Senegal:

A Country Report Based on Data 1900-2012

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About V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is a collaboration between some 50+ scholars across the world hosted by the Department of Political Science at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden; and the Kellogg Institute at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

With four Principal Investigators (PIs), three Project Coordinators (PCs), fifteen Project Managers (PMs) with special responsibility for issue areas, more than thirty Regional Managers (RMs), almost 200 Country Coordinators (CCs), a set of Research Assistants (RAs), and approximately 3,000 Country Experts (CEs), the V-Dem project is one of the largest ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.

V-Dem is collecting data on 329 indicators of various aspects democracy tied to the core of electoral democracy as well as six varying properties: liberal, majoritarian, consensual, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian dimensions of democracy.

A pilot study in 2011 tested the preliminary set of indicators and the data collection interfaces and procedures. Twelve countries from six regions of the world were covered, generating 462,000 data points. In the main phase, all countries of the world will be covered from 1900 to the present, generating some 22 million data across the 329 indicators, as well as several indices of varying forms of democracy.

The resulting database will be the largest of its kind, and make possible both highly detailed, nuanced analysis of virtually all aspects of democracy in a country, and quick, summary comparisons between countries based on aggregated indices for at least seven varieties of democracy.

The data will be downloadable from a public V-Dem website as a public good some time in 2015. Users from anywhere will also be able to use sophisticated but intuitive and accessible online analysis tools. Students and media across the world will benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs will be able to make much better informed decisions, and even go back in time to re-evaluate aid efforts.

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Executive Summary

- In an Africa undermined by longtime monarchical and colonial influences, Senegal can be considered as a “democratic exception” because Senegal is relatively democratic compared to other countries in Africa. Since gaining independence in 1960, Senegal has experienced a strengthening of its democracy as measured by our indices of civil liberties, civil society, media, political parties, and electoral democracy, albeit with some deficits in political equality and the judiciary.

- Two other moments strengthened Senegal’s democracy. The first was the establishment of a multi-party system in the 1980s. Second, in the early 1990s, the electoral management body increased its autonomy from the president and elections became increasingly free and fair overall as perceived by our country experts. However, in some significant respects the quality of elections in Senegal is relatively low. There is no public funding for parties, candidates, or campaigns, which very likely gives an advantage to the incumbent party.

- Senegal deserves its reputation as a relatively democratic country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, its electoral democracy score hovers around three on a four-point scale, signifying that in some respects there is room for improvement.

- The political parties, civil society, and civil liberties scores follow the same trend and increase in 1960 with Senegalese independence. For example, freedom of discussion has followed the major regime changes, with increases at independence in 1960, at the retirement of Senghor in 1980, and with the opposition victory in the 2000 election. Nonetheless, the “Freedom from political killings” indicator register dips in 1993 and 2012. These were both years of presidential elections with increased violence in the Casamance region, where regional groups were pressing demands for autonomy.

- Political equality and the Judiciary are the two indicators that, although improved after independence, have had a slower development in Senegal. The shared perception of our country experts is that men have much more political power than women, LGBTs have less political power than heterosexual citizens, wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power, and access to health care is unequal. Moreover, our country experts also judge that half of the time the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees and that judges’ decisions usually reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record. In addition, high court independence is significantly less democratic than the other judicial indicators and this has remained constant throughout the century.
1. Overview: Senegal

From French colonial status in 1904 to independence in 1960, the Republic of Senegal provides an interesting case study of democracy and its development in West Africa. Colonial Senegal, marked by social and political inequality, occupied a privileged place in French West Africa. While residents of the urban communes received access to French citizenship and Western education and employment, Senegalese residents in the rural protectorate were disenfranchised until 1946. As rural residents gained power, so too did the drive for Senegalese independence. Elected in 1951 to the French Assembly, Léopold Sédar Senghor guided Senegal to unilateral independence in April of 1960. Senghor was elected president in 1963 under a new constitution that established a notably powerful executive. Senghor governed in the absence of organized opposition, as Senegal became a virtual one-party state with the Socialist Party in overwhelming control. With Senghor’s resignation in December of 1980, Senegal experienced political reform under the leadership of Abdou Diouf. President Diouf sought to eliminate executive corruption and increase opportunity for political participation in Senegal, allowing 14 opposition parties to take part in the elections of 1983.

Figure 1: Overview

Diouf served four terms as President and was defeated in the 2000 elections by opposition candidate Abdoulaye Wade. A new constitution passed a year after Wade’s election, decreasing the length of the presidential term and limiting the role of the prime
minister. Wade served a two-term, highly scrutinized presidency and was defeated in 2012 by current president Macky Sall on a controversial run for a third term.

In an Africa undermined by longtime monarchical and colonial influences, Senegal is often seen as a “democratic exception.” This is not because Senegal fully meets Western standards of democracy but rather because Senegal is relatively democratic compared to other countries in Africa. Since gaining independence in 1960, Senegal has experienced a strengthening of its democracy as measured by indices of civil liberties, civil society, media, political parties, and electoral democracy, as shown in Figure 1. With the important exceptions of the political equality and judiciary indices—which have experienced slower improvements—Senegal displays a notable and dramatic increase in index scores immediately following independence in April of 1960. Figure 1 notes the two most dramatic developments around 1960 and 1983; first, the achievement of independence (an essential element of self-government) and second, the establishment of a multi-party system. In order to obtain a clearer and more complete understanding of the evolution of democracy in Senegal, it is important to evaluate in depth each index and disaggregate to the indicator level to see which indicators have historically driven and/or obstructed the democratic process in Senegal.

**Electoral Democracy: A long tradition**

V-Dem’s index of Electoral Democracy, shown in Figure 2, is a measure of the degree to which elections are free and fair with full adult suffrage, multiple political parties are able to compete electorally without government interference, and the executive is either appointed by parliament or directly elected and is accountable to a powerful elected legislature. It is notable here that elections took place in French West Africa before independence. In fact, much of the improvement in electoral democracy took place before independence. Of course, colonies, which lack self-government, cannot be considered democratic. But clearly some of the foundations for electoral democracy were laid before Senegal’s independence.

Figure 2 notes important events in the electoral history of Senegal. In French West Africa before independence Senegal was entitled to elect a Deputy to the French Parliament. In 1914 the first African deputy was elected to the French National Assembly. Following the 1945 elections to the Constituent Assembly in France, French authorities gradually extended the franchise until in 1955 the principle of universal suffrage was passed into law and implemented the following year. The first electoral contest held under universal suffrage was the municipal elections of November 1956, and the first national election was the 1957 election of the Territorial Assembly.
This index suggests that Senegal moved part of the way toward electoral democracy before independence, but made further improvements in the 1970s and 1980s, reaching nearly full electoral democracy in the mid-1990s. Senegal deserves its reputation as a relatively democratic country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, its electoral democracy score hovers around three on a four-point scale, signifying that in some respects there is room for improvement.

Figure 3 gives more detail about these developments. Election dates are marked by small dots for indicators that are election-specific. First, a word about the colonial elections. Quite a few elections took place before 1945, but only to a small and relatively powerless council, and the suffrage was restricted to a small number of citizens of the metropolis. Furthermore, these were not elections with party competition, and there was no institutionalized electoral management body. However, reforms in the French Union after the Second World War led to more meaningful elections. The suffrage was expanded to some Africans in 1946 and parties were allowed to compete. At first these were elections only to local General Councils, but with the Loi Cadre of 1956, the suffrage expanded greatly and Territorial Assemblies were elected and soon able to send representatives to the Governing Council. Leaders of Senegal’s independence movement, including Senghor, first came to political prominence in these colonial elections.
The Electoral Democracy index shows only brief improvement at independence in 1960. The Elections multiparty variable registers the proscription of all opposition parties by Senghor in 1965. Full multiparty competition was not achieved until 1980. There continued to be voting irregularities (also present in colonial elections), but these diminished in the early 1990s, especially as the electoral management body increased its autonomy from the president, and around the same time the shared perception of our country experts is that elections became increasingly free and fair overall from 1990 to the present.

However, in some significant respects the quality of elections in Senegal is relatively low (Figure 4). There is no public funding for parties, candidates, or campaigns, which very likely gives an advantage to the incumbent party, which has access to state resources during campaigns. Other parties must rely on private donations, and they have no obligation to disclose the sources of their funding. Parties have limited ability to buy campaign advertisements; however, they have gained some access to free airtime in the broadcast media for their campaigns.
Civil Liberties: Progress up to a point

In the preamble to its Constitution, Senegal affirms its commitment to human rights as defined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Senegal has several associations of civil liberties such as the Senegalese League for Human Rights, Amnesty International, the African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights, the African Institute for Human Rights, and the Institute for Human Rights and Peace. Despite the protests that often follow elections, Senegalese political life has a reputation for being more peaceful than in other African countries. However, the war between the Senegalese army and the separatist rebels of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC - Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance) gives rise to many abuses perpetrated by each party. Amnesty International regularly denounces these violations of human rights.

Figure 5 displays the civil liberties index score for Senegal over time, a score that begins to increase in 1945 as rural residents of the Senegalese protectorate were granted basic political rights by the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic. The civil liberties score dramatically increases in 1960 with Senegalese independence.
Figure 5: Civil Liberties

![Chart showing Civil Liberties in Senegal]

Figure 6 shows several civil liberties that are typical of the overall trend in Senegal. For example, religious freedom has never been very limited. In Senegal 94 percent of the population is Muslim and only 4 percent is Christian. There is relative harmony between these religious communities. There has never been a major incident that would constitute significant repression. Similarly, freedom of discussion among men has followed the major regime changes, with increases at independence in 1960, at the resignation of Senghor in 1980, and with the opposition victory in the 2000 election. The average perception among our country experts is that “transparent laws with predictable enforcement” also improved in 1960 and 1980. Freedom from political killings lagged a bit behind in the 1960s. After independence, under President Senghor, there were many unsolved murders: several politicians died due to unknown causes and it seemed that the government tried to hide these events. It is widely believed that the governed enjoyed impunity for such actions, but it is difficult to prove. Finally, the “Freedom from political killings” indicator shows many incremental improvements, especially compared to the colonial era. It is now at a fairly democratic level, although it does register dips in 1993 and 2012. These were both years of presidential elections with increased violence in the Casamance region, where regional groups were pressing demands for autonomy.
Nevertheless, this smooth overall trend since independence obscures some dramatic differences with respect to specific civil liberties. Some indicators have been consistently higher than the overall index. As Figure 7 shows, freedom of domestic movement has been fairly high for both men and women, even before independence. Other indicators—freedom of foreign movement, freedom from forced labor for men, and property rights for men—rose dramatically at independence, to a level higher than that of other civil liberties, and have remained high. Still, we can see an additional small shift in freedom of foreign movement in 1983 and in male property rights in 2001. The latter reflects the policy shift of the Abdoulaye Wade government away from central planning, although he was known more for his promotion of large public works projects than for economic liberalization.  

In some respects, civil liberties are respected less than the overall index suggests. According to Figure 8, Senegal has only middling scores on freedom from torture, access to justice, equal civil liberties with respect to class, and public administration. According to Amnesty International, torture is often carried out by security forces to extract confessions (Amnesty International 2012). Working through the judicial system is expensive, and therefore out of reach for the large portion of the population that is economically disadvantaged, while wealthy defendants are thought to be less constrained by the law. The class inequality affects poorer citizens’ enjoyment of civil liberties as well.

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1 Property rights are relevant for some democratic principles, such as liberalism, but not others, such as egalitarianism.
Senegalese women, as observed in Figure 8 below, experienced dramatic increases in access to justice and property rights with independence in 1960. Freedom of discussion for Senegalese women, however, has evolved more gradually and perhaps is a testament to a country that retains a strong commitment to religion.
The role of the Senegalese woman in the twentieth century was seen as an inferior housewife and women were believed to be violating rules and morals if they were politically invested. This role, however, appears to have transformed as Senegalese women experienced an increase in freedom of discussion scores with the elections of President Diouf in 1980 and Wade in 2000.

**Civil Society: Two waves of growth**

Civil society is the cornerstone of Senegal’s democratic development and a key indicator of the state’s political climate. The civil society index used in this section evaluates the role in Senegal’s society of interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices.

![Figure 9: Civil Society](image)

The civil society index as observed in Figure 9 below displays notable increases in scores at independence and gained traction in the 1980s after the introduction of multipartism under Abdou Diouf, which resulted in radical changes to Senegalese political life. These changes, as well as the development of a critical press and associations defending human rights, the emergence of unions and the institutionalization of competitive elections, paved the way for the emergence of a genuine civil society. Examples of civil society
organizations in Senegal today include the Conseil National de Concertation et de Coopération des Ruraux (CNCR), the National Research Foundation (NRF), and the African Assembly for the Defense of Human Rights (RADDHO). Senegalese civil society is able to stand up to those in power and dialogue with them in the hopes of negotiating policies. The fruit of the growth of civil society is seen in the historic 2000 election of opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, when civil society became engaged in the protection of democratic rights, and also in subsequent years. In 2005, a civic movement that focused on organizing political forums was founded. This spirit also continued on into 2007, when the Senegalese people boycotted the legislative elections taking place that same year.

In particular, Figure 10 notes a similar trajectory for the indicator CSO entry and exit, which measures the extent to which the government achieves control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life. It is not until independence when appears that civil society organization begins to have a major role in Senegal.

Figure 10: Civil Society indicators

Further liberalization occurred in 1980, accompanying many other improvements in the political regime after Senghor’s withdrawal from politics. However, CSO entry and exit reached a relatively democratic level later than some of the other indicators in this index: CSO repression, civil society structure, religious organization consultation and CSO participatory environment.

Figure 11 spotlights religious repression in Senegal, which tends to behave better than other indicators in the 20th century.
Figure 11: More Democratic Civil Society Indicators

This indicator reflects the relationship between the Senegalese state and the religious brotherhoods. From 1997 to 2000 we witnessed the birth of some other religious organizations who in some case are also members of the parliament. This figure also shows a notable improvement in the CSO repression indicator score in 1980 as Senegal experienced political reform under the leadership of President Abdou Diouf.

Figure 11: Less democratic civil society indicators
In Figure 12 we report the indicator that on average is less democratic: the CSO consultation indicator, which remains at very low levels even before independence. In general terms, in Senegal neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate and their influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations both large and small contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers. In this context, there are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal even in recent years.

**Political Parties: Increasing competition among leaders**

In Senegal, political parties serve several functions including the exercise of suffrage in political life, vehicles for political socialization, and the planning and implementation of public policies. Senegal’s democracy today is home to hundreds of active political parties. This development, however, came nearly 20 years after independence. In fact, the decline in the political parties index in Figure 13 reflects President Senghor’s complete ban on opposition parties in 1965. During the 1960s and 1970s only one party was legally allowed to take part in elections: the Senegalese Progressive Union led by Senegal's first president, Léopold Senghor. It was not until 1976 that opposition parties were finally allowed to participate—a Marxist party (the African Independence Party) and a liberal party (the Senegalese Democratic Party).

**Figure 13: Political Parties Indicators**

![Graph showing political parties in Senegal over time](image-url)
In 1980, President Senghor retired from politics and chose Prime Minister Abdou Diouf as his successor. Diouf served four terms as President. In the presidential election of 2000, he was defeated in an election that was considered as free and fair by the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade. This presidential election represented the first alternation of power in Senegal.

Figure 14 also notes this major trend. Between the 1960s and 1970s indicators such as the opposition party autonomy and subnational party control also declined. In these years, opposition parties were not allowed, until the 1980s when our data shows that most significant opposition parties were autonomous, cohesive, and independent of the ruling regime.

Figure 12: Political Parties indicators

In Figure 15 this trend is also reflected in the party ban and barriers to parties. Two key developments in the 1970s helped to pave the way for a multiparty democracy in Senegal. First, the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS) was legally founded in 1974 by Abdoulaye Wade with President Senghor’s blessing. Second, a constitutional reform in 1976 allowed for three legal political parties (Abdoulaye’s PDS, Majhmout Diop’s PAI, and Senghor’s PS). The effect of these developments can be observed in Figure 14 as the opposition party autonomy indicator rises sharply. With the reforms of President Diouf in 1981, the party ban indicator also rises sharply as all political parties were legalized regardless of ideology. The number of active political parties continued to grow, as the Ministry of the Interior registered nearly one hundred ten (110) political parties during the 2000 elections.
Nonetheless, even if political parties can participate, this does not imply they have the organization or structure to be successful. Figure 16 shows indicators that are less democratic than the average: party organizations, party branches, national party control and distinct party platforms. This is due to the personalistic character of most political parties in Senegal. In fact, most of political parties registered in Senegal are marginal and little more than vehicles for their leaders.
Media: A bright spot

The Constitution guarantees the liberty of expression, the liberty of the press, and the right to the access of information. Enforcing this constitutional guarantee is the responsibility of the High Audiovisual Council (HCA – le Haut Conseil de l’Audiovisuel) and the numerous press syndicates such as the Senegalese Press Agency (l’Agence de Presse Sénégalaise). Press stories are numerous and varied thanks to a multitude of daily newspapers. The media index score seen over time in Figure 17 appears to acknowledge a strong advancement in the aforementioned constitutional rights.

Figure 17: Media Freedom

The media, as reported in Figure 18 during the period after the 1980s, are largely free from official or informal control. They are flourishing and have contributed to the consolidation of democracy in Senegal. This can be seen in indicators such as media bias, media self-censorship and print/broadcast media critical. In general terms, these indicators declined when there was a one-party system during the 1960s and 1970s. During that time, President Senghor banned opposition parties and major civil liberties were not usually respected in Senegal; media outlets received similar treatment. But between 1970 and 1990, the media became increasingly bold in its criticism, became less biased, and gradually relaxed its self-censorship, according to V-Dem’s Senegal experts. In this process, the media had a major role in consolidating democracy in Senegal.
This trend is also noted in Figure 19, specifically regarding print/broadcast media perspectives. Before independence, the major media represented only the government’s perspective.
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, during the one-party era of President Léopol Sedar Senghor (1960 - 1980) there was also a very strong media monopoly and the major media represented mostly the perspectives of the government. During the multiparty era of Abdou Diouf (1981 - 2000), the media were liberalized and independent media outlets arose with the birth of private television. In the last years, all perspectives that are important in this society have been represented in at least one of the major media outlets.

**Figure 17: Less democratic media freedom indicators**

Indicators that are less democratic

While the media index score shows improvement since 1960, some indicators took much longer to see any increase in scores, and the increase was not very profound (Figure 20). This is the case with access to media, which measures the percentage of the population having access to at least one opposition media outlet. Such outlets have clearly existed for some time, but poverty limits access to them. Media corruption has shown virtually no improvement, and may in fact be in a worse state than under French colonial administration (although there were many fewer publications available then). “Government censorship effort--media” reflects whether the government directly or indirectly attempts to censor the print or broadcast media. Our data show that attempts to censor are direct although limited to especially sensitive issues. Throughout the history of Senegalese media, certain journalists have received death threats after the dissemination of their work. Senegal has seen improvement in terms of harassment of journalists since the beginning of the 1990s, as President Diouf declared general amnesty for all political detainees in 1989. Nonetheless, there are still cases in which the government or other actors in society threatens the media or journalists. The most
concrete example of this is the experience of journalist Abdoul Latif Coulibaly who, in July of 2003, received death threats for his book covering Abdoulaye Wade, an opposition leader.

**Deliberation: Little change since Independence**

The deliberation index measures the environment of respectful discourse in which government must listen to citizens and provide reasoned justifications for its policies. In this respect, this index also significantly increased after independence and has maintained stable until today. This is also the case of indicators that produce our index, such as range of consultation, common good and means-tested v. universalistic.

![Graph of Deliberation in Senegal](image)

The reasons why these indicators have not achieved high scores are several. First, although it has improved considerably since the 1960, consultation still does not engage all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business. Second, there is still a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests as opposed to broader appeals to the common good. And third, a significant portion of welfare state policies is means-tested rather than universalistic.

Three indicators have lower scores than the overall index: encompassing-ness, respected counterarguments, and reasoned justification. The reasons are because –even after
independence and in a multiparty system—elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them, elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome and social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs. These three indicators have remained without significant changes in the last 30 years according to our data.

Figure 19: Deliberation indicators

There is one indicator that is more democratic than the average: engaged society. In Senegal, in general terms, public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas. This has been especially true in the last ten years in Senegal, which coincides with the government of Abdoulaye Wade.
Figure 20: Less democratic deliberation indicators

Indicators that are less democratic

Figure 21: More democratic deliberation indicators

Indicators that are more democratic
Political (in)equality

The political equality index evaluates the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. In particular, it reflects the distribution of political power among economic, social, gender, and sexual orientation groups within the population. This index, as noted in Graph 24, has a major change only after independence, but later on remains stable.

Figure 22: Political equality

The indicators that follow this same trend are power distribution by gender, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic position; and education equality. These indicators remain in medium levels because our data reflect that men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence, LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens, wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power and education in Senegal is somewhat equal. The indicator that is significantly less democratic is health inequality, because of poor access to high-quality healthcare. Our Senegal experts estimate that the ability of at least 75 percent of citizens to exercise their political rights is undermined by the lack of health care. By contrast, the only indicator that shows better performance after independence than the overall tendency is power distribution by social group. Our data shows that all significant social groups have a turn at the seat of power.
Figure 23: Political equality indicators

Figure 27: More and Less Democratic Political Equality Indicators
The unchanging judiciary

The overall judicial index did not experience any significant change throughout the 20th century. However, at the indicator level, there were some noteworthy developments. Compliance with the judiciary, lower court independence and judicial purges converge by the end of the century and remain at a medium level. In particular, our data shows that after independence, about half of the time the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees, and, in the same way, about half of the time on cases that are salient to the government, judges’ decisions reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record. Nonetheless, regarding judicial purges, during this period of time, there were limited arbitrary removals. It is also worth mentioning that several indicators show improvement in the last couple of years due to a current judicial reform to change the structure of justice in Senegal and achieve more transparency.

Figure 24: Judiciary

There are two indicators that are more and less democratic than the average (Figure 30). High court independence is significantly less democratic than the average judicial indicators and this has remained constant throughout the century. In particular, the executive branch seems to exert undue control over the high court. Our data notes that the high court usually reflects government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record.
In contrast, compliance with the high court is slightly more democratic than the overall of judicial index. After independence, Figure 29 observes a significant improvement that has lasted to the present. Specifically, our data suggest that the government in most cases complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees.
2. Conclusion

In 53 years, from 1960 to 2013, Senegal has experienced changes in the executive and legislative branches in addition to the creation of 173 political parties. Within these 53 years, Senegal has democratically elected 4 presidents (Léopold Sédar Senghor 1960-1980, Abdou Diouf 1981-2000, Abdoulaye Wade 2000-2012 and Macky Sall 2012-today) and 12 legislatures. In many ways, Senegal is a country whose political development appears better in comparison to other African countries. It is that fact that gave Senegal the labels of “exceptional,” “democratic showcase” and “an oasis of democracy” amidst the spirit of authoritarianism favored by other nations. While these claims have grounds in reality, the labels are exaggerated. Senegal is incontestably a democracy, the proof of which is found in its political stability, respect for human rights, freedom of the press, and transparent and routine elections with executive turnover. However, it is equally evident that Senegal also has room to reform its political system and constitution to encourage the equal participation of women in society, ensure the rights of the media, and to enhance equal competition in its elections.
References

• BBC on President Wade: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16905528](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16905528)