust (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011) have also been proposed.

Given the commonness of colonization and the atypical nature of uncolonized countries, most of these accounts compare colonized countries to each other, or compare different regions of a single colonized country, focusing on the importance of specific colonial policies or types of colonial rule. The following sections will explore how specific types of colonialism was associated previous types of colonial outcomes. Section D (below) discusses how some of these hypotheses have been operationalized.

*Democracy:* Opinion is sharply divided on the effect of colonialism on democracy. On the one hand, few precolonial regimes were democratic, and the strong institutions thought to be characteristic of stable democracy were often implanted during the colonial period. Defenders



of colonialism use this to propose a robust positive relationship between colonialism and democracy (Ferguson 2012). Other scholars, along with many contemporaries, considered colonial rule to be fundamentally despotic (Mamdani 1996, Furnivall 2012), and to have had a negative influence on political participation both at the time and post-colonially. This, of course, leave open the question of whether colonialism would in fact increase at independence.

One type of colonialism often thought to be associated with higher levels of democracy is British rule. Britain’s more stable democracy at home and adherence to common law may have contributed to these outcomes. Early arguments and evidence championed a positive British democratic legacy (Emerson 1960; Huntington 1984; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Weiner 1987; Lipset et al. 1993; more recently see Bernhard et al. 2004 and Olsson 2009), and scholars routinely control for a British colonial rule dummy in cross-national democracy regressions. However, many more recent statistical studies do not replicate the beneficial British effect (Arat 1991; Hadenius 1992; Barro 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; Woodberry 2012).

Complementing these results, many recent studies have instead examined other aspects of the colonial or pre-colonial era thought to encourage democracy by altering either preferences or social institutions. Examples of Protestant missionaries (Woodberry 2012; Lankina and Getachew 2012), lack of pre-colonial state development and colonial-era European settlers (Hariri 2012), or broader measures of direct rule (Lange 2004, 2009). Unlike the literature on British influence, many of these accounts emphasize the importance of local factors in shaping the type of colonial “treatment” that states received.

*Conflict:* Theoretical considerations and empirical evidence suggest opposing possibilities for the relationship between colonial rule and internal warfare. On the one hand, contemporary Europeans characterized colonialism in terms of a disinterested yet militarily strong government that eliminated endemic local violence, such as conflicts during Africa’s 19th century military revolution (Reid 2012). Some evidence supports this view. During the time period of the most destructive international wars in history, 1914 to 1945, a remarkable

period of internal peace occurred within the Western European-colonized world—including no internal wars in Africa.

On the other hand, colonialism also created conflict-inducing conditions. The transition to colonial rule created upheaval and violence (Wimmer and Min 2006), and considerable change continued even after the establishment of colonial rule. Policies such as forced creation of hierarchical political organizations among natives for the purpose of collecting taxes (Ranger 1983) and the migration of millions of European settlers and Christian missionaries (Paine 2016; Woodberry 2011) correspond to conflict risk factors such as high grievances (Cederman et al. 2013) and migration (Fearon and Laitin 2011) that scholars have studied extensively in the post-colonial period since 1945. Furthermore, colonial states often had minimal administrative presence on the ground and weak control over the societies they ruled (Herbst 2000), which—applying arguments such as Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)—could create opportunities to attack the colonial government.

The debate on over the relative influence of these two factors is reflected in the debate over the influence of specific colonial policies. Mukherjee (2013) and Verghese and Teitelbaum (2014), for instance, come to opposite conclusions on the relationship between indirect rule and the naxalite insurgency in India. Similarly, some authors have claimed that indirect rule in Africa was associated with conflict (Lange 2009, Blanton, Mason and Athow 2001) while others emphasize the negative role of European settlers (Paine 2016).

*Economic Development:* The influence of colonial rule on economic development could work through a variety of mechanisms. On the one hand, colonial rule could directly effect the availability of economic factors, either by leading to increased investment in physical capital such as railroads (Donaldson 2015), decreased investment in human capital (Chaudhary 2010), or the expropriation of productive resources. Others argue that colonialism redistributed economic resources in ways that might encourage subsequent political conflict (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Lee 2017). Most accounts, however, have argued that colonialism was influential by establishing durable institutions that regulate economic exchange.

There are many examples of colonial institutions that might be problematic for economic production. These include forced labor institutions (Dell 2010, Owolabi 2015), institutions regulating land tenure (Banerjee and Iyer 2005) and taxation (Berger 2009), or “extractive” institutions in general (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002), all of which might plausibly be associated with weak property rights and high levels of social inequality. However, in some circumstances extractive and brutal regimes can be propitious for economic development, as Mattingly (2017) and Kohli (2004) show for Japanese colonial rule. Conversely, areas with common law legal systems (La Porta et. al 1998), and participatory institutions (Engerman and Sokoloff 2011) are often thought to have stronger property rights and higher levels of growth. A variety of macro-factors might influence what type of institutions countries receive, including the length of colonization (Feyrer and Sacerdote 2009) the identity and ideology of the colonial state (Mahoney 2010; Olsson 2009), and the proportion of settlers in the population (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001).

One aspect of colonial rule that has been particularly controversial was the common practice of delegating authority to native authorities, commonly called “indirect rule.” Some authors have suggested that indirect rule insulated citizens from the worst aspects of colonial rule (Lee and Schultz 2012, Iyer 2010). Others, by contrast, argue that indirect rule was fundamentally despotic and associated with low levels of economic development.

*State Revenue:* The relationship between colonialism and the strength of the state is less fully explored than other variables, in part because of a lack of quality data. Herbst (2014) powerfully argues that colonial states were relatively weak, modifying Young’s (1970) emphasis on the raw coercive power of the colonial state in Africa. By contrast, others have found examples of well-financed “developmental states” under colonial rule, especially in Asia (Kohli 2004, Booth 2007). Empirically, the pattern is similarly mixed, though few colonial states were as well financed as their European contemporaries (Lee and Paine 2016). Other authors, such as (Engerman and Sokoloff 2011) and Lee (2016), find high levels of variation within colonial states in taxation levels, and argue that this variation is important

in explaining subsequent outcomes.


## A.2 Data Description

Table A.1: Summary Statistics

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>N</b>
VDEM Democracy	0.217	0.176	2983
Internal war onset	0.022	0.148	3079
Log revenues/pop.	-1.248	1.937	1049
Log GDP/pop.	7.187	0.886	2513
Independent	0.593	0.491	3283
Colonial autonomy	0.087	0.281	3283

## A.3 Additional Measures, Samples, and Models

Figure A.1: Political Outcomes and the Timing of Independence: Growth



Note: The Figure shows a local polynomial and 95% confidence interval of the distribution of the outcomes with respect to the number of years before independence. The sample is all colonized country years from 1919 to 1990.

The first three appendix tables alter the time sample used in Table 1. Table A.2 only includes the first 10 years before independence for each territory and the first 10 years after independence. The next two tables lengthen the time sample, either 1919 to 1989 (Table A.3) or from 1815 to 1989 (Table A.4). All the variables have reasonably good coverage dating back to the end of World War I, and Table A.3 provides estimates over a much longer panel than in most comparative political science research. Table A.4 analyzes an even longer time panel dating back to 1815, albeit with considerable missing data during the 19th century.

Table A.2: Within 10 Years of Independence

<b>Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.0264** (0.0100)	1.880 (2.204)	0.0471 (0.0483)	0.0175* (0.00903)
Territory-years	1,093	192	402	1,006
R-squared	0.930		0.987	0.997
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0325*** (0.00770)	-7.088*** (1.931)	0.0297 (0.0632)	-0.00651 (0.0101)
Independent	0.00568 (0.0122)	-3.325 (3.888)	0.0763 (0.0854)	0.0119 (0.0118)
Territory-years	1,093	192	402	1,006
R-squared	0.932		0.987	0.997
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using a restricted time sample: within a decade either before or after independence. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.3: Expanded Time Sample: 1919-1989

<b>Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.0112** (0.00459)	-0.670 (0.642)	0.0171 (0.0286)	9.56e-06 (0.00677)
Territory-years	4,216	1,264	1,637	2,582
R-squared	0.962		0.958	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0232*** (0.00460)	-0.945 (0.601)	0.0259 (0.0348)	-0.00528 (0.00919)
Independent	0.000530 (0.00476)	-1.160 (0.804)	0.0266 (0.0334)	-0.00237 (0.00758)
Territory-years	4,216	1,264	1,637	2,582
R-squared	0.963		0.958	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1919 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.4: Expanded Time Sample: 1815-1989

<b>Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Independent	-0.00511** (0.00212)	-0.257 (0.612)	-0.0329 (0.0326)	-0.00728 (0.00450)
Territory-years	8,521	1,383	4,157	5,821
R-squared	0.971		0.968	0.995
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0206*** (0.00427)	-0.941* (0.562)	-0.00956 (0.0258)	-0.00461 (0.00669)
Independent	-0.000149 (0.00242)	-0.730 (0.750)	-0.0356 (0.0373)	-0.00911* (0.00546)
Territory-years	8,521	1,383	4,157	5,821
R-squared	0.972		0.968	0.995
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
LDV controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but using an expanded time sample: 1815 to 1989. Years prior to European colonization are omitted. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.5 presents alternative measures for some of the variables for which we have alternative data the covers the colonial and post-colonial periods. Column 1 replaces Maddison’s GDP data with Penn World Table, which tends to be of higher quality but has relatively scant coverage during the colonial era. Column 2 replaces Correlates of War’s internal war data with Brecke (1999). Column 3 replaces the revenue measure with normalized revenues, albeit at the cost of a smaller sample.

Table A.5: Colonial Rule: Alternate Measures

<b>Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule</b>			
DV:	PWT GDP	Brecke war	Norm. rev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent	0.00854 (0.0106)	-0.507 (0.454)	-0.0299 (0.0386)
Territory-years	1,887	2,162	710
R-squared	0.992		0.962
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Add. controls	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule</b>			
DV:	PWT GDP	Brecke war	Norm. rev.
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent	0.00882 (0.0119)	-0.0620 (0.573)	-0.0349 (0.0551)
Territory-years	1,887	2,162	710
R-squared	0.992		0.962
Country FE	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES
Add. controls	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Panel A estimates Equation 1 and Panel B estimates Equation 2, but with different measures of the dependent variables. Column 1 replaces Maddison’s GDP per capita variable with Penn World Table. Column 2 replaces internal war incidence measured using Correlates of War with internal war incidence measured using Brecke (1999). Column 3 replaces revenue per capita with revenue per capita normalized by GDP, although this shrinks the sample size considerably. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1 and 3 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .



The econometrics literature provides options for dynamic panel estimators. One concern in models with a lagged dependent variable and unit fixed effects is Nickell bias, although this is a strong concern only for data with a smaller  $T$  than ours. An alternative is to use the Arellano-Bond estimator, which uses lagged values of the dependent variable as instruments, but these models are problematic in larger  $T$  samples because the number of orthogonality conditions to satisfy increases at a rate of  $\frac{T \cdot (T-1)}{2}$  (Alvarez and Arellano 2003). Despite these caveats, Table A.6 presents estimates using Arellano-Bond estimators for the three continuous dependent variables. The main positive finding is unaltered: there is a strong and substantively meaningful correlation between colonial autonomy and democracy level. Although this table produces additional statistically significant findings, the many models presented throughout the paper show that these correlations are not robust to alternative model specifications (which, given the long time sample, are appropriate than Arellano-Bond models, anyway). Also, note that the coefficient estimate for colonial autonomy is more than four times larger than that for independence in Panel B, Column 1.

Table A.6: Arellano-Bond Estimates

<b>Panel A. Post-independence vs. colonial rule</b>			
DV:	Democracy	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Independent	-0.00301 (0.00236)	0.0666* (0.0351)	-0.00121 (0.00771)
Territory-years	2,958	929	2,365
Territories	63	42	62
<b>Panel B. Distinguishing late colonial rule</b>			
DV:	Democracy	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Colonial autonomy	0.0356*** (0.00624)	0.0684* (0.0356)	-0.00343 (0.00937)
Independent	0.00864*** (0.00291)	0.0869** (0.0443)	-0.00251 (0.00800)
Territory-years	2,958	929	2,365
Territories	63	42	62

*Notes:* Table A.6 estimates a series of Arellano-Bond models, with the distinction between Panels A and B following that in Table 1. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

## A.4 Varieties of Colonialism

A wide political economy literature has examined how different policies and modes of governance across colonies has shaped outcomes today. We focus here on the most widely debated varieties of colonialism. Many important contributions to the colonialism literature focus mainly on Sub-Saharan Africa (Young 1994; Mamdani 1996; Herbst 2014). Most Sub-Saharan countries were colonized relatively late and were ruled indirectly. Low population density, few navigable rivers, and tsetse fly prevalence in much of the continent may pose particularly stark development challenges that alter the effect of gaining independence.

British colonialism has also received considerable attention for promoting democracy (Weiner 1987) and development (Grier 1999; Lange 2009; Lee and Schultz 2012), perhaps through its greater tolerance for ruling indirectly through local leaders. Coding British colonies is somewhat complicated because in some colonies Britain exerted minimal internal control (Arabian peninsula colonies) or only ruled for a very short period of time (Middle Eastern Mandate territories colonized after World War I). To avoid conditioning on the directness of British rule, we use a broad definition of British colonialism that includes its Middle Eastern colonies.

The amount of time for which a territory was colonized by Western Europe could also condition the effect of gaining independence. Longer-ruled colonies tended to be more directly governed and considered an integral part of the metropolitan country. Longer-ruled colonies also tended to come under colonial rule during a mercantilist global era (Mahoney 2010; Olsson 2009), which could affect long-term development and democracy trajectories. We use Olsson's (2009) colonial onset and independence data to calculate the length of Western European colonial rule.

European settlers have also received considerable attention for affecting development (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine 2016), democracy (Hariri 2012), and internal warfare (Paine 2017). Settler colonies tended to gain greater degrees of self-governance and democratic representation for Europeans, which also tended to create frictions between

Europeans and non-Europeans in the lead-up to independence and/or majority rule. We use the logged of European population percentage for the closest available data point to the year of independence. Easterly and Levine (2016) provide most of the data points, and Paine (2017) describes the settler variable in more detail.

Finally, colonies that were occupied by a different power during World War II may have experienced systematically different paths toward independence than colonies with continuous rule. Lawrence (2013) argues that disruptions in colonial rule created incentives for nationalist protests when the original colonizer returned after World War II. She provides this data for French colonies and we coded it ourselves for other empires. Both European settlers and World War II occupation are particularly important for affecting the timing of independence since colonies characterized by either sizable settler minorities or colonial disruption account for nearly every case with a major decolonization war following World War II.

Tables A.7 through A.11 add interaction terms for the conditioning variable to estimate models of the form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha \cdot Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_1 \cdot \textit{Autonomy}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \cdot \textit{Indep}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \cdot \textit{Autonomy}_{i,t} \cdot C_i + \beta_4 \cdot \textit{Indep}_{i,t} \cdot C_i + \gamma_i + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad (3)$$

where  $C_i$  is the country-specific conditioning variable. Because the static conditioning variables are perfectly collinear with the unit fixed effects, the models do not contain the lower-order conditioning term. For the three binary conditioning variables, the corresponding regression table provides marginal effect estimates for each of colonial autonomy and independence for both values of the conditioning variable. For duration of colonial rule, we present marginal effect estimates for the 25% percentile of colonial rule length (64 years) and the 75% percentile (144 years). For European settlers, we present marginal effect estimates for the range of the settlers variable: 0% and 11% European population share (non-logged).

The 25% percentile of the settlers variable is also 0%, and the upper bound of this variable is more meaningful to interpret than the 75% percentile (1% European population share) because it is heavily right-skewed.

Table A.7: Varieties of Colonialism: Africa

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0275*** (0.00935)	-1.604** (0.647)	-0.0382 (0.0582)	0.0162 (0.0186)
Independent	0.0130 (0.00824)	-2.964** (1.161)	-0.109 (0.0781)	0.00949 (0.0170)
Autonomy*SSA	0.00964 (0.0131)	-0.265 (2.048)	0.0978 (0.0848)	-0.0298 (0.0204)
Independent*SSA	-0.00835 (0.00611)	3.008*** (1.094)	0.258* (0.129)	-0.0141 (0.0181)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy   SSA=0	0.0275*** (0.00935)	-0.00723 (0.0140)	-0.0382 (0.0582)	0.0162 (0.0186)
Autonomy   SSA=1	0.0372*** (0.00876)	-0.436 (0.392)	0.0596 (0.0675)	-0.0137 (0.00961)
Independent   SSA=0	0.0130 (0.00824)	-0.00859 (0.0166)	-0.109 (0.0781)	0.00949 (0.0170)
Independent   SSA=1	0.00462 (0.00529)	0.00873 (0.185)	0.149* (0.0811)	-0.00459 (0.00804)

*Notes:* Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.8: Varieties of Colonialism: British Colonial Rule

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0242*** (0.00671)	-0.730 (0.861)	0.216* (0.112)	-0.0177 (0.0117)
Independent	0.000933 (0.00528)	-0.706 (0.876)	0.204* (0.110)	-0.0105 (0.00651)
Autonomous*British col.	0.0167 (0.0108)	-0.485 (1.237)	-0.264** (0.120)	0.0239 (0.0165)
Independent*British col.	0.0164*** (0.00469)	-0.326 (1.029)	-0.265* (0.133)	0.0185* (0.0105)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Marginal effects				
Autonomy   Br. col.=0	0.0242*** (0.00671)	-0.00115 (0.00232)	0.216* (0.112)	-0.0177 (0.0117)
Autonomy   Br. col.=1	0.0408*** (0.00848)	-0.167 (0.273)	-0.0475 (0.0443)	0.00620 (0.0132)
Independent   Br. col.=0	0.000933 (0.00528)	-0.00113 (0.00248)	0.204* (0.110)	-0.0105 (0.00651)
Independent   Br. col.=1	0.0173** (0.00706)	-0.133 (0.207)	-0.0606 (0.0620)	0.00797 (0.0109)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.9: Varieties of Colonialism: Length of Colonial Rule

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0331*** (0.00813)	-0.306 (0.924)	-0.0103 (0.0696)	0.00925 (0.0137)
Independent	0.00594 (0.00612)	-0.878 (1.100)	0.118 (0.0743)	0.00369 (0.0103)
Autonomy*Colonial duration	-1.53e-05 (3.10e-05)	-0.00370 (0.00460)	9.05e-05 (0.000181)	-0.000107 (9.66e-05)
Independent*Colonial duration	1.30e-06 (1.67e-05)	0.000971 (0.00763)	-0.000401 (0.000340)	-4.06e-05 (4.93e-05)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.955		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Marginal effects				
Autonomy   Colonial rule=64 years	0.0321*** (0.00676)	-0.000794 (0.00183)	-0.00455 (0.0615)	0.00237 (0.00968)
Autonomy   Colonial rule=144 years	0.0309*** (0.00558)	-0.0425 (0.0414)	0.00269 (0.0532)	-0.00623 (0.00920)
Independent   Colonial rule=64 years	0.00602 (0.00569)	-0.00106 (0.00217)	0.0928 (0.0604)	0.00109 (0.00838)
Independent   Colonial rule=144 years	0.00612 (0.00541)	-0.0389 (0.0528)	0.0608 (0.0514)	-0.00216 (0.00739)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.10: Varieties of Colonialism: European Settlers

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0299*** (0.00625)	-1.296 (1.575)	0.0396 (0.0529)	-0.0146 (0.0128)
Independent	0.00723 (0.00537)	-1.042 (0.803)	0.119 (0.0770)	-0.00135 (0.00819)
Autonomy*ln(Eu. pop. %)	-0.000198 (0.00247)	-0.156 (0.439)	0.0143 (0.0178)	-0.00432 (0.00415)
Independent*ln(Eu. pop. %)	0.000865 (0.00131)	-0.100 (0.203)	0.0413 (0.0255)	0.000910 (0.00278)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.955		0.955	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Marginal effects			
Autonomy   Eu. pop %=0%	0.0308*** (0.00978)	-0.000132 (0.000380)	-0.0261 (0.0810)	0.00525 (0.0135)
Autonomy   Eu. pop %=11%	0.0294*** (0.0106)	-0.000296 (0.00168)	0.0736 (0.0782)	-0.0250 (0.0210)
Independent   Eu. pop %=0%	0.00325 (0.00742)	-0.000133 (0.000389)	-0.0714 (0.0763)	-0.00554 (0.0122)
Independent   Eu. pop %=11%	0.00930 (0.00662)	-0.000179 (0.000760)	0.217 (0.130)	0.000826 (0.0124)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Table A.11: Varieties of Colonialism: WWII Occupied

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0375*** (0.00695)	-0.603 (1.329)	0.0436 (0.0531)	-0.00704 (0.0114)
Independent	0.00684 (0.00580)	-0.0227 (0.955)	0.0988 (0.0644)	-0.00668 (0.00792)
Autonomy*WWII occupied	-0.0249*** (0.00900)	-0.889 (1.452)	-0.116* (0.0639)	0.00936 (0.0147)
Independent*WWII occupied	-0.00242 (0.00380)	-1.809 (1.151)	-0.427* (0.223)	0.0269** (0.0133)
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
	Marginal effects			
Autonomy   WWII occupied=0	0.0375*** (0.00695)	-0.143 (0.297)	0.0436 (0.0531)	-0.00704 (0.0114)
Autonomy   WWII occupied=1	0.0126** (0.00630)	-0.00186 (0.00408)	-0.0727* (0.0425)	0.00232 (0.00985)
Independent   WWII occupied=0	0.00684 (0.00580)	-0.00565 (0.238)	0.0988 (0.0644)	-0.00668 (0.00792)
Independent   WWII occupied=1	0.00442 (0.00565)	-0.00202 (0.00456)	-0.329* (0.186)	0.0202 (0.0126)

Notes: Every panel estimates Equation 3 using the same sample as Table 1. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

## A.5 “Exogenous” Independence

The 13 French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. We define a minor colony as one with either total population or European population less than half that of another colony in the same geographic region colonized by the same European power. The regions are North Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The 16 minor colonies are as follows, with the major colony in parentheses: Morocco and Tunisia (Algeria), Burundi and Rwanda (DRC), Gambia and Sierra Leone (Ghana/Nigeria), Bhutan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka (India), Cambodia and Laos (Vietnam), and Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia (Zimbabwe). Pakistan is excluded because it did not exist as a separate colony until just prior to independence. Note that we did not separately code which French Sub-Saharan African countries met the minor colony definition, and none of these are included in Panel C. Finally, due to the small samples and the fact that every colony in Panel B gained independence in the same year, in Panels B and C we replace the year fixed effects with a time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941 (however, the results are very similar with the year fixed effects, available upon request).

Table A.12: “Exogenous” Independence Colonies

<b>Panel A. Pooled</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0420*** (0.00960)	-3.057*** (0.806)	0.149 (0.0941)	-0.00537 (0.00881)
Independent	-0.00146 (0.0116)	-4.018*** (1.354)	0.245** (0.106)	-0.000148 (0.0118)
Territory-years	1,400	199	353	1,132
R-squared	0.959		0.975	0.992
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel B. French SSA colonies - 1960 independence</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0351** (0.0119)		0.344*** (0.0943)	0.0116** (0.00463)
Independent	-0.0168** (0.00701)	-3.900 (3.169)	0.478*** (0.105)	0.0221* (0.0116)
Territory-years	616	131	242	546
R-squared	0.907		0.969	0.992
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
<b>Panel C. Small colonies</b>				
DV:	Democracy	Internal war	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0510*** (0.0141)	-0.258 (1.053)	0.0268 (0.131)	-0.0104 (0.0101)
Independent	0.00277 (0.00953)	-1.620 (1.619)	-0.103 (0.112)	0.00997 (0.0101)
Territory-years	784	336	111	586
R-squared	0.968		0.920	0.990
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time trend	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES

*Notes:* Every panel estimates Equation 2 on a restricted sample consisting of either French Sub-Saharan African countries that gained independence in 1960 (Panel B), small colonies (Panel C), or both of these (Panel A). Every model contains territory fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Every model in Panel A contains year fixed effects, and every model in Panels B and C contains a time trend variable that counts the number of years since 1941. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .



Table A.13: Conditioning on Guerrilla Takeover at Independence

DV:	Democracy	Internal war onset	Revenue	Income
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Colonial autonomy	0.0342*** (0.00594)	-0.738 (0.776)	0.0194 (0.0491)	0.00372 (0.00865)
Independent	0.00672 (0.00574)	-0.713 (0.801)	0.0417 (0.0536)	0.00249 (0.00788)
Autonomy*Guerrilla regime	-0.0230** (0.0106)	-0.840 (1.378)	-0.0380 (0.0628)	-0.0720* (0.0391)
Independent*Guerrilla regime	-0.00282 (0.00464)	-0.773 (1.309)	-0.0598 (0.0511)	-0.0241* (0.0143)
Territory-years	2,969	1,001	982	2,423
R-squared	0.956		0.954	0.996
Country FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Lag controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
		Marginal effects		
Autonomy   Guerrilla=0	0.0342*** (0.00594)	-0.00259 (0.00426)	0.0194 (0.0491)	0.00372 (0.00865)
Autonomy   Guerrilla=1	0.0112 (0.00921)	-0.00579 (0.0190)	-0.0186 (0.0353)	-0.0682* (0.0382)
Independent   Guerrilla=0	0.00672 (0.00574)	-0.00253 (0.00450)	0.0417 (0.0536)	0.00249 (0.00788)
Independent   Guerrilla=1	0.00390 (0.00575)	-0.00516 (0.0138)	-0.0181 (0.0344)	-0.0216 (0.0133)

*Notes:* Every panel estimates Equation 2 on a restricted sample. Every model contains territory and year fixed effects and clusters standard errors by territory. Columns 1, 3, and 4 include a lagged dependent variable, and Column 2 contains peace years and cubic splines. \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

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