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Measuring Citizen Ownership of the State*

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Abstract

This paper defines citizen ownership of the state (COS) as a combination of an acceptable election and implementation of the election promises. It introduces a two-tier measurement of the COS. Tier 1 by using election results determines whether the COS existed or not during a past period of time and Tier 2 using election promise implementation status determines how much the COS existed. Then, a combination of Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores results in an overall COS. At Tier 2, the paper argues, the level of implementation of election promises is a measurement of the COS. The paper models the authority of a representative government to a power of attorney. The citizen as principal awards a power of attorney to the winning individual, party or alliance as an agent in their election. In the election, the set of election promises of the agent becomes the only written part of the power of attorney. The 2009-2012 tenure of USA President Barack Obama is used to test how the methodological approach works with empirical data. The test finds Tier 2 COS at 70.7 percent and party intrusion into the COS at 29.3 percent in the tenure. After averaging Tier 1 and Tier 2 COS scores, the overall COS stands at 85.35 percent on a 0-100 scale.

Keywords: Citizen ownership of the state (COS); Election promises; Individual, party or alliance (IPA); Power of attorney; President Obama: Representative government

Introduction

The concept of citizen ownership of the state (COS) is related to republicanism and more specifically, democracy. The word *republic* has originated from the Latin *res* and *publica*. *Res* implies a thing, affairs or interest, and *publica* means everybody. Thus, the word *republic* literally means thing or affair that belongs to everybody (LaRosa, 2005). Besides, the four basic elements of the state – land, people, government, and sovereignty – are conceptually centered on the existence of citizens. The people themselves are citizens; the land, in general, belongs to citizens; citizens create the government, and, thus, all of these three points mean that the sovereignty of the state is in the hands of citizens.

The constitution of democracies acknowledges citizens as the owner of the state, but political parties in representative democracies apparently challenge this constitutional acknowledgement in practice. The global scenario ranging from Western to non-Western democracies manifests more-or-less uncomfortable relations between citizens and political parties. Especially, non-Western democracies have witnessed the worst situation in this context as politicians after coming to power usually break their election promises. These democracies also have witnessed partisan approaches and unfair efforts to come and cling to power. A study on Bangladesh shows how political parties exert overwhelming influence on the state machinery and how the so-called democracy has evolved into a ‘partyarchy’ (BIGD, 2015). According to a survey, a vast majority of citizens in developing countries thinks that their governments do not listen to them (Pew Research Centre, 2014). In Western democracies, Prime Ministers or Presidents have become the dominant political actor (Cameron, 2013). Against this backdrop, this paper investigates the question: Do citizens own the state in practice – how can one measure the ownership?

There is no much literature relating to COS. Karl Marx’ revolutionary thoughts found the state belonging to owners of the means of production. These owners are capitalists in capitalism and proletarians in socialism. However, the ongoing controversy over his claim entered a wider phase at the end of the last century when the proletarian states in Eastern Europe got back to capitalist hands that included non-owners of the means of production too. Pettit’s (Pettit, 2008) Condominium Model provides an insight into COS as the model’s apartment owners of a condominium resemble state owners in general. But there is no literal mention of ‘citizen ownership of the state’ in Pettit (2008) and the Condominium Model does not deal with the party system which this paper is interested in. The only works found are Bezhanyan (2009) and Cummine (2016) that literally use the concept of COS. They both define the concept as a traditional legal-institutional framework of democracy. Bezhanyan (2009) operationalizes the concept as a right to fight corruption in government mechanism¹. Cummine (2016) uses the

¹ Bezhanyan (2009) is an unpublished work that does not provide clear access to the concept of citizen ownership of the state.

concept in order to explain who will manage sovereign funds in a country. They did not need to measure COS. Therefore, devising a measure of COS is still crucial.

Unlike the dearth of literature on COS, the literature relating to how or whether governing individual, party or alliance (IPA) fulfills their promises made to citizens during elections is abundant (e.g. Bradley, 1969; David, 1971; Fishel, 1985; Krukones, 1984; Monie're, 1988; Pe'try, 2002; Pe'try and Collette, 2006; Petry and Collette, 2009; Pomper, 1968; Pomper and Lederman, 1980; Rallings, 1987; Ringquist and Dasse, 2004; Rose, 1984; Royed, 1996; Royed and Borelli, 1997; Royed and Borelli, 1999; Thomson, 2001; Thomson et al., 2017). Petry and Collette (2009) review 18 studies of election promise fulfillment in North America and Europe. They find that governing parties, on an average, fulfil 67 percent of their electoral promises. However, none of such works links their findings to any idea like COS. This paper argues that the level of implementation of election promises is a measurement of COS.

The rest of the paper is divided into a few sections. The Theory section explains what the COS is in a normative term. Then, the Empirical Study Method section designs how to measure COS with empirical data. The Test section presents findings of a test of the methodological approach using the 2009-2012 term of USA President Barak Obama and his 2008 election promises. The Conclusion talks about the implications of the paper.

Theory: What is COS?

As per the social contract and Marxian theories (Evers, 1977; Hühne, 2012; Ritchie, 1891; Sanderson, 1963; Semenov, 1975), this paper identifies citizens as traditional inhabitants or settlers of a sovereign state and considers that the state by birth belongs to its citizens. Therefore, all the laws and judgments that govern the state affairs, including the citizenship, are meant to have approval from the citizens. This paper also considers that the citizenry is universal and if any practices or theories such as the ones based on force or wealth go against this universality that is a result of a distortion of the originality. In accordance with the originality, the state is meant to be run by its owners, the citizen.

The ancient Greek city-state of Athens is by and large an example of such a system. The then Athenian citizens² generally used to formulate laws, execute the laws, and judge the laws and their execution (Blackwell, 2003; Jones, 1958; Landauer, 2014). Thus, Athenian citizens used to get whatever the majority of them wanted from the state. This paper considers the Athenian regime the ideal model of the COS. But present-day states are so big in terms of geographical area and size of population that citizens cannot run the state affairs themselves. Therefore, citizens get the state affairs governed by their representatives. However, the representative government is not straightforward. Different groups or individuals compete to either represent citizens or occupy the

² Many Athenian inhabitants like women and slaves were not recognized as citizens. However, this paper considers just what Athenian citizens used to practice in terms of what citizens are meant to do as the owner of the state.

COS. A representative election is a possible solution to this effect, but, still, there is a possibility of no acceptable election or no election at all. Once an election is found acceptable, it is considered that the state has a representative government.

Considering the points made above, this paper primarily defines citizen ownership of the present-day large-scale state as a condition where whatever the majority of citizens want from the state is implemented. But, in such a large-scale state, how is it possible to know what the citizens want the state to do? Also, how can one determine what the state does not do, or does something that goes against what the citizens want? Citizens usually choose their representative IPA based on, among others, their current election promises, past promise fulfillment records, their general characteristics, ideologies and programs. Among those, election promises are apparently most relevant, specific and well-documented. In elections, individual candidates, different parties and alliance place their promises before citizens as to what they will do and do not if voted to govern the state affairs. Such promises are usually expressed in different ways, such as speeches in public meetings, debates and election manifestos.

This paper considers parties or alliances the main contenders in an election. Once citizens vote for a IPA, it is understood that the citizens who vote the IPA want what the election promises of the IPA say implemented. In case of a presidential system, where the chief executive is recruited through a separate election and not accountable to the parliament for their workings, it is understood that the majority of the citizens has voted the winning IPA and wanted what the IPA promised during their election campaign fulfilled. In a parliamentary system, where the majority party or alliance of an elected parliament appoints the chief executive, such as prime minister and they along with their cabinet colleagues is accountable to the parliament for their workings, it is understood that the majority of the citizens has voted the majority party or alliance and wanted what the majority party or alliance promised during their election campaign fulfilled. But election results do not always produce a majority party or alliance straightaway. In such cases, elected smaller parties or individuals by negotiation between themselves create a majority alliance and form a coalition government. In the process of the negotiations, their conflicting election promises, if any, are compromised or become inactive, and, if they want, some new promises are also added to the policy preferences of the newly formed governing coalition. Elected party executives and individuals rightfully make such changes because their election acknowledges their leadership quality and they emerge as leaders, though none of their parties or alliances emerges as the majority party. And, the leadership quality of the smaller parties or individuals apparently convinces their respective voters that any changes in the election promises in the process of forming a coalition government are acceptable. Therefore, in a case where no party or alliance emerges as a majority party to form the government and some minor parties or alliances after the election get united to form a coalition government, it is understood that the coalition partners' conflicting promises, if any, are compromised or disabled at the levels of the coalition partners and their voters as soon as the coalition is formed. Hence, it is understood that the citizens who had voted for those IPAs

separately get united and become the majority and want what the non-conflicting promises of the minor parties, alliances or individuals had said during the election campaign kept. In a case of absence of formal political parties in a democracy where elected individuals backed by their informal parties create an alliance to form a government, it is understood that the conflicting election promises of the alliance partners are compromised or disabled as soon as they form the government and their non-conflicting promises get together. And, accordingly, it is understood that the citizens who had voted for those individuals separately get united, become the majority and want what the non-conflicting promises had said fulfilled.

When the majority of citizens vote for an IPA, who eventually forms the government, the promises of the elected IPA become the main part of a governing contract between the citizen as the owner of the state and the governing IPA as the governing contractor. It is like an unwritten power of attorney where citizens as the principal appoint the winning IPA an agent to govern the state affairs for the next tenure of government and where the set of election promises is considered as the only written part of the power of attorney.

At a personal level, in a general power of attorney, a person as the principal authorizes another person or persons as an agent or attorney to act on the principal's behalf. The principal generally specifies, among others, the purposes, scope and terms for the power of attorney. To this effect, the principal signs a document witnessed by some other persons. The agent must agree on the document and have the capacity to perform. The power of attorney ends once the agent has completed the task or tasks mentioned in the power of attorney document or when the principal withdraws it (Law Institute Victoria, n.d.). The agent also can resign at any time (Bird, n.d.).

In this paper, the governing IPA as the agent writes the only document (election promises) of the power of attorney before their election and the citizen as principal approves it by electing the IPA to the government. The election promises work as the task list for the agent. Since the governing IPA itself writes the power of attorney document (election promises), there are no doubts about their agreement on the document and their capacity to carry out the tasks. The tenure of the government is the normal timeframe for the power of attorney although the citizen as the principal can withdraw it anytime and the governing IPA as the agent has the right to resign whenever they want.

Once the winning IPA assumes the office of the government, the power of attorney provides them with crucial responsibilities and required rights. Their responsibilities are to govern the state affairs following their election promises while the rights aim at having supports required to fulfill the election promises. Those IPAs become a popular agent and win the power of attorney often, who fulfill their promises with their rights exercised at a level generally acceptable to the principal.

After a tenure has ended, a comparison between what the election promises had said and how much of the promises were implemented, unimplemented or negatively implemented can answer the question of how much COS existed and how much the governing IPA intruded into

the COS during their tenure. When the winning IPA goes by their election promises while governing the state affairs, it is understood that they as an agent obey the power of attorney. Conversely, if they do not go by their promises or go opposite the promises, they breach the power of attorney and act like owners of the state. Also, the power of attorney is meant to be withdrawn by the principal if it is evidently observed that the governing IPA does not go by their electoral promises at all. Furthermore, if there are no election held or even if there are some elections held, the electoral competition is solely between the candidates who are nominated by the same IPA and, as a result, the regime does not change, no power of attorney is meant to exist there. In such cases, the governing IPA does not bother to have power of attorney – the state runs on a might-is-right basis.

Therefore, there are four categories of the status of the power of attorney: (1) implementation of election promises, (2) non-implementation of election promises, (3) negative implementation of election promises, and (4) absence of a power of attorney. And, an acceptable election is a prerequisite for COS. Hence, COS is a combination of an acceptable election and the election promise implementation. At the same time, the amount of non-implementation and negative implementation of election promises, and the election not acceptable or not held at all are all considered as the component amount of governing IPA's intrusion into the COS.

Empirical study method: How to measure COS

There could be two tiers of study of COS. Tier 1 determines whether any COS existed in a past period of time under study. An investigation at this tier checks a single question – if the state affairs was governed by a IPA who had been selected based on an acceptable election. A 'yes' to the question means presence of COS and a 'no' confirms absence. Such elections are rated and preserved in related traditional databases, such as V-Dem fair election data (v2elfrfair_ord) (Coppedge et al., 2020a; Coppedge et al., 2020b; Pemstein et al., 2020). One can choose this data, where an acceptable election is coded 3-4 on a 0-4 scale. The electoral fairness score of an acceptable election is considered Tier 1 COS score, which is used to calculate the overall COS score following the Tier 2 study.

At Tier 2 study of COS, government tenure is considered the primary unit of study. Tier 2 investigation determines how much COS existed in the tenure of a government. Such an investigation is carried out into the tenure of a government, where a presence of COS is already determined by a Tier 1 investigation.

To carry out a Tier 2 study, data are needed about: (1) election promises the governing IPA made to citizens before their election, and (2) their implementation, non-implementation and negative implementation, if any, during the tenure. The promises that fall under any of the following categories and are expressed along with a specific way of implementation are considered for study:

1. Written election manifestos published by parties, alliances or individuals.
2. The promises made in a national election forum of an IPA.
3. The ones published as election promises in mass media or in a research article.
4. Statements made by IPAs regarding changes in election promises.

This paper following Thomson et al. (2017) considers a firm commitment as a promise, which is pronounced along with specific “action or outcome” (p. 532). In the case of a large unmanageable number of promises, only focused promises are chosen for study. The promises that get published or discussed in generally recognized mass media, Internet-based news portals, social media and research works, including research sites, are considered as focused promises. Data about election promise implementation status are collected from government disclosures, generally recognized research findings, databases, news reports and analyses published online or in a hard copy. Sources of the data about both election promises and their implementation status are well documented.

In case of unavoidable circumstances, under which a government is not able to implement a promise or even they have to carry out a negative implementation of a promise, the likely affected promise or promises do not come under study. Such circumstances may include but not limited to natural calamities like cyclone, earthquake, flooding; international circumstances like an economic recession, war; and changes in public opinion. The impact of such circumstances is explained in well-documented notes as to how the government was not really in a position to implement the particular promise or promises. Besides, if an issue has been resolved through a referendum or any other direct democratic procedure, which dismisses an election promise, such a promise does not come under study.

In the presidential form of government, the winning presidential election promises and the tenure, while in the parliamentary form of government, the winning parliamentary election promises and the tenure come under study. In a presidential system, if a presidential effort to fulfill an election promise has been blocked in the legislature, the particular promise is considered fulfilled partly since there were two different sets of winning election promises – one was the president’s and the other the legislature’s. For the same reason, in a semi-presidential system where there is a kind of balance between parliamentary and presidential systems (see Choudhry and Stacey, 2013), if a parliamentary effort to fulfill an election promise has been blocked by the head of the state such as President, the implementation status of the election promise is considered implemented partly. In a case, where some minor political parties or elected individuals have formed a coalition government, only their non-conflicting election promises come under study and the conflicting promises are omitted. If the coalition partners before or after forming their government have made any statements saying what changes they have made in their election promises, those changes come under study. In an event of withdrawal of any partner from an alliance government, the partner’s election promises are not covered in the study. If a government

has not completed its tenure, the tenure does not come under study. However, if a government had not completed its tenure, but the same governing IPA has formed a new government and completed the tenure, the election promises of the IPA come under study for the whole tenure.

This paper assumes that there are available resources required for the implementation of the election promises made by IPA candidates because they are meant to be responsible for and make implementable promises. And, it is reasonable that false promises fall under the non-implementation category.

This paper uses a nine-point scale (Table 1) to measure implementation, non-implementation and negative implementation of election promises. The implementation status of every promise for a period under study is assessed and quantified using the scale. The scale points range from ‘4’ (full positive implementation) to ‘- 4’ (full negative implementation). In the case of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the question about the implementation status of election promises for the whole tenure of the government, ‘yes’ is assigned ‘4’, ‘no’ is ‘0’ while a negative implementation is ‘- 4’. In the case of a proportional implementation of an election promise, the researcher uses their judgment in assigning the right values to the implementation status of the promise, realizing the modality of different points on the scale. For example, the implementation of an election promise – ‘Income tax will not be increased’ – is assigned 3 for the whole four-year tenure if one year of the tenure has witnessed an increase in income tax. Another example of an election promise – the construction of a bridge had just started, and there was no more progress during the tenure of the government. In this case, the quantified implementation status of the promise is 1, the lowest positive point of the scale before zero.

Table 1. Election promises implementation scale

Description	Quantification
Full implementation	4
Above average implementation	3
Average implementation	2
Below average implementation	1
No implementation	0
Below average negative implementation	-1
Average negative implementation	-2
Above average negative implementation	-3
Full negative implementation	-4

Note: This researcher develops the scale and table.

To calculate a government tenure score of COS at Tier 2, the number of election promises considered for the study is counted first. Then, all the quantified scores of the positive implementation of promises during the tenure of the governing IPA are added, and the result is subtracted from the total negative implementation score of promises, if any. Then, the total positive implementation score is transformed into percentage point (total promise implementation

score $\times 100 \div$ total number of promises multiplied by the highest code, 4), which results in the tenure score of COS. If an election promise has had some sub-points, the number of sub-points is counted first, and then all the scores of the positive implementation of the sub-points are added, and the result is subtracted from the total negative implementation of the sub-points, if any. Then, the total is divided by the number of sub-points. It results in the implementation score of the promise. The amount of intrusion of the IPA into COS is calculated by subtracting the COS from their base ownership value. Citizens' base ownership value at Tier 2 is the total intact value of the election promises that is 100%. For example, if a tenure score of the COS is found 52%, the intrusion of the governing IPA into the COS is 48% $(100-52)^3$ for the tenure.

After finding a Tier 2 COS score, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores are averaged to get a combined overall COS score (see Table 2 for example). To find Tier 1 COS score, one can choose V-Dem fair election data (v2elfrfair_ord) (Coppedge et al., 2020a; Coppedge et al., 2020b; Pemstein et al., 2020), where an acceptable election is coded 3-4 on a 0-4 scale. The 0-4 scale could be converted into a 0-100 scale (see Table 2).

Table 2. The conversion of a 0-4 scale into 0-100

0-4 scale	0-100 scale
0	0
1	25
2	50
3	75
4	100

Since the Tier 1 score is based on electoral fairness, combining of Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores standardizes the overall COS score by minimizing any possible distance between the score and the realness of the governing IPA and their election promises. It is considered that the more the fairness of election, the more the chance of implementation of real election promises, and the vice-versa.

Test

The 2009-2012 tenure of USA President Barack Obama was chosen to test how the measurement method for COS works with empirical data. For a Tier 1 investigation, a 2.75-above threshold was set up on the 0-4 V-Dem scale using V-Dem fair election data (v2elfrfair_ord) (Coppedge et al., 2020a; Coppedge et al., 2020b; Pemstein et al., 2020), where an acceptable election is coded 3-4 on

³ For further explanation, please refer to the Test section.

a 0-4 scale. The investigation finds a 100 percent presence of citizen ownership of state in the tenure as the fairness of the 2008 election is found 4 on the scale 0-4 scale (Table 2).

At a Tier 2 investigation, the implementation status of his 2008 election promises has been analysed to measure how much COS existed in the tenure. Manifesto Project data (Manifesto Project, n.d.) were used as the set of original promises, and from among those, the ones that got focused in research works, mass media and social media were considered for this study. If only a part of a promise mentioned in the Manifesto data had gotten focused in research works, mass or social media, that part was considered as an independent unit of promise.

The implementation status of the promises is rated based on the information collected from different sources, including Amadeo (2018), Bradner (2014), Condon (2012), Democracy Now (2017), Holdren (2011), Park (2009), Polity Fact (2017), Siniscalco (2010), Soffen (2017), Sullivan (2012), and Washington Post (2018). The implementation statuses are quantified based on the scale shown in Table 1 and the criteria described in the Empirical Study Method section of this paper. According to the criteria, some promises are considered partly implemented (coded 2 or 3) because President Obama made efforts to fulfill those promises, although the efforts failed in part (coded 3) or fully (coded 2) in the Congress.

Barack Obama as the Democratic Party nominee was elected President to run the government for the 2009-2012 tenure. During the election campaign, Obama had made several promises to citizens, from which precisely 105 promises were considered in this study. Among those, the implementation status of 53 promises scores 4; 17 promises score 3; 16 promises score 2; 2 promises score 1 while the rest 17 score 0. The implementation status of the election promises reveals that President Obama broke some promises he had made to citizens during his 2008 election campaign. It has resulted in a party intrusion into COS during the tenure. Tier 2 COS stood at 70.7 percent, meaning that the Democratic Party as the agent intruded 29.3 percent into the COS (Appendix 1).

Finally, Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores are averaged, which results in a combined overall COS score of 85.35 percent (see Table 2 and Table 3).

Table 3. Citizen ownership of the state (COS) in the USA, 2009-2012

Country	Tenure/ Year	Tier 1 COS%	Tier 2 COS%	Overall COS%
USA	2009	100	70.7	85.35
USA	2010	100	70.7	85.35
USA	2011	100	70.7	85.35
USA	2012	100	70.7	85.35

Note: This researcher develops the table using the findings of Tier 1 and Tier 2 COS studies on the 2009-2012 term of USA President Barack Obama.

A 70.7 percent implementation of election promises is as usual as the existing election promise fulfilment studies reveal. Petry and Collette (2009) find that the electoral promise fulfilment in the US ranged from 60 percent to 80 percent between 1944 and 1999 while the North

American and European rate was 67 percent on an average. Also, President Obama himself observed that he kept 60 percent of his 2008 election promises (Mason, 2011).

The findings of this paper are crucial in respect of its methodological strength. The methodological approach this paper uses shows some improvements compared to the approaches used by the existing studies of election promises in the US. There are four criteria introduced by Petry and Collette (2009) for election promise fulfilment research. The criteria are (1) operational definitions of an election promise, (2) election promise implementation, (3) sourcing of the information, and (4) open judgment on the level of distance between a promise and its implementation. None of the works on US electoral promise fulfilment reviewed by Petry and Collette (2009) meets all of these criteria (see Petry and Collette, 2009 pp. 71-72) except some recent work like Thomson et al. (2017), which is not reviewed by Petry and Collette (2009). Even the recent works (e.g. Thomson et al., 2017) barely meet the fourth criterion. However, this paper meets all of the four criteria (see Empirical Study Method section, Test section and Appendix 1). To meet the fourth criterion, this paper uses a 9-point scale (see Table 1) that covers both positive and negative implementation status of promises and, thus, goes for deeper analysis of the distance between a promise and its implementation status. Such a scale with a wider scope for researchers to use their judgment is unusual in the existing studies of US election promise fulfilment.

As this paper measures COS, it goes some extra miles. First, totality: this paper focuses on the totality of promises expressed by an IPA at a national level election instead of randomization, choosing a section of promises or focusing on a geographical part of the state. There are many existing studies (e.g. Bradley, 1969; Elling, 1979; Royed and Borelli, 1997; Royed and Borelli, 1999), which use only those promises that match their chosen research topic. Thomson et al. (2017) randomize election promises. Second, conflict analysis: it is seemingly uncommon that the existing promise fulfilment studies employ theory to explain the conflict between different promises, such as presidential versus parliamentary election promises and the election time promises of the partners of a coalition government. This paper explains how and when election promises conflict and get together, abolished or omitted (see Theory section). Third, systematic drop-off: it also leaves a space where some promises can be dropped systematically under exceptional circumstances that do not have an impact on the resulting finding. A well documented explanation of such exceptions is made necessary.

Conclusion

This paper defines COS as a combination of an acceptable election and implementation of the election promises. It introduces a two-tier measurement of COS. Tier 1 by using election results determines whether COS existed or not in a past period of time under study and Tier 2 by using the election promise implementation status determines how much the COS existed in the tenure, where a presence of COS is found at the Tier 1 investigation. Then, a combination of Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores results in an overall COS score. At Tier 2, the paper argues, the level of

implementation of election promises is a measurement of COS. The paper models the authority of a representative government to a power of attorney. The citizen as principal awards a power of attorney to the winning IPA as an agent in their election. In the election, the set of election promises of the agent becomes the only written part of the power of attorney. The 2009-2012 tenure of USA President Barack Obama is used to test how the methodological approach works with empirical data. The test finds Tier 2 COS at 70.7 percent, meaning that the agent of the power of attorney intruded into the COS by 29.3 percent in the tenure. After averaging Tier 1 and Tier 2 scores, the overall COS stands at 85.35 percent on a 0-100 scale.

This paper paves some new ways for future researchers to conduct studies. They can conduct studies on the intrusion of governing IPA into COS. Also, they can make comparison between Tier 1 and Tier 2 COS scores to investigate the distance between electoral fairness and chances of the realness of the governing IPA and their election promises. Besides, following the theory and methodology used in this paper, they can conduct studies of COS using a sample of past tenures of government of a single or multiple countries. A multi-tenure single country sample may facilitate a comparison between government tenures of a country while a cross-country single or multi-tenure sample can facilitate a comparison between countries (see Table 4 for example). For such studies, tenures can be ranked on an index that may be called State Owner Perception Index (SOPI) based on the tenure score of COS. The more the tenure score of COS, the higher the tenure rank. If more than one tenures have attained the same score, those tenures are ranked in alphabetic order.

Table 4. State Owner Perception Index (SOPI)

(a) Example table of a single country study

Country	Tenure/ Year	IPA	Rank	SOPI
A	2011	X	2	91.56
A	2012	X	3	83.56
A	2013	X	4	81.66
A	2014	Y	5	75.37
A	2015	Y	6	72.37

(a) (b) Example table of a cross-country study

Country	Tenure/ Year	IPA	Rank	SOPI
D	2011-2013	X	1	91.56
B	2012-2014	Y	2	83.56
C	2010-2014	P	3	81.66
A	2011-2015	N	4	75.37
E	2009-2013	Z	5	72.37

Note: These tables are imaginary developed by this researcher for explanation of how the theory and methodology used in this paper to study of COS could be used for a single and a cross-country sample.

However, this paper has some methodological limitations. Among those, first, election promises usually do not cover many general government tasks, which the winning IPA has to deal with while governing the state affairs. Second, election promises do not cover unforeseen and unpredictable events or issues, which could get more focused on the practical lives of citizens than the election promises do. Third, different election promises may have different degrees of importance in terms of, among others, their influences on the public lives, but the methodology introduced in this paper cannot capture data on different degrees of importance of election promises because of its static and equal quantification. For example, ‘creating a Military Families Advisory Board’ and ‘bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end’ are two promises, and both of them score 4 although their importance may not be the same. Fourth, citizens choose their representative IPA based not only on election promises, but this paper relies on election promises only. However, though these limitations weaken the methodology to some extent, such limitations are quite common in scientific studies, especially in the social sciences. These limitations could be dealt with by future researchers.

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Appendix 1: USA election promises implementation status, 2009-2012

No.	Promise	Status
1	... provide an immediate energy rebate to American families struggling with the record price of gasoline....	0
2	Families and individuals should have the option of keeping the coverage they have or choosing from a wide array of health insurance plans ...	4
3	Coverage should be made affordable for all Americans with subsidies provided through tax credits and other means.	4
4	Health insurance plans should accept all applicants and be prohibited from charging different prices based on pre-existing conditions.	4
5	... promote healthy lifestyles and disease prevention	4
6	... end health care disparities among minorities ...	3
7 support increased funding into research, care and prevention of HIV/AIDS around the world.	3
8	. invest in biomedical research ...	2
9	... automatically enroll every worker in a workplace pension plan that can be carried from job to job and we will match savings for working families who need the help.	0
10	... eliminate all federal income taxes for seniors making less than \$50,000 per year.	0
11	... fight to pass the Employee Free Choice Act.	2
12	... fight to ban the permanent replacement of striking workers...	0
13	... raise the minimum wage and index it to inflation, and increase the Earned Income Tax Credit.....	1
14	...expand the childcare tax credit	4
15	...expand the Earned Income Tax Credit..	3
16increase the supply of affordable housing ...	0
17	...pass the Lilly Ledbetter Act, which will make it easier to combat pay discrimination; we will pass the Fair Pay Act; and we will modernize the Equal Pay Act.	4
18	...fast-track investment of billions of dollars over the next ten years to establish a green energy sector that will create up to five million jobs.	2
19	...make quality, affordable early childhood care and education available to every American child from the day he or she is born. Our Children's First Agenda, including increases in Head Start and Early Head Start, and	3

	investments in high-quality Pre-K, will improve quality and provide learning and support to families with children ages zero to five.	
20	... ensure that every student has a high-quality teacher.	4
21	... support full funding of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.	0
22	... fix the failures and broken promises of No Child Left Behind—while holding to the goal of providing every child access to a world-class education, raising standards, and ensuring accountability for closing the achievement gap.	4
23	... address the dropout crisis by investing in intervention strategies in middle schools and high schools.....	4
24	... produce highly skilled graduates in science, technology, engineering, and math disciplines	4
25	... make college affordable for all Americans by creating a new American Opportunity Tax Credit....	2
26	... took a critical step with the America Competes Act and will start by implementing that Act	4
27	... make the Research and Development Tax Credit permanent.	4
28	... lift ... ban on using federal funding for embryonic stem cells	4
29	... invest in American jobs and finally end the tax breaks that ship jobs overseas.	3
30	...create an Advanced Manufacturing Fund to provide for our next generation of innovators and job creators...	4
31	...expand the Manufacturing Extension Partnerships	4
32	... invest in a clean energy economy to create up to five million new green-collar jobs.	2
33	... start a National Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank	2
34	... ensure every American has access to high speed broadband.	2
35	... strengthen privacy protections in the digital age and will harness the power of technology to hold government and business accountable for violations of personal privacy.	4
36	...exempt all start-up companies from capital gains taxes and provide them a tax credit for health insurance.	2
37	... create a national network of public-private business incubators and technical support.	4
38	... ensure that the foreclosure prevention program enacted by Congress is implemented quickly and effectively so that at-risk homeowners can get help and hopefully stay in their homes.	2
39	... work to reform bankruptcy laws to restore balance between lender and	0

	homeowner rights.	
40	... implement the newly created Affordable Housing Trust Fund.	0
41	.. target homelessness among veterans in particular by expanding proven programs and launching innovative preventive services.	4
42	...reform and modernize our regulatory structures and will work to promote a shift in the cultures of our financial institutions and our regulatory agencies.	4
43	... establish a Credit Card Bill of Rights to protect consumers and a Credit Card Rating System to improve disclosure.	4
44	... require that employees who have company pensions receive annual disclosures about their pension fund's investments.	2
45	... negotiate bilateral trade agreements that ... include enforceable international labor and environmental standards ..	2
46	work with Canada and Mexico to amend the North American Free Trade Agreement ...	0
47	...end tax breaks for companies that ship American jobs overseas, and provide incentives for companies that keep and maintain good jobs here in the United States.	3
48	Our agenda is ambitious—particularly in light of the current Administration's policies that have run up the national debt to over \$4 trillion.	0
49 must first bring the Iraq war to a responsible end...	4
50	...defeat Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan	4
51 we lack the resources to finish the job because of our commitment to Iraq. We will finally make the fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban the top priority....	3
52protect the critical infrastructure	2
53	... spend homeland security dollars on the basis of risk.	3
54	... establish a National Declassification Center to ensure openness.	4
55	...lead a global effort to work with other countries to secure all nuclear weapons material at vulnerable sites within four years.	3
56 work to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.	4
57	...seek deep, verifiable reductions in United States and Russian nuclear weapons ..	4
58 must prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.	4
59 effort to achieve a verifiably nuclear-free Korean peninsula.	0
60	work to build a trustworthy and accountable cyber-infrastructure that is resilient, protects America's competitive advantage, and advances our national	4

	and homeland security.	
61	support plans to increase the size of the Army by 65,000 troops and the Marines by 27,000 troops.	4
62	... rebuild our armed forces to meet the ... needs of the new century.	4
63	... build the capacity of U.S. civilian agencies to deploy personnel and area experts where they are needed....	4
64	... ensure that every veteran has access to quality health care for injuries both physical and mentalWe will aggressively address Traumatic Brain Injury.	4
65	... dramatically reduce the backlog of disability claims.	0
66	... combat homelessness, unemployment, and underemployment among veterans ...	4
67	... create a Military Families Advisory Board.	4
68	... end the (military) stop-loss and reserve recall policies.	4
69	... provide the National Guard with the equipment it needs for foreign and domestic emergencies.	3
70	... elevate the Chief of the National Guard to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.	4
71	... support the repeal of Don't Ask Don't Tell and the implementation of policies to allow qualified men and women to serve openly regardless of sexual orientation.	4
72	... instruct the Defense and State Departments to develop a strategy for determining when contracting makes sense, and when certain functions are inherently governmental and should not be contracted out.	2
73we will create a \$2 billion Global Education Fund	0
74	... must do more to fight the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, as well as malaria, tuberculosis, and neglected tropical diseases. We will provide \$50 billion over five years	3
75	pandemic make it a top priority to reduce oil consumption	4
76	... support additional personnel, infrastructure, and technology on the border and at our ports of entry.	3
77	... support a system that requires undocumented immigrants who are in good standing to pay a fine, pay taxes, learn English, and go to the back of the line for the opportunity to become citizens.	0
78	... assist the victims of Hurricane Katrina and restore the region economically.	2
79	... work to prevent future catastrophic response failures	4

80	... implement a market-based cap and trade system to reduce carbon emissions ...	1
81	..United States must be a leader in combating climate change around the world, including exporting climate-friendly technologies to developing countries.	4
82	... help local communities in the American West preserve water to meet their fast growing needs.	4
83	... reinvigorate the Environmental Protection Agency	4
84	... use innovative measures to dramatically improve the energy efficiency of buildings ...	3
85	... create a new vision for conservation of natural system.	4
86	... fully fund the Community Development Block Grant.	4
87	... support art ... increased public funding for the National Endowment for the Arts	4
88	... lead the United States in ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.	2
89	... make investments in ... Head Start, and Early Head Start	4
90	... support fathers by providing transitional training to get jobs, removing tax penalties on married families, and crack down on men who avoid child support payments and ensure those payments go directly to families instead of bureaucracies.	3
91	work towards closing the donut hole in Medicare prescription drug plan for seniors.	4
92	... restore funding for the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant Program.....	4
93	... expand the use of drug courts and rehabilitation programs for first-time, non-violent drug offenders.	4
94	... create a special advisor to the president regarding violence against women.	4
95	... support the Violence Against Women Act.	4
96	... pass ... Hate Crimes Prevention Act.	4
97	... sign the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ...	3
98	...require that agencies conduct significant business in public and release all relevant information unless an agency reasonably foresees harm to a protected interest.	2
99	... make government less beholden to special interest groups and lobbyists.	0
100 end the abuse of no-bid contracts by requiring nearly all contract orders over \$25,000 to be competitively awarded. MP	3
101not take any contributions from Political Action Committees during this	0

	election.	
102	...restrict the current Administration's warrantless wiretapping program.	3
103	... revisit the Patriot Act ...	4
104	... close the detention camp in Guantanamo Bay.	0
105	...create a White House advisor on Indian Affairs...	4
	Total amount of COS =	70.7%
	Total amount of party intrusion into citizen ownership =	29.3%

Note: This researcher uses the 2008 USA election promises data from Manifesto Project (2017) and rates the implementation status of the promises on a 9-point scale (see table 1) using the information from Amadeo (2017), Bradner (2014), Condon (2012), Democracy Now (2017), Park (2009), Polity Fact (2017), Siniscalco (2010), Soffen (2017), Sullivan (2012), Holdren (2011), Washington Post (2017). Associated sources of information, among others, are The American Presidency Project (n.d.-a) and The American Presidency Project (n.d.-b).