



The Long March
Contentious Mobilization &
Deep Democracy

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Abstract

Over the last several decades, dozens of authoritarian regimes have fallen and been replaced by formal democracies. These new democracies are not all of identical quality. Some have made substantially greater progress than others towards deepening democratic institutions. We argue that prolonged unarmed contentious mobilization prior to transition drives democratic progress in each of these five dimensions. Mobilization matters because it generates a new, democratically-oriented political elite and because it furnishes non-elites with the capacity for autonomous collective action. In panel regressions spanning the 1950 to 2010 period and using original data, we show that the duration of anti-authoritarian mobilization is a significant and consistent predictor of subsequent democratic deepening. To illustrate the mechanisms, we present a historical analysis of democratic transition in Brazil. This case study shows how both political elites and non-elite collective actors, emboldened by prolonged mobilization, drove the deepening of democracy post-transition.

1. Introduction

Over the last several decades, the world has witnessed the fall of dozens of dictators. In a variety of countries and in a variety of circumstances, autocracies have transitioned to democracy. By any of the several cross-national indices now available, formal democracy has spread far and wide. Today, a larger proportion of countries are ruled by elected governments than ever before.

However, beneath the veneer of formal democracy lies wide variation in how ordinary people experience and practice political life. Some new democracies build institutions that empower their citizens: they hold free and fair elections, they ensure that the law and legislature hold the executive to account, that the citizens participate in decision-making beyond national elections, and they give ordinary individuals the capacity to realize their formal rights in practice. Others, however, are only minimally democratic. Ordinary individuals are formally represented but not substantively empowered. What explains this variation? Why does democratization only sometimes lead to deep democracy?

Democracy is a multidimensional concept. Theorists of democracy have identified electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian dimensions of the democratic ideal. Despite this rich literature, it remains challenging to study the different dimensions of democracy in any empirical detail. Thus far, cross-national studies of democracy have explored progress in its formal (i.e. electoral and liberal aspects) dimensions only (e.g. Boix 2011). Even though social scientists have long been concerned about the quality of democracy (Putnam and Leonardi 1993; Tocqueville 2002), we do not yet have good explanations for variation in democratic *depth*. In this paper, we take advantage of V-dem dataset which measures democratic quality in the five dimensions distinguished above. This offers new insights into hitherto-unstudied *trajectories of democratization*.

Our specific concern is to examine the role of contentious mobilization in deepening democracy. By “deepening democracy,” we mean improvement not only in electoral and liberal dimensions of democracy, but also in its participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian aspects. Some democratic transitions have been characterized by the mobilization of enormous numbers of people for an extended period, while others have been elite-driven affairs in which ordinary people played limited or no role. In this paper, we investigate whether these different pathways of transition affect democratic deepening in the post-transition period.

To study this, we gathered data on every democratic transition after 1950 to identify the role of contentious mobilization in detonating it. Unlike existing studies that cover contention

during democratization (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Haggard and Kaufman 2016), we argue that it is not just the fact of protest but its duration that matters. The explanatory role of the length of mobilization suggests a more processual account (cf. Abbott 2016) of democratic deepening, which stands in distinction to explanations of democratic deepening that rely on relatively static configurations of specific classes or actors (e.g. Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens 1997).

Building on insights from these literatures, we argue that sustained unarmed mobilization leads to deeper democracy. This is because longer anti-authoritarian movements require an organizational infrastructure, which nurtures a new pro-democratic elite and furnishes non-elites with capacity for autonomous collective action. In a time-series cross-national analysis of all democracies that emerged after 1950, we demonstrate that sustained unarmed mobilization is associated with post-transition improvements in the quality of electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian dimensions of democracy. We then present an analysis of Brazil's democratic transition to illustrate the mechanisms that link contentious mobilization to democratic deepening.

2. Existing Literature: Protest Mobilization & Formal Democracy

While much of the literature on democratization offers abstract accounts of the democratic transition (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Ansell and Samuels 2010; Boix 2003; Wejnert 2005), many scholars have recognized that there are various modes of transition. Naturally, democracies may bear the imprint of their origins long after transition. In other words, even if all roads lead to democracy, they may not all lead to democracy to the same degree or democracy of the same kind (Higley and Burton 1989; Karl 1990; Munck and Leff 1997). This furnishes one explanation for variation in post-transition trajectories. Not all democracies are forged in the same way.

One feature of democratic transitions has attracted attention in this regard: the role of mass protest in toppling dictatorships. Some democratic transitions are contentious and involve the mobilization of masses of people; some are negotiated by elites (Collier 1999; Haggard and Kaufman 2012). An earlier, influential literature held a very pessimistic view about the consequences of mass mobilization. These scholars argued that popular mobilization might force the “pivotal elite” to abort the transition process (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Indeed, even

if popular protest succeeded in installing democracy, the resulting regime was likely to be unstable and conflict-prone (Huntington 1984).

By contrast, work that deploys the method of comparative historical analysis has argued the opposite: far from hindering the process of democratization, contentious mobilization should advance it. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens (1992) argued that it was the mobilization of the working-class and the middle-classes that extended democratic rights in Europe, South America, and Central America. Slater (2009) documents revolutions that democratized Southeast Asia in 1970s-90s. Recent studies of democratization using different methodological designs (Alemán and Yang 2011; Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Wood 2001) further support the view that protest and mobilization have spurred democratic transitions.

The literature thus contains two competing hypotheses about the relationship between mass mobilization and democratic transitions. Some recent work has shown that democracies emerging from mass mobilization are both more durable and more competitive (Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2016; Haggard and Kaufman 2016), which supports the second view. However, for two reasons, neither this recent work nor the earlier studies answer the question as we pose it.

First, these studies focus on the emergence and durability of formal democracy, defined as a set of institutional arrangements that guarantee fair and free elections as the main method of choosing the decision makers in a country. There are a variety of long-run datasets which grade countries by this metric—either as a binary (Boix, Miller, and Rosato 2013; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010) or ordinal measure (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). While we have learned a considerable amount from work which examines democratization defined in this way, scholarly progress has been hampered by the narrowness of these existing measures. Democratization matters, after all, because it redistributes power (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992). To the extent that democratization is merely formal, it is also incomplete. To quote Lindberg et al (2014:168) “we find ourselves in roughly the same position as an economist who has access to ... measures of GDP but nothing else.” In this paper we examine the substantive dimensions of democratization, as well. Does mobilization win ordinary individuals the right to participate in everyday institutions? To be consulted by decision-makers? Does it help non-elites take advantage of the rights it grants them on paper? Or, as the transitologists argued, does mobilization lead to illiberal, demagogic, emotional, and ultimately inegalitarian politics?

Second, recent work on contentious mobilization during democratic transitions measures contention as a binary variable. Did mobilization occur, or did it not? This simplifies the

diversity of paths that countries have taken towards democracy. Again, unlike existing scholarship studying instances of popular mobilization, which have been leveraged to address similar questions (Bayer et al. 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; Haggard and Kaufman 2016) we argue that it is not only the fact that mobilization occurs, but also its duration which matters. We are thus able to distinguish, for instance, the 1994 transition to democracy in South Africa, led by a massive, prolonged, and well-organized set of popular organizations, from the 2009 transition in Pakistan, where a middle-class lawyers' movement led a year-long campaign to unseat the incumbent dictator. These were both contentious transitions, but the duration of contention was substantially different. In this paper, we ask if their political consequences are likely to differ as well.

3. Theory and Argument

3.1. Which Movements Matter

Following Kadivar (2018), we argue that duration matters because, to *sustain* mobilization, movements must build an organizational infrastructure. This infrastructure is necessary because it helps movements to recover from repression, to adapt their tactics, and to keep their members motivated and connected under severe conditions. Organization also unifies a sense of collective purpose in the movement, and brings command and discipline, which helps combat regimes' usual tactics of divide and rule (Pearlman 2011). For a similar reason, we focus on *unarmed* mobilization. Studies of nonviolent resistance have shown that nonviolent campaigns typically engage a much larger number of participants than violent ones (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012; DeNardo 1985). Engaging such large number of participants means building a vast organizational infrastructure to train and coordinate such tactics among members.

3.2. Why Movements Matter

The organizations built by these sustained, unarmed mobilizations have an enduring effect on the quality of democracy for two principal reasons. First, sustained movements generate a group of credible political elites with democratic convictions and proven leadership, embedded in mass organizations. This political elite typically comes from the parties born out of contentious movements (Lust and Waldner 2016). Neither short nor violent movements furnish elites of the

same standing or with the same commitments, and in the absence of movements altogether, they are less likely to exist.

Second, by building enduring organizations, sustained movements give non-elites the capacity for autonomous collective action after the democratic transition. In other words, contentious mobilizations empower ordinary people to defend their interests in the post-transition civil society. A non-elite populace with the capacity of autonomous collective action ensures that even erstwhile pro-democracy elites cannot abuse power. Anti-authoritarian movements furnish the parties, civil society groups, and movements of the post-transition era. They boost the autonomous and contentious nature of organizational life in civil society in new democracies (Forsys and Gorlach 2015; Wenzel 2015). Separately, the reliance of an anti-authoritarian movement on methods of protest could serve as a source of inspiration and empowerment for citizens of the new democracy to become active in new social movements and make their demands on democratic office-holders and keep them accountable (Ekiert and Kubik 1999; Klandermans 2015). In short: long periods of mass mobilization are likely to result in a multi-layered, contentious and autonomous civil society.

3.3. What Movements Win

As noted already, in contrast to most existing work, we consider democratization to be a multi-layered process with electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian dimensions. By democratic deepening we mean to refer to improvement of quality in all five of these dimensions. For the two reasons outlined above, we expect democracies borne of sustained unarmed contention to make more progress in each of these dimensions.

What are these five dimensions and how are they distinguished? Electoral democracy refers to a political regime in which citizens elect their rulers through periodic fair and free elections. To ensure the competitiveness of elections and the responsiveness of elected officials to citizenry, a minimum set of political rights such as freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and inclusive citizenship must be guaranteed. The liberal dimension of democracy signifies protection of individual rights and civil liberties from tyranny of majority and state repression. The participatory dimension of democracy embodies values of direct participation by citizens in governing processes beyond casting ballots in elections. The deliberative dimension of democracy concerns formation of decisions from open and reasonable conversation among citizens free from coercion, and self-interest. Finally, the egalitarian or social aspect of

democracy refers to the idea that all citizens should be able to equally participate in democratic processes, regardless of their class, race, gender, and other salient social groupings (Coppedge et al. 2016; Sigman and Lindberg 2015; Teorell et al. 2016).

Electoral and Liberal Democracy

Why does enduring mobilization generate tendencies for higher quality electoral and liberal democracy? First, sustained protest builds momentum to push authoritarian elites from the center of post-transition politics. The presence of strong pro-democratic movements and parties makes it more difficult for the authoritarian elite to preserve the privileges of the incumbent elite, and to limit the competitiveness of the new democracy. Thanks to the political parties built out of the pro-democracy movement, a new committed and experienced political elite is ready to replace the old incumbents. Second, the presence of democratic parties and movements makes it more likely that the new regime will create institutional checks on the abuse of executive power, and will include stronger defenses for political and civil liberties (Haggard and Kaufman 2016; Bayer et al. 2016; Kadivar 2018).

Participatory and Deliberative Democracy

The effects of long pro-democracy movements on democratic quality, however, go beyond the traditional electoral and liberal dimensions of democracy. Democracies born out of sustained mobilization are more likely to demonstrate higher levels of participation and deliberation, as well. Ruling parties born out of an anti-dictatorship struggle are more likely to initiate and support institutional initiatives which cultivate and encourage citizen participation. (Baiocchi 2003; Fung and Wright 2003). These parties have been built on the participation of citizens in pro-democracy campaigns, so they tend to have leaders and cadres more committed to the ideals of participation and deliberation.

Furthermore, sustained pro-democracy movements enhance democratic participation and deliberation through their influence on civil society. Even in the absence of institutional reform for participation, an empowered civil society can use contentious methods to promote democratic participation. Citizens that feel empowered and entitled to their rights will use their organizational networks to demand inclusion (Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2008; Wampler and Avritzer 2004a; Wampler 2008). Furthermore, in polities with significant history of contentious collective action, the political culture and institutional setting is more open and receptive to such contentious demands from the grassroots. The success of contention in forging democracy in the past legitimizes contentious methods as a major means of claims-making in the political

sphere (Fishman 2011; see also Sewell 1990). Civil society leaders are more likely to promote democratic deliberation, and a network of seasoned activists are in place to facilitate it (Baiocchi 2005; Fung 2003).

Egalitarian Democracy

Finally, we argue that longer pro-democracy movements also create the potential for more egalitarian democracies, in which citizens possess equal capacities to participate in governing processes. First, we expect that parties born out of years of struggle will be disposed to deliver to the masses that they mobilized during the campaign period. The broader the party's base had grown during years of pre-democracy mobilization, the more likely the party is to provide equal protection to different constituencies and to promote the redistribution of resources.

Second, a strong and well-organized civil society also empowers excluded groups to organize themselves, articulate their interests, and win concessions from elites (Sandbrook et al. 2007). Movements do not always endure, after all, upon coming to power; they give way to global pressures for market reforms, and often betray their initial egalitarian promises (Silva 2009). The contentious tendencies of civil society and social movements are particularly significant here. Contentious collective action provides additional support for programs of social redistribution (Roberts 1998). Strong social movements can keep pressure on ruling parties, and hold them to their initial redistributive promises (Ekiert, Kubik, and Wenzel 2017; Silva 2009).

4. Data and Methods

Our hypothesis, therefore, is that sustained, unarmed mobilization should be associated with democratic deepening after transition. We first assess this hypothesis by running panel regressions to assess the trajectory of democratic quality in all countries that transitioned to democracy between 1950 and 2010. To define democratic periods, we followed Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014), who classify as democracies all political regimes whose executive comes to power through “direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections” (ibid.: 6). These authors code the characteristics of different political regimes, including democracies, providing extensive details about the rationale for their coding. Table 6 in the Appendix lists details of all democratic regimes in our sample.¹

¹ Not all democracies remain democratic, after transition. These countries leave our sample upon their reversion to authoritarianism, though they re-enter our sample in the event of another democratic transition.

4.1. Democratic Deepening

Concerns about the narrowness of conventional definitions of democracy are probably as old as the measures themselves. Fortunately, in recent years, a set of scholars has responded with a new data-gathering effort, known as the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset (Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning, and Teorell 2016). These data were conceived to address two weaknesses of the traditional indices. First, as emphasized already, V-Dem's definition of democracy is multidimensional. The dataset measures democracy in the five major dimensions already mentioned: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. Table 1 summarizes V-Dem's own definitions of what each dimension was conceived to capture. The first two overlap with traditional indices, but the other three are new, and register changes for which scholars have hitherto had only inconsistent or anecdotal evidence. These five measures are the flagship contribution of the dataset, and they are our focus in this paper. As discussed earlier, each of these dimensions is relevant to our theoretical account.

Second, V-Dem proposes new methods to deal with the challenge of reliable and consistent cross-national measurement. After all, while some of the relevant properties of regimes are objective (did a country hold credible elections?), many other features are unavoidably difficult to assess (to what extent do political elites give public justifications for their positions?). Rather than relying on traditional solutions to the measurement challenge, V-Dem solicits an unprecedented amount of information from several thousand experts, and then aggregates these responses systematically.² This represents a considerable improvement on past practice.

In this paper, we draw our dependent variables from the V-Dem dataset. We use the five measures in V-Dem which best capture overall progress in each of the five dimensions of democracy that Coppedge et al. (2016) distinguish: electoral democracy, the liberal dimension, the deliberative dimension, the participatory dimension, and the egalitarian dimension.³ Note that the original V-Dem scale runs from 0 to 1, but we multiply by 100 to ease interpretation of

² On average, five independent experts rate each country in each year. These answers are pooled using an item response theory model to account for differences in expert interpretation and their varying reliability (Pemstein et al. 2015). V-Dem takes additional steps to attenuate other problems that inhere in a cross-country effort of this kind. They assign a subset of coders to multiple countries to account for country-specific idiosyncrasies amongst raters. Moreover, the item response theory models are fit by Bayesian methods with informative priors, which pools information but retains distinctive information about each country-year.

³ Each of the non-electoral dimensions has 'thin' and 'thick' variants. The 'thick' variants combine information about progress in these dimensions with the overall electoral democracy score. This is intended to capture the intuition that electoral progress is the *sine qua non* of democracy---no matter how considerable the progress a regime has made in other dimensions, it cannot be considered a democracy unless it holds free and competitive elections. We use the 'thin' variants in this analysis, since our objective is to gauge the determinants of distinctive progress in each of these dimensions.

regression coefficients.⁴

4.2. Contentious Mobilization

We have argued that sustained unarmed mobilization prior to a democratic transition should advance democracy in each of these five dimensions. To measure the existence and duration of antecedent mobilizations, we use an original dataset measuring anti-authoritarian mobilization leading to a democratic transition. Based on a wide array of secondary sources (see Appendix C for details), this dataset codes all contentious mobilizations contributing to democratic transitions that occurred in the post-1950 period. Building on Chenoweth and Stephan's (2012) definition of a campaign and Tilly and Tarrow's (2007) definition of contentious politics, the dataset defines contentious mobilization as collective action comprising at least 1,000 people making demands on a government. First, was the transition preceded by this kind of mobilization? Second, how long did this popular mobilization last? Thus, the dataset measures sustained unarmed mobilization by the duration (in years) of consistent mobilization leading to the democratic period in question. This is the main independent variable in our analysis, but the dataset does also code the duration of *armed* mobilization preceding transition, which we include as a control. If no mass movement existed, then these variables are coded as zero. In total, there are 108 distinct democracies in our sample (we include different democratic periods in the same country as separate instances of democracy). Sixty-five of these democracies were preceded by unarmed mobilizations lasting at least a year. The average length of these campaigns was 1.64 years (counting non-campaigns as 0 years), and the 90th percentile value is 4.3 years. As argued earlier, we believe that the duration of the pro-democratic movement is the best possible approximation of the organizational legacy of antecedent mobilizations—the longer the mobilization, the more likely it is that it was anchored by enduring organizations.

4.3. Controls

We include political, socio-economic, international, and historical controls to account for the potential endogeneity of our key variable. One might worry that properties of a regime could explain the coincidence of contentious movements and subsequent democratic progress. We do our best to account for this possibility by controlling for two observable characteristics of the

⁴ Note that the fact that these variables share a common scale does not license cross-dimensional comparisons. A country which scores highest in one dimension is not therefore *most* democratic in that dimension, as compared to others. By extension, when we report unstandardized regression estimates, the fact that a given variable has its largest impact in one dimension does not indicate that it has a larger effect in that dimension as compared to all others.

antecedent dictatorship. First, we add a measure of the old regime's aggregate civil society score (from the V-Dem dataset) in the year prior to the start of the pro-democratic campaign. This score is formed from a variety of questions posed to country experts about the autonomy, influence, and membership of civil society organizations. As an example: by our coding, the campaign to unseat Poland's communist regime began in 1980, so we include the V-Dem civil society score from 1979 as a measure of that regime's permissiveness towards civil society on the eve of the campaign to depose the dictatorship. Second, we add a measure of the old regime's average civil liberties score (also from V-Dem) over the life of the pro-democratic campaign. Again, in Poland, this campaign lasted between 1980 and 1989, so we include the civil liberties score from these years in all models. Similarly, we account for previous years of democratic experience in a country, as previously democratic countries might have societies more prone to political mobilization, and institutions with greater democratic qualities. For similar reasons, we also include a variable that accounts for number of years that a country has been democratic before a democratic spell (Geddes et al. 2014). The character of the authoritarian regime before a democratic regime could also have lasting consequences for both mobilization and democratic quality. For instance, military dictatorships are more likely to collapse in the wake of popular mobilization (Geddes 1999), and post-military democracies are more vulnerable to democratic collapse because of military coups (Svolik 2008). Accordingly, we include controls for character of antecedent authoritarian regime –personalistic, one-party, and military (Geddes et al. 2014).

There are also potential socioeconomic confounders discussed in the literature. Democracy should deepen in countries which are economically more developed or which are growing faster (Boix 2011; Lipset 1994; Przeworski and Limongi 1997) and it is also easier to build organizational capacity in these countries, so we include measures of GDP per capita and its growth rate in all models (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). Scholarship on the resource curse also suggests democratization is more difficult and protest is more rare in oil producing countries, so we include a variable that captures oil production per capita (Ross 2012). It is also possible that the exclusion of ethnic groups pushes a country towards armed insurrection, while also making democratic deepening more challenging. We therefore include controls for both ethnic fractionalization and the size of excluded populations in a country (Wimmer et al. 2009).

The international context and a country's historical legacy might also explain both democratization and pro-democratic mobilization. Democracies are more likely to emerge and endure in regions with more democratic regimes (Wejnert 2005), and movements are also more likely to emerge and sustain in such regions because of diffusion mechanisms. Thus, we include the lag of the average value of the dependent variable across all other countries in the region. A

country's integration into the world economy might shape both its democratic trajectory and social movement mobilization by providing more resources to civil society. Therefore, we add a control for the extent of globalization, measured as share of trade in GDP (WB 2016). Finally, to control for legacies of colonialism we include dummies for the identity of a country's colonizer, if any (Hensel 2014).

4.4. Methods

To estimate the impact of antecedent mobilization on subsequent democratic progress, we fit autoregressive distributed lag models (ADL's), so-called because we include a lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side. This specification allows us to estimate both the short-run (i.e., immediate) and long-run (i.e., cumulative) effects of each independent variable on the outcome (De Boef and Keele 2008). Together with error-correction models, which are algebraically equivalent (ibid.), ADL's have become conventional for analysis of time-series cross-sectional data such as these. In what follows, for the purposes of parsimony, we focus entirely on the long-run effects (Table 4 in the Appendix presents the original short-run estimates). In addition, we include year fixed effects to account for time trends and shocks common to all countries, regional fixed effects to account for any time-invariant, region-specific confounders, and we adjust our standard errors for clustering at the country level.

In our preferred models, we further add country-level random effects, to capture country-specific heterogeneity not captured by the regional fixed effects or other variables. Given the constraints of our dataset, we consider these more appropriate than country-level fixed effects. While country-level fixed effects have obvious inferential appeal (Firebaugh, Warner, and Massoglia 2013), they are better suited to a universe in which each country experiences several democratic transitions, detonated by unarmed mobilizations of varying duration. This is very far from being the case in the post-1950 world. Over the life of our sample, most countries experience only a single democratic transition (56 of the 77), and thus only a single democratic spell. In only 16 of the 21 countries which experience more than one is there any variation in the length of antecedent campaigns. As Table 2 shows, the average in-sample standard deviation of our key independent variable is about 2.5 years, but its average within-country standard deviation is only 0.18 years. In short: these are poor grounds for within-country inference. Though we expect much of the country-level heterogeneity to be accounted for by the regional fixed effects and the history-specific dummies, in robustness tests we discuss estimates from two supplementary models which do include country-level fixed effects.

5. Results

Table 3 presents long-run estimates from our preferred specifications. There are five models, one for each of our dependent variables: (1) electoral democracy, (2) liberal dimension, (3) deliberative dimension, (4) participatory dimension, and (5) egalitarian dimension. All coefficients are divided by the standard deviation of the independent variable to ease interpretation.

5.1. Contentious Mobilization

Our main hypotheses find strong support across the five models. All else equal, the duration of unarmed, contentious mobilization is positively associated with democratic quality in each of the five dimensions. In the long-run, a hypothetical increase in the length of mobilization of roughly 2.5 years leads to discernible improvements in the level of democracy: an increase of 5.1 points in the electoral dimension (95% CI: 1.9 to 8.6), 4.6 points in the liberal dimension (95% CI: 2.2 to 8.2), 6.0 points in the deliberative dimension (95% CI: 3.0 to 9.8), 4.8 points in the participatory dimension (95% CI: 2.3 to 7.1), and 6.8 points in the egalitarian dimension (95% CI: 2.8 to 12.4). As indicated in Table 5, each of these five estimates is statistically significant at $\alpha = 0.01$. Together, these models furnish strong evidence that the duration of contentious, unarmed mobilization is a significant predictor of subsequent progress in these distinct domains. All else equal, when authoritarian regimes are toppled by prolonged, unarmed movements, they are replaced by democracies which tend to become more electorally democratic, more liberal, more deliberative, more participatory, and more egalitarian than those which were born amidst quiescence.

How large are these estimates? Had mobilization been more common, the post-1950 world would have been a more democratic place---but how much more democratic? To shed light on these questions, we considered two counterfactual scenarios which are distinguished by the size of the mobilizations involved. First, we estimate outcomes in a hypothetical world in which all transitions unfolded amidst quiescence; where there was no mobilization prior to any democratic transition in our sample. Second, we estimate outcomes in a world in which all transitions were detonated by mass mobilizations of 4.3 years (the 90th percentile value in our sample of post-1950 mobilizations). In both cases, all other variables are held at their observed values. We loop through every regime, and predict the level of each outcome under each scenario. Rather than discussing trends in a given, idiosyncratic country, we focus here on aggregate trends across all regimes. To do this, we order these predictions by the number of

years elapsed since the precipitating transition. Moreover, since the level of any given dependent variable has no intuitive meaning, here we discuss progress rather than the predicted levels. In other words, for each democratic period, we calculate the gains made under each counterfactual (i.e. the predicted democracy score in a given year in a given period minus the actual democracy score on the eve of transition leading to that period). Section B of the Appendix gives further details.

The counterfactual impact of large mobilizations is best captured by the difference in gains made under the two scenarios---by the *additional* progress made in a world filled with mass mobilization as compared to a world of generalized quiescence. Figure 1 plots the magnitude of these additional gains in each dimension, as a function of the number of years that have elapsed since transition.⁵ Gains due to mobilization are sizeable in all five dimensions. (Because the scales of these variables are not readily interpretable, we divide our estimates by the in-sample standard deviation of the respective outcomes.) Had all post-1950 democracies in our sample been preceded by 4.3 years of unarmed mobilization, they would have been significantly more democratic than in a universe in which the masses had never mobilized. Ten years out from transition, average additional gains amount to 0.49 standard deviations in the electoral dimension (95% CI: 0.23 to 0.80), 0.50 standard deviations in the liberal dimension (95% CI: 0.25 to 0.80), 0.56 standard deviations in the deliberative dimension (95% CI: 0.26 to 0.79), 0.50 standard deviations in the participatory dimension (95% CI: 0.15 to 0.71), and 0.28 standard deviations in the egalitarian dimension (95% CI: 0.12 to 0.41). In short: a quiescent world would likely have been substantially less democratic, and a mobilized world substantially more.⁶

5.2. Robustness Checks

As illustrated in Figure 2 (see also Figure 5 in the Appendix), we conducted a wide array of robustness checks. These further affirm our confidence in the impact of prolonged unarmed mobilization on democratic deepening. One might worry, for instance, that our specification of the pre-transition controls is somewhat arbitrary, but across several reasonable specifications (or, if these controls are dropped), the estimated impact of unarmed mobilization on these outcomes is positive and statistically significant at $\alpha = 0.01$. Separately, we found no evidence that our estimates are driven by campaigns of outlying length. Estimates are unchanged when we drop

⁵ Figure 3 in the Appendix graphs the predicted trajectories of progress under each of these scenarios (from which the estimates of additional progress are calculated).

⁶ To be clear, this does not imply that there would have been no democratic progress in a quiescent world. Other factors certainly mattered alongside. Nonetheless, as Section B of the Appendix explains, mobilization explains a large share of aggregate progress (anywhere from 25% to 50% of democratic progress made in the ten years after transition, depending on the dimension in question).

the longest campaign in our sample (South Africa in 1994), or when we use the natural log of campaign length.

One might argue that strength of a movement is better approximated by considering years in which movements exist but do not actively mobilize (as in Poland's Solidarity, mid 1980s), so we constructed an alternative coding scheme that counts both years of public protest mobilization as well as years of organizing or abeyance. All estimates remain statistically significant at conventional levels. Separately, we replaced our measure of the duration of mobilization with a dummy variable denoting the existence of a campaign ('Campaign Dummies'). The simple existence of a nonviolent campaign is not a consistently significant predictor of deepening in all five democratic dimensions, even though estimates are still all positive. This result affirms the importance of measuring not just the presence of contention (as in Haggard et al. (2012)) but also its duration. Finally, we constructed an alternative measure of pre-transition mobilization based on the data on mobilizations available in NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2012) that codes all violent and nonviolent campaigns during the 20th century. Again, even by their coding, we find that unarmed mobilization has a positive impact on democratic quality, though the estimate is not statistically significant in the participatory dimension.

The removal or addition of a barrage of other controls leaves results largely unchanged. In a sparse specification (including only the lag of GDP per capita, its growth rate, the regional and year fixed effects, and country random effects), the estimated impact of unarmed mobilization remains statistically significant at conventional levels in all but the egalitarian dimension, where it is still significant at $\alpha = 0.10$. The inclusion of four lags (rather than one) of the dependent variable makes no difference to our preferred specification, suggesting that a single lag captures the dynamic behavior of these series reasonably well. Neither do our results seem to be driven by measures of a country's membership in international governmental organizations, land and income inequality, or the proportion of a country's trade conducted with the US, the EU, China or Russia.⁷ These results suggest that the coincidence of sustained mobilizations and democratic deepening is not an artifact of international linkages or to levels of inequality. The results are also robust to including all post-WWII transitions from before 1950, or to excluding all transitions, which we have not had much time to observe (i.e., those which happened after 2000). We also ran the models using an alternative measure of democracy (Cheibub et al. 2010) to define our universe of cases; each of the estimates is positive and significant at $\alpha = 0.05$ or less.

⁷ We exclude these variables from our main specifications because their inclusion considerably shrinks our sample.

Finally, as discussed already, we also estimate specifications which include country fixed-effects. In the first ('Dem. Years, Country Fixed-Effects' in Figure 2), we replace the random-effects in our preferred model with fixed-effects, but change nothing else. While all estimates are still positive, they are also generally more imprecise— significant at the $\alpha = 0.10$ level in the electoral and deliberative dimensions, but not in the other three. Given the absence of within-country variation in our key independent variable, this imprecision is not surprising. For this reason, we also estimate country fixed-effects models on an expanded sample (all years for all countries in our sample, whether democracies or dictatorships). In effect, these models ask: over the post- WWII world, were countries which experienced sustained unarmed mobilizations more democratic during the subsequent democratization episode than when dictatorships or when in democratic episodes which were preceded by shorter or negligible contentious mobilizations? These models are very similar to those estimated by Haggard and Kaufman (2016: Chapter 5). Encouragingly, all estimates are positive and, at minimum, weakly significant (electoral, liberal and participatory at $\alpha = 0.01$, egalitarian at $\alpha = 0.01$, and deliberative at $\alpha = 0.10$).

6. Case Study: The Long March to Democracy in Brazil

Our statistical analyses thus offer strong evidence of a general relationship between contentious mobilization and democratic deepening. Mobilization is consistently associated with deeper democratization after transition, as we have argued it should be. Yet, the results presented thus far are not well-suited to identifying the *mechanisms* underlying the associations we have presented. In other words: we know contentious mobilization matters, but why?

To shed light on the mechanisms linking prolonged mobilization to democratic deepening, we analyze the process of democratization in Brazil, which is a paradigmatic case. In the period between the military coup in 1964 and the first, indirect national elections in 1985, millions organized and took to the streets. As we show below, this movement spurred democratic deepening by changing the functioning and accountability of the state in ways that provided civil society with the capacity to hold new democratic leaders to account and articulate substantive social and economic demands. In short, pro-democratic contentious mobilization had lasting influence on the substantive dimensions (participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) of Brazilian democracy, beyond the gains made in the traditional liberal and electoral dimensions.

6.1. Movement

A long line of social scientists have shown that contentious mobilizations were decisive to the Brazilian transition to democracy in 1985 (Seidman 1994; Collier and Mahoney 1997; Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva 2011). Military leaders initiated a process of political liberalization in 1974, which provided limited electoral space for a single officially recognized opposition party to compete with the military-aligned Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA). Within even this limited space, a broad social front came together to demand democratic elections. This constellation of movements linked together new independent trade unions, neighborhood groups, urban reform movement, Catholic churches, and cultural groups. Such “social movement unionism” integrated demands for substantive dimensions of democracy with calls for liberal and electoral reforms. Labor agitation gained force in 1977, and large strikes in the industrial suburbs of São Paulo in the 1978 and 1979 made clear that social movements could challenge the political authority of the military dictatorship. Large-scale land occupations in both urban and rural areas further undermined this authority. The new union movement, which formalized its organization into the Unified Workers’ Central (CUT), was known for practices of internal democracy, and instilling a deliberative ethos of organization. This was particularly so during debates over the relationship between CUT and its political party ally, the Worker’s Party (PT), in preparation for elections in the mid-1980s (Keck 1995; Sluyter-Beltrão 2010).

During this period of struggle, the most significant political party to emerge was the Worker’s Party (PT). The Movement for a Democratic Brazil (PMDB) was the only legal opposition party to the ruling ARENA, and it never seriously challenged for control of the presidency. The PT’s importance lay in its capacity to articulate social movement demands in the formal political sphere. The party first participated in tightly-controlled parliamentary elections in 1982. After the PT’s poor showing in these elections, the party resolved to focus primarily on organizing its base in trade unions and social movements. While this initially seemed like a retreat, it is precisely this process of organizational renewal that explains the steady growth of the PT in later periods (Keck 1995). The PT’s growth at the municipal and eventually the federal level allowed it to generate strong associational ties and carry forward a political agenda which deepened Brazilian democracy (Baiocchi 2003).

6.2. Transition

In 1984, the “Diretas Já” movement for direct elections united this social movement-trade unionist alliance with more middle-class segments of society. These protests led to indirect

presidential elections in 1985, the constitution of 1988 and the first direct elections of 1989. The sequencing of this transition opened significant avenues for expressing voice and building new associational capacities in civil society. Civilian elites, military elites, and popular classes all were included in constitutional negotiations, and organizations within civil society managed to find spaces to expand their formal participation (Oliveira and Silva Martins da Cunha Marinho 2012). The participation of the PT in constitutional negotiations opened space for social movements to gain independent standing in the negotiations (Kingstone and Power 2008). Primarily, civil society associations influenced these constitutional negotiations by proposing popular amendments (Whitaker 1994). Key chapters on health, social assistance, and urban politics were all altered after such amendments (Avritzer 2012).

However, the PT initially struggled to move beyond its urban industrial worker base, and the presidential candidacy of the party's leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva ("Lula"), a former trade unionist, failed to succeed in early elections in the democratic era. The key opening came through electoral victories in many municipalities in 1989, including São Paulo. This made it possible for the party to begin implementing key policy experiments, such as participatory budgeting, a wide range of participatory sectoral councils (e.g. housing, health, education), and new programs for delivering collective goods even in contexts of highly constrained finances (Avritzer 2012).

Social movements used the transition period to consolidate access to a range of formal institutional spaces. They created mechanisms for achieving their substantive demands, beyond procedural democratization. In addition to their alliance with the PT, social movements could make direct inputs to the constitutional negotiations. The new constitution of 1988, which institutionalized Brazil's democracy also carried some of the most significant socio-economic protections of any constitution in the world. This opened the possibility for deepening democracy in the years to come.

6.3. Democratic Deepening After Transition

Electoral and Liberal Democracy

The alliance of activist movements and party organizations which first came together in the pro-democracy struggle was decisive in consolidating formal dimensions of democracy. In addition to progress in the electoral arena, several other features of a liberal democracy were built through struggle. The independence of the judiciary, for instance, was the product of struggle by constellation of civil society activists and progressive bureaucrats. It was achieved not only through new constitutional provisions, but by progressive activism by professionals from within

key judicial institutions, such as the Public Ministry (Coslovsky 2011). Professionals within the ministry were able to craft alliances with civil society groups, such as environmental activists (Hochstetler and Keck 2007). This allowed public prosecutors to position their independence as a defense of civil society against corporate and state collusion. The initial possibility for such alliances was due to the openness of constitutional negotiations to civil society groups.

The durability of formal democratic institutions was also tested by the corruption scandals that engulfed the presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992. This helped establish in practice the independence of the legislative branch of government. Significant popular pressure in the streets, coupled with a unified front by the three largest opposition parties from the authoritarian era — the PT, PSDB, and PMDB — combined to force Collor de Mello from office. His impeachment helped consolidate the liberal dimension of the country's new democracy (Dos Santos 1994). Many of the same forces that mobilized for democratization in the 1980s were therefore instrumental in establishing democratic accountability after transition.

Participatory and Deliberative Democracy

While continuing to build power at the municipal level, the PT came closer in successive elections to winning the national presidency in second round elections. In 2002, Lula won, and took office on 1 January 2003. The PT's rise through municipal power and finally national power was marked by the introduction and extension of participatory councils for budgeting (Baiochi et al. 2011) and for specific policy sectors, such as housing and health. These were critical to deepening the participatory and deliberative dimensions of democracy, and built on provisions first written into the 1988 constitution for participatory institutions.

Civil society demands were instrumental to the establishment of these councils in two ways. First, civil society associations ensured that the constitution of 1988 provided for the establishment of participatory councils at the municipal level. Second, the participation of these associations in the councils oriented them towards achieving redistributive outcomes. These institutions became a mechanism for delivering to the PT's working-class base without alienating the middle classes who also participated in the councils. Participatory initiatives were an extension of internal democratic practices common to the trade unions and social movements that formed during the struggle for democracy. Participatory and sectoral budgeting councils were a common attribute of PT-run cities as soon as they began to take over mayoral seats in direct elections in 1989 (Wampler and Avritzer 2004b). Participatory councils and policy achievements at the municipal level created avenues for local chapters of social movements to continue to direct grievances and hold officials accountable. Though these councils have exhibited some variation in the quality of participation and influence on policy, they are more

effective at building citizenship than comparable institutions in other countries (Houtzager and Acharya 2011). Such democratic deepening is all the more remarkable given Brazil's long history of clientelist modes of governance, especially at the local level (Hagopian 1996).

While institutional reforms were key to promoting participatory practices, there were also areas in which contentious and empowered social movements promoted participatory practices by directly demanding access to city halls or health services (Baiocchi et al. 2008). The democratic governance of social movements and unions in the struggle for democracy also affected the degrees of accountability for urban governance that the new constitution mandated. This was made possible through significant provisions for decentralization of financial administration to municipalities. Decentralization and participatory initiatives also altered the effectiveness and distribution of municipal delivery of public goods.

Egalitarian Democracy

Brazil's deepening of egalitarian elements of democracy was most clearly associated with the interaction of the reconstruction of state institutions and civil society. Much of this was mediated through the political project of the PT. Its rise to national power was preceded by a progressive march through key municipal governments. These posts allowed the party to experiment with policies that have deepened the egalitarian dimension of Brazilian democracy. These municipal policy innovations drew on the mutually constitutive relationship between the PT and social movements. In cities such as São Paulo and Porto Alegre, following the wave of PT mayors in the first direct elections of 1989, local governments began supporting housing movements involved in land occupations to begin "self-construction" housing projects and to formalize previously informal "favela" settlements. Local control, increased bureaucratic capacity, empowerment of social movements, and improved distribution of public services often went together.

The 2002 national election proved a watershed for the further development of the egalitarian dimensions of Brazilian democracy. The PT came to power and managed to implement redistributive policies in the labor market, healthcare, housing provision, and land rights. In this sense, the PT era heralded a significant expansion of egalitarian democracy. The urban reform movement achieved a major victory in the same years that the PT would eventually ascend to power with the passage of new laws, such as the City Statute in 2001. This legislation was designed to realize some of the key "aspirational" socio-economic rights recognized by the 1988 constitution. The City Statute made it possible for municipal governments to promulgate policies that captured value from private land transactions for public investments, regularized

informal settlements, and extended public goods such as housing, sanitation and transport. It also mandated that cities establish participatory councils.

These legal and bureaucratic shifts were signals of federal government support for decentralized management of primarily public goods provision (Fernandes 2007). The scaling up of the cash transfer program of Bolsa Escola, begun in the municipality of Belo Horizonte, to the national Bolsa Familia program is perhaps the most well-known instance of policy under the PT-controlled presidency (Sugiyama 2008). The link between redistribution and the move from clientelistic to programmatic welfare policies is most clearly exemplified by the administration of Bolsa Familia. Federal transfers could go directly to beneficiaries, as opposed to through local political bosses. Sugiyama and Hunter (2013) have cited this aspect of the program as a watershed in breaking the hold of clientelistic welfare provision. Furthermore, the PT pushed major investments in public infrastructure through the Growth and Acceleration Program (PAC) in 2007 and in low-income housing through the My House My Life (MCMV) program in 2009 (Pires and Gomide 2016). In addition, one of the main contributors to a reduction in income inequality was the regular rise in the minimum wage in the PT era (Ban 2013). Finally, the provision of universal health care was a hallmark program of the PT government, through the Unified Health System (SUS), leading to remarkable gains in life expectancy and drops in infant and maternal mortality (Gragmolati et al. 2013).

These achievements were all the more remarkable because they came at a time in which the policies of the Washington Consensus limited possibilities for redistribution in poor and middle income countries (Rudra 2002). Because it was accountable to a wider social base, the PT did not simply cave to market pressures (Lee 2016).

The social movements that had organized for a lengthy period to help catalyze a democratic transition faced a dilemma in the democratic period of what could be interpreted as essentially too much success. Not only had their political allies reached national office, but many of their goals were implemented. Rural land reform efforts — advocated by the Landless People's Movement (MST) — were formalized after many land occupations (Ondetti 2006). Urban reform movements achieved federal legislation in the form of the city statute and a ministry at which they could direct grievances (Fernandes 2007). Inevitably, challenges did emerge as founder generations of movements struggled to achieve renewal through the entrance of new leaders, which led to a process of demobilization. And yet, the coordination across local and national scales that had been so integral to the movements' earlier successes made them remarkably resilient. The period of consolidation also saw the emergence of new movements, which had been active in civil society mobilization against dictatorship, and rose to more

significant prominence in the democratic era. In particular, movements for the rights of Afro-Brazilians, indigenous people, and LGBTQ, have deepened the civil society sphere's articulation of demands for egalitarian inclusion and representation (Paschel 2016).

In sum, the case of democratic deepening in Brazil is emblematic of the mechanisms of a programmatic, redistributive political party, and a social movement forged through lengthy contentious mobilization under authoritarianism. The interaction between party, movement, and state institutions in the democratic period made it possible to deepen democracy not only along liberal and electoral dimensions, but in democracy's participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian dimensions as well. The case also shows that these mechanisms do not operate independently but change each other over time. This processual dynamic explains some of the particularities of precisely how social movements and political parties worked together to deepen Brazil's democracy, particularly in terms of new institutional structures and redistributive policies in a context of unusually high socio-economic inequalities.

7. Conclusion

Why do some new democracies progress while others stagnate? Some new regimes move to expand electoral competition, to guarantee protection against government tyranny, to promote the participation of citizens in policy making, and to ensure equal access to the decision-making process. Others, however, remain democracies in name only: making slow or no progress in any of these dimensions. In this paper, we have shown that the pathway of transition is an important explanation of subsequent democratic deepening. We collected original data for 108 democratic regimes between 1950 and 2010 and exploited a new dataset which measures five dimensions of democracy –electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian, which allowed us to put this question to its first comprehensive quantitative test. Considered together, our evidence strongly suggests that longer episodes of unarmed pro-democratic mobilization lead to deeper democracies.

Why does mobilization matter? We argued that sustained unarmed mobilization matters because it builds political and civil society organization, which deepens democracy for two reasons: (1) it generates a new and democratically-oriented political elite; and (2) it gives the post-transition civil society the autonomy and capacity to make demands after transition.

The case of democratization in Brazil demonstrates both mechanisms. The pro-democracy movement in Brazil, which began in the late 1970s, led to the formation of the PT,

which has proven to be the country's most important pro-democracy political party⁸. It also built the capacities of local associations, trade unions, and civic groups at the grass-roots level. During the transition era, both the PT and these social movements were the protagonists of Brazil's democratic revolution. Their actions and activism led to progress in all five dimensions of Brazilian democracy. Civil society pressure was able to support legislators to push back an early challenge to the liberal dimensions of democracy and impeach a corrupt president. The traditional dimensions of electoral and liberal democracy are clear by virtue of regular elections, decentralized administration, and a clear separation of powers between branches of government. As a result of popular demands, especially through unions and urban social movements, participatory and deliberative dimensions of democracy have been particularly consequential for the deepening of democracy in Brazil. For example, social movements have been able to use local participatory councils to articulate policies and advocate for their passage. In turn, PT-led governments have been able to implement redistributive policies that deepen the egalitarian dimension of democracy, for example, through cash transfer programs and providing universal public health. Social movements were the first to articulate these demands in the sphere of civil society, which the PT could then translate into the formal political sphere. The long experience of contention and deliberation and civil society has inspired new movements aimed at further deepening the egalitarian dimension of democracy, through a focus on rights for LGBTQ people and Afro-Brazilians.

There are studies that contend popular mobilization generates more durable and competitive electoral democracies. Our analysis shows that it is not just the occurrence of contentious mobilization but also its duration that leads to democratic deepening. This argument extends studies of social movement outcomes beyond policy changes in long established democracies such as the US, by focusing on quality of democracy in new democratic regimes. Finally, in contrast to more pessimistic views about mass mobilization, this finding demonstrates that contentious mobilization improves, rather than threatens, the quality of democracy in post-transition contexts. The fall of dictators is usually swift, but deep democracy often requires a long march of contentious mobilization.

⁸ While other parties were also involved in the pro-democracy movement, the PT has been the only consistent competitor in presidential politics in all elections in the democratic era.

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Table 1: Main Outcomes as Defined by V-Dem

Variable	V-Dem Name	Definition
Electoral Democracy	v2x_polyarchy	Electoral democracy prevails when there are clean elections in which most of the population can participate, when civil society organizations and political parties operate freely, and when the result of these elections bears on the composition of the executive. It also requires that there be freedom of expression and an independent media.
Liberal Dimension	v2x_liberal	The liberal component is higher when states protect individual and minority rights against the state and against the majority, which requires that civil liberties be protected, that the rule of law prevail, that there be an independent judiciary and checks on the exercise of executive power.
Deliberative Dimension	v2xdl_delib	The deliberative component is higher when decisions are judged to be reached via deliberation characterized by a commitment to the common good, and not by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochialism, or coercion. V-Dem measures the extent to which political elites justify their behavior by adverting to the public good, respecting counter-arguments, and the extent to which they consult other elites.
Participatory Dimension	v2x_partip	The participatory component is higher in countries which actively involve citizens in the political process. It measures the extent to which citizens have direct influence on policy decisions, through civil society, through direct democratic initiatives, and through subnational bodies.
Egalitarian Dimension	v2x_egal	The egalitarian component is higher in countries which reduce the barriers that ordinary people face, when trying to exercise their formal rights. It is thus higher in countries where resources and rights are judged to be distributed equally across social groups, and where this allocation meets their basic needs.

Table 2: In-Sample Descriptive Statistics

	Average	SD	Within SD
Dependent Variables			
Electoral Democracy	65.69	17.87	6.11
Liberal Dimension	70.75	15.22	4.40
Deliberative Dimension	74.74	18.00	6.70
Participatory Dimension	54.61	12.96	4.89
Egalitarian Dimension	63.37	21.32	3.17
Independent Variables			
Unarmed Mobilization	2.06	2.46	0.19
Armed Mobilization	1.78	5.20	0.19
Civil Society Pre-Mob.	32.79	22.50	2.49
Civil Liberties During Mob.	45.72	18.88	1.53
Post-Military Rule	0.45	0.50	0.06
Post-Personalistic Rule	0.38	0.49	0.06
Post-Party Rule	0.22	0.42	0.02
Post-Independence	0.14	0.35	0.04
Democratic Experience	6.87	8.98	0.88
GDP per capita (log)	8.37	1.03	0.16
Growth Rate	0.02	0.05	0.05
GDP per capita (log)	8.37	1.03	0.16
Population (log)	16.36	1.20	0.12
Oil Production per capita	0.20	0.48	0.04
Excluded Population	0.13	0.16	0.03
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.35	0.27	0.00
Globalization	65.68	36.25	13.92


This table presents the average, standard deviation, and average within-country standard deviation ('Within SD') of each variable included in our preferred specifications. By average within-country standard deviation we refer to the average of the within-country standard deviations in our sample (i.e. $\frac{\sum_{i=1}^N SD_i}{N}$, where SD_i is the standard deviation of a given variable in country i).

Table 3: Long-Run Estimates, Main Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Long-Run Multiplier</i>					
Electoral Democracy (Reg. Avg.)	0.408 [-5.97 to 7.49]				
Liberal Dimension (Reg. Avg.)		-2.800 [-12.73 to 4.71]			
Deliberative Dimension (Reg. Avg.)			3.162 [-4.22 to 9.43]		
Participatory Dimension (Reg. Avg.)				-0.529 [-11.27 to 13.56]	
Egalitarian Dimension (Reg. Avg.)					0.925 [-17.7 to 18.43]
Unarmed Mobilization	5.096** [1.93 to 8.55]	4.575** [2.19 to 8.2]	6.016** [3 to 9.79]	4.484** [2.25 to 7.1]	6.847** [2.82 to 12.37]
Armed Mobilization	-1.276 [-3.43 to 1.16]	-1.534 [-3.28 to 0.79]	-1.441 [-4.75 to 2.25]	0.876 [-0.88 to 2.65]	-2.347 [-5.53 to 2.1]
Civil Society Pre-Mob.	2.420 [-2 to 7.1]	-0.818 [-4.37 to 4.03]	1.776 [-2.31 to 6.54]	5.940** [2.36 to 10.56]	-1.807 [-8.34 to 3.57]
Civil Liberties During Mob.	-2.630 [-6.51 to 1.59]	-0.094 [-4.38 to 3.32]	-3.800 ⁺ [-8.02 to 0.35]	-3.333* [-6.73 to -0.49]	0.304 [-4.76 to 8.51]
Post-Military Rule	-9.738** [-17.01 to -2.06]	-5.080 [-13.27 to 2.54]	-3.263 [-11.78 to 4.96]	-0.582 [-7.42 to 6.89]	-12.609* [-27.3 to -1.37]
Post-Personalistic Rule	1.186 [-3.7 to 7.06]	1.392 [-4.36 to 7.47]	1.479 [-6.31 to 9.05]	0.828 [-4.6 to 6.95]	6.096 ⁺ [-0.59 to 20.73]
Post-Party Rule	-0.605 [-10.31 to 9.25]	-0.104 [-9.17 to 7.96]	9.176 ⁺ [-1.51 to 18.76]	7.655 ⁺ [-1.49 to 16.35]	-3.180 [-25.46 to 9.78]
Post-Independence	-10.481 [-25.34 to 5.22]	-7.347 [-20.79 to 7.39]	-8.570 [-22.03 to 3.92]	6.352 [-7.98 to 26.24]	-4.567 [-26.72 to 12.35]
Democratic Experience	7.611** [5.02 to 10.07]	6.679** [3.92 to 9.67]	6.356** [3.16 to 9.49]	2.987 [-1.19 to 6.49]	10.075** [6.6 to 16.6]
GDP per capita (log)	3.155 [-3.2 to 9.54]	6.395 ⁺ [-0.1 to 12.74]	-0.215 [-7.56 to 5.69]	-2.322 [-6.87 to 2.88]	5.997 [-2.96 to 21.19]
Growth Rate	-0.258 [-1.75 to 1.14]	-0.266 [-1.73 to 1.44]	-0.434 [-2.22 to 1.65]	-0.161 [-2.03 to 1.49]	0.060 [-4.06 to 3.61]
Population (log)	-3.540 [-8 to 0.69]	-2.513 [-6.91 to 1.59]	-4.084 ⁺ [-8.17 to 0.54]	-0.999 [-4.49 to 2.09]	-7.558* [-14.07 to -1.47]
Oil Production per capita	4.002* [0.46 to 7.36]	-0.269 [-3.49 to 4.04]	4.837* [0.47 to 10.46]	4.690** [1.51 to 8.42]	1.726 [-9.41 to 7.1]
Excluded Population	-1.545 [-3.9 to 0.83]	-3.155* [-6.68 to -0.03]	-3.678* [-7.39 to -0.21]	-1.458 [-4.85 to 1.66]	-3.807 ⁺ [-8.48 to 0.12]
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.233 [-3.21 to 5.53]	1.583 [-3.59 to 6.21]	3.699 [-2.81 to 9.35]	0.325 [-3.36 to 3.99]	4.783 [-1.79 to 14.14]
Globalization	1.104 [-2.05 to 4.09]	0.240 [-2.72 to 2.87]	0.174 [-3.16 to 3.6]	-2.973* [-7.23 to -0.07]	1.556 [-4.13 to 6.84]
<i>Model Info</i>					
Observations	1,326	1,327	1,327	1,327	1,327
Countries	78	78	78	78	78
Range	1955-2010	1955-2010	1955-2010	1955-2010	1955-2010
Avg. N_i	17	17	17	17	17
Colonizer Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-Level	RE	RE	RE	RE	RE
Region-Level	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
Year-Level	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
Adj. R^2	0.858	0.865	0.846	0.903	0.979


This table reports long-run estimates from our preferred models. As discussed in the main text and in Section A of the Appendix, the inclusion of a lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of our models permits calculation of the cumulative (and not just immediate) impact of a change in a given independent variable. Note that each of these estimates is semi-standardized: it represents the impact of a SD-sized change in the independent variable on the relevant variable (in its original units). Each column of this table presents estimates from models with a different dependent variable (in order: electoral, liberal, deliberative, participatory, and egalitarian). Our favored specification thus includes each of the controls listed along the left-hand side of the table, as well as a variety of other controls indicated in ‘Model Info’ (dummies for the identity of a country’s colonial ruler, country-level random effects, region-level fixed effects, and year-level fixed effects). As explained in Section A of the Appendix, due to the difficulty of calculating standard errors analytically, we report 95% confidence intervals (and we use 90%, 95% and 99% confidence intervals to compute the corresponding level of statistical significance).

Figure 1: Gains from Mobilization by Year of Democracy



This figure illustrates the estimated aggregate impact of mobilization on democratic deepening, as measured by the predicted gap in democratic gains made in a world in which all transitions unfolded amidst mobilizations of 4.3 years, which is the 90th percentile value in our sample, and a world in which all transitions unfolded amidst quiescence. Section B of the Appendix describes our methods and the results in more detail. The y-axis denotes the average difference in gains made under these two scenarios (in standard deviations of the dependent variable), and the x-axis denotes the number of years that have elapsed since transition. The solid line plots the average size of gains made across all spells that have survived a given number of years since transition, while the shaded area spans a 95% confidence interval for this average.

Figure 2: Robustness Checks, Main Outcomes



This figure illustrates that our main estimates are robust to a variety of alternative specifications. This figure lists each of these robustness checks on the y-axis (for a full description of each specification, see the main text), and each of our main dependent variables on the x-axis. Unless otherwise suggested, each model is restricted to the same sample we use for our preferred specification.