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# APPENDIX A: POST-SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

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# APPENDIX B: BACKGROUND NOTES

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Explanatory Notes

OVERVIEW OF THE CODEBOOK

- **Main body:** all variables assembled for the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project, divided into twenty sections.
- **Glossary:** defines key terms.
- **Appendix A:** the Post-survey Questionnaire that all coders complete.
- **Appendix B:** background materials and experts consulted in the course of developing the questionnaire.

VARIABLE TYPES

- **A:** *Coding by Project Managers and Research Assistants.* This is usually based on extant sources and is usually factual in nature.
- **B:** *Coding by Country Coordinators.* This is typically a graduate student or recent graduate who is from the country. These questions are also factual in nature.
- **C:** *Coding by Country Experts.* This is typically a scholar or professional with deep knowledge of a country and perhaps of a particular institution. Generally, that person is a citizen or resident of the country being coded. Multiple experts (usually 5) code each variable.
- **D:** *Indices,* i.e., composite variables composed of type A, B, or C variables. This may be accomplished by adding a denominator (e.g., per capita), by creating a cumulative scale (Total number of...), or by aggregating larger concepts (e.g., components or indices of democracy).
- **E:** *Non-V-Dem,* i.e., variables that do not involve any original coding. If we adopt a variable from another source, perhaps imputing missing data, it is not considered a V-Dem product. Many of these variables are found in the section of the Codebook labeled “Background Factors.” If, however, we gather data from a number of sources and combine them in a more than purely mechanical fashion (requiring some judgment on our part), we regard this as a V-Dem product and classify it as type A, B, C, or D.

VARIABLE LABELS

- Each variable is given a label (title) that is brief, descriptive, and unique.

VARIABLE TAGS

- **Format**
  - Prefix + Index (if V-Dem index) + Section + Abbreviated title
- **Prefixes**
• v2: V-Dem variables (A, B, C, D)
• e_: Non-V-Dem variables (E)

Classifications
• cl: Civil liberty
• dd: Direct democracy
• de: Demography
• dl: Deliberation
• mi: Miscellaneous (all background variables)
• el: Elections
• ex: Executive
• ju: Judiciary
• lg: Legislature
• me: Media
• pe: Political equality
• ps: Political parties
• sv: Sovereignty
• x_: Index (combines several variables in the database)

Key terms
• All key terms appear in the Glossary, unless they are specific to a single section (in which case they need only appear in the Introduction to that section or in the clarifications for particular questions). Key terms are sometimes cross-referenced with hypertext.

Project manager
• The team member(s) primarily responsible for crafting and collecting data for a variable.

Compiler
• The team member(s) who worked on data collection for this variable. Applicable only to type-A variables.

Question
• The question that the variable attempts to measure.

Clarification
• Definition of key terms, clarification of scope-conditions, contexts, and any other features needed to understand the question (if any).
AGGREGATION

- Explanation of how an index is constructed. Applicable to type-D variables.

RESPONSES

- Numeric
- Percentage
- Text
- Date
- Countries (chosen from a pre-populated menu)
- Specific response categories (listed below)

ANSWER-TYPES

- Multiple-choice: Where a coder can select only one answer. This is the usual protocol and is therefore not noted.
- Multiple-selection: Where a coder can select more than one answer.
- (Extra response options such as N/A, Don’t know, or Other, are not counted as part of this classification.)

SCALES

- Dichotomous
- Nominal
- Ordinal
- Interval (or ratio)
- (Extra response options such as N/A, Don’t know, or Other, are not counted as part of this classification.)

CROSS-CODER AGGREGATION

- IRT, Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net)
- Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence
- Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals
- (Applicable only to type-C indicators.)

SOURCES

- Citations for type-A variables are listed, wherever possible, with complete references in the References section. Note that sometimes this coding rests on numerous country-specific sources, in which case it is not possible to include all citations. But general sources should be listed, and naturally wherever a variable is taken entirely from another source, this source is listed.
• Composite indices (type-D) build on other variables in the V-Dem database, which are therefore listed as the source for that index.

SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS

• **CCP** = Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al. 2012)
• **CLEA** = Constituency-Level Elections Archive (Kollman et al. 2011)
• **DPI** = Database for Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000)
• **EDATES** = Election Dates Dataset (Reif 2011)
• **GVED** = Global Violent Elections Dataset (Reif 2012)
• **IDEA** = International IDEA ([http://www.idea.int/](http://www.idea.int/))
• **IPU** = Inter-Parliamentary Union ([http://www.ipu.org/](http://www.ipu.org/))
• **KRWE** = Keesing’s Record of World Events (Keesing’s Worldwide, 1987-2012)
• **KRWE/KCA** = Keesing’s Contemporary Archives (Keesing’s Worldwide, 1931-1986)
• **NELDA** = National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (Hyde, Marinov 2012)

VERSIONING

• **Versions.** Versions respond to changes to the dataset for V-Dem variables (A, B, C, D), including new variables, new indices, corrections to existing variables, and new iterations of the measurement model. Changes are synchronized with Codebook and Methodology documents so that they all share the same version number.
  • v1: 31 March 2014
  • v2: 11 September 2014
• **Sub-versions.** Refers to the second number (after the decimal point). Sub-versions are not synchronized across files.

FILENAME PROTOCOL

• Varieties of Democracy: Dataset v2. (2014)
• Varieties of Democracy: Methodology v2. (2014)
• Varieties of Democracy: Codebook v2. (2014)
• Varieties of Democracy: V-Dem Country Coding Units v2. (2014)

SUGGESTED CITATIONS

• **Nota bene:** If a variable(s) drawn from the V-Dem database plays an important role in your project (published or unpublished) this should be publicly acknowledged. Suggested citation(s) are offered at the end of each entry. Citations for V-Dem files are listed below. (They include version numbers but not sub-version numbers.)
  • **V-Dem Codebook:** Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl


### DATA RELEASES

- **Release 1:** 31 March 2014, 68 countries, on-line graphing for specified variables

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- **Release 2:** 11 September 2014, 19 additional countries, on-line graphing for specified variables. (Newly released variables cover previously released countries.)
Argentina  Brazil  Colombia  Ethiopia  India  Kenya  Korea, North  Korea, South  Kosovo  Lebanon  Morocco  Nigeria  Philippines  Taiwan  Tanzania  Thailand  Tunisia  Uganda  Venezuela

- **Release 3:** 31 December 2015, 76 new countries plus all countries listed above, online graphing and data download for all variables.

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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>Sao Tomé and Príncipe</td>
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1 Main Indices

This section groups together macro-level indices that describe features of democracy at the highest (most abstract) level.

1.1 Electoral Component Index (D)

Tag: v2x_EDmult_thick

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections.

Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link. Specifically, the index is formed by multiplying indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_freass_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), and elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_freass_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_accex

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

1.2 Electoral Democracy Index (D)

Tag: v2x_polyarchy

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance.

In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential
element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by first averaging the index of freedom of expression (v2x_freexp) and the index for alternative sources of information (v2xme_altinf), and then averaging the result with the electoral component index (v2x_EDmult_thick).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2x_freexp v2xme_altinf v2x_EDmult_thick

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 1.3 LIBERAL COMPONENT INDEX (D)

**Tag:** v2x_liberal

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

**Clarification:** The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

**Aggregation:** This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 1.4 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX (D)

**Tag:** v2x_libdem

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

**Clarifications:** The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary,
and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.
To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is formed by multiplying the liberal component index (\(v2x\_liberal\)) with the electoral democracy index (\(v2x\_polyarchy\)).

Scale: Interval
Sources: \(v2x\_liberal\) \(v2x\_polyarchy\)
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

1.5 Participatory Component Index (D)

Tag: \(v2x\_partip\)
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?
Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (\(v2x\_iccpart\)), direct popular vote (\(v2xdd\_dd\)), elected local government power (\(v2xel\_locelec\)), and elected regional government power (\(v2xel\_regelec\)).

Scale: Interval
Sources: \(v2x\_iccpart\) \(v2xdd\_dd\) \(v2xel\_locelec\) \(v2xel\_regelec\)
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

1.6 Participatory Democracy Index (D)

Tag: \(v2x\_partipdem\)
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.
society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

**Aggregation:** This index is formed by multiplying the participatory component index \( (v2x\_partip) \) with the electoral democracy index \( (v2x\_polyarchy) \).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** \( v2x\_polyarchy \) \( v2x\_partip \)

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 1.7 DELIBERATIVE COMPONENT INDEX (D)

**Tag:** \( v2x\_dl\_delib \)

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

**Clarification:** The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification \( (v2dlreason) \), common good justification \( (v2dlcommon) \), respect for counterarguments \( (v2dlcountr) \), range of consultation \( (v2dlconslt) \), and engaged society \( (v2dlengage) \).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** \( v2dlreason \) \( v2dlcommon \) \( v2dlcountr \) \( v2dlconslt \) \( v2dlengage \)

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
1.8 Deliberative Democracy Index (D)

**Tag:** v2x_delibdem

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?

**Clarification:** The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

**Aggregation:** This index is formed by multiplying deliberative component index (v2xdl_delib) with the electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

1.9 Egalitarian Component Index (D)

**Tag:** v2x_egal

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

**Clarifications:** The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to justice (v2clacjust), equal access to education (v2peeduq), equal access to health (v2pehealth), power distribution according to gender (v2pepwrugen), share of budget allocated to...
public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-tested benefits (v2dlunivl).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2clacjust v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrgen v2dlencmps v2dlunivl

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

1.10 Egalitarian Democracy Index (D)

Tag: v2x_egaldem

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: This index is formed by multiplying egalitarian component index (v2x egal) with the electoral democracy index (v2x_polyarchy).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2 Other Indices

2.1 Electoral Regime Index (D)

Tag: v2x_elecreg

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent?
Clarification: A country is coded 0 until the first election, at which point it is coded 1 until there is an electoral interruption. An electoral interruption is (i) an event that dissolves, replaces, or otherwise terminates an elected body (executive or parliament) or (ii) an event that implies that the elected body, while still intact, will not be subject to election in the future. Typically, an interruption is the product of a coup, declared state of emergency, or military defeat. After an interruption, a coding of 0 continues until another election occurs.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: v2xel_elecparl v2xlg_leginter v2xel_elecpres v2x_hosinter
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.2 Suffrage index (D)

Tag: v2x_suffr

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

Clarification: This question applies to citizens only and does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, citizenship, having been convicted for crime, being legally incompetent, or belonging to particular occupational groups such as the clergy, the armed forces, or election officials. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto).

Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage is coded as 50%. The absence of an electoral regime in the year (as defined v2elecreg) is coded 0%. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, education, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’, rough estimates are reported. They are based on the number and character of qualifying criteria that are generally translated into percentages in the following ways (if only male suffrage): property/income/taxes and education = 5%; property/income/taxes = 10%; education or property/income/taxes = 20%; ‘economic dependency = 40%. If available, numbers of eligible or registered voters and information on population distribution are used to qualify the estimates.

Aggregation: v2elsuffrage/100

Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Source: v2elsuffrage
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.3 FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (THICK) INDEX (D)

Tag: v2x_freass_thick

Project manager: Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csreprss). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csreprss

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.4 CHIEF EXECUTIVE NO LONGER ELECTED (D)

Tag: v2x_hosinter

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive no longer elected?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: v2exhoshog v2expathhg v2expathhs

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
2.5 Elected executive index (de jure) (D)

Tag: v2x_accex

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?

Clarifications: This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

Aggregation: There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected \((a=1)\) or not \((a=0)\). Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected \((b)\), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state \((c1=1,\text{ otherwise } 0)\). Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government \((c2=1,\text{ otherwise } 0)\). Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state \((d=1)\) or not \((d=0)\). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected \((e=1)\) or not \((e=0)\).

Define \(hosw\) as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government \((v2exhoshog==1)\), \(hosw=1\). If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then \(hosw=1\); if the reverse is true, \(hosw=0\). If they share equal power, \(hosw=.5\). Define the weight for the head of government as \(hogw=1-hosw\).

\(v2x\_accex\) is then equal to: \(hosw*[\max(a1, b*c1)]+hogw*[\max(a1*d, b*c1*d, a2, b*c2)]\)

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2lgello v2lggelecup v2lgdomchm v2exaphos v2expathhs v2exaphogp v2expathhg v2exdfcbhs v2exdjcblhg v2exdfdmhs v2exdfdshg v2exhoshog

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
2.6 Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index (D)

**Tag:** v2x_jucon

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juhcind), and lower court independence (v2juncind).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juhcind v2juncind

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.7 Freedom of Expression Index (D)

**Tag:** v2x_freexp

**Project managers:** Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent does government respect press & media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression?

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for print/broadcast censorship effort (v2mecenefm), internet censorship effort (v2mecenefi), harassment of journalists (v2meharjrn), media self-censorship (v2meslfcen), freedom of discussion for men/women (v2cldiscm, v2cldiscw) and freedom of academic and cultural expression (v2clacfree).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2mecenefm v2mecenefi v2meharjrn v2meslfcen v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2clacfree

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

2.8 Civil Society Participation Index (D)

**Tag:** v2x_cspart

**Project manager:** Michael Bernhard

**Question:** Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymaker; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is
legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

**Clarifications:** The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection – national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2csconsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’s participation (v2csgender).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2pscnslnl v2csconsult v2csprtcpt v2csgender

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 2.9 Female empowerment index (D)

**Tag:** v2x_gender

**Project manager:** John Gerring

**Question:** How politically empowered are women?

**Clarifications:** Political empowerment is understood to include open discussion of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, freedom of movement, the right to private property, access to justice, freedom from forced labor, representation in the ranks of journalists, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists (v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2clmdmovew), freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2clmdmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw v2pepwrgen

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.
3 Elections

3.1 Elections Introduction (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2elintro

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent or constitutional assemblies), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency.

For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a prime minister, not a president. In order to be considered a president, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

3.2 Non-Election Specific Coding Introduction (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2elintro1

The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

3.3 Presidential Election (D)

Tag: v2xel_elecpres

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Did a presidential election take place this year?

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: v2eltype_6 v2eltype_7

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.4 Legislative or Constituent Assembly Election (D)

Tag: v2xel_elecparl

Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: Did a legislative or constituent assembly election take place this year?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous.
Sources: v2eltype_0 v2eltype_1 v2eltype_4 v2eltype_5
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.5 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (A)
Tag: v2elrstruct
Project manager: Pamela Paxton
Compiler: Valeriya Mechkova
Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for national executive or legislative office formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?
Responses:
0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.
1: No, but law requires that candidates must renounce (or hide) their ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic identity.
2: No, there are no such restrictions.
Scale: Ordinal
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v221; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.6 Disclosure of campaign donations (C)
Tag: v2eldonate
Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg
Question: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?
Responses:
0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.
1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.
2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.
3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.
4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.7 PUBLIC CAMPAIGN FINANCE (C)

Tag: v2elpubfin
Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg
Question: Is significant public financing available for parties’ and/or candidates’ campaigns for national office?
Responses:
0: No. Public financing is not available.
1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties’ campaigns.
2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.
3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.
4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.8 MINIMUM VOTING AGE (A)

Tag: v2elage
Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif
Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?

Responses: Numeric

Scale: Interval


Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.9 COMPULSORY VOTING (A)

Tag: v2elcomvot

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Compiler: Valeriya Mechkova

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.
2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.
3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

Scale: Ordinal

Sources: PIPE (Przeworski et al. 2013); Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in PIPE (Przeworski et al. 2013).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.10 COMPULSORY VOTING (A)

Tag: v2elcomvot_2

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?
Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.
2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.
3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.
4: Sanctions DO NOT exist in the law, but mandatory voting is enforced in practice.
5: Compulsory decided at subnational level
6: Compulsory for men only


Coverage: Almost full coverage 1900-2012, but without sanction information. Most gaps/missing data represent continuation of last available rule about compulsory voting prior to that year, but may represent data missing due to lack of explicit confirmation and the possibility that the voting age was different). Expected coverage from first election (~1800-present) to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding, incorporating the nuanced outcome coding in v2elcomvot.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.11 Compulsory Voting Penalties (A)

Tag: v2elcompen

Project managers: Megan Reif, Pamela Paxton

Question: If law makes voting compulsory, what are the penalties when eligible voters abstain? Check all that apply.

Clarification: Choose all that apply

Responses:

0: There are no penalties for abstaining in compulsory vote system [v2elcompen_0]
1: Fines (incl. salary freeze; e.g., Bolivia) [v2elcompen_1]
2: Temporary disenfranchisement [v2elcompen_2]
3: Indefinite disenfranchisement [v2elcompen_3]
4: Denial of public goods and services (may include passport – e.g., Brazil) [v2elcompen_4]
5: Other costly penalty [v2elcompen_5]

Answer type: Multiple-selection

3.12 Suffrage level (A)

Tag: v2elGVsuflvl

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: What is the level of suffrage practiced?

Clarification: Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). In cases where married people are allowed to vote at a younger age than single people, the higher (older) age minimum for single voters is given (see v2elage).

Responses:

0: Indirect suffrage and/or offices filled by appointment only
1: Propertied ethnic males
2: Ethnic males
3: Propertied/educated males
4: Ethnic males & females
5: Propertied/educated males & females
6: All males
7: Spatially variant
8: Universal
9: Occupational categories/Party membership
10: Only citizens of colonial metropole
11: Propertied/tax-paying colons & non-colons
12: Propertied males & military females
13: Propertied/landowning households
14: All households
15: All males and married Females
16: Age differential: Married people vote at younger age than single

Scale: Nominal (v2elGVsuflvl), or a series of dichotomous scales.


Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.13  Percentage of Population with Suffrage (A)

*Tag:* v2elsuffrage

*Project manager:* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

*Clarification:* This question applies to citizens only and does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, citizenship, having been convicted for crime, being legally incompetent, or belonging to particular occupational groups such as the clergy, the armed forces, or election officials. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto).

Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage is coded as 50%. The absence of an electoral regime in the year (as defined v2elecreg) is coded 0%. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’, rough estimates are reported. They are based on the number and character of qualifying criteria that are generally translated into percentages in the following ways (if only male suffrage): property/income/taxes and literacy = 5%; property/income/taxes = 10%; literacy or property/income/taxes = 20%; ‘economic dependency = 40%. If available, numbers of eligible or registered voters and information on population distribution are used to qualify the estimates.

*Responses:* Percent

*Scale:* Interval

*Sources:* v2elfemrst, v2elvotrst, PIPE (Przeworski et al. 2013), country-specific sources.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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3.14  Resident Noncitizens Who Cannot Vote (C)

*Tag:* v2elnnoncit

*Project manager:* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* What percentage (%) of the people residing in the country (or colony) does not enjoy the legal right to vote in national elections because they are not full citizens?

*Clarification:* This question focuses on people whose exclusion from suffrage stems from their immigrant status or lack of recognition as citizens by a colonial power. An example of the first sort would be Kuwait, where about half of the population consists of non-nationals, who are thereby excluded from the suffrage. An example of the second sort would be French West Africa, where (until the late 1950s) only a small portion of permanent residents were allowed to vote.
Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.15 ADULT CITIZENS WITH RIGHT TO VOTE % (A)
Tag: v2eladltvt

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?
Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); Paxton et al. (2003).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.16 FEMALE SUFFRAGE RESTRICTED (A)
Tag: v2elfemr

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

Question: Are women eligible to vote in national elections?
Clarification: If there are no (direct) national elections, observations are not coded (missing).
Responses:
  0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote, but some or all males vote.
  1: Suffrage exclusions affect men and women equally—some women are allowed to vote, but they are excluded on same basis as men (e.g., occupational categories, white or educated men and women, men and women with property).
  2: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote, and face more or different restrictions than men
  3: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.
Scale: Ordinal
Sources: Paxton et al. (2003); Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008), Reif (GVED).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.17 **Suffrage exclusions (de jure) (A)**

*Tag:* v2elsufrst

*Project manager:* Megan Reif

*Question:* Are there any other de jure exclusions to universal suffrage beyond voting age in this election?

*Clarification:* This question refers to legal (de jure) restrictions and is a simple yes/no variable that incorporates the related suffrage level variables but also any additional specific restrictions mentioned in sources not explicitly defined or included in v2elvotrst or v2elsulfvl.

*Responses:*

0: No exclusions

1: Yes, one or more de jure exclusions to universal suffrage exists in this election.

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.18 **Types of suffrage exclusions (de jure) (A)**

*Tag:* v2elvotrst

*Project managers:* Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

*Question:* Is the right to vote in national elections denied any of the following categories of citizens? Check all that apply.

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply. This question applies to citizens only and to legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto).

*Responses:*

0: No exclusions beyond existing suffrage rules

1: Illiterates

2: Clergy

3: Armed forces/security services

4: Current prisoners

5: Ex-felons

6: Mentally ill/Insane

7: Deaf/Mutes

8: Other groups with disabilities

9: Students

10: Occupational/class groups (e.g., aristocracy)

11: Election officials/workers/bureaucrats

12: Other social groups

13: Single people's voting rights are more restricted than married

14: Single women cannot vote
15: Immigrant but naturalized citizens cannot vote
16: Indigenous peoples' voting rights restricted

Answer type: Multiple-selection.


Coverage: Near full coverage, 1900-2012, expected to be complete by end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.19 DIASPORA VOTING (A)

Tag: v2eldiasvot

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Can the diaspora and/or citizens abroad vote?

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes


Coverage: Using the sources listed above is 1900-2012, but most sources were silent on this issue. Thus, there is a great deal of missing-ness. Coverage expected from first election (~1800-present), to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.20 MILITARY VOTING (A)

Tag: v2elmilvot

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Are members of the military permitted to vote?

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Coverage: Using the sources listed above, coverage is in theory 1900-2012, but most sources were silent on this issue, and additional sources suggest more variation than the current coverage suggests. There is therefore a great deal of missing-ness. Coverage expected from first election (~1800-present) to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.21 Military voting in barracks (A)

Tag: v2elmilbrk

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: If members of the military are allowed to vote, must they vote in the barracks?

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Coverage: Using the sources below, coverage is in theory 1900-2012, but most sources were silent on this issue, and additional sources suggest more variation than the current coverage suggests. Most of this variable is missing. Expected coverage from first election (~1800-present) to be complete by end 2014 pending funding.


See Reif GVED and Reif EDATES (2011, 2012) for additional country-specific sources.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.22 De jure ballot secrecy (A)

Tag: v2elsec

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Is there ballot secrecy?

 Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes
2: Secrecy optional
3: Varies spatially and/or hierarchically

Coverage: Using the sources below, current coverage is in theory 1900-2012, but most sources were silent on this issue. Expected coverage from first election (~1800-present), to be completed by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Notes: For many elections, ballot secrecy has been enshrined fully or partially, but either de jure or de facto practice makes voting behind a screen optional. This was a typical practice in the Eastern bloc during the Cold War, and continues to be practiced in China. In countries where elections are held only for certain levels of government or locations (e.g., China), ballot secrecy can vary by village, district, or type of election in question. In the United States and Western Europe before the secret ballot, similar variation was probably practiced but data on such micro-level differences is not uniformly and consistently available.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.23 Election day holiday (A)

Tag: v2elholivot

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Is election day also a national holiday?

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes


Coverage: Using the sources below, coverage is in theory 1900-2012, but most sources were silent on this issue, and additional sources suggest more variation than the current coverage suggests. Most of this variable is missing. Coverage from first election (~1800-present) expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.24 EMB autonomy (C)

Tag: v2elembaut

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg
**Question:** Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

**Clarification:** The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

**Responses:**

0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other de facto ruling body.

1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the de facto ruling body.

2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.

3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the de facto ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.

4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**3.25 EMB CAPACITY (C)**

**Tag:** v2elembcap

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

**Clarification:** The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

**Responses:**

0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.

1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.

2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.
3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.

4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** *V*-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.26 Clean Elections Index (D)

**Tag:** v2xel_frefair

**Project managers:** Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent are elections free and fair?

**Clarifications:** Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMP autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elpeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg)

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elpeace v2elfrfair

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** *V*-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.27 Election-Specific Questions Introduction (A)(B)(C)

**Tag:** v2elintro2

The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date.
3.28 Elections NELDA id-number1 (A)

*Tag:* v2elNELDA (Provisionally included as the text field in v2eltype.)

*Project manager:* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* What is the NELDA-type unique identifier for each election date, type, and round?

*Responses:* Numeric

*Source:* NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012).

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.11 Elections GVED id-number (A)

*Tag:* v2elgvedeid

*Project manager:* Megan Reif

*Question:* What is the GVED-type unique identifier for each election date, type, and round?

*Clarification:* Code format is COW_YYYYMMDD_#R# (where # before R=ETYPE and # after R=ERND). Because election violence is often used to hasten or postpone election, this code includes elections not held where sources provided that information.

*Responses:*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ETYPE</th>
<th>ERND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10- Executive</td>
<td>10-Single Round Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Vice-Presidential</td>
<td>11-First/Primary Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>12-Second Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-Legislative/Parliamentary</td>
<td>13-Third Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-Lower Chamber</td>
<td>14-Fourth Round</td>
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<td>32-Upper Chamber</td>
<td>15-Fifth Round</td>
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<tr>
<td>33-Additional Chamber</td>
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<td>40-Referendum/Plebiscite</td>
<td>20-Run-off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-Local/Municipal</td>
<td>21-First and Decisive Round</td>
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<tr>
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<td>22-By-election</td>
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<tr>
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<td>23-By-election 2(^{nd}) or later round</td>
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<td>3.28.1.2 80-Supranational</td>
<td>31-Phased Elec Phase 1</td>
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Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.29 Election type (A*)

Tag: v2eltype

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova
**Question:** What type of election was held on this date?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply. Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (e.g., two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

**Responses:**

0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_0]
1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_1]
2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_2] (Not yet coded)
3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_3] (Not yet coded)
4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_4]
5: Constituent Assembly, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_5]
6: Presidential, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_6]
7: Presidential, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_7]
8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_8] (Not yet coded)
9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltype_9] (Not yet coded)

**Scale:** Nominal (v2eltype), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Sources:** NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; CIA Factbook; Wikipedia.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.30 Elections Multiparty (C)

**Tag:** v2elmulpar

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** Was this national election multiparty?

**Responses:**

0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).
1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.
2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained – legally or informally.
3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (de jure or de facto) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.
4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.31 ELECTION VOTER REGISTRY (C)

Tag: v2elrgstry

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

Responses:
0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.
1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).
2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.
3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.
4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
3.32 ELECTION MALE SUFFRAGE IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2elmalsuf

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of male citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do not consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.33 ELECTION FEMALE SUFFRAGE IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2elfemsuf

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of female citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do not consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.34 ELECTION SUFFRAGE IN PRACTICE (D)

Tag: v2elprasuf

Project manager: Pamela Paxton
**Question:** In this national election, what percentage (%) of citizens (male and female) who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

**Clarification:** Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do not consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

**Aggregation:** An average (mean) of indicators focused on election suffrage in practice for men (v2elmalsuf) and women (v2elfemsuf).

**Responses:** Percent

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2elmalsuf v2elfemsuf

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.35 ELECTION VOTE BUYING (C)

**Tag:** v2elvotbuy

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

**Clarification:** Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., “porkbarrel” legislation.

**Responses:**

0: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.

1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

2: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an ‘entry-ticket’ expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.

3: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.

4: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.36 Election characterized by (non-violent) fraud by most parties (A)

**Tag:** v2elallfrd

**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** Was this election characterized by use of fraud by most parties?

**Clarification:** If most or all parties, whether regime or opposition, engaged in some form of fraud, whether counting fraud, ballot stuffing, etc., this variable is coded as “Yes” (1).

**Responses:**
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage expected from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.37 Election results changed or compromised by fraud (A)

**Tag:** v2elfrdchng

**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** Did fraud compromise the results of this election?

**Clarification:** This variable is coded as “Yes” (1) if the source states objectively that the results of the election might have been different had it not been for the use of non-violent election fraud by one or more actors. If the source cites another actor (e.g., Russia, a party) having alleged that fraud compromised results, the variable is coded as “No” (0) unless multiple sources with competing interests and/or the source itself reports that the outcome would have been different had fraud not occurred.

**Responses:**
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.
3.38 **ELECTION ALLEGED INCUMBENT/REGIME (NON-VIOLENT) FRAUD (A)**

*Tag*: v2elincfrd  
*Project manager*: Megan Reif  
*Question*: In this election, were there any allegations or reports from any actor, internal or external, that the incumbent/governing regime used (non-violent) fraud?

*Responses:*
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

*Sources*: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

*Coverage*: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present) and adding additional sources other than Keesing’s to entire period expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

*Data release*: 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.39 **ELECTION OPPOSITION REPORTEDLY USED (NON-VIOLENT) FRAUD (A)**

*Tag*: v2eloppfrd  
*Project manager*: Megan Reif  
*Question*: Were there reports that one or more opposition parties used non-violent fraud?

*Clarification*: If there are reports from one or more actors that one or more opposition parties engaged in some form of non-violent fraud, whether counting fraud, ballot stuffing, etc., this variable is coded as “Yes” (1).

*Responses:*
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

*Sources*: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

*Coverage*: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

*Data release*: 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.40 **ELECTION INCUMBENT/REGIME ALLEGEDLY RIGGED ELECTION (USING NON-VIOLENT MEANS) (A)**

*Tag*: v2elincrig
Question: Were there reports or allegations that the incumbent “rigged,” “stole,” or otherwise held a “sham election”?

Clarification: If there are reports from one or more actors EXPLICITLY using language implying that the incumbent/governing regime rigged or stole the election, or similar terminology implying a wholesale, centralized effort to hold a sham election, without mentioning the use of violence in the same context, this variable is coded as “Yes” (1).

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

3.41 ELECTION OTHER VOTING IRREGULARITIES (C)

Tag: v2elirreg

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

Clarification: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes.

This question does not refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

Responses:
0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.
1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.
2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.
3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.
4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.42 Election Government Intimidation (C)

**Tag:** v2elintim

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents?

**Clarification:** Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

**Responses:**

0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.

1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.

2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.

3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.

4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.43 Election other electoral violence (C)

**Tag:** v2elpeace

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

**Responses:**

0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.

1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.

2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.

4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.44 Election involved any incidents of violence/coercion (A)

**Tag:** v2elvany

**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** Did any incidents of election violence or coercion occur during some phase of this election?

**Clarification:** This item is coded as “Yes” if even one documented incident of intimidation or violence occurred according to this definition: Coercive campaigning and election violence are any spontaneous or organized actions by candidates, party supporters, election authorities, voters, civil society, or other political actors that employ physical harm, intimidation, blackmail, verbal abuse, violent demonstrations, psychological manipulation, or other forms of coercion (or the threat thereof) aimed at disrupting, determining, hastening, delaying, reversing, or otherwise influencing an election and its
outcome (Fischer 2002, Reif 2012). Rumors of violence, threats, spiritual coercion (invocation of divine displeasure, partisan statements by influential religious leaders, witchcraft, etc.), fake incidents reported in partisan press designed to incite or justify retaliation, planned but thwarted incidents, such as bombs found and defused before exploding, and other phenomena that generally contribute to a climate of fear and anticipated violence are counted when information on them arises in the sources. Users should be cautious when using this variable if they are interested in the scale or severity of violence, which is measured by other VDEM variables separately or in aggregation.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.45 ELECTION INVOLVED INCUMBENT/REGIME USE OF VIOLENCE/COERCION (A)

Tag: v2elvinc

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Did the regime/incumbent or its affiliates/sponsors use any coercion and violence in this election?

Clarification: Using the definition provided under v2elany, this variable is coded as “Yes” if the incumbent regime or their associates (e.g., police, public officials, bureaucrats, affiliated local governments/administrators, parties ruling in coalition with the incumbent, army, etc.) perpetrated any acts of coercion and violence, whether or not there is verifiable proof that the candidate or other leaders planned or knew about the incident in advance. If the source independently attributes undue influence to the incumbent regime, voters and other stakeholders are likely to perceive it as state violence, whether or not the incumbent/ regime/state can plausibly deny knowledge of the incident.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)
**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.46 ELECTION INVOLVED OPPOSITION USE OF VIOLENCE/COERCION (A)

**Tag:** v2elvopp

**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** Did one or more opposition leaders, parties, or their associates engage in any election violence or coercion?

**Clarification:** Using the definition provided under v2elany, this variable is coded as “Yes” if one or more opposition leaders, parties, or their associates (e.g., parties in coalition with a major opposition group, affiliated local governments/administration, partisan media, partisan militias, organizations, businesses, etc.) perpetrated any acts of coercion and violence, *whether or not there is verifiable proof that the candidate or other leaders planned or knew about the incident in advance.* If the source independently attributes undue influence to the opposition, voters and other stakeholders are likely to perceive it as opposition violence, whether or not the opposition groups can plausibly deny knowledge of the incident.

**Responses:**

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.47 ELECTION PATTERN OF VIOLENCE/COERCION, IF ANY (A)

**Tag:** v2elvgeo

**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** If election coercion and violence occurred during this electoral process, what general spatio-temporal pattern describes the incidents?

**Clarification:** This variable summarizes the spatio-temporal pattern of election violence in the entire election. When Keesing’s and other media sources are used, they generally
describe the nature of violence in these general terms and typically include reference to threats and intimidation in addition to physical acts of violence. The variable thus attempts to measure the location of incidents in time and space, NOT whether the violence affected the (a) OUTCOME of one or more races or the election as a whole or the (b) SCALE or type of coercion/violence that occurs. (a) A single incident of violence, such as the assassination of local, provincial, or national candidates, may influence the outcome and perceptions of the quality and integrity of election, but the level of violence itself would not affect ordinary people and their normal routines. Just as ballot stuffing or problems in one constituency can affect an entire nation’s electoral outcome (e.g., Palm Beach County Florida in 2000, a few precincts in Lyndon Johnson’s 1948 senate race; see Campbell, 2005), single incidents of violence like the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and subsequent demonstrations can affect only a few locations but alter outcomes. Similarly, many small incidents that occur throughout the country may affect perceptions of ordinary people and might be defined as “widespread” even if the incidents have no influence on the electoral process or election administration. (b) Violence and coercion may not cause deaths or even injuries, but may have an enormous impact on outcomes. In Newark, New Jersey, for example, candidates who have challenged incumbents and their families have been harassed and followed by police over the years to the point that they withdrawal from the race, leaving the incumbent unchallenged. Businesses whose owners post fliers on their private property in support of opposition candidates lose their licenses, and thugs have been hired to stand outside of polling stations. No incidents occur and electoral administration proceeds normally, but coercion is such that voter and candidate behavior are dramatically affected. Curses and witchcraft in Indonesia, parts of Africa, and other places influence entire neighborhoods, villages, and/or regions (e.g., Ternate Indonesia, Sultan’s curse in 2004 (Terkaif, 2004).

Responses:

0: Isolated/Sporadic. Incidents of violence, including threats and other forms of coercion, occurred intermittently during the election process in various locations without a consistent pattern. Although people might imagine that violence and coercion could occur anywhere, they would view the chances of being affected as remote, entirely random, and unlikely to impact their day-to-day lives and the electoral process.

1: Clustered/Regional. Incidents of violence and coercion occurred in one or more clusters (e.g., concentrated in specific neighborhoods, villages, towns, cities, districts, regions, or provinces) during one or more phases of the electoral process, while areas outside of that area were entirely peaceful. As long as people were not located in those areas, they would not have feared violence.

2: Widespread. Incidents of violence and coercion occurred in many parts of the country during one or more phases of the electoral process so that people in many areas of the country would consider altering their normal routines to avoid it and imagine that some aspects and phases of the electoral process
(registration, candidate selection, campaigning, voting, counting, etc.) might have been influenced by violence.

3: Key Constituencies. Incidents of violence and coercion occurred in one or more specific constituencies during one or more phases of the electoral process so that people inside those constituencies would alter their normal routines and imagine that one or more phases and aspects of the electoral process might have been influenced by this violence, but people in neighboring and other constituencies would be unaffected. Reports of incidents in sensitive, problematic, or critical constituencies, key races, swing districts, etc., would likely put the election violence in this category.

4: There was no election violence, coercion, rumors, or threats thereof.

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.48 ELECTION RESULTS CHANGED OR COMPROMISED BY VIOLENCE (A)

Tag: v2elvchg

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Did the election compromise the results or change the outcome of this election so that the result may have been different had the coercion and/or violence not occurred?

Clarification: This variable is coded “Yes” only if the source indicates explicitly that the results of the election in one or more constituencies would have been different had the election been conducted peacefully. If the election results were compromised by FRAUD, but no violence occurred or the violence is not mentioned as an explicit and direct cause of problematic results, this variable is coded as “No”. Coders did not make any assumptions or influences on the likely effect of any incidents or descriptions on the outcome. If the source describes partisan actors as having alleged that violence compromised the results, this variable is still coded “No” unless the source states independently or cites independent sources (e.g., more than one election observation group agreeing on the conclusion) that the election was likely compromised by violence.

Responses:
0: No
1: Yes

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)
Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.49  Timing of any election violence and coercion (A)

Tag: v2elvtim

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: During which phases of the election did election violence and coercion occur? (check all that apply)

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Election violence/coercion occurred prior to election [v2elvtim1pre]
1: Election violence/coercion occurred on election day [v2elvtim2day]
2: Election violence occurred after the election [v2elvtim2aft]
3: Election violence occurred after announcement of/dispute over results [v2elvtim3res]

Answer type: Multiple-selection

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.50  Types and direct consequences of election violence and coercion (A)

Tag: v2elvtyp

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: What types of violence occurred during the electoral process? (check all that apply)

Clarification: Choose all that apply. If at least one form of the specified violence occurred during any phase of the election process, this variable is coded as “Yes”. Only those incidents clearly related to the election are coded. For example, leading up to Pakistan’s 2013 election, there have been many incidents of sectarian violence that are clearly unrelated to the election. Keesing’s and other media sources typically make this distinction. WMDs are Weapons of Mass Destruction and include bombs, chemical
weapons, and any other instrument designed to inflict harm on as many people as possible in a single attack. If a bomb is found under a stage at a rally but defused by police, it is considered a WMD. Such incidents are often mentioned in summaries of circumstances surrounding elections. Similarly, attempted kidnappings are counted as kidnappings. Property and infrastructure do not include election posters and other election materials. Damage to such materials are vandalism and constitute violence, but not major property damage. Detentions and arrests include both arbitrary detentions as well as arrests of perpetrators.

Responses:
1: Election involved one or more deaths [v2elvtyp1dth]
2: Election involved one or more injuries [v2elvtyp2inj]
3: Election involved overkill in incidents of violence [v2elvtyp3okl]
4: Election involved one or more kidnappings [v2elvtyp4kid]
5: Election involved one or more detentions/arrests [v2elvtyp5det]
6: Election involved one or more detonated or thwarted WMD attacks [v2elvtyp6wmd]
7: Election involved major damage to property, infrastructure [v2elvtyp7prp]
8: Election involved use of or show of guns in one or more incidents [v2elvtyp8gun]
9: Election involved one or more incidents of riots, clashes, fighting [v2elvtyp9rio]

Answer type: Multiple-selection

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.51 Victims or Targets of Election Violence and Coercion (A)

Tag: v2elvtgt

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: What types of actors were victims and/or targets of election violence and coercion?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. There is no separate code for bystanders, which will be counted in the numeric counts of deaths and injuries. If the source lists any of the above categories of actors as either victims or targets of one or more forms and incidents of election coercion or violence during any phase of the electoral process, they are coded in this variable.

Responses:
1: Election violence targeted voters [v2elvtgt1vt]
2: Election violence targeted candidates [v2elvtgt2cn]
3: Election violence targeted election officials at pollsite or higher levels [v2elvtgt3eo]
4: Election violence targeted party officials and leaders [v2elvtgt4pl]
5: Election violence targeted party supporters/workers [v2elvtgt5ps]
6: Election violence targeted demonstrators or people marching (peacefully) on election-related matters but not necessarily affiliated with parties [v2elvtgt6ppl]
7: Election violence targeted domestic or intl media and/or observers [v2elvtgt7mo]
8: Election violence targeted state and regime actors [v2elvtgt8rg]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing's, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.52 ELECTION VIOLENCE NUMBER OF DEATHS (A)
Tag: v2elvdthn
Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: If deaths occurred and the source specifies the number or gives some indication of quantity, summarize the total number of deaths during the entire electoral process.
Clarification: If the source does not provide a precise number, but provides descriptions like “several” riots, deaths, injuries, and so on occurred, the number is coded as 3. If the source indicates only a plural, such as “dozens”, the number is coded as 24 (12x2), a rule applied any time a general number is mentioned (e.g., “tens”, “hundreds” (2x100=200), “thousands” (2x1000=2000), “several thousand” (3x1000=3000). Thus the actual figures are likely to underestimate rather than inflate the actual numbers involved. As additional sources are added to the source dataset (GVED), the numbers will represent an average of the precise and estimated numbers.

Responses: Numeric
Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)
Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing's, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.53 Election violence number of injuries (A)

Tag: v2elvinjn

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: If injuries/casualties of any level of severity occurred and the source specifies the number or gives some indication of quantity, summarize the total number of injuries that during the entire electoral process.

Clarification: See information provided under v2elvdthn.

Responses: Numeric

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.54 Election violence involved "unrest" or other disruption (A)

Tag: v2elvunrst

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Did some form of “unrest” or public disruption occur at any time during the electoral process?

Clarification: If any form of unrest or public disruption, such as “riots”, “strikes”, “demonstrations”, “marches”, “clashes”, etc., occurred and involved coercion or violence (see information under v2elvany for definition), this variable is coded as “Yes”.

Responses:
  0: No
  1: Yes

Sources: KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

Coverage: Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by end 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.55 Election number of riots and demonstrations involving violence (A)

Tag: v2elvdemosn

Project manager: Megan Reif


**Question:** How many incidents of unrest, such as riots, strikes, or demonstrations, involving some degree of coercion and violence, occurred during all phases of this electoral process?

**Clarification:** See information provided under v2elvdthn. If any form of unrest or public disruption, such as “riots”, “strikes”, “demonstrations”, “marches”, “clashes”, etc., occurred and involved coercion or violence (see information under v2elvany for definition), and the source describes specifies the number, the number of incidents is counted according to the rules given under v2elvdthn.

**Responses:** Numeric

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**3.56 Election Riots and Demonstrations Total Participants (A)**

**Tag:** v2elvptcpn

**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** How many people in total were involved across all incidents of unrest, such as riots, strikes, or demonstrations that occurred during all phases of this electoral process?

**Clarification:** See information provided under v2elvdthn for quantity estimation rules. If any form of unrest or public disruption, such as “riots”, “strikes”, “demonstrations”, “marches”, “clashes”, etc., occurred and involved coercion or violence (see information under v2elvany for definition), and the source describes specifies the number of people who participated, the numbers are added across all of the incidents.

**Responses:** Numeric

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**3.57 Election-related Detentions and Arrests Detained X Number of People (A)**

**Tag:** v2elvdetn
**Project manager:** Megan Reif

**Question:** If any arbitrary detentions and/or legal arrests of participants in incidents of violence occurred and the source specifies the number or gives some indication of quantity, summarize the total number of both detentions AND arrests that occurred during the entire electoral process.

**Clarification:** See information provided under v2elvdthn for quantity estimation rules.

**Responses:** Numeric

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.58 Election number of security forces deployed (A)

**Tag:** v2elvfrcn

**Question:** How many total people from any and all security services were deployed for this election, both in the normal course of election administration and in association with particular incidents, threats or problems in specific regions.

**Clarification:** See information provided under v2elvdthn for quantity estimation rules. If a source mentions any information about deployment of security services (e.g., police, army, special forces, intelligence, UN peacekeeping forces, private security companies, etc.) for the purpose of administering the election, preventing election violence, or responding to incidents during any phase of the electoral process, any numbers or estimates of numbers provided by the source are totaled here.

**Responses:** Numeric

**Sources:** KRWE (1987-2012); KRWE/KCA (1931-1987)

**Coverage:** Currently, 1931-2012. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), adding additional sources other than Keesing’s, expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.59 Election number of parties/candidates participating/competing (A)

**Tag:** v2elppartn

**Project manager:** Megan Reif
**Question:** How many parties (or candidates, if presidential or non-party election) participated in this election?

**Clarification:** Keesing’s often mentions the total number of parties/candidates competing, but if only the results are reported and sources below group all small parties and independence together as “other”, they are counted as only one additional party. As additional sources are added, the largest number will be reported.

**Responses:** Numeric


**Coverage:** Reliable current coverage is 2006-2012, otherwise spotty. Coverage from first election (~1800-present) expected by be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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### 3.60 ELECTION BOYCOTTS (C)

**Tag:** v2elboycot

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

**Clarification:** A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

**Responses:**

0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.

1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.

2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.

3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.

4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.61 ELECTION BOYCOTT NUMBER OF PARTIES/CANDIDATES BOYCOTTING (A)

Tag: v2elboyctn

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: How many parties (or candidates, if presidential or non-party election) boycotted this election during at least one point in the process?

Clarification: If a party boycotted earlier in the process, but later decided to participate, or participated and later boycotted, they are counted as boycotting, if the source provides such information. If multiple sources are found for a single election, the source reporting the largest number of parties/candidates boycotting is reported.

Responses: Numeric


Coverage: Using the sources below, coverage is in theory 1900-2012, but most sources were silent on this issue, and additional sources suggest more variation than the current coverage suggests. There is a great deal of missing-ness, therefore. Coverage from first election (~1800-present), along with refinement of existing data based on additional sources, expected to be completed by the end of 2014, pending funding.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.62 ELECTION LEGAL PETITIONS FILED DISPUTING RESULTS (A)

Tag: v2eldisplgl

Project manager: Megan Reif

Question: Did one or more parties or candidates file legal petitions to dispute the results on the grounds that some aspect of the electoral process was flawed?

Clarification: If any form of unrest or public disruption, such as “riots”, “strikes”, “demonstrations”, “marches”, “clashes”, etc., occurred and involved coercion or violence (see information under v2elvany for definition), this variable is coded as “Yes”.

Responses:

0: No
1: Yes


Coverage: Currently, 2006-2012, based on Keesing’s. Most sources consulted thus far were silent on this issue, particularly prior to 1990. There is thus a great deal of missing-ness. Coverage from first election (~1800-present) and refinement of existing data based on additional sources expected to be complete by the end of 2014, pending funding.
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.63 **Election free campaign media (C)**

*Tag:* v2elfrcamp

*Project manager:* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Do parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media during national election periods?

*Responses:*

0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.
1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.
2: All parties receive free access.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.64 **Election paid campaign advertisements (C)**

*Tag:* v2elpdcamp

*Project manager:* Staffan I. Lindberg

*Question:* Are parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media during national election periods?

*Responses:*

0: Not at all.
1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.
2: It is permitted without limit.
3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.65  ELECTION PAID INTEREST GROUP MEDIA (C)

Tag: v2elpaidig

Project manager: Holli Semetko

Question: Are interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media during national election periods?

Responses:
- 0: Not at all.
- 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.
- 2: It is permitted without limit.
- 3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.66  ELECTION DOMESTIC ELECTION MONITORS (B)

Tag: v2eldommon

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

Responses:
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.67  ELECTION INTERNATIONAL MONITORS (A) (E?)

Tag: v2elintmon

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were international election monitors present?

Responses:
0: No/Unclear/Not Applicable
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.68  Election International Monitors Denied (A) (E?)

Tag: v2elmonden

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were some international election monitors denied opportunity to be present by the government holding the election?

Responses:

0: No/Unclear/Not Applicable
1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.69  Election Free and Fair (C)

Tag: v2elfrfair

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

Clarification: The only thing that should not be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

Responses:

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).
1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).
2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).

4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.70 Election VAP Turnout (A)

*Tag:* v2elvaptrn

*Project manager:* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* In this national election, what percentage (%) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

*Responses:* Percent

*Scale:* Interval

*Sources:* IDEA.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.71 Election Turnout (A)

*Tag:* v2eltrnout

*Project manager:* Pamela Paxton

*Question:* In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

*Responses:* Percent


*Coverage:* 1945-.

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
## 3.72 Election executive turnover nominal (B)

**Tag:** v2eltvrexn

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Question:** Which offices (if any) experienced turnover as a result of this national election?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply.

**Responses:**

0: A new president took office. S/he is a member of the same party as the previous president. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_0]

1: A new president took office. S/he is a member of a different party than the previous president. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_1]

2: A new prime minister took office. S/he is a member of the same party as the previous prime minister. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_2]

3: A new prime minister took office. S/he is a member of a different party than the previous prime minister. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_3]

4: No change in personnel or party control occurred in the presidency or the prime minister’s office. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2eltvrexn_4]

**Answer type:** Multiple-selection.

**Scale:** Nominal (v2eltvrexn), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

## 3.73 Election executive turnover ordinal (A)

**Tag:** v2eltvrexo

**Project manager:** Staffan I. Lindberg

**Compiler:** Valeriya Mechkova

**Question:** Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

**Clarification:** Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems, and it refers not only to the individual person holding office but also to that person’s party. This question considers whether turnover occurs both in the office of head of state and head of government, even if one of the positions is not contested in the particular elections.

**Responses:**

0: No. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- retained their position either as a result of the outcome of the election, or because the elections do not affect the executive.

1: Half. The head of state or head of government is a different individual than before the election but from the same party (or independent) that was in power before
the election. In parliamentary systems this code applies when the head of
government changes as an effect of alternations in the ruling coalition, changes
in party leadership, or a new independent head of government. In semi-
presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation
after a period when one party (or independent) has held both offices, or if one of
the executive office holders - the head of state or head of government changes,
while the other retains their position.

2: Yes. The executive(s) - head of state and head of government- lost their position(s)
as a result of the outcome of the election. In presidential systems this code
applies when the new president is both a different person and from a different
party (or independent) than before the election. In parliamentary systems the
ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new head of government is from a
different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code
applies when one party holds both the office of the head of state and head of
government after a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices
change in terms of person and party (or independent) in the same election. This
code also applies if this is the first head of state and/or head of government
elected for a newly (semi-) independent state country.

Scale: Ordinal
Sources: Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org; coding by V-Dem
Country Coordinators.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.74 ELECTION LOSERS ACCEPT RESULTS (C)

Tag: v2elaccept

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election
within three months?

Responses:

0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election,
or all opposition was banned.

1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those
who constituted the main opposition force did not.

2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it
is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively
insignificant.
3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.
4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.75 Election assume office (C)

Tag: v2elasmoff

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

Responses:
0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by unconstitutional means.
1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.
2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.76 Effective number of cabinet parties (B)

Tag: v2elncbpr

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

Responses:
0: Parties are not allowed.
1: One party.
2: Two parties.
3: Three parties.  
4: Four or more parties.  

*Scale:* Ordinal  
*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.77 Election Women in the Cabinet (B)

*Tag:* v2elwomcab  
*Project manager:* Pamela Paxton  
*Question:* In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (%) of the ministers was female?  
*Clarification:* A “minister” is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.  
*Responses:* Percent  
*Scale:* Interval  
*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.78 Presidential Elections Introduction (A)

The following questions pertain to specific presidential elections. A presidential election is defined as the direct election of an executive by the populace (perhaps with the mediation of an electoral college).

### 3.79 Presidential Elections Cumulative (D)

*Project manager:* Staffan I. Lindberg  
*Question:* How many presidential elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?  
*Clarification:* This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.  
*Scale:* Interval  
*Sources:*  
*Coverage:* 1900-2011.  
*Data release:* 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.80 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS CONSECUTIVE (D)

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive presidential elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 (whichever is more recent). Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

Sources:
Coverage: 1900-2011.
Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.81 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VOTE SHARE OF LARGEST VOTE-GETTER (A)

Tag: v2elvotlrg

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Compilers: Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval


Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.82 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION VOTE SHARE OF SECOND-LARGEST VOTE-GETTER (A)

Tag: v2elvotsml

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Compilers: Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.
Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.83 PRESIDENTIAL EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES/EXECUTIVE (A)
Tag: v2elnmelpr
Project manager: Allen Hicken
Question: In this presidential election, what was the effective number of parties by share of votes?
Clarification: The effective number of electoral parties in a country’s party system at the national level for the specified election year. This is calculated at the national level following Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) specification for popular presidential elections.
Responses: Numeric
Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).
Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 70% coverage is the goal, 1900-.
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.84 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION INTRODUCTION (A)(B)
Tag: v2elintro3
The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

3.85 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION CUMULATIVE (D)
Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg
Question: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?
Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.
Sources:
Coverage: 1900-2011.
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.86 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION CONSECUTIVE (D)

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 (whichever is more recent). Do not code if there is no legislature.

Sources:
Coverage: 1900-2011.
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.87 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTORAL SYSTEM (E)

Tag: v2elloelsy
Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, The New International IDEA Handbook (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at www.idea.int/publications/esd/.

Responses:

0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.

1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold – usually 50%+1 – is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.

2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% +1 of the votes.
3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.

4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party’s list). The party with the most votes (i.e., a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.

5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.

6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election – by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).

7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size >7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.

9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector’s second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.

10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

11: Limited vote in multi-member districts. Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the
most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)

12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

Sources: Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various.

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.88 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION DISTRICT MAGNITUDE (A)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Responses: Numeric

Sources: Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011); various.

Coverage: Expect some coverage, 1950-.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.89 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION STATUTORY THRESHOLD (B)

Tag: v2elthresh

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (% share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.90 **LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION VOTE SHARE OF LARGEST VOTE-GETTER (A)**

*Tag:* v2ellovtlg

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:* Percent

*Scale:* Interval


*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.91 **LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION VOTE SHARE OF SECOND-LARGEST VOTE-GETTER (A)**

*Tag:* v2ellovtsm

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Compilers:* Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

*Clarification:* Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

*Responses:* Percent

*Scale:* Interval


*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.92 **LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION SEATS WON BY LARGEST PARTY (A)**

*Tag:* v2ellostlg

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Compilers:* Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

*Question:* In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?
Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if
election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were
allowed.
Responses: Numeric
Scale: Interval
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.93 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION SEATS (A)

Tag: v2elloseat

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Compilers: Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral)
chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if
election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were
allowed.

Responses: Numeric
Scale: Interval
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.94 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION SEAT SHARE WON BY LARGEST PARTY (A)

Tag: v2ellostsl

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Compilers: Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or
unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if
election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were
allowed.

Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.95  LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION SEATS WON BY SECOND LARGEST PARTY (A)

Tag: v2ellostsm

Project manager: Allen Hicken
Compilers: Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses: Numeric
Scale: Interval

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.96  LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION SEAT SHARE WON BY SECOND LARGEST PARTY (A)

Tag: v2ellostss

Project manager: Allen Hicken
Compilers: Ionut Gusoi, Valeriya Mechkova, Eva Karlsdottir

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.97 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTION TURNOVER (A)

Tag: v2eltvrig

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Compiler: Frida Andersson

Question: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

Responses:
0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10% of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition.
1: Half. A minority party or coalition who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10% of the seats in the legislature.
2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.


Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.98 LOWER CHAMBER EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL PARTIES (E)

Tag: v2ellonmpe

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what was the effective number of parties by share of votes?

Clarification: The effective number of electoral parties in a country’s party system at the national level for the specified election year. This is calculated at the national level following Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) specification for elections to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature. Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses: Numeric

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).
Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 70% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.99 LOWER CHAMBER EFFECTIVE NUMBER OF LEGISLATIVE PARTIES (E)

Tag: v2ellonmpl

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: After this election, what was the effective number of parties as measured by share of seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature? Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses: Numeric

Sources: Golder (2006).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.100 UPPER CHAMBER ELECTIONS INTRODUCTION (A)

The following questions pertain to specific upper chamber legislative elections. In a bicameral legislature, the lower and upper chambers are distinguished by the number of representatives, with the upper chamber containing a smaller membership than the lower chamber.

3.101 UPPER CHAMBER ELECTIONS CUMULATIVE (D)

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many upper chamber legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the upper chamber of the legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no upper chamber, i.e., if the legislature is unicameral or there is no legislature. However, if there is an upper chamber and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

Scale: Interval

Sources:

Coverage: 1900-2011.
3.102 Upper chamber elections consecutive (D)

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive upper chamber legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of upper chamber legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 (whichever is more recent). Do not code if there is no upper chamber, i.e., if the legislature is unicameral or if there is no legislature.

Scale: Interval

Sources:

Coverage: 1900-2011.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.103 Introduction subnational elections and offices (C)

Tag: v2elintro4

Project manager: Kelly McMann

This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about subnational elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as "regional government" and "local government".

Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

3.104 Regional government I (A)

Tag: v2elreggov

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a regional government?

Clarification: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities
(e.g. making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as “0” for the appropriate time period.

If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your Regional manager (RM) or to V-Dem (using the email contact designated for your country).

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Notes: To be converted from (C) to (A) by Kelly McMann.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.105 Regional government name (C)

Tag: v2elregnam

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as “provinces and federal city.” If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called “Lander.”

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.106 Regional government elected (C)

Tag: v2elsrgel

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: “Government offices” here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual
(or a very small group) (e.g., a governor). An assembly is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

“Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:

0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsrgel_0]
1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsrgel_1]
2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsrgel_2]
3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsrgel_3]
4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsrgel_4]
5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsrgel_5]

Scale: Nominal (v2elsrgel), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.107 REGIONAL OFFICES RELATIVE POWER (C)

Tag: v2elrgrpwr

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices to each other, not the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government. Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)
An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.
3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.
4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.108 ELECTED REGIONAL GOVERNMENT POWER INDEX (D)

Tag: v2xel_regelec

Project managers: Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

Question: Are there elected regional governments, and — if so — to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

Clarification: The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.)

Aggregation: First, regional government elected (v2elsgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2elsgel v2elrgpwr

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
3.109 LOCAL GOVERNMENT I (A)

**Tag:** v2ellocgov

**Project manager:** Kelly McMann

**Question:** Is there a local government?

**Clarification:** Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages. Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (e.g. making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

**Responses:**

0: No.
1: Yes.

**Scale:** Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Notes:** To be converted from (C) to (A) by Kelly McMann.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.110 LOCAL GOVERNMENT NAME (C)

**Tag:** v2ellocnam

**Project manager:** Kelly McMann

**Question:** What is the term(s) for the local government units?

**Clarification:** If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units. If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called “Municipios.”

**Responses:** Text

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.111 LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTED (C)

**Tag:** v2ellocelc

**Project manager:** Kelly McMann
Question: At the local level, are government (local government) offices elected in practice?

Clarification: “Government offices” here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, not a judiciary and not minor bureaucrats. An executive is a single individual (or a very small group) (e.g., a mayor). An assembly is a larger body of officials.

“Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be non-elected.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

Responses:

0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2ellocelc_0]
1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2ellocelc_1]
2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2ellocelc_2]
3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2ellocelc_3]
4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2ellocelc_4]
5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2ellocelc_5]

Scale: Nominal (v2ellocelc), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.112 Local offices relative power (C)

Tag: v2ellocpwr

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices to each other, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, not those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)
An office is "subordinate" if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

**Responses:**

0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.
1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.
2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.
3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.
4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.113 Elected local government power index (D)

**Tag:** v2xel_locelec

**Project managers:** Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

**Question:** Are there elected local governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

**Clarification:** The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.)

**Aggregation:** First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.
3.114 **Subnational elections free and fair (C)**

*Tag:* v2elffelr

*Project manager:* Kelly McMann

*Question:* Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

*Clarification:* This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

“Free and fair” refers to all aspects of the election process except the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

*Responses:*

0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).

1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).

2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).

3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).

4: Yes. There was some amount or human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

5: Does not apply. There were no subnational elections.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
**Question:** Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

**Clarification:** Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

**Responses:**

0: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).

1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

2: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.116 Subnational Election Area Less Free and Fair Name (C)

**Tag:** v2elsnless

**Project manager:** Kelly McMann

**Question:** In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly less free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

**Clarification:** If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “the North”).

**Responses:** Text

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 3.117 Subnational Election Area Less Free and Fair Pop (C)

**Tag:** v2elsnlpop

**Project manager:** Kelly McMann

**Question:** What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections that are significantly less free and fair?

**Responses:** Percent

**Scale:** Interval
Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.118 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (C)

Tag: v2elsnlfc

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly less free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_1]
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnlfc_21]
Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2elsnlfc), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.119 SUBNATIONAL ELECTION AREA MORE FREE AND FAIR NAME (C)
Tag: v2elsnmmore
Project manager: Kelly McMann
Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly more free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?
Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “the North”).
Responses: Text
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.120 SUBNATIONAL ELECTION AREA MORE FREE AND FAIR % (C)
Tag: v2elsnmpop
Project manager: Kelly McMann
Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections that are significantly more free and fair?
Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.121 SUBNATIONAL ELECTION AREA MORE FREE AND FAIR CHARACTERISTICS (C)
Tag: v2elsnrmrfc
Project manager: Kelly McMann
Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly more free and fair?
Clarification: Choose all that apply.
Responses:
0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnrmrfc_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_1] 
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_2] 
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_3] 
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_4] 
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_5] 
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_6] 
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_7] 
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_8] 
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_9] 
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_10] 
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_11] 
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_12] 
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_13] 
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_14] 
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_15] 
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_16] 
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_17] 
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_18] 
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_19] 
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_20] 
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2elsnmrfc_21]

Answer type: Multiple-selection
Scale: Nominal (v2elsnmrfc), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

3.122 Comments Subnational Elections

Tag: v2elcomsn
Project manager: Kelly McMann
Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on subnational elections and offices.
Responses: Text
4 Political Parties

4.1 Parties introduction (C)

Project manager: Allen Hicken

A “political party” refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party.

Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization.

Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the de jure/de facto distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.
4.2 PARTY BAN (C)

*Tag:* v2psparban

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Question:* Are any parties banned?

*Clarification:* This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

*Responses:*

- 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.
- 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.
- 2: Yes. Many parties are banned.
- 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.
- 4: No. No parties are officially banned.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.3 PARTY BAN TARGET (C)

*Tag:* v2psbantar

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Question:* If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply.

*Responses:*

- 0: Ethnic party.
- 1: Religious party.
- 2: Regional/local party.
- 3: Leftist extremist party.
- 4: Rightist extremist party.
- 5: Other.

*Answer type:* Multiple-selection.

*Scale:* Nominal (v2psbantar), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
4.4 Barriers to parties (C)

*Tag:* v2psbars

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Question:* How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

*Clarification:* Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

*Responses:*

0: Parties are not allowed.
1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).
2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
4: There are no substantial barriers.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.5 Opposition parties autonomy (C)

*Tag:* v2psoppaut

*Project manager:* Allen Hicken

*Question:* Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

*Clarification:* An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, i.e., that has no control over the executive.

*Responses:*

0: Opposition parties are not allowed.
1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.
2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.6  PARTY ORGANIZATIONS (C)

Tag: v2psorgs

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

Clarification: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season.

Responses:

0: No parties.
1: Fewer than half of the parties.
2: About half of the parties.
3: More than half of the parties.
4: All parties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.7  PARTY BRANCHES (C)

Tag: v2psprbrch

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

Responses:

0: None.
1: Fewer than half.
2: About half.
3: More than half.
4: All.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
4.8 PARTY LINKAGES (C)

Tag: v2psprlnks

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

Clarification: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

Responses:

0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.
1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.
2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.
3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.
4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party’s positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.9 DISTINCT PARTY PLATFORMS (C)

Tag: v2psplats

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

Clarification: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is not intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

Responses:

0: None, or nearly none.
1: Fewer than half.
2: About half.
3: More than half.
4: All, or nearly all.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 4.10 Candidate selection—national/local (C)

**Tag:** v2pscnsl

**Project manager:** Allen Hicken

**Question:** How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

**Clarification:** The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

**Responses:**

0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.
1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.
2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.
3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.
4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.
5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
4.11 LEGISLATIVE PARTY COHESION (C)

Tag: v2pscohesv

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

Responses:

0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.
1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.
2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.
3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.12 PARTY SWITCHING (C)

Tag: v2psswitch

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature changes or abandons their party in between elections?

Clarification: Do not include official party splits (when one party divides into two or more parties) or dissolutions (when a party formally dissolves).

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.13 PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION INDEX (D)

Tag: v2xps_party

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: To what extent are political parties institutionalized?
Clarifications: Party institutionalization refers to various attributes of the political parties in a country, e.g., level and depth of organization, links to civil society, cadres of party activists, party supporters within the electorate, coherence of party platforms and ideologies, party-line voting among representatives within the legislature. A high score on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.

This index considers the attributes of all parties with an emphasis on larger parties, i.e., those that may be said to dominate and define the party system.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party organizations (v2psorgs), party branches (v2psprbrch), party linkages (v2psprlnks), distinct party platforms (v2psplats), and legislative party cohesion (v2pscohesv).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2psorgs v2psprbrch v2psprlnks v2psplats v2pscohesv

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.14 Party system nationalization Cox Inflation Score (A)

Tag: v2pssnacois

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: A measure of party linkage across a country's electoral constituencies that builds on the economic principle of inflation. Here inflation refers to the discrepancy that occurs in party linkage as parties are aggregated from the constituency-level to the national-level party system. This measure was developed by Cox (1999).

Responses: Numeric

Scale: Interval

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

4.15 Party system nationalization Standardized and weighted Score (A)

Tag: v2pssnastrdwsc

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: A summary expression of the level of the nationalization of a party system that standardizes for the number of territorial units and also weights for the size of the territorial units (Bochsler, 2010).

Responses: Numeric

Scale: Interval
4.16 PARTY COMPETITION ACROSS REGIONS (C)

Tag: v2pscomprg
Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10% of the vote)?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, i.e., their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.
1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.
2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

4.17 NATIONAL PARTY CONTROL (C)

Tag: v2psnatpar
Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: How unified is party control of the national government?

Clarification: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.) Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

0: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition
in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.

1: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.)

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**4.18 Subnational party control (C)**

Tag: v2pssunpar

Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

Clarification: Leave this question blank if election was nonpartisan, i.e., no parties (not even pro-government parties) were allowed.

Responses:

0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.
1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.
2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**4.19 Parties comments (C)**

Tag: v2pscommnt
Project manager: Allen Hicken

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political parties.

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5 Direct Democracy

5.1 Direct Democracy Introduction (A)

Project manager: David Altman

This set of questions focuses on direct popular votes. Four mechanisms are distinguished:

a. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature that concern constitutional matters or basic laws. These are referred to as constitutional referendums (aka obligatory referendums).

b. Measures placed on the ballot by the executive and/or the legislature that do not concern constitutional matters or basic laws. These are referred to as plebiscites.

c. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible adoption of a new law or constitutional amendment. These are referred to as popular initiatives.

d. Measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process that concern the possible rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. These are referred to as referendums.

To clarify...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Placed on ballot by...</th>
<th>Concerning...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional referendum</td>
<td>Executive/Legislature</td>
<td>Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plebiscite</td>
<td>Executive/Legislature</td>
<td>Other than constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular initiative</td>
<td>Citizen petition</td>
<td>Adoption of new law or amendment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referendum</td>
<td>Citizen petition</td>
<td>Rejection of law</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature even they may also involve a gathering of signatures or a popular vote.
Note also that in coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the de jure/de facto distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...”

5.2 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES POPULAR VOTE (A)

Tag: v2ddvotcon
Project manager: David Altman
Question: Is a popular and direct vote required in order for a constitutional change to be legally binding?
Responses:
0: No, it is not required.
1: Depends on the content of constitutional change (for some reforms it is required, for others however it is not).
2: Yes, any constitutional change must be approved directly by the citizenry in order to be included in the Constitution.
Scale: Ordinal.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.3 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES PARTICIPATION THRESHOLD (A)

Tag: v2dbincon
Project manager: David Altman
Question: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for a constitutional change to be binding?
Clarification: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.
Responses: Percent.
Scale: Interval.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.4 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES APPROVAL THRESHOLD (A)

Tag: v2ddthrcon
Project manager: David Altman
Question: Must some threshold of approval — among registered voters — be reached in order for a constitutional change to be binding?
Clarification: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.
5.5 **CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES ADMINISTRATIVE THRESHOLD (A)**

*Tag*: v2dddiscon  
*Project manager*: David Altman  
*Question*: What percentage of subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a constitutional change to be approved?  
*Clarification*: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
*Responses*: Percent.  
*Scale*: Interval.  
*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.6 **PLEBISCITE PERMITTED (A)**

*Tag*: v2ddlegpl  
*Project manager*: David Altman  
*Question*: Is there legal provision for plebiscites?  
*Clarification*: These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature and/or the executive.  
*Responses*:  
  0: Not allowed.  
  1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).  
  2: Allowed and binding.  

*Scale*: Ordinal.  
*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.  
*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.7 **PLEBISCITE LEVEL (A)**

*Tag*: v2ddlevpl  
*Project manager*: David Altman  
*Question*: At what level(s) of government can plebiscites be held?  
*Responses*: 
0: Only at the national level.
1: Only at subnational levels.
2: At both national and subnational levels.

Scale: Ordinal.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.8 Plebiscite participation threshold (A)
Tag: v2ddbindpl
Project manager: David Altman
Question: What threshold of participation – expressed as a percentage of registered voters – must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?
Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.
Responses: Percent.
Scale: Interval.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.9 Plebiscite approval threshold (A)
Tag: v2dthrepl
Project manager: David Altman
Question: What threshold of approval – expressed as a percentage of registered voters – must be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?
Clarification: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.
Responses: Percent.
Scale: Interval.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.10 Plebiscite administrative threshold (A)
Tag: v2ddistpl
Project manager: David Altman
**Question**: Must a majority across subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

**Responses**:

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes - at least half of subnational districts.
- 2: Yes - more than half of subnational districts.

**Scale**: Ordinal.

**Notes**: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

**Data release**: 1, 2, 3.

**Citation**: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**5.11 Plebiscite super majority (A)**

**Tag**: v2ddspmlpl

**Project manager**: David Altman

**Question**: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

**Clarification**: For 2/3, enter 66%.

**Responses**: Percent.

**Scale**: Interval.

**Notes**: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

**Data release**: 3.

**Citation**: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**5.12 Initiatives permitted (A)**

**Tag**: v2ddlegci

**Project manager**: David Altman

**Question**: Is there legal provision for initiatives?

**Clarification**: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

**Responses**:

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
- 2: Allowed and binding.

**Scale**: Ordinal.

**Notes**: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.
5.13 INITIATIVES LEVEL (A)

Tag: v2ddlevci

Project manager: David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can initiatives be held?

Responses:

0: Only at the national level.
1: Only at a subnational level.
2: At both national and subnational levels.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.14 INITIATIVES SIGNATURES (A)

Tag: v2ddsigcin

Project manager: David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

Responses: Numeric

Scale: Interval

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.15 INITIATIVES SIGNATURES % (A)

Tag: v2ddsigcip

Project manager: David Altman

Question: How many signatures – expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters – are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
5.16 INITIATIVES SIGNATURE-GATHERING TIME LIMIT (A)

**Tag:** v2ddgrtlci

**Project manager:** David Altman

**Question:** Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?

**Responses:**
- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

**Scale:** Dichotomous.

**Notes:** Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.17 INITIATIVES SIGNATURE-GATHERING PERIOD (A)

**Tag:** v2ddgrgpci

**Project manager:** David Altman

**Question:** If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for an initiative?

**Responses:** Numeric.

**Scale:** Interval.

**Notes:** Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.18 INITIATIVES PARTICIPATION THRESHOLD (A)

**Tag:** v2ddbbindci

**Project manager:** David Altman

**Question:** What threshold of participation – expressed as a percentage of registered voters – must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

**Clarification:** Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

**Responses:** Percent.

**Scale:** Interval.

**Notes:** Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.
**5.19 Initiatives Approval Threshold (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddthreci  
*Project manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* What threshold of approval – expressed as a percentage of registered voters – must be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
*Responses:* Percent.  
*Scale:* Interval.  
*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.  
*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**5.20 Initiatives Administrative Threshold (A)**

*Tag:* v2dddistci  
*Project manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* What percentage of subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for an initiative to be approved?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.  
*Responses:* Percent.  
*Scale:* Interval.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**5.21 Initiatives Super Majority (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddsmpjci  
*Project manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?

*Clarification:* For 2/3, enter 66%.  
*Responses:* Percent.  
*Scale:* Interval.  
*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.  
*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.
5.22 REFERENDUMS PERMITTED (A)

Tag: v2ddlegrf

Project manager: David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for referendums?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)

Responses:
0: Not allowed.
1: Allowed but non-binding (or with an intervening institutional veto).
2: Allowed and binding.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.23 REFERENDUMS LEVEL (A)

Tag: v2ddlevrf

Project manager: David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can referendums be held?

Responses:
0: Only at the national level.
1: Only at a subnational level.
2: At both national and subnational levels.

Scale: Ordinal.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.24 REFERENDUMS SIGNATURES (A)

Tag: v2ddsigrfn

Project manager: David Altman
**Question:** How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

*Clarification:* If the law treats this as a percentage (%) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

*Responses:* Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**5.25 REFERENDUMS SIGNATURES % (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddsigrfp

*Project manager:* David Altman

**Question:** How many signatures – expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters – are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

*Clarification:* If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

*Responses:* Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**5.26 REFERENDUMS SIGNATURE-GATHERING LIMIT (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddgrtlrf

*Project manager:* David Altman

**Question:** Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

*Responses:*

  0: No.

  1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
5.27 **REFERENDUMS SIGNATURE-GATHERING PERIOD (A)**

*Tag*: v2ddgrgrpfr

*Project manager*: David Altman

*Question*: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days) for a referendum?

*Responses*: Numeric.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.28 **REFERENDUMS PARTICIPATION THRESHOLD (A)**

*Tag*: v2ddbindrfr

*Project manager*: David Altman

*Question*: What threshold of participation – expressed as a percentage of registered voters – must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

*Clarification*: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses*: Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.29 **REFERENDUMS APPROVAL THRESHOLD (A)**

*Tag*: v2ddthrerfr

*Project manager*: David Altman

*Question*: What threshold of approval – expressed as a percentage of registered voters – must be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

*Clarification*: Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses*: Percent.

*Scale*: Interval.

*Notes*: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
5.30 Referendums Administrative Threshold (A)

*Tag:* v2dddistrf

*Project manager:* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage of subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) must approve (by majority vote) in order for a referendum to be approved?

*Clarification:* Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

*Responses:* Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.31 Referendums Super Majority (A)

*Tag:* v2ddspmjrf

*Project manager:* David Altman

*Question:* What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?

*Clarification:* For 2/3, enter 66%.

*Responses:* Percent.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.32 Occurrence of Obligatory Referendum This Year (A)

*Tag:* v2ddoblref

*Project manager:* David Altman

*Question:* How many obligatory referendums occurred this year?

*Responses:* Numeric.

*Scale:* Interval.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.33 Occurrence of Plebiscite This Year (A)

*Tag:* v2dplebyr

*Project manager:* David Altman

*Question:* How many plebiscites occurred this year?
5.34 **OCCURRENCE OF CITIZEN-INITIATIVE THIS YEAR (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddciniyr  
*Project manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* How many citizen-initiatives occurred this year?  
*Responses:* Numeric.  
*Scale:* Interval.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.35 **OCCURRENCE OF REFERENDUM THIS YEAR (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddrefyr  
*Project manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* How many referendums occurred this year?  
*Responses:* Numeric.  
*Scale:* Interval.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.36 **NUMBER OF POPULAR VOTES THIS YEAR (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddnumvot  
*Project Manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* How many direct democracy elections (initiatives, referendums and/or plebiscites) occurred this year?  
*Responses:* Numeric.  
*Scale:* Interval.  
*Data release:* 3  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.37 **OCCURRENCE OF ANY TYPE OF POPULAR VOTE THIS YEAR CREDIBLE (A)**

*Tag:* v2ddvotcrd  
*Project manager:* David Altman  
*Question:* If any direct democracy election occurred this year, was the official result of the vote, or votes (their success or failure) credible?
Clarification: By credible, we mean whether the official results of the vote(s) reflect the actual vote (leaving aside issues of voter exclusion, intimidation, or vote-buying).

Responses:
0: Not credible.
1: Credible.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) by David Altman.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

5.38 DIRECT POPULAR VOTE INDEX (D)

Tag: v2xdd_dd

Project manager: David Altman

Question: To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

Clarification: Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy.

The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

Aggregation: This index measures how easy it is to initiate and approve a direct popular vote and how consequential that vote is (if approved)? Ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level of government (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbindci), (c) supermajority (v2ddspmjci), and (d) district majority (v2dddistci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlegci), and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past (v2ddciniyr).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgrtlci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbindci v2ddthreci v2ddsmjci v2dddistci v2ddlegci v2ddciniyr

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6 The Executive

6.1 Executive Introduction (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2exintro1

Project manager: Jan Teorell

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The head of state is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes, this is a largely ceremonial role, e.g., a monarch who reigns but does not rule or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed.

The head of government is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then servers as both head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the functions that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of “president” s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country.

Likewise, it may be that the effective head of state/head of government is someone other than the official head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the “effective” head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semisovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general - not the King/Queen of England - would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony - not the prime minister in London - would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the
names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, “HOS name.” This is your key to what we mean by “head of state” or “head of government.”

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your Regional Manager. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

6.2 HOS/HOG INTERREGNUM (A)

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Is the country in a transitional period in which one or more executives (the head of state or the head of government) stay in office for fewer than 100 days?

*Clarification:* Enter the specific dates for the beginning of such an interregnum (1) and for the beginning of the next period with executives lasting at least 100 days (0).

*Responses:* Date

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.3 HOS NAME (A*)

*Tag:* v2exnamhos

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Compilers:* Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar

*Question:* What is the name of the head of state?

*Clarification:* If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression “collective body.” If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change
the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses: Text

Sources: Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org.

Coverage: worldstatesmen.org, Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesmen.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.4 HOS TITLE (A*)

Tag: v2extithos

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar

Question: What is the title of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression “collective body.” If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses: Text


Coverage: worldstatesmen.org, Lentz, and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesmen.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6.5 **HOS AGE (A)**

*Tag:* v2exagehos  
*Project manager:* Jan Teorell  
*Compilers:* Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar  
*Question:* In what year was the head of state born?  
*Responses:* [date – year only]  
*Sources:* worldstatesman.org.  
*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.6 **HOS FEMALE (A)**

*Tag:* v2exfemhos  
*Project manager:* Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton  
*Compilers:* Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar  
*Question:* What is the gender of the head of state?  
*Clarification:* If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.  
*Responses:*  
0: Male  
1: Female  
*Scale:* Dichotomous.  
*Sources:* worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).  
*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.7 **HOS DISADVANTAGED SOCIAL GROUP (B)**

*Tag:* v2exdighos  
*Project managers:* Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell  
*Question:* Is the head of state a member of a disadvantaged social group?  
*Clarification:* If the head of state is a collective body, answer for the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are members of a disadvantaged identity group. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.
6.8 HOS PARTY (A)

v2: v2exparhos

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

*Responses:* Text

*Sources:* Henisz (2000; 2002).

*Coverage:* Henisz provide the names of the HOSs political party with pretty much global coverage from 1800-2000. Probably NO COVERAGE for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.9 HOS APPOINTMENT BY LAW (A)

*Tag:* v2expathsl

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* How is the Head of State selected?

*Clarification:* If the Head of State is selected by the legislature, please select "Elected by Elite Group."

*Responses:*

1: Heredity/Royal Selection
2: Elected by Citizens
3: Elected by Elite Group
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

*Scale:* Nominal (v2expathsl), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Source:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), var v89; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8a, 1-4.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.10 HOS APPOINTMENT IN PRACTICE (A+B)

Tag: v2expathhs

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Compiler: Talib Jabbar

Question: How did the head of state reach office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

Responses:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
1: Appointed by a foreign power.
2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
3: Appointed by a royal council.
4: Through hereditary succession.
5: Appointed by the military.
6: Appointed by the legislature.
7: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
8: Other.

Scale: Nominal (v2expathhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.11 HOS APPOINTMENT BY OTHER (A)

Tag: v2exothhsl

e_ HOSELCTR

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Who are the electors for the Head of State?

Clarification: Please provide any details about the process of election by electors in the comments section.

Responses:

1: Text
99: Not Applicable

Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), var v91; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8a, 1-4.
Coverage: The CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) has more or less global coverage from 1789 to present, but needs to be extended to countries without written constitution; the IAEP also has wide coverage but only from 1972 through 2005. Probably NO COVERAGE for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.12 HOS SELECTION BY LEGISLATURE IN PRACTICE (B)

Tag: v2exaphos

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of state?

Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are not concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.13 HOS REMOVAL REGULATED BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exremhsl

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of State?

Clarification: When referring to dismissal, we mean the active removal of a public official, so do not answer yes to this question if the constitution only refers to death/incapacitation or expiration of term of office.

Responses:

1: Yes
2: No
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
99: Not Applicable
**6.14 HOS REMOVAL GROUNDS BY LAW (A)**

*Tag:* v2exremhsg

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

**Question:** On what grounds can the **Head of State** be dismissed?

**Clarification:** You should select the "general dissatisfaction" option if the constitution refers to a loss of confidence or support for the Head of State.

**Responses:**

1: General dissatisfaction with the leadership (i.e., dismissal is fairly unrestricted). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_1]

2: Crimes and other issues of conduct. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_2]

3: Treason. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_3]

4: Violations of the constitution. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_4]

5: Incapacitated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_5]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_96]

97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_97]

98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSDCOND_98]

**Scale:** Nominal (v2exremhsg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v97; cf. IAEP, questions 4.1 and 8.1; 8a.1-4.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**6.15 HOS REMOVAL BODY BY LAW (A)**

*Tag:* v2exremhsb

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

**Question:** Who can approve a dismissal of the **Head of State**?

**Clarification:** If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

**Responses:**

1: **Head of Government**. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_1]
2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_2]
3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_3]
4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_4]
5: Public (e.g., recall). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_5]
6: Public Prosecutor. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_6]
7: Court. (0=No, 1=Yes). [e_HOSADISS_7]
8: Constitutional Council or Constitutional Court. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_8]
9: The Government/Cabinet. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_9]
10: No approval needed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_10]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOSADISS_98]

Scale: Nominal (v2exremhsb), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v104 (also see v105-107 on proportion of vote needed by legislature); cf. IAEP, questions 4.1 and 8.1; 8a.1-4.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.16 HOS REMOVAL BY LEGISLATURE IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exremhsp
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of state from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

Responses:
0: No, under no circumstances.
1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.
2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.
3: Yes, most likely.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
6.17 HOS REMOval BY OTHER IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exrmhsol

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of state if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

Responses:
0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_4]
5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_5]
6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_6]
7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exrmhsol_7]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Scale: Nominal (v2exrmhsol), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.18 HOS TERM LENGTH BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exfxtmhs

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder. For constitutional monarchies, please type "100".

Responses:
1: Numeric
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.
6.19 HOS TERM LIMIT BY LAW (A)

**Tag:** v2exyhrsl

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms the **Head of State** may serve?

**Clarification:** For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

**Responses:**

1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: Explicitly no term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

**Scale:** Ordinal.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v93.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.20 HOS CONTROL OVER (C)

**Tag:** v2exctlhs

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** In practice, from which of the following bodies must the **head of state** customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply.

**Responses:**

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_4]
5: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_5]
6: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_6]
7: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhs_7]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2exctlhs), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.21 HOS OTHER BODY CONTROLS (C)
Tag: v2exctlhos
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of state need approval for its actions?
Responses: Text
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.22 HOS DISSOLUTION IN PRACTICE (C)
Tag: v2exdfdshs
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: If the head of state took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?
Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth
months of the head of state’s term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.23 HOS APPOINTS CABINET IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdfcbhs

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the head of state have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.
2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.
3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.
4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.24 HOS VETO POWER IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdfvths

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of state took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?
Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills). The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).
2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).
3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority – e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 – of those voting).
4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.25 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C)

Tag: v2exdfdmhs

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of state took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence).

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature’s approval, i. e., so called "constructive dismissal").
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.26 HOS PROPOSES LEGISLATION IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdfpphs

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Does the head of state have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.27 HOS COMMENTS (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2excommhs

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of state.

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.28 HOS = HOG (A*)

Tag: v2exhoshog
**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Compilers:** Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar

**Question:** Is the head of state (HOS) also head of government (HOG)?

**Clarification:** Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any pre-coded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the pre-coded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

**Responses:**
- 0: No
- 1: Yes

**Scale:** Dichotomous.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**6.29 HOG introduction (A)(B)(C)**

**Tag:** v2exintro2

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

This section of the survey pertains to the head of government (HOG).

Answer questions in this section only for years in which the head of government is not identical to the head of state, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that “effective” head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or
perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, “HOG name.” This is your key to what we mean by “head of government.” Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your Regional Manager. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

6.30 HOG NAME (A*)

Tag: v2exnamhog

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar

Question: What is the name of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression “collective body.” If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and reappointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses: Text


Coverage: worldstatesman.org, Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesmen.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6.31 HOG TITLE (A*)

Tag: v2extithog

Project manager: Jan Teorell
Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar

Question: What is the title of the head of government (HOG)?

Clarification: Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

Responses: Text


Coverage: worldstatesman.org, Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesman.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.32 HOG AGE (A)

v2: v2exagehog

Project manager: Jan Teorell
Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar

Question: In what year was the head of government born?

Responses: [date-year only]

Sources: worldstatesman.org.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6.33 **HOG FEMALE (A)**

*Tag*: v2exfemhog  
*Project managers*: Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell  
*Compilers*: Vlad Ciobanu, Talib Jabbar  
*Question*: What is the gender of the head of government?  
*Clarification*: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.  
*Responses*:  
0: Male  
1: Female  
*Scale*: Dichotomous.  
*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.34 **HOG DISADVANTAGED SOCIAL GROUP (B)**

*Tag*: v2exdighog  
*Project managers*: Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell  
*Question*: Is the head of government a member of a disadvantaged social group?  
*Clarification*: If the head of government is a collective body, answer for the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are members of a disadvantaged social group. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.  
*Responses*:  
0: No, the head of government is not a member of a disadvantaged social group  
1: Yes, the head of government is a member of a disadvantaged social group  
*Scale*: Dichotomous.  
*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.  
*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.35 **HOG PARTY (A)**

*Tag*: v2expothog  
*Project manager*: Jan Teorell
**Question:** What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

**Responses:** Text

**Sources:** Henisz (2000; 2002); DPI (Beck et al. 2000).

**Coverage:** Henisz provide the names of the HOGs political party with pretty much global coverage from 1800-2000. Probably no coverage however for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**6.36 HOG APPOINTMENT BY LAW (A)**

**Tag:** v2expathgl

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** How is the Head of Government selected?

**Clarification:** If the Head of Government is selected by the legislature alone, please select "Elected by Elite Group." If there is more than one body who is involved in the selection process for the Head of Government and one of them happens to be the legislature, please select "Appointed."

**Responses:**
1: Heredity/Royal Selection
2: Elected by Citizens
3: Elected by Elite Group
4: Appointed
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

**Scale:** Nominal (v2expathgl), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v122.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**6.37 HOG NOMINATION BY LAW (A)**

**Tag:** v2exnmghl

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** Who nominates the Head of Government for Appointment?

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Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:
1: Head of State. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_1]
2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_2]
3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_3]
4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_4]
5: Parliamentary Majority. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_5]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGNOM_98]

Scale: Nominal (v2exnmghl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v124.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.38 HOG APPROVAL BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exaphgl

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Who approves the nomination of the Head of Government?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:
1: Head of State. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_1]
2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_2]
3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_3]
4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_4]
5: Parliamentary Majority. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_5]
6: No formal approval process specified, but appointer is directed to act on the advice of party/legislative majority. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_6]
7: No formal approval process specified, but appointer is directed to act on the basis of election results. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGAPP_98]
6.39 HOG APPOINTMENT IN PRACTICE (A+B)

Tag: v2expathhg

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Compiler: Talib Jabbar

Question: How did the head of government gain access to office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

Responses:

0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
1: Appointed by a foreign power.
2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
3: Appointed by a royal council.
4: Through hereditary succession.
5: Appointed by the military.
6: Appointed by the head of state.
7: Appointed by the legislature.
8: Directly through a popular election (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
9: Other.

Scale: Nominal (v2expathhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.40 HOG OTHER APPOINTING BODY IN PRACTICE (B)

Tag: v2exothhgl

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Describe the body/appointment procedure:

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6.41 HOG SELECTION BY LEGISLATURE IN PRACTICE (B)

Tag: v2exaphogp

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment.

Responses:

  0: No
  1: Yes

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.42 HOG REMOVAL REGULATED BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exremhgl

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of Government?

Clarification: For all questions referring to the dismissal of the Head of Government, we are referring to normal dismissal procedures as well as vote of confidence procedures. We are not referring to events such as death, incapacitation, or expiration of term.

Responses:

  1: Yes
  2: No
  96: Other, please specify in the comments section
  97: Unable to Determine
  99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v131.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6.43 HOG REMOVAL GROUNDS BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exremhgg

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Under what grounds can the Head of Government be dismissed?

Clarification: You should select the "general dissatisfaction" option if the constitution refers to a loss of confidence or support for the Head of Government.

Responses:

1. General dissatisfaction or no confidence with the leadership (i.e., dismissal is fairly unrestricted). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_1]
2. Crimes and other issues of conduct, only. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_2]
3. Treason. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_3]
4. Violations of the constitution. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_4]
5. Incapacitated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_5]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGDCOND_98]

Scale: Nominal (v2exremhgg), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v132.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.44 HOG REMOVAL BODY BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exremhgb

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of Government?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

1: Head of State. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_1]
2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_2]
3: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_3]
4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_4]
5: Public (e.g., recall). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_5]
6: Public Prosecutor. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_6]
7: Court. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_7]
8: Constitutional Council or Constitutional Court. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_8]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_HOGADISS_98]

Scale: Nominal (v2exremhgb), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v133.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.45 HOG REMOVAL BY LEGISLATURE IN PRACTICE (C)
Tag: v2exremhog
Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the head of government from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity and without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

Responses:
0: No, under no circumstances.
1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.
2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.
3: Yes, most likely.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.46 HOG REMOVAL BY OTHER IN PRACTICE (C)
Tag: v2exrmhgnp
Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the head of government if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?
Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_0\]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_1\]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_2\]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_3\]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_4\]
5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_5\]
6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_6\]
7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_7\]
8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) \[v2exrmhgnp_8\]

Scale: Nominal \(v2exrmhgnp\), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.47 HOG OTHER BODY REMOVE HOG IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exrmhgp

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the head of government from office?

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.48 HOG TERM LENGTH BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exfxtmgh

e_HOGTERM

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the Head of Government?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if the term length is explicitly unlimited or is the life of the office holder.

Responses:

1: Numeric
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Interval

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v126.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.49 HOG TERM LIMIT BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exnyrhgl

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms the Head of Government may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

Responses:
1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v127 [HOGTERML].

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.50 HOG CONTROL OVER (C)

Tag: v2exctlhg

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the head of government need approval for its actions?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.
Responses:

0: None. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_0]
1: A foreign power. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_1]
2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_2]
3: A royal council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_3]
4: The military. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_4]
5: The head of state. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_5]
6: A religious body. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_6]
7: A tribal or ethnic council. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_7]
8: Other. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2exctlhg_8]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2exctlhg), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.51 HOG OTHER BODY CONTROLS (C)

Tag: v2exctlhg
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the head of government need approval for its actions?
Responses: Text
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.52 HOG DISSOLUTION IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdjdsfhg
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: If the head of government took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?
Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of government’s term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.53 HOG APPOINTS CABINET IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdjcbhg

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the head of government have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of government necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.
2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.54 HOG DISMISSES MINISTERS IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdfdshg

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of government took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?
Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence).

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).
2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, i.e., so called "constructive dismissal").
3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.55 HOG VETO POWER IN PRACTICE (C)

Tag: v2exdfvthg

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: If the head of government took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills). The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).
2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).
3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority – e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 – of those voting).
4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 6.56 HOG PROPOSES LEGISLATION IN PRACTICE (C)

**Tag:** v2exdfpphg

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** Does the head of government have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

**Clarification:** By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

**Responses:**

0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).

1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.

2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 6.57 HOG COMMENTS (A)(B)(C)

**Tag:** v2excommhg

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the head of government.

**Responses:** Text

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
6.58 **EXECUTIVE AS A WHOLE INTRODUCTION (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2exintro3

This final section of the survey pertains to the executive, considered as a whole. Some questions refer to “members of the executive,” i.e., the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers. If you feel that the answer to a question varies across these offices, your answer should reflect the average (arithmetic mean) across these offices.

Other questions refer to lower-level members of the executive branch. This will be clarified as we proceed.

6.59 **EXECUTIVE RESPECTS CONSTITUTION (C)**

*Tag:* v2exrescon

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

*Responses:*

0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.

1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.

2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.

3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.

4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.60 **LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON THE EXECUTIVE INDEX (D)**

*Tag:* v2xlg_legcon

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?
**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvststp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvststp v2lgoppart

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 6.61 EXECUTIVE BRIBERY AND CORRUPT EXCHANGES (C)

**Tag:** v2exbribe

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

**Responses:**
- 0: It is routine and expected.
- 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.
- 2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.
- 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.
- 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 6.62 EXECUTIVE EMBEZZLEMENT AND THEFT (C)

**Tag:** v2exembez

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

**Responses:**
- 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.63 PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPT EXCHANGES (C)

Tag: v2excrptps

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.
1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.
2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.
3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.
4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.64 Public sector theft (C)

Tag: v2exthftp

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like you to think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

Responses:

0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.65 Cabinet regulated by law (A)

Tag: v2excabl

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Does the constitution mention the executive cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: By cabinet, we are referring to the government's ministers who are responsible for particular substantive areas.
Responses:
1: Yes
2: No
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v163.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.66 Cabinet Appointment by Law (A)
Tag: v2excabapl
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: Who nominates/appoints the cabinet/ministers?
Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."
Responses:
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_1]
2: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_2]
3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_3]
4: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_4]
5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_5]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPT_98]

Scale: Nominal (v2excabapl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v164.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.67 Cabinet Approval by Law (A)
Tag: v2excabapr
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: Who approves the cabinet/ministers?
Clarification: If the person or group who is responsible for appointing the cabinet/ministers must consult or be advised by another group in their selection, please select one of the "Appointer is directed..." options, rather than choosing that group as the approving body. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_1]
2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_2]
3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_3]
4: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_4]
5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_5]
6: Appointer is directed to act on the advice of majority party, legislature, or executive (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_6]
7: Appointer is directed to act on the basis of election results (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABAPPR_98]

Scale: Nominal (v2excabprl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v165.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.68 Cabinet Dismissal by Law (A)

Tag: v2excabds

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Who has the authority to dismiss the cabinet/ministers?

Responses:

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_1]
2: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_2]
3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_3]
4: Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_4]
5: Both Chambers of the Legislature acting separately. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_5]
6: Both Chambers of the Legislature in a joint session. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_6]
7: By Public Recall. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_7]
8: Public Prosecutor. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_8]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CABDISS_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2excabdsl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v167.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.69 Veto legislation by law (A)

Tag: v2exvetolw
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: Who has the power to approve/reject legislation once it has been passed by the legislature (not including reviews for constitutionality)?
Clarification: If the constitution allows a body to ask for reconsideration or request a second reading, please make a note in the comments, but do not select that body below.
Responses:
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)
2: Head of Government
3: Both Head of State and Head of Government
4: The Government/Cabinet
5: Legislation does not require approval
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Nominal (v2exvetolw), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v270 (also see v271-275 on details and override); IAEP question 4. 2.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.70 Propose legislation by law (A)

Tag: v2exprlegl
Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Who does the constitution specify can initiate general legislation?

Clarification: Note any restrictions on how the particular offices can initiate legislation. Choose all that apply.

Responses:
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems). (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_1]
2: Head of Government. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_2]
3: The Government/Cabinet. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_3]
4: Political Party. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_4]
5: Member of First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_5]
6: Member of Second Chamber of the Legislature. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_6]
7: Public (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_7]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_96]
97: Unable to Determine. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_97]
98: Not Specified. (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_LEG_IN_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Scale: Nominal (v2exprlegl), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v263; IAEP question 3. B 2; but only either or.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.71 DISSOLUTION OF LEGISLATURE BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2exdissolel

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Who, if anybody, can dismiss the legislature?

Clarification: If constitution expressly prohibits any actor from dissolving or adjourning the legislature, please answer "Other, please specify in the comments section". Choose all that apply.

Responses:
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)
2: Head of Government
3: Either Head of State or Head of Government
4: The Government/Cabinet
5: The Legislature itself
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Scale: Nominal (v2exdisolel), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v255; IAEP, questions 4. 1; but only either or.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

6.72 ENTIRE EXECUTIVE COMMENTS (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2excomex

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the entire executive.

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7 The Legislature

7.1 LEGISLATURE INTRODUCTION (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2lgintro1

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London).
A popular election need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted.

A “direct election” can include seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the de jure/de facto distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the de facto state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the de jure state of affairs.

7.2 **LEGISLATURE BICAMERAL (A*)**

*Tag:* v2lgbicam

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Compilers:* Vlad Ciobanu, Valeriya Mechko, Talib Jabbar

*Question:* How many chambers does the legislature contain?

*Responses:*

0: 0 chambers.

1: 1 chamber.

2: 2 or more chambers.

*Scale:* Ordinal.


*Notes:* In cases when a parliament consists of three or more chambers, one of the chamber names is coded in the variable "Lower chamber legislature name" (v2lgnamelo), while the others are enlisted in the variable “Upper chamber name” (v2lgnameup).

*Example:* South Africa had a three-chamber parliament during the period of 1984-1994. Subsequently, variable v2lgbicam is coded 2, v2lgnamel0 is coded "House of Assembly", and v2lgnameup enlists "House of Representatives, House of Delegates".

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.3 **LEGISLATURE DOMINANT CHAMBER (C)**

*Tag:* v2lgdomchm

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Question: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

Responses:
0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.
1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
2: They are roughly co-equal in power.
3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.4 LEGISLATURE SUPERMAJORITY (A)

Tag: v2lgspmaj
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Question: Is a supermajority needed for passing any legislation?
Clarification: Mark "Yes" if there are any types of legislation that require a supermajority, but this does not include economic legislation or any legislative approval powers (i.e. impeachment, declaration of war, etc.).

Responses:
1: Yes
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Dichotomous (assuming that missing observations can be interpreted as “No”).
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v264.
Notes: We might consider adding a “No” option, which could be interpreted as the residual category.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.5 LEGISLATURE SUPER-MAJORITY TYPES (A)

Tag: v2lgspmjlg
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Question: What types of legislation require a supermajority?
**Clarification:** This question refers exclusively to legislation, not other acts performed by the legislature like declaring war, impeaching members of government, etc.

**Responses:**
1: Text  
99: Not Applicable

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v265.

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.6 Legislature Questions Officials by Law (A)

**Tag:** v2lgqstexl

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** Does the legislature have the power to interpellate members of the executive branch, or similarly, is the executive responsible for reporting its activities to the legislature on a regular basis?

**Responses:**
1: Legislature can call executive to report as it sees fit  
2: Executive must report to legislature at regular intervals  
3: Both  
4: Neither  
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law  
96: Other, please specify in the comments section  
97: Unable to Determine  
99: Not Applicable

**Scale:** Ordinal.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v261.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.7 Legislature Questions Officials in Practice (C)

**Tag:** v2lgqstexp

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

**Clarification:** By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

**Responses:**
0: No - never or very rarely.
1: Yes - routinely.

*Scale:* Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.8 Legislature Investigates by Law (A)

*Tag:* v2lginvestl

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* Does the legislature have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?

*Clarification:* Please answer "no" if the constitution explicitly denies the subject of the question and "not specified" if the subject of the question is not mentioned in the constitution.

*Responses:*

1: Yes

2: No

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v262 [INVEXE].

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.9 Legislature Investigates in Practice (C)

*Tag:* v2lginvstp

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

*Responses:*

0: Extremely unlikely.
1: Unlikely.
2: As likely as not.
3: Likely.
4: Certain or nearly certain.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.10 EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT (C)

Tag: v2lgotovst

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body other than the legislature, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

Responses:
0: Extremely unlikely.
1: Unlikely.
2: Very uncertain.
3: Likely.
4: Certain or nearly certain.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.11 LEGISLATURE CORRUPT ACTIVITIES (C)

Tag: v2lgcrpt

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

Clarification: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of
employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

**Responses:**

0: Never, or hardly ever.
1: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
3: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
4: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.12 Legislature Opposition Parties (C)

**Tag:** v2lgoppart

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

**Responses:**

0: No, not at all.
1: Occasionally.
2: Yes, for the most part.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.13 Legislature Controls Resources (C)

**Tag:** v2lgfunds

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?
Responses:
0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature’s operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.14 LEGISLATURE AMENDS CONSTITUTION (B)

Tag: v2lgamend
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Question: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.15 LEGISLATURE APPROVAL OF TREATIES BY LAW (A)

Tag: v2lgltreaty
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Compiler: Valeriya Mechkova
Question: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?
Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.
Scale: Dichotomous.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v492; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
7.16 **Legislature Declares War by Law (A)**

*Tag:* v2lgwarlaw

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Compiler:* Valeriya Mechkova

*Question:* By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v488; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.

*Notes:* Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.17 **Legislature Amnesties (B)**

*Tag:* v2lgamnsty

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question:* By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?

*Responses:*

0: No.

1: Yes.

*Scale:* Dichotomous.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.18 **Legislature Immunity in Practice (A)**

*Tag:* v2lgimmune

*Project managers:* Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Question: Does the constitution provide for immunity for the members of the legislature under some conditions?

Clarification: Absolute immunity means immunity from all types of legal process. Limited immunity means immunity only for certain types of actions. Please note in the comments section if there are any time restrictions for immunity or if immunity can be waived.

Responses:
1: Absolute Immunity
2: Limited Immunity
3: No Immunity
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99. Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v260.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.19 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (C)

Tag: v2lgdsadlo

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Question: Considering all disadvantaged social groups in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

Responses:
0: There are no disadvantaged social groups.
1: They have no representation at all.
2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
3. They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.
5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.20  LEGISLATURE CLOSED DOWN OR ABORTED (D)

Tag: v2xlg_leginter

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: Has the legislature been closed down or aborted?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: v2lgbicam

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.21  INTRODUCTION LOWER CHAMBER (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2lgintro2

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

The following questions pertain to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature. The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," is typically the more numerous chamber and also more directly representative of the general population.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

Country experts will find the name (proper noun) of the lower chamber of the legislature in the first question (following this page). To see the name, click on any year in the grid. All subsequent questions in this section pertain to that body.

7.22  LOWER CHAMBER LEGISLATURE NAME (A*)

Tag: v2lgnamelo

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Question: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?
Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.
Responses: Text
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.23 LOWER CHAMBER ELECTED (A)
Tag: v2lgello
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Valeriya Mechkova
Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?
Clarification: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.
We are not concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.
Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.24 LOWER CHAMBER QUOTA FOR SOCIAL GROUPS (A)
Tag: v2lgqumin
Project manager: Pamela Paxton
Compiler: Valeriya Mechkova
Question: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?
Clarification: These quotas are sometimes informally known as “minority quotas.” Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group).
Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code “yes” only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

Responses:

0: No national level quota for any social group.
1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

Scale: Dichotomous.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v225; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.
Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.25 LOWER CHAMBER FEMALE LEGISLATORS (A)

Tag: v2lgfemleg
Project manager: Pamela Paxton
Question: What percentage (%) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?
Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Sources: Paxton, Green, Hughes (2008).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.26 LOWER CHAMBER GENDER QUOTA (A)

Tag: v2lgqugen
Project manager: Pamela Paxton
Compiler: Valeriya Mechkova
Question: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?
Clarification: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection
of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak
sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial
penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a
strong sanction would be the rejection of a party’s list. Code “yes” if quotas apply to any
seats.

Responses:

0: No national level gender quota.
1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance.
2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance.
3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for
noncompliance.
4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v225; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full
quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators
answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.27 LOWER CHAMBER GENDER QUOTA PLACEMENT MANDATE (B)

Tag: v2lgqugen

Project manager: Pamela Paxton

Question: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the
legislature contain a placement mandate?

Clarification: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually
to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example
would be a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the
same gender.

Responses:

0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.28 LOWER CHAMBER GENDER QUOTA THRESHOLD (B)

Tag: v2lgqugent
**Project manager:** Pamela Paxton

**Question:** What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

**Clarification:** A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as a percentage (%) of the total seats in the legislature.

**Responses:** Percent

**Scale:** Interval

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.29 Lower Chamber Legislates by Law (B)

**Tag:** v2llegllo

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

**Responses:**

0: No.
1: Yes.

**Scale:** Dichotomous.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.30 Lower Chamber Legislates in Practice (C)

**Tag:** v2llegplo

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

**Responses:**

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.
1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is bypassed.
2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.31 LOWER CHAMBER REGULAR SESSIONS (A)

Tag: v2lgseshlo
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: For how long are legislators in session during each year?

Clarification: Report the number of months per year. Answer "0" if not specified.

Responses:
1: Numeric
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Interval


Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.32 LOWER CHAMBER COMMITTEES (C)

Tag: v2lgcomslo
Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

Responses:
0: No, there are no committees.
1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.
2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.
3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
7.33 LOWER CHAMBER MEMBERS SERVE IN GOVERNMENT (C)

Tag: v2lgsrvlo

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.34 LOWER CHAMBER INTRODUCES BILLS (A)

Tag: v2lgintblo

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Compiler: Valeriya Mechkova

Question: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v263; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.

Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.35 LOWER CHAMBER STAFF (C)

Tag: v2lgstafflo

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.36 LOWER CHAMBER TERM LIMITS (A)

Tag: v2lgtrmlup

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms members of the first, (lower) (or only) chamber may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit. "Eligible for re-election" should be coded as "no term limits."

Responses:
1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v223.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.37 UPPER CHAMBER INTRODUCTION (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2lgintro3

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
The following questions pertain to the upper chamber of the legislature (if bicameral). The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the senate or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

**7.38  UPPER CHAMBER NAME (A*)**

*Tag: v2lgnameup*

*Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig*

*Question: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?*

*Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.*

*Responses: Text*

*Data release: 3.*

*Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).*

**7.39  UPPER CHAMBER ELECTED (A)**

*Tag: v2lgelecup*

*Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig*

*Compilers: Vlad Ciobanu, Valeriya Mechkova*

*Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?*

*Clarification: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.*

*Responses: Percent*

*Scale: Interval*


*Notes: Converted from (B) to (A) coding.*

*Data release: 1, 2, 3.*
7.40 **Upper Chamber Legislates by Law (B)**

*Tag*: v2lgleglup

*Project managers*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question*: By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

*Responses*:
- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

*Scale*: Dichotomous.

*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.41 **Upper Chamber Legislates in Practice (C)**

*Tag*: v2lglegpup

*Project managers*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Question*: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

*Responses*:
- 0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.
- 1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
- 2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

*Scale*: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation*: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

7.42 **Upper Chamber Introduces Bills (A)**

*Tag*: v2lgintbup

*Project managers*: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

*Compiler*: Valeriya Mechkova
**Question:** By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

**Responses:**
0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.
1: Yes.

**Scale:** Dichotomous.

**Source:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v263; Coding by V-Dem Country coordinators.

**Notes:** Converted from (B) to (A) coding. The resulting data has not gone through full quality control with thorough cross-referencing yet. V-Dem Country Coordinators answers were used for country-years where data was missing in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 7.43 UPPERS CHAMBER TERM LIMITS (A)

**Tag:** v2lguchatrmlim

**Project managers:** Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

**Question:** What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms members of the second chamber (upper) may serve?

**Clarification:** For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

**Responses:**
1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

**Scale:** Ordinal.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v252.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
8 Deliberation

8.1 Deliberation Introduction (C)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country’s politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

8.2 Reasoned Justification (C)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cut spending.”

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, “We must cut spending. The state is inefficient.” [The inference is incomplete because
addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]

2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs.”

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation.”

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

8.3 COMMON GOOD (C)

Tag: v2dlcommon

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
8.4 Respect Counterarguments (C)

Tag: v2dlcountr

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

8.5 Range of Consultation (C)

Tag: v2dlconsult

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

Responses:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party’s or parties’ local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

8.6 ENGAGED SOCIETY (C)

Tag: v2dlengage

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

Responses:
0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.
3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.
5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
**8.7 PARTICULARISTIC OR PUBLIC GOODS (C)**

**Tag:** v2dlencmps

**Project managers:** Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

**Question:** Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how “particularistic” or “public goods” are most expenditures?

**Clarification:** Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as “pork,” “clientelistic,” or “private goods.”

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

**Responses:**

0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is public-goods.
2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., ¾ or 1/3) is particularistic.
4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**8.8 MEANS-TESTED V. UNIVERSALISTIC POLICY (C)**

**Tag:** v2dlunivl
Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

Responses:

0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) are means-tested.
5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9 The Judiciary

9.1 Judiciay Introduction (A)(C)

Tag: v2juintro

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general,
whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless prompted to do otherwise, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. It also includes courts at every level. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, e.g. an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Two of the questions about the judiciary (“v2juhcind” and “v2juhccomp”) concern high courts. To review briefly, by “high court” we are asking you to consider the country’s constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the high court to be the highest ordinary court in the state.

If you are considering a semisovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (e.g., the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (e.g., the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens “on the ground”). In order to clarify the de jure/de facto distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

9.2 Judicial reform (C)

Tag: v2jureform

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Were the judiciary’s formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

Clarification: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

Responses:

0: The judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power was reduced via institutional reform.

1: There was no change to the judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.

2: The judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power was enhanced via institutional reform.
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.3 Judicial Purges (C)

Tag: v2jupurge

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (i.e., when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

Responses:

0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.
1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.
2: There were limited arbitrary removals.
3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.
4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.4 Government Attacks on Judiciary (C)

Tag: v2jupoatck

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often did the government attack the judiciary’s integrity in public?

Clarification: Attacks on the judiciary’s integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in
various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

Responses:

0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.
1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.
2: Attacks occurred more than once.
3: There were attacks, but they were rare.
4: There were no attacks on the judiciary’s integrity.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.5 COURT PACKING (C)

Tag: v2jupack

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (i.e. when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

Responses:

0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.
1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.
2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.
3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.

Note: A previous version of the variable contained category “4: There was no increase”. As of November 2014, all responses in category “4” are assigned to category “3”, since the two responses have the same meaning in practice.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.6 Judicial Accountability (C)

Tag: v2juaccnt

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

Responses:
- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.7 Judicial Corruption Decision (C)

Tag: v2jucorrdc

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

Responses:
- 0: Never.
- 1: Not usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.8 HIGH COURT NAME (C)
Tag: v2juhcname
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: Please enter the name of the high court.
Clarification: As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.
Responses: Text
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.9 HIGH COURT INDEPENDENCE (C)
Tag: v2juhcind
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?
Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without “merely reflecting” those wishes, i.e. a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government’s position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government’s position is meritorious. By “merely reflect the wishes of the government” we mean that the court’s own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government’s position regardless of its sincere view of the record.
Responses:
0: Always.
1: Usually.
2: About half of the time.
3: Seldom.
4: Never.
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
9.10 LOWER COURT INDEPENDENCE (C)

Tag: v2juncind

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: When judges not on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

Responses:

0: Always.
1: Usually.
2: About half of the time.
3: Seldom.
4: Never.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.11 COMPLIANCE WITH HIGH COURT (C)

Tag: v2juhccomp

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

Responses:

0: Never.
1: Seldom.
2: About half of the time.
3: Usually.
4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.12 COMPLIANCE WITH JUDICIARY (C)

Tag: v2jucomp

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

Clarification: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the high court. You should consider judges on both ordinary courts and specialized courts.

Responses:
0: Never.
1: Seldom.
2: About half of the time.
3: Usually.
4: Always.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.13 JUDICIAL REVIEW (C)

Tag: v2jureview

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

Responses:
0: No.
1: Yes.

Scale: Dichotomous, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.14 CASE SELECTION (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What kind of high court are you considering?

Responses:
1: Supreme court
2: Constitutional court
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.15 COURT NAME (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the proper name (in English) of the court you have selected?

Responses:
1: Text
99: Not Applicable

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.16 CONCRETE OR ABSTRACT REVIEW (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What type of constitutional review is the court you have selected empowered to carry out?

Clarification: Concrete review involves constitutional interpretation in the presence of areal case or legal controversy. For example, consider a presidential system in which the legislature passes a law granting the president wide discretion to manage national parks via the regulations of an environmental agency. Imagine that this agency makes it illegal to carry firearms on park property. A week after the regulation becomes effective, a hunter is arrested and fined for carrying a rifle in a national park. In his defense, he argues that a) the regulation violates a constitutional right to bear arms and b) that congress violated the constitution by delegating law making power to the executive. When a court evaluates the law (and regulation) in this context, it is engaging in
concrete constitutional review. In contrast, abstract review does not require a real case or controversy. Instead, judges can evaluate a policy with respect to the constitution on the basis of a merely hypothetical situation. Continuing the example from above, suppose that after the law granting the president discretion to regulate the national parks is passed but prior to the agency enacting the regulation, a group of legislators ask a court to declare the statute an unconstitutional delegation of law making power to the president. When a court evaluates this argument, it does so absent a real controversy. No person has been directly harmed here. Indeed, the president has not even attempted to use this new power to do anything. When a court evaluates the law in this context, it is carrying out abstract constitutional review.

Responses:
1: Concrete
2: Abstract
3: Concrete and abstract
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Coverage: 1900-2010
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.17 FIXED NUMBER OF JUDGES AT ALL (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: Does the constitution require a specific size for the court you have selected?
Responses:
1: Yes, the constitution fixes the entire size of the court
2: No, however, it does require that the court be no smaller than a particular number
90: No, size is explicitly left to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Coverage: 1900-2010
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.18 NUMBER OF JUDGES (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: What is the constitutional requirement identified in v4a?

Responses: Numeric

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.19 Fixed Budgetary Requirement (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution require that a fixed portion of the federal budget be allocated to the judiciary?

Responses:
1: Yes
2: No
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.20 Nature of Budgetary Requirement (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the federal budget does the constitution require be allocated to the judiciary?

Responses: Numeric

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.21 Is CJ Appointment Process Different? (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Is the Chief Justice of the court appointed via a different process than regular members?
Responses:
   1: Yes
   2: No
   90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
   96: Other, please specify in the comments section
   97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Coverage: 1900-2010
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.22 Is CJ removal process different? (A)

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: Is the Chief Justice of the court removed via a different process than regular members?
Responses:
   1: Yes
   2: No
   90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
   96: Other, please specify in the comments section
   97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Coverage: 1900-2010
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.23 Type of courts (A)
e_LEVJUD

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: Does the court system provide for any of the following?
Clarification: By ordinary courts, we mean non-specialized courts. For example, the Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, and District Courts in the United States. By contrast, specialized courts include the constitutional court, military courts, and administrative courts.
Responses:
   1: Supreme or top court only [e_LEVJUD -1]
   2: Supreme court and other courts to be determined by law [e_LEVJUD -2]
3: Supreme court and specific other courts, such as provincial or city courts
   [e_LEVJUD -3]
4: Other courts mentioned, but no supreme court [e_LEVJUD -4]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section [e_LEVJUD -96]
97: Unable to Determine [e_LEVJUD -97]
98: Not Specified [e_LEVJUD -98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Coverage: 1900-2010
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.24 Specialized Courts (A)

Tag: v02juspecclcrts
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: For which of the following specialized courts does the constitution contain provisions?

Clarification: If religious courts, labor courts, tax courts, military courts, courts charged with hearing cases against public officials, or courts of amparo are mentioned, please list any special provisions for these courts in the comments section. Choose all that apply.

Responses:
1: Administrative courts (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-1]
2: Constitutional court (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-2]
3: Courts of amparo (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-3]
4: Military courts (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-4]
5: Courts charged with hearing cases against holders of public offices (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-5]
6: Tax courts (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-6]
7: Labor courts (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-7]
8: Religious courts (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-8]
9: Special court (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-9]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_JUDCRTS-98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Scale: Nominal (v02juspecclcrts), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.25 **Supreme Court Name (A)**

*Tag*: v2jdsprmcrt

e_ SUPNAME

*Project manager*: Jeffrey Staton

*Question*: What name is given to the highest ordinary court?

*Responses*:

1: Text
99: Not Applicable

*Sources*: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Coverage*: 1900-2010

*Data release*: 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.26 **Chief Justice (CJ) Highest Ordinary Court (A)**

*Tag*: v2jdjchordcrt

*Project manager*: Jeffrey Staton

*Question*: Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other justices of the Highest Ordinary Court?

*Responses*:

1: Chief Justice only
2: Regular Justices only
3: Both with same procedure
4: Both with different procedures for each
5: Neither
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
99: Not Applicable

*Scale*: Nominal (v2jdjchordcrt), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Sources*: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release*: 1, 2, 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.27 **CJ Nomination (A)**

*Tag*: v2jdcjnomet

*Project manager*: Jeffrey Staton
**Question:** Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply

**Responses:**

1. **Head of State** (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-1] [v2jdcjnom_1]
2. **Head of Government** (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-2] [v2jdcjnom_2]
3. The **Government/Cabinet** (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-3] [v2jdcjnom_3]
4. First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-4] [v2jdcjnom_4]
5. Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-5] [v2jdcjnom_5]
6. Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-6] [v2jdcjnom_6]
7. Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-7] [v2jdcjnom_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-90] [v2jdcjnom_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-96] [v2jdcjnom_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-97] [v2jdcjnom_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHIEFNOM-98] [v2jdcjnom_98]

**Answer type:** Multiple-selection.

**Scale:** Nominal (v2jdcjnom), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**9.28 CJ APPROVAL (A)**

**Tag:** v2jdcjapprvl

**Project manager:** Jeffrey Staton

**Question:** Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply

**Responses:**

1. **Head of State** (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-1] [v2jdcjapprvl_1]
2. **Head of Government** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-2] [v2jdcjapprvl_2]
3. The **Government/Cabinet** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-3] [v2jdcjapprvl_3]
4. First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-4] [v2jdcjapprvl_4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-5] [v2jdcjapprvl_5]

6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-6] [v2jdcjapprvl_6]

7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-7] [v2jdcjapprvl_7]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-90] [v2jdcjapprvl_90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-96] [v2jdcjapprvl_96]

97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-97] [v2jdcjapprvl_97]

98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-98] [v2jdcjapprvl_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2jdcjapprvl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.29 CJ TERM (A)

Tag: v2jdcjapr

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

Responses:
- 1: Numeric
- 99: Not Applicable

Scale: Interval

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.30 CJ RESTRICTIONS (A)

Tag: v2jdcjestr

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?
Responses:
1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.31 HIGHEST ORDINARY COURT JUDGE NOMINATIONS (A)
Tag: v2jdhordjnom
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary court?
Clarification: Choose all that apply. By judicial council/commission, we are referring to an independent body that is composed of experts in law who are important in the selection process for judges.
Responses:
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-1] [v2jdhordjnom_1]
2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-2] [v2jdhordjnom_2]
3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-3] [v2jdhordjnom_3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-4] [v2jdhordjnom_4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-5] [v2jdhordjnom_5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-6] [v2jdhordjnom_6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-7] [v2jdhordjnom_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-90] [v2jdhordjnom_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-96] [v2jdhordjnom_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-97] [v2jdhordjnom_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-98] [v2jdhordjnom_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2jdhordjnom), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.32 HIGHEST ORDINARY COURT APPROVAL (A)

Tag: v2jdhordaprvl

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations to the highest ordinary court?

Clarification: Choose all that apply

Responses:

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-1] [v2jdhordaprvl_1]
2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-2] [v2jdhordaprvl_2]
3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-3] [v2jdhordaprvl_3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-4] [v2jdhordaprvl_4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-5] [v2jdhordaprvl_5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-6] [v2jdhordaprvl_6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-7] [v2jdhordaprvl_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-90] [v2jdhordaprvl_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-96] [v2jdhordaprvl_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-97] [v2jdhordaprvl_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: SUPAP-98] [v2jdhordaprvl_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2jdhordaprvl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.33 HIGHEST ORDINARY COURT TERMS (A)

*Tag:* v2jdhordtrm

*Project manager:* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* What is the maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court?

*Clarification:* Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

*Responses:* Numeric

*Scale:* Interval

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.34 HIGHEST ORDINARY COURT RESTRICTIONS (A)

*v2 tem:* v2jdhordrstrct

*Project manager:* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms that members of the highest ordinary court may serve?

*Clarification:* For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified.

*Responses:*

1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.35 **ORDINARY COURT NAME (A)**

*Tag*: v2jdordname

*Project manager*: Jeffrey Staton

*Question*: What name is given to the ordinary courts?

*Clarification*: Please list the name in the order given in the constitution.

*Responses*: Text

*Sources*: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Coverage*: 1900-2010

*Data release*: 3.

*Citation*: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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9.36 **NOMINATION OF ORDINARY JUDGES (A)**

*Tag*: v2jdordnom

*Project manager*: Jeffrey Staton

*Question*: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to *ordinary courts*?

*Clarification*: Choose all that apply

*Responses:*

1: [Head of State](#) (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-1] [v2jdordnom_1]
2: [Head of Government](#) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-2] [v2jdordnom_2]
3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-3] [v2jdordnom_3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-4] [v2jdordnom_4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-5] [v2jdordnom_5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-6] [v2jdordnom_6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-7] [v2jdordnom_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-90] [v2jdordnom_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-96] [v2jdordnom_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-97] [v2jdordnom_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: ORDNOM-98] [v2jdordnom_98]

*Answer type*: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2jdordnom), or a series of dichotomous scales.  
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3.  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.37 Approval of Ordinary Court nominations (A)  
Tag: v2jdordnomaprvl  
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton  
Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations to ordinary courts?  
Clarification: Choose all that apply  
Responses:  
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-1]  
2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-2]  
3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-3]  
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-4]  
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-5]  
6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-6]  
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-7]  
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-90]  
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-96]  
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-97]  
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_ORDAP-98]  
Answer type: Multiple-selection.  
Scale: Nominal (v2jdordnomaprvl), or a series of dichotomous scales.  
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).  
Data release: 1, 2, 3.  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.38 Constitutional court nominations (A)  
Tag: v2jdconnom  
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton  
Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the constitutional court?  
Clarification: Choose all that apply  
Responses:  
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-1] [v2jdconnom_1]
2: **Head of Government** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-2] [v2jdconnom_2]
3: The **Government/Cabinet** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-3] [v2jdconnom_3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-4] [v2jdconnom_4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-5] [v2jdconnom_5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-6] [v2jdconnom_6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-7] [v2jdconnom_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-90] [v2jdconnom_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-96] [v2jdconnom_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-97] [v2jdconnom_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: CONNOM-98] [v2jdconnom_98]

**Answer type:** Multiple-selection.

**Scale:** Nominal (v2jdconnom), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 9.39 Approval of Constitutional Court Nominations (A)

**Tag:** v2jdconnomarpv1

**Project manager:** Jeffrey Staton

**Question:** Who is involved in the approval of judges to the constitutional court?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply

**Responses:**

1: **Head of State** (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-1]
2: **Head of Government** (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-2]
3: The **Government/Cabinet** (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-5]
6: Judicial Council/Commission (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-6]
7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CONAP-97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) \[e_{\text{CONAP}}\-98]\]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2jdconnomarpvl), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.40 Special procedures for removing constitutional judges (A)

Tag: v2jdspeconrem
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: Does the constitution mention any special procedures for removing members of the constitutional court?
Responses:
1: Yes
2: No
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
99: Not Applicable
Scale: Dichotomous.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.41 Procedures for removing constitutional judges (A)

Tag: v2jdconrem
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton
Question: What are the details of the process for removing members on the constitutional court?
Responses:
1: Text
99: Not Applicable
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.42 TERM FOR CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES (A)

Tag: v2jdcontrm

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the maximum term length for judges for the constitutional court?

Clarification: Please answer 0 if the term length is not specified, and answer 100 if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

Responses:

1: Numeric
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Interval

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.43 RESTRICTIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGE TERMS (A)

Tag: v2jdcontrmrstrct

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms judges on the Constitutional Court may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

Responses:

1: Only one term permitted, total
2: Only two terms permitted, total
3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
5: No term limits
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
**9.44 CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (A)**

*Tag:* v2jdconrev

*Project manager:* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution?

*Clarification:* Choose all that apply. If the constitutional court is mentioned in the constitution, you need to check it here regardless if they are explicitly given the power of interpretation. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

*Responses:*

1. Any Ordinary Court (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-1] [v2jdconrev_1]
2. Constitutional Court/Council (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-2] [v2jdconrev_2]
3. Supreme Court Only (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-3] [v2jdconrev_3]
4. Special chamber of the Supreme Court (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-4] [v2jdconrev_4]
5. First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-5] [v2jdconrev_5]
6. Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-6] [v2jdconrev_6]
7. Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-7] [v2jdconrev_7]
90. Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-90] [v2jdconrev_90]
96. Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-96] [v2jdconrev_96]
97. Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-97] [v2jdconrev_97]
98. Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: INTERP-98] [v2jdconrev_98]

*Answer type:* Multiple-selection.

*Scale:* Nominal (v2jdconrev), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**9.45 STANDING - CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (A)**

*Tag:* v2jdstndconrev
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who has standing to initiate challenge to the constitutionality of legislation?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-1]
2: Head of Government (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-2]
3: The Government/Cabinet (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-5]
6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-6]
7: Lawyers (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-7]
8: Public (by complaint) (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-8]
9: The Courts (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-9]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALLEG-98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Scale: Nominal (v2jdstndconrev), or a series of dichotomous scales.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.46 TYPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (A)

Tag: v2jdconrev

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: At what stage of the legislative process can bills be reviewed for constitutionality?

Responses:

1: Pre-promulgation
2: Post-promulgation
3: Either
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified

Scale: Ordinal.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.47 EFFECTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (A)

Tag: v2jdconrevefct
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

1: Law is void (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-1]
2: Void for specific case, but law still exists (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-2]
3: Returned to legislature for revision/reconsideration (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-3]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [e_CHALUNCN-98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2jdconrevefct), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.48 AMPARO (A)

Tag: v2jdamparo
Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution provide for a right to petition for ‘amparo’?

Responses:

1: Yes
2: No
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.49 DISMISSAL PROCEDURES (A)

Tag: v2jdisprcd

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing judges?

Responses:
1: Yes
2: No
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.50 DISMISSAL RATIONALE (A)

Tag: v2jdisrtnl

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Under what conditions can judges be dismissed?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:
1: General dissatisfaction (i.e. dismissal is fairly unrestricted) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-1] [v2jdisrtnl_1]
2: Crimes and other issues of conduct (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-2] [v2jdisrtnl_2]
3: Treason (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-3] [v2jdisrtnl_3]
4: Violations of the constitution (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-4] [v2jdisrtnl_4]
5: Incapacitated (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-5] [v2jdisrtnl_5]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-90] [v2jdisrtnl_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-96] [v2jdisrtnl_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-97] [v2jdisrtnl_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMCON-98] [v2jdisrtnl_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.
**Scale:** Nominal (v2jdisrtnl), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 9.51 DISMISSAL PROPOSAL (A)

**Tag:** v2jdisprpsl

**Project manager:** Jeffrey Staton

**Question:** Who can propose the dismissal of judges?

**Clarification:** Choose all that apply. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

**Responses:**

1. **Head of State** (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-1] [v2jdisprpsl_1]
2. **Head of Government** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-2] [v2jdisprpsl_2]
3. The **Government/Cabinet** [CCP tag: JREMPRO-3] [v2jdisprpsl_3]
4. First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-4] [v2jdisprpsl_4]
5. Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-5] [v2jdisprpsl_5]
6. Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-6] [v2jdisprpsl_6]
7. Public Prosecutor (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-7] [v2jdisprpsl_7]
8. Judicial Council (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-8] [v2jdisprpsl_8]
9. Public (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-9] [v2jdisprpsl_9]
90. Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-90] [v2jdisprpsl_90]
96. Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-96] [v2jdisprpsl_96]
97. Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-97] [v2jdisprpsl_97]
98. Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-98] [v2jdisprpsl_98]

**Answer type:** Multiple-selection.

**Scale:** Nominal (v2jdisprpsl), or a series of dichotomous scales.

**Sources:** CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), variable name: JREMPRO.

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
9.52 DISMISSAL VOTE (A)

Tag: v2jdisvote

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or unicameral) chamber to propose the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.53 DISMISSAL VOTE 2 (A)

Tag: v2jdisvote2

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to propose the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable
9.54 DISMISSAL VOTE 3 (A)

Tag: v2jdisvote3

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to propose the dismissal of judges?

Responses:
1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.
Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.55 DISMISSAL APPROVAL (A)

Tag: v2jdisaprvl

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who can approve the dismissal of judges?

Clarification: Choose all that apply. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

Responses:
1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-1] [v2jdisaprvl_1]
2: **Head of Government** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-2] [v2jdisaprvl_2]
3: The **Government/Cabinet** (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-3] [v2jdisaprvl_3]
4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-4] [v2jdisaprvl_4]
5: Second Chamber of the Legislature (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-5] [v2jdisaprvl_5]
6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-6] [v2jdisaprvl_6]
7: Public Prosecutor (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-7] [v2jdisaprvl_7]
90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-90] [v2jdisaprvl_90]
96: Other, please specify in the comments section (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-96] [v2jdisaprvl_96]
97: Unable to Determine (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-97] [v2jdisaprvl_97]
98: Not Specified (0=No, 1=Yes) [CCP tag: JREMAP-98] [v2jdisaprvl_98]

*Answer type:* Multiple-selection.

*Scale:* Nominal (v2jdisaprvl), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**9.56 DISMISSAL APPROVAL VOTE 1 (A)**

*Tag:* v2jdisaprvlv

*Project manager:* Jeffrey Staton

*Question:* What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or unicameral) chamber to approve the dismissal of judges?

*Responses:*
1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

*Scale:* Ordinal.

*Sources:* CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.
9.57 DISMISSAL APPROVAL VOTE 2 (A)

Tag: v2jdisaprvlv2

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to approve the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.58 DISMISSAL APPROVAL VOTE 3 (A)

Tag: v2jdisaprvlv3

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to approve the dismissal of judges?

Responses:

1: Plurality
2: Majority
3: 3/5 Majority
4: 2/3 Majority
5: 3/4 Majority
6: Unspecified supermajority
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine
98: Not Specified
99: Not Applicable
99: Not Applicable

Scale: Ordinal.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.59 DISMISSAL DETAILS (A)

Tag: v2jdisdtls

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What are the details of the process to remove judges?

Responses:

1: Text
99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

9.60 JUDICIAL SALARIES (A)

Tag: v2jdsal

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution explicitly state that judicial salaries are protected from governmental intervention?

Responses:

1: Yes
2: No
96: Other, please specify in the comments section
97: Unable to Determine

Scale: Dichotomous.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

9.61 JUDICIARY COMMENTS (C)

Tag: v2jucommnt

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the judiciary.
10 Civil Liberty

10.1 Civil Liberties Introduction (C)

Tag: v2clintro

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

The following questions are focused on actual practices (de facto) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (de jure).

10.2 Freedom of Academic and Cultural Expression (C)

Tag: v2clacfree

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.3 FREEDOM OF RELIGION (C)

Tag: v2c1relig

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom of religion?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.

2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
10.4 FREEDOM FROM TORTURE (C)

Tag: v2cltort

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom from torture?

Clarification: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (e.g., police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.

2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.

4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.5 FREEDOM FROM POLITICAL KILLINGS (C)

Tag: v2clkill

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom from political killings?

Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.
1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.
2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.
4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.6 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (C)

Tag: v2cltrnslw

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are the laws of the land clear, well-publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

Responses:
0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.
1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.
2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.
3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.
4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
10.7  EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY INDEX (D)

Tag:  v2xcl\_rol

Project manager:  Jan Teorell

Question:  To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

Aggregation:  The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration (v2clrspct), transparent laws with predictable enforcement (v2cltrnslw), access to justice for men/women (v2clacjstm, v2clacjstw), property rights for men/women (v2clprptym, v2clprptyw), freedom from torture (v2cltort), freedom from political killings (v2clkill), from forced labor for men/women (v2clslavem v2clslavef), freedom of religion (v2clrelig), freedom of foreign movement (v2clfmove), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women (v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew).

Scale: Interval

Sources:  v2clrspct v2cltrnslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmove v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release:  1, 2, 3.

Citation:  V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.8  RIGOROUS AND IMPARTIAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (C)

Tag:  v2clrspct

Project manager:  Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question:  Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

Clarification:  This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

Responses:

0:  The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.

1:  The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.
2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.

3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.

4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.9 Freedom of Foreign Movement (C)

Tag: v2clfmove

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

Responses:

0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.

1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular social groups. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.

2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular social groups is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.

3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.

4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.10 **FREEDOM OF DOMESTIC MOVEMENT FOR MEN (C)**

*Tag:* v2clmovem

*Project manager:* Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal—and extremely low—freedom of movement.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

*Responses:*

- 0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea).
- 1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
- 2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not.
- 3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
- 4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.11 **FREEDOM OF DOMESTIC MOVEMENT FOR WOMEN (C)**

*Tag:* v2clmovew

*Project managers:* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?
Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – freedom of movement.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:

0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.12 Freedom of domestic movement index (D)

Tag: v2xcl_dmove

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do citizens enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Aggregation: An average (mean) of indicators focused on freedom of domestic movement for men (v2cldmovem) and women (v2cldmovew).
Responses:

0: Virtually no citizens enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
1: Some citizens enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
2: Most citizens enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
3: Most citizens enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
4: Virtually all citizens enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Sources: v2clmovem v2clmovew

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.13 Freedom of discussion for men (C)

Tag: v2cldiscm

Project managers: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to
soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.14 Freedom of discussion for women (C)

Tag: v2cldiscw

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

Responses:

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 10.15 Freedom of Discussion Index (D)

**Tag:** v2xcl_disc  

**Project managers:** Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning  

**Question:** Are citizens able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?  

**Clarification:** This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

**Aggregation:** An average (mean) of indicators focused on freedom of discussion for men (v2cldiscm) and women (v2cldiscw).

**Responses:**

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists. Citizens are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if people make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech in homes and public spaces is not restricted.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model

**Sources:** v2cldism v2cldiscw

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 10.16 Freedom from Forced Labor for Men (C)

**Tag:** v2clslavem
Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

Responses:

0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.17 Freedom from forced labor for women (C)

Tag: v2cslavef

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies. This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

Responses:
0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the \textit{state}.

1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the \textit{public authorities}, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular \textit{social groups}.

3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

\textit{Scale}: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

\textit{Cross-coder aggregation}: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see \textit{V-Dem Methodology}, posted at \textit{V-Dem.net}).

\textit{Data release}: 1, 2, 3.

\textit{Citation}: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

\textbf{10.18 Freedom from forced labor index (D)}

\textit{Tag}: \texttt{v2xcl_slave}

\textit{Project managers}: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

\textit{Question}: Are adult citizens free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

\textit{Clarification}: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

\textit{Aggregation}: An average (mean) of indicators focused on freedom from forced labor for men (\texttt{v2clslavem}) and women (\texttt{v2clslavef}).

\textit{Responses}:

0: Servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the \texttt{state}.

1: Servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the \texttt{public authorities}, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.

2: Servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular \textit{social groups}.
3: Servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.

4: Servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Sources: v2clslavem v2cslavef

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.19 State ownership of economy (C)

Tag: v2clstown

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

Clarification: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does not measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

Responses:

0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.

1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.

3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.20 Property rights for men (C)

Tag: v2clprptym
Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

Responses:

0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.
1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.
4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.21 Property rights for women (C)

Tag: v2clprptyw

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

Responses:
0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 10.22 Property rights index (D)

Tag: v2xcl_prpty

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

Aggregation: Average (mean) of indicators focused property rights for men (v2clprptym) and women (v2clprptyw).

Responses:

- 0: Virtually no one enjoys private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some citizens enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many citizens enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of citizens enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share have much more restricted rights.
- 4: Most citizens enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
- 5: Virtually all citizens enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2clprptym v2clprptyw

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
**Access to Justice for Men (C)**

**Tag:** v2clacjstm  
**Project manager:** Svend-Erik Skaaning  
**Question:** Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?  
**Clarification:** This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.  
This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.  
**Responses:**  
0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.  
1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.  
2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.  
3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.  
4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.  
**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  
**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).  
**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.  
**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Access to Justice for Women (C)**

**Tag:** v2clacjstw  
**Project managers:** Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning  
**Question:** Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?  
**Clarification:** This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.
This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.

**Responses:**
0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**10.25 Access to Justice Index (D)**

**Tag:** v2xcl_acjst

**Project managers:** Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

**Question:** Do citizens enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

**Aggregation:** Average (mean) of indicators focused on access to justice for men (v2clacjstm) and women (v2clacjstw).

**Responses:**
0: Secure and effective access to justice is non-existent.
1: Secure and effective access to justice is usually not established or widely respected.
2: Secure and effective access to justice is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
3: Secure and effective access to justice is usually observed.
4: Secure and effective access to justice is almost always observed.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Sources:** v2clacjstm v2clacjstw

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
10.26 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C)

Tag: v2clacjust

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:
0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.
1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.
2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.
3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.
4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.27 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C)

Tag: v2clsocgrp

Project manager: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:
0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.28 Regional unevenness in respect for civil liberties (C)

Tag: v2clrgunev

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

Responses:

0: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.

1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

2: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.29 Stronger civil liberties population (C)

Tag: v2clsnmpct

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is significantly stronger than the country average?

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.
10.30 Stronger respect for civil liberties characteristics (C)

Tag: v2clrgstch

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the **country** where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is significantly **stronger**?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_1]
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgstch_21]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Scale: Nominal (v2clrgstch), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.31 Weaker civil liberties population (C)

Tag: v2clsnlpct

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is significantly weaker than the country average?

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.32 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (C)

Tag: v2clrgwkch

Project manager: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials’ respect for civil liberties is significantly weaker?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

Responses:

0: Rural. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_0]
1: Urban. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_1]
2: Areas that are less economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_2]
3: Areas that are more economically developed. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_3]
4: Inside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_4]
5: Outside the capital city. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_5]
6: North. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_6]
7: South. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_7]
8: West. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_8]
9: East. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_9]
10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_10]
11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_11]
12: Areas that are very sparsely populated. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_12]
13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_13]
14: Areas where there are indigenous populations. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_14]
15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_15]
16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_16]
17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_17]
18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_18]
19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_19]
20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_20]
21: None of the above. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2clrgwkch_21]

Answer-type: Multiple-selection.
Scale: Nominal (v2clrgwkch), or a series of dichotomous scales.
Cross-coder aggregation: Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

10.33 Civil liberties comments (C)

Tag: v2clcommnt
Project manager: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Kelly McMann
Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil liberties.
Responses: Text
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

11 Sovereignty

11.1 Sovereignty introduction (C)

Tag: v2svintro
Project manager: Michael Bernhard
This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the state. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state’s autonomy from other actors in the system.

The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

11.2 Domestic Autonomy (C)

Tag: v2svdomaut

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

Clarification: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (e.g., NATO), international organizations (e.g., the WTO), or confederations (e.g., the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

Responses:

0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power (e.g. Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (e.g., the USSR during WW II).

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet “satellite” states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.
**INTERNATIONAL AUTONOMY (C)**

*Tag:* v2svinlaut  

*Project manager:* Michael Bernhard  

*Question:* Is the state autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?  

*Responses:*  

0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).  

1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called “satellite” states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII).  

2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).  

>Data release:* 1, 2, 3.  

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
11.4 State authority over territory (C)

Tag: v2svstterr

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the state have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (e.g. opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (e.g., contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By “officially part of the country” we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

11.5 State authority over population (C)

Tag: v2svstpop

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the population does the state have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over the population. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the populations over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is
recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (e.g. opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (e.g., contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the population that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total population.

By “population” we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, the existence of Taiwan should not be considered an example of the PRC’s failure to control its territory.

Responses: Percent
Scale: Interval
Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.
Data release: 1, 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

12 Civil Society

12.1 CSOs introduction (C)
Tag: v2csintro
Project manager: Michael Bernhard

The following set of questions focus on civil society organizations (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but not businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

12.2 CSO entry and exit (C)
Tag: v2cseorgs
Project manager: Michael Bernhard
**Question:** To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

**Responses:**

0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.

1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.

2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.

3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 12.3 CSO Repression (C)

**Tag:** v2csrepress

**Project manager:** Michael Bernhard

**Question:** Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

**Responses:**
0: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

1: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin’s Russia.

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.

3: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 1 and 2 above below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.

4: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

12.4 CSO CONSULTATION (C)

Tag: v2scsconsult

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

Responses:
0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

12.5 CSO STRUCTURE (C)

Tag: v2csstruc

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

Responses:

0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs.

1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers.

2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers.

3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
12.6  CSO PARTICIPATORY ENVIRONMENT (C)

**Tag:** v2csprtcpt

**Project manager:** Michael Bernhard

**Question:** Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

**Responses:**
- 0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.
- 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.
- 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.
- 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

12.7  CORE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX (D)

**Tag:** v2xcs_ccsi

**Project manager:** Michael Bernhard

**Question:** How robust is civil society?

**Clarifications:** The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.

The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs), CSO repression (v2csreprss) and CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2csprtcpt

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.
**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 12.8 CSO WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION (C)

**Tag:** v2csgender

**Project manager:** Michael Bernhard

**Question:** Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

**Clarification:** Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women’s interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

**Responses:**
- 0: Almost always.
- 1: Frequently.
- 2: About half the time.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Almost never.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 12.9 CSO ANTI-SYSTEM MOVEMENTS (C)

**Tag:** v2csantimv

**Project manager:** Michael Bernhard

**Question:** Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

**Clarification:** An anti-system opposition movement is any movement – peaceful or armed – that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, e.g., from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a “movement” character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.

If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

**Responses:**
0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.
1: There is a only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.
2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.
3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.
4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

12.10 CSO ANTI-SYSTEM MOVEMENT CHARACTER (C)

Tag: v2csanmvch

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

Clarification: Check all that apply.

Responses:

0: Works through legal channels, for the most part. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_0]
1: Participates in elections. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_1]
2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_2]
3: Insurrectionary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_3]
4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_4]
5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices). (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_5]
6: Leftist, socialist, communist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_6]
7: Rightist, conservative, party of order. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_7]
8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_8]
9: Separatist or autonomist. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_9]
10: Religious. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_10]
11: Paramilitary. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_11]
12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, e.g., narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping. (0=No, 1=Yes) [v2csanmvch_12]

*Answer type:* Multiple-selection.

*Scale:* Nominal (v2csanmvch), or a series of dichotomous scales.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Mode, weighted by self-reported confidence.

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 12.11 Religious Organization Introduction (C)

*Tag:* v2csintro2

In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

### 12.12 Religious Organization Repression (C)

*Tag:* v2csrlgrep

*Project manager:* Michael Coppedge

*Question:* Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

*Responses:*

0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.

1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.
3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

12.13 Religious organization consultation (C)

Tag: v2csrlgcon

Project manager: Michael Coppedge

Question: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

Responses:

0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.

1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.

2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13 The Media
13.1 **MEDIA INTRODUCTION (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2meintro  
*Project manager:* Holli Semetko

Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media.

We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, “the print and broadcast media” can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

13.2 **PRINT/BROADCAST CENSORSHIP EFFORT (C)**

*Tag:* v2mecenefm  
*Project manager:* Holli Semetko

*Question:* Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

*Clarification:* Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

*Responses:*

0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.3 **INTERNET CENSORSHIP EFFORT (C)**

*Tag:* v2mecenefi
Project manager: Holli Semetko

Question: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

Clarification: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the extent of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

Responses:

0: This country has no Internet access at all.
1: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.
2: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.
3: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.
4: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.4 PRINT/BROADCAST MEDIA CRITICAL (C)

Tag: v2mecrit

Project manager: Holli Semetko

Question: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

Responses:

0: None.
1: Only a few marginal outlets.
2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.
3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.  

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).  

Data release: 1, 2, 3.  

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.5 PRINT/BROADCAST MEDIA PERSPECTIVES (C)  

Tag: v2merange  

Project manager: Holli Semetko  

Question: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?  

Responses:  
0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.  
1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.  
2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.  
3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.  

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.  

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).  

Data release: 1, 2, 3.  

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.6 FEMALE JOURNALISTS (C)  

Tag: v2mefemjrn  

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Holli Semetko  

Question: Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.  

Responses: Percent  

Scale: Interval  

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.  

Data release: 1, 2, 3.  

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
13.7 Harassment of Journalists (C)

*Tag:* v2meharjrn

*Project manager:* Holli Semetko

*Question:* Are individual journalists harassed - i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed -- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

*Responses:*

0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at [V-Dem.net](http://V-Dem.net)).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.8 Media Self-censorship (C)

*Tag:* v2meslfcen

*Project manager:* Holli Semetko

*Question:* Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

*Responses:*

0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.

1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.

2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.

3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.
Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.9 MEDIA ACCESS (C)

Tag: v2meaccess

Project manager: Holli Semetko

Question: Approximately what percentage (%) of the population has access to any print or broadcast media that are sometimes critical of the national government?

Responses: Percent

Scale: Interval

Cross-coder aggregation: Mean, with bootstrapped confidence intervals.

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.10 MEDIA BIAS (C)

Tag: v2mebias

Project manager: Holli Semetko

Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

Clarification: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered “more or less impartial” when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

Responses:

0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.

1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.

3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated amount of coverage to the governing party or candidates.

4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.11 Alternate sources of information index (D)

Tag: v2xme_altinf

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the media (a) un-biased in their coverage (or lack of coverage) of the opposition, (b) allowed to be critical of the regime, and (c) representative of a wide array of political perspectives?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media bias (v2mebias), print/broadcast media critical (v2mecrit), and print/broadcast media perspectives (v2merange).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2mebias v2mecrit v2merange

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

13.12 Media corrupt (C)

Tag: v2mecorrpt

Project manager: Holli Semetko

Question: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

Responses:

0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.

1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.

3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.

4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.
Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14 Political Equality

14.1 Political equality introduction (C)

Project manager: John Gerring

This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc. et al.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

14.2 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C)

Tag: v2pepwres

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

Responses:

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.3 Power distributed by social group (C)

Tag: v2pepwrsoc

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to social groups?

Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society – to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

Responses:

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.

4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.4 Power distributed by gender (C)

Tag: v2pepwrgen

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.5 Power distributed by sexual orientation (C)

Tag: v2pepwrort

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

Clarification: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as “heterosexual” and (B) as “LGBT.”

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power per person. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean relative to their share of the population (as near as this can be estimated).

Responses:

0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).
1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.
2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.
3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.
4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.6 Educational Equality (C)

Tag: v2peedueq

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

Responses:

0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.7 Health equality (C)

Tag: v2pehealth

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

Responses:

0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.

4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.8 Education 15+ (E)

Tag: e_peaveduc

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the average years of education among citizens older than 15?

Clarifications: The base variable is (a) Average years of education, 15+ (Morrison & Murtin 2009). Additional data is imputed from (b) Average years of educational attainment, 15+ (Narduilli, Peyton & Bajjalieh 2010 [an updating and extension of Barro & Lee 1996]), (c) Primary completion rate (World Bank 2013), (d) Secondary enrollment rate (World Bank 2013), (e) Literacy rate, 15+ (World Bank 2013), (f) Literacy rate, ages 15-24 (World Bank 2013), (g) Average years of education, 15+ (Clio-Infra). Imputations are generated by linear models – a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given consistent time-trends and high inter-correlations among the variables.

Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated, increase the number of non-missing observations for each of the afore-listed variables, as follows: (a): 888 to 8214; (b): 7179 to 8302; (c): 3914 to 5432; (d): 2001 to 3515; (e): 548 to 3171; (f): 540 to 3150; (g) 11827 to 12267.

Step 2: For each country, missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases and usually just a few years) is extrapolated. Missing data is not extrapolated backwards.

Step 3: Missing data for the base variable is imputed from other variables, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 8214 to 15401.


Data release: 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.9 University Students per 100,000 (E)

Tag: e_penstud

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Matthew Maguire

Question: How many university students are there per 100,000 inhabitants?
Clarifications: Includes universities and other higher education institutions.
Sources: Vanhanen (2003).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.10 Educational Inequality, Gini (E)

Tag: e_peedgini
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: How unequal is the level of education achieved by the population aged 15 years and older?

Clarifications: Gini coefficient of educational inequality estimated from average education data using the method as suggested by Thomas, Wang, and Fan (2000), Checchi (2004) and Castelló and Doménech (2000: 4). Van Leeuwen, van Leeuwen-Li, and Foldvari (N.d.) provide the following explanation in the Clio-Infra codebook:

“In order to convert the educational information in educational Ginis they start with

\[
G^h = \frac{1}{2H} \sum_{i=0}^{3} \sum_{j=0}^{3} |\hat{x}_i - \hat{x}_j| n_i n_j
\]

Where H is average years of schooling in the population aged 15 years and over, i and j are different levels of education, \(n_i\) and \(n_j\) are the attainment per level of education, and \(\hat{x}_i\) and \(\hat{x}_j\) are the cumulative average years of schooling at each educational level.

This equation can be rewritten as follows:

\[
G^h = n_0 \frac{n_1 x_2 (n_2 + n_3) + n_3 x_3 (n_1 + n_2)}{n_1 x_1 + n_2 (x_1 + x_2) + n_3 (x_1 + x_2 + x_3)}
\]

Where \(x\) stands for the average years of schooling per level of education (0= no education, 1= primary education, 2 = secondary education, and 3 is higher education) divided by the percentage population with at least that level of education attained. \(n_0, n_1, n_2, \) and \(n_3\) are the percentages of the population with no-, primary-, secondary-, and higher education respectively.

This equation gives the possibility to calculate the educational Gini for every year and country.”
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
14.11 INCOME INEQUALITY, GINI (E)

Tag: e_peginiwi

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: How unequal is the distribution of income?

Clarifications: Distribution of income expressed as a Gini coefficient (aka Gini index, Gini ratio). Missing data is imputed, as follows, using linear models (a reasonable imputation procedure in this instance given the stickiness of the variable of interest).

Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated.

Step 2: Missing data from the last recorded data point to 2012 (less than a decade in all cases) is filled by repeating the last observation. The number of non-missing observations is thereby increased from 4004 to 6740.

Sources: UNU-WIDER (2008).

Data release: 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.12 INFANT MORTALITY RATE (E)

Tag: e_peinfmar

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the infant mortality rate?

Clarifications: The infant mortality rate is measured as the number of deaths prior to age 1 per 1000 live births in a year. The base variable is drawn from (a) Gapminder, with additional data imputed from (b) Clio-Infra. Interpolations and imputations employ linear models.

Step 1: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated for each variable, increasing non-missing observations as follows: (a): from 11592 to 12185; (b): from 567 to 5369.

Step 2: Missing data for (a) is imputed with (b), and increasing the number of non-missing observations from 12185 to 13566.


Data release: 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
14.13 MATERNAL MORTALITY RATE (E)

*Tag:*  e_pematmor

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg

*Question:* What is the maternal mortality rate?

*Clarifications:* Maternal mortality is defined as the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy from any cause or disease associated with pregnancy. The maternal mortality rate is calculated as a ratio of 100,000 live births.

*Sources:* Gapminder (gapminder.org), drawing from various sources (unspecified).

*Data release:* 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.14 LIFE EXPECTANCY (E)

*Tag:*  e_pelifeex

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg

*Question:* What is life expectancy?

*Clarifications:* Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. The base variable is drawn from (a) Gapminder, with additional data drawn from (b) Clio-Infra. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated and imputed using linear models, as follows.

1. Step 1: Missing data is interpolated within a time-series, increasing the number of observations for (a) from 12973 to 16139 and for (b) from 1401 to 12976.
2. Step 2: Missing data for (a) is imputed with (b), increasing the number of non-missing observations from 16139 to 16674.


*Data release:* 2, 3.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.15 LIFE EXPECTANCY, MALE (E)

*Tag:*  e_pemaliex
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the life expectancy at birth for men?

Clarifications: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 1006 to 8386.


Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.16 Life expectancy, female (E)

Tag: e_pefeliex

Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the life expectancy at birth among women?

Clarifications: Life expectancy refers to expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 1004 to 8375.


Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

14.17 Height (E)

Tag: e_peheight

Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the average height of the population?

Clarifications: Average height estimates are organized by birth decade. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 907 to 10735.

Sources: Clio-infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Baten & Blum (2012).
Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**14.18 FAMILY FARMS (E)**

Tag: e_peffarm

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Matthew Maguire

Question: What percentage of (cultivated) land area is comprised of family farms?

Clarifications: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 930 to 7774.

Sources: Vanhanen (2003).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**14.19 POLITICAL EQUALITY COMMENTS (C)**

Tag: v2pecommnt

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political equality.

Responses: Text

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**BACKGROUND FACTORS**

**15 Extant (non V-Dem) Democracy Indices**

**15.1 COMPETITION (VANHANEN) (E)**

Tag: e_micomp

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Matthew Maguire

Question: What is the degree of democratic competition in a country?
Clarifications: 100 - votes/seats (%) gained by the largest political party in parliamentary elections and/or in presidential (executive) elections.
Sources: Vanhanen (2000).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.2 PARTICIPATION (VANHANEN) (E)
Tag: e_mipartic
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: What is the degree of democratic participation in a country?
Clarifications: An aggregate of the turnout in elections (percentage of the total population who voted in the same election) and the number of referendums. Each national referendum raises the value of Participation by five percentage points and each state referendum by one percentage point for the year of the referendum.
Sources: Vanhanen (2000).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.3 DEMOCRACY INDEX (VANHANEN) (E)
Tag: e_mivanhan
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: How democratic is a country?
Clarifications: Derived by multiplying Competition (Vanhanen) and Participation (Vanhanen) and then dividing this product by 100.
Sources: Vanhanen (2000).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

15.4 DEMOCRACY (BMR) (E)
v2 tag: e_mibmr
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: Is a country democratic?
Clarifications: Dichotomous democracy measure based on contestation and participation. Countries coded democratic have (1) political leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level of suffrage.

Sources: Boix, Miller, and Rosato (2013)

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

16 Geography

16.1 Land Area (E)

Tag: e_milandhm

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Matthew Maguire

Question: What is the land area of a country?

Clarifications: Country land area in square kilometers.

Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011)

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17 Economics

17.1 GDP per Capita (E)

Tag: e_migdppc

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the GDP per capita?

Clarifications: GDP refers to gross domestic production, understood on a per capita basis. The base variable is (a) Maddison (2010). Missing data is imputed from (b) GDP per capita PPP in constant 2005 international dollars (World Bank 2013). Imputations are generated with linear models – a reasonable procedure given the fairly consistent long-term time-trends and high inter-correlations among variables.

Step 1: Missing data for (a) and (b) within a time-series is interpolated.
Step 2: Missing data for (a) is imputed from (b), thereby increasing the number of non-missing observations from 10972 to 13525.

Sources: See above
Data release: 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.2 GDP per capita, logged (E)
Tag: e_migdppcln
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Michael Coppedge
Question: What is the GDP per capita, transformed by the natural logarithm?
Sources: e_migdppc
Data release: 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.3 GDP growth (E)
Tag: e_migdpgro
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg
Question: What is the GDP growth rate?
Clarifications: Estimated from the variable GDP per capita.
Sources: See GDP per capita sources.
Data release: 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.4 GDP growth (rescaled) (E)
Tag: e_migdpgro
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Michael Coppedge
Question: What is the GDP growth rate (rescaled)?
Clarifications: An S transformation of GDP growth that expands values close to zero and compresses extreme highs and lows. For positive growth, the transformation is ln(growth + 1). For negative growth, the transformation is -ln(abs(growth -1)). For display purposes only; do not use for analysis.
Sources: e_migdpgro.
Data release: 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.5 Exchange rate to US dollar (E)

Tag: e_miexraus

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the exchange rate of the local currency to the US Dollar?

Clarifications: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated with a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 10573 to 10761.

Sources: Clio-infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Officer (2011), Heston, Summers, Aten (2012), Reinhart & Rogoff (N.d.).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.6 Inflation (E)

Tag: e_miinflat

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the annual inflation rate?

Clarifications: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated with a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 9462 to 9983.


Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.7 Government bond yield (E)

Tag: e_migovbon

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the average annual percentage of long term government bond yield?

Clarifications: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 2177 to 2354.

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.8 Central Government Debt, Gross (E)

Tag: e_migovdeb

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the total gross central government debt?

Clarifications: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 5554 to 6358.

Sources: Clio-infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Reinhart & Rogoff (2010), World Bank (2013).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.9 Exports (E)

v2 tag: e_micowexp

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Matthew Maguire

Question: What is the total value of a country’s exports?

Clarifications: Total exports in current US millions of dollars.

Sources: Barbieri and Keshk (2012)

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.10 Imports (E)

v2 tag: e_micowimp

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Matthew Maguire

Question: What is the total value of a country’s imports?

Clarifications: Total imports in current US millions of dollars.

Sources: Barbieri and Keshk (2012)

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
17.11 Degree of Decentralization of Non-Agricultural Economic Resources (E)

Tag: e_midnonag  
Project manager: John Gerring  
Compiler: Matthew Maguire  

Question: What is the degree of decentralization of non-agricultural economic resources in a country?  
Sources: Vanhanen (2003).  
Data release: 3.  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.12 Food Supply (E)

v2 tag: e_mifood  
Project manager: John Gerring  
Compiler: Matthew Maguire  

Question: What is the supply of food in a country?  
Clarifications: Food supply from crops in kilocalories per capita per day.  
Sources: FAOstat (2014)  
Data release: 3.  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.13 Oil Reserves (E)

Tag: e_mioilres  
Project manager: John Gerring  
Compiler: Matthew Maguire  

Question: How much oil does a country have in reserves?  
Clarifications: Oil reserves in billions of barrels.  
Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011)  
Data release: 3.  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.14 Petroleum Production per Capita (E)

Tag: e_mipetrol  
Project manager: John Gerring  
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: What is the real value of a country’s petroleum production?
Clarifications: Real value of petroleum produced per capita.
Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.15 Coal Production Per Capita (E)
Tag: e_micoal
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: What is the real value of a country’s coal production?
Clarifications: Real value of coal produced per capita.
Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.16 Natural Gas Production Per Capita (E)
Tag: e_migas
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: What is the real value of a country’s natural gas production?
Clarifications: Real value of natural gas produced per capita.
Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.17 Petroleum, Coal, and Natural Gas Production Per Capita (E)
Tag: e_mipetcg
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: What is the real value of a country’s petroleum, coal, and natural gas production?
Clarifications: Real value of petroleum, coal, and natural gas produced per capita.
Sources: Haber and Menaldo (2011)
Data release: 3.
17.18 **Metal minerals production per capita (E)**

*Tag:* e_mimetal  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Matthew Maguire  
*Question:* What is the real value of a country’s metal minerals production?  
*Clarifications:* Real value of metal minerals produced per capita.  
*Sources:* Haber and Menaldo (2011)  
*Data release:* 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.19 **Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita (E)**

*Tag:* e_mipetcgm  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Matthew Maguire  
*Question:* What is the real value of a country’s petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production?  
*Clarifications:* Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.  
*Sources:* Haber and Menaldo (2011)  
*Data release:* 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

17.20 **Government revenues from oil, gas, and minerals (E)**

*Tag:* e_miogmrev  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Matthew Maguire  
*Question:* What percentage of a country’s government revenues come from oil, natural gas, and minerals?  
*Clarifications:* Percentage of government revenues from oil, gas, and minerals.  
*Sources:* Haber and Menaldo (2011)  
*Data release:* 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
18 Infrastructure

18.1 Radios (E)
Tag: e_miradiog
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg
Question: What is the number of radio sets?
Clarifications: Original source doesn’t specify if the indicators considers total number of radio sets or only radio sets in use.
Sources: Comin & Hobijn (2009).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

18.2 Televisions (E)
Tag: e_mitvchat
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg
Question: What is the number of television sets in circulation?
Sources: Comin & Hobijn (2009).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

18.3 Postal Items (E)
Tag: e_mipostit
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg
Question: What is the total number of items sent through the postal system annually?
Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

18.4 Telegraphs sent (E)
Tag: e_mitelsen
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg

**Question:** What is the total number (in millions) of telegraphs sent annually?  
**Sources:** CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).  
**Data release:** 3.  
**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 18.5 Railroads Length (E)

**Tag:** e_miraille  
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg  

**Question:** What is the total length (in kilometers) traversed by all railroads?  
**Sources:** CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).  
**Data release:** 3.  
**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 18.6 Railroad Passengers (E)

**Tag:** e_mirailpa  
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg  

**Question:** What is the total number of railroad passengers (in thousands) annually?  
**Sources:** CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).  
**Data release:** 3.  
**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 18.7 Railroad Passenger KM (E)

**Tag:** e_mirailkm  
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg
Question: What is the total distance (millions of kilometers) traveled by railroad by all passengers annually?

Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

18.8 Railroad freight (E)

Tag: e_miraferto
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the total railroad freight (in metric tons) carried annually?

Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

18.9 Railroads freight traffic (E)

Tag: e_mirailfr
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the total load of railroad freight traffic (million tons per kilometer) carried annually?

Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from Almanach de Gotha (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

18.10 Ships (E)

Tag: e_mishiall
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the total number of ships?
Clarifications: Includes ships of all kinds (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 18.11 Ships, Tonnage (E)

**Tag:** e_mishiton  
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg  
**Question:** What is the total weight (in thousands of tons) of all ships?  
**Clarifications:** Includes ships of all kinds (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### 18.12 Steamships (E)

**Tag:** e_mishiste  
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg  
**Question:** What is the total number of steamships?  
**Clarifications:** Includes steamships (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

Sources: CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

Data release: 3.

### 18.13 Steamships, Tonnage (E)

**Tag:** e_mishimto  
**Project manager:** John Gerring  
**Compiler:** Alejandro Avenburg
**Question:** What is the total weight of all steamships (in thousands of tons)?

**Clarifications:** Includes steamships (above a minimum weight) registered to a country that are in use at midyear.

**Sources:** CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a, 1914b, 1914c, 1914d).

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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### 18.14 Air Travel, Passenger Km (E)

*Tag:* e_miairpas  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg

**Question:** What is the total distance (in kilometers) traveled by all air passengers?

**Clarifications:** Civil aviation passenger-Km traveled on scheduled services by companies registered in the country concerned. Not a measure of travel through a country’s airports.

**Sources:** CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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### 18.15 Air Cargo, Ton/Km (E)

*Tag:* e_miaircar  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg

**Question:** What is the total air cargo (in tons/kilometer) carried annually?

**Clarifications:** Civil aviation tonnage-Km carried by scheduled services by companies registered in the country concerned. Not a measure of travel through a country’s airports.

**Sources:** CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Comin & Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).

**Data release:** 3.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
18.16 Motor Vehicles (E)

*Tag:* e_mimotveh  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg  
*Question:* What is the total number of motor vehicles in use?  
*Clarifications:* Includes trucks, tractors, buses, and passenger cars.  
*Sources:* CLIO (2014) drawn from *Almanach de Gotha* (1895), Mitchell (1998b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914a), Herbertson & Howarth (1914b), Herbertson & Howarth (1914c), Herbertson & Howarth (1914d).  
*Data release:* 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

19 Demography

19.1 Fertility Rate (E)

*Tag:* e_miferrat  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg  
*Question:* What is the fertility rate?  
*Clarifications:* The fertility rate (aka total fertility rate, period total fertility rate, total period fertility rate) of a population is the mean number of children that would be born to a woman over her lifetime if (a) she were to experience the current age-specific fertility rates through her lifetime, and (b) she were to survive through the end of her reproductive life. It is obtained by adding single-year age-specific rates at a given time.  
*Sources:* Gapminder drawn from various sources (unspecified).  
*Data release:* 2, 3.  
*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

19.2 Population (E)

*Tag:* e_mipopula  
*Project manager:* John Gerring  
*Compiler:* Alejandro Avenburg  
*Question:* What is the total population (in millions)?
Clarifications: Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 3969 to 20979.

Sources: Clio-infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Goldewijk, Beusen, Janssen (2010), History Database of Global Environment (www.pbl.nl/hyde).

Data release: 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

19.3 Population (Logged) (E)

Tag: e_mipopulog

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Michael Coppedge

Question: What is the total population, transformed by the base 10 logarithm?

Sources: e_mipopula

Data release: 2, 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

19.4 Urban Population (E)

Tag: e_miurbpop

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: What is the total urban population?

Clarifications: The United Nations (from where Clio-Infra obtained data for years after 1950) defines urban population as the population living in areas classified as urban according to the criteria of each area or country. No definition for urban population is provided by sources used by Clio-Infra for years prior to 1950. Missing data within a time-series is interpolated using a linear model, increasing the number of non-missing observations from 3969 to 20979.


Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

19.5 Urbanization (E)

Tag: e_miurbani
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg
Question: What is the urbanization rate?
Clarifications: Ratio of Urban Population to Population.
Sources: See Population and Urban population.
Data release: 2, 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

19.6 NON-AGRICULTURAL POPULATION % (E)
Tag: e_minonagr
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Matthew Maguire
Question: What percentage of the population work in non-agricultural occupations?
Clarifications: 100 - agricultural workers (%).
Sources: Vanhanen (2003).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

20 Conflict

20.1 ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL (E)
Tag: e_miinteco
Project manager: John Gerring
Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg
Question: Did the country participate in an international armed conflict?
Clarifications: Coded 1 if the country participated in an international armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.
Sources: Clio-infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).
Data release: 3.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
20.2 ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNAL (E)

Tag: e_miinterc

Project manager: John Gerring

Compiler: Alejandro Avenburg

Question: Did the country experience an internal armed conflict?

Clarifications: Coded 1 if the country suffered in an internal armed conflict in a given year, 0 otherwise. The original source codebook (Brecke 2001) states that no war is coded as 0 and war is coded as 1. However, the data contains only 1’s along with missing data (no 0’s). Following the authors’ instructions (personal communication), we re-code missing observations as non-conflict (0) for countries where at least one year in the original times series (which runs from 1500 until present) was coded as 1.

Sources: Clio-infra (clio-infra.eu), drawing on Brecke (2001).

Data release: 3.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

GLOSSARY

CIVIL SOCIETY

An organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and private life. Civil society is composed of voluntary associations of people joined together in common purpose. Four varieties of organizations should NOT be considered part of civil society:

(A) Any organization that has forced membership for some class of people (e.g. transmission belt organizations under totalitarian, post-totalitarian regimes, or authoritarian regimes).

(B) Economic firms (whether private or public). However, if owners or workers of firms organize for their mutual interest such organizations are part of civil society. Illustration – General Motors is not part of civil society, but any producers association it takes part in, or any labor union which its workers belong to, clearly is.

(C) Those parts of religious organizations devoted to the practice of spirituality. However, organizations devoted to social or political ends that are based in common religious belief or affiliation (the Moral Majority, CARE, American Friends Service Committee, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Anti-Defamation League, or the Council on American-Islamic Relations) are clearly part of civil society. To clarify: the Catholic Church should not be considered a civil society organization, but in many societies there are a multitude of Catholic organizations, linked to the Church in varying degrees, that are a part of civil society. Such public activities even when physically housed in places
of worship should be considered civil society organizations (e.g., charitable or social action committees that are physically located on ecclesiastical property).

(D) Criminal Associations. Such associations may influence or even capture elements within the state or political society. They are not to be considered part of civil society. Examples include narcotics cartels, smuggling organizations, and slavery networks. Civic associations that are declared criminal by political authorities for carrying out civic or political activities should not be conflated with criminal associations.

COUNTRY

A sovereign state or semi-sovereign territory. All political units of concern to V-Dem are referred to as countries, even though their status in international law varies – some being colonies others being nation-states or empires.

DISADVANTAGE

Refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, a group or individual is judged disadvantaged if their annual income is significantly below the median national income.

GOVERNMENT

The executive branch of the government, including its head of state (HOS) and/or head of government (HOG) - whichever is most prominent, or both if they are both powerful - along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants. We are only concerned here with the government that actually resides within the country or semi-sovereign territory. Thus, in a typical British colony the government would include the governor-general and his local administration but not the King/Queen of England or government of England.

HEAD OF GOVERNMENT (HOG)

A head of government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of its government, typically presiding over a cabinet. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions respect to the head of government that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local prime minister in a British colony, not the King/Queen of England).

HEAD OF STATE (HOS)

A head of state (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions with respect to the head of state that is seated within the territory in question (such as the governor-general in a British colony, not the King/Queen of England).
**HIGH COURT**

By high court we mean the constitutional court of your country or the highest ordinary court. Specifically, if your country has a constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to that court. If there is no constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to the country's highest ordinary court. For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and in Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. If the state is a federation, please focus on the federal judiciary. Finally, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to highest ordinary court seated within the territory in question, not abroad (i.e., do not consider a colonial court like the Privy Council for British Colonies).

**IDENTITY GROUP**

An identity group is any group within a society that is defined in non-economic terms, i.e., by caste, ethnicity, gender, language, race, region, religion, sexuality, or some combination thereof. Contrast social group.

**LEGISLATURE**

A collective body, commonly associated with national governments, having the formal right to propose, amend, enact, and repeal legislation that is binding for the entire political unit. It is typically distinct from other branches of government such as the judiciary and the executive. Advisory bodies that do not have the formal authority to legislate—as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent—are not considered legislatures.

Legislative bodies typically have the power to decide on one or more of the following:

- National budget
- Domestic taxation
- International treaty ratification
- Instituting states of emergency
- Declaring war
- Territorial integrity and national sovereignty
- Executive oversight

Membership of a legislative body may be the result of a popular election, selection by lower level bodies, or appointment by representatives of the executive. A legislature may be organized as one or more chambers, often though not always, having distinct responsibilities.
A legislature is a permanent body, considered to exist from the day it has first convened until the end of its legal mandate; or until another date when the body is dissolved for another reason or when it is practically incapacitated during protracted states of emergency, civil wars, or similar conditions; or when its legal existence is eliminated by a suspension of the constitutional order.

**LOCAL GOVERNMENT**

The lowest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. Situated below regional government (if there is a regional government). Refers to government at the level of towns, cities, and counties/communes (all-inclusive).

**LOWER CHAMBER**

The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," typically means the more numerous chamber that is also more directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

**NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

The highest level of aggregation recognized by the V-Dem project. Refers to the national government of a sovereign state or the territorial level of government for a semi-sovereign colony or territory. Thus, the “national” government of India prior to independence – the British Raj – was situated in New Delhi, not in London – even though decisions affecting the Indian colony were often made in London.

**ORDINARY COURT**

A court with general jurisdiction or a court with civil and/or criminal jurisdiction.

**POLITICAL PARTY**

An organization that nominates candidates for public office. The term includes a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituencies then it should be considered the same organization.

**POPULAR ELECTION**

A process of direct leadership selection in which voters choose parties or individuals to serve in executive offices or as representatives in legislative or constitutional assemblies.
The only accepted mediation is the situation where voters select a body of electors, who are pledged to support specific candidates, and whose sole purpose is to intermediate the leadership selection process, as in US presidential elections.

The electorate (those allowed to vote) in a popular election may include all adult citizens or it may be restricted to particular groups (e.g., men, property holders, racial or ethnic groups). The extent of suffrage is not what qualifies an election as popular (so long as the number of voters is much larger than the number of representatives being selected). Likewise, the freeness or fairness of an election is not at issue. A popular election may be restricted to a single party or candidate, for example, but does not include referendums on term extensions for incumbents.

**PUBLIC AUTHORITIES**

Includes the government as well as subnational governments, agencies, para-statals, and the like. Compare State.

**REGIONAL GOVERNMENT**

The second-highest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. A regional government is situated below the national government. Regional units may be referred to as cantons, departments, provinces, regions, or states. Note that some countries are so small that they do not have regional governments, or did not have regional governments for some portion of the 20th century.

**SEMI-sovereign Territory**

This refers to a country that is not fully sovereign but nonetheless exercises some – at least minimal – level of self-determination. Many of the countries of concern to this project began as colonies of an empire. If a country moved from semi-sovereign status to sovereign status over the course of the twentieth century – maintaining comparable borders – then we want to code both entities. Likewise, we want to include countries like Taiwan that are not universally recognized as sovereign but nonetheless enjoy self-determination (in part or in full).

Most questions pertaining to semi-sovereign territories ask you to reflect on the practices and institutions located within that territory – rather than the empire or nation-state that may claim ultimate sovereignty over the territory. Thus, a question about the government or judicial bodies seated within a British colony would refer to the governor-general and his local administration rather than the King/Queen or government of England.

**SOCIAL GROUP**

A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined
and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely
to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of
multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a
society that are understood – by those residing within that society – to be different, in
ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast Identity group.

**Specialized Court**

Specialized courts have jurisdiction restricted to particular areas of the law outside of
criminal and civil law. Examples of specialized courts include administrative, commercial,
immigration or environmental courts. We exclude constitutional courts from this category.

**State**

A political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a
continual basis.

**Upper Chamber**

The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the
"first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly
representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory,
such as a colony, please consider the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within
the territory in question (such as the “senate” or upper chamber of a local legislative
assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).
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APPENDIX A: Post-Survey Questionnaire

POST-SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE INTRODUCTION (A)(B)(C)
Tag: v2zzint1
Project manager: John Gerring
Please answer this set of questions after you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

TODAY’S DATE (A)(B)(C)
Tag: v2zzdate
Project manager: John Gerring
Question: What is today’s date?
Responses: Date

GENDER (A)(B)(C)
Tag: v2zzgender
Project manager: John Gerring
Question: What is your gender?
Responses:
0: Male
1: Female

EDUCATION (A)(B)(C)
Tag: v2zzedlev
Project manager: John Gerring
Question: What is your level of education?
Responses:
0: None.
1: Incomplete primary.
2: Primary completed.
3: Incomplete secondary.
4: Secondary completed.
5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.
6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.
7: University undergraduate degree completed.
8: Masters degree (MA).
9: Ph.D.
10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

**Current Educational Status (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2zzcurred

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Question:* Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

*Responses:*

0: No.
1: Yes.

**Country of Education (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2zzedcnt

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Question:* In which country are you currently attending school or – if no longer in school – in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (e.g., BA, MA, PhD)?

*Responses:* Country (chosen from menu)

**Year of Birth (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2zzborn

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Question:* In what year were you born?

*Responses:* Numeric

**Country of Birth (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2zzbornin

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Question:* In which country were you born?

*Responses:* Country (chosen from menu)

**Country of Residence (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag:* v2zzreside
Project manager: John Gerring  

**Question:** In what country do you live today?  

**Clarification:** If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.  

**Responses:** Country (chosen from menu)

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**YEARS IN COUNTRY (B)(C)**  

*Tag:* v2zztimein  

**Project manager:** John Gerring  

**Question:** How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?  

**Clarification:** Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".  

**Responses:** Numeric

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**YEARS AWAY FROM COUNTRY (B)(C)**  

*Tag:* v2zyrsout  

**Project manager:** John Gerring  

**Question:** How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?  

**Clarification:** If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".  

**Responses:** Numeric

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**COUNTRY OF EMPLOYER OR UNIVERSITY (B)(C)**  

*Tag:* v2zzempcnt  

**Project manager:** John Gerring  

**Question:** Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?  

**Responses:**  

0: No.  
1: Yes.  
2: Unemployed/Retired.
EMPLOYER (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzemploy

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: For whom do you currently work?

Responses:

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.
1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).
2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.
3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.
4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.
5: A public university.
6: A private university.
7: A private-sector company.
8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.
9: Full-time student.
10: Other.

ROLE IN PROJECT (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzrole

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: What is your primary role in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project?

Responses:

0: Research assistant coding (or entering) factual data across many countries – type (A) coder.
1: Country research assistant – type (B) coder.
2: Country expert – type (C) coder.
3: Research assistant working at University of Gothenburg.
4: Research assistant working at University of Notre Dame.
5: Other research assistant.
6: Regional manager (RM).
7: Project manager (PM).
8: Principal investigator (PI).
9: Not sure.

DEMOCRACY SCORES (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzdemoc

Project manager: John Gerring
**Question:** What democracy score would you assign to the following countries on a 0-100 scale?

**Clarification:** Imagine a scale that measures the degree of democracy-autocracy in countries around the world today, stretching from 0 to 100. 0 represents the most extreme autocracy in the world today and 100 represents the most democratic country in the world today.

These scores are meant to represent the actual state of regimes across the world today, not ideal-types. Thus, countries could become, over time, more autocratic than the most autocratic country in the world today, or more democratic than the most democratic country today. And they may have been so in the past. All we are concerned about here is the state of regimes at the current time.

Because some regimes are undergoing rapid change, it is important to clarify a specific date. Your coding should reflect the state of democracy in a country on 1 January, 2012.

In assigning scores we ask that you apply your understanding of democracy. This need not accord with the vision of democracy embraced by extant indices (Freedom House, Polity, et al.) or with the perspective of the V-Dem project (which embraces a variety of models of democracy).

All we ask is that you consider democracy-autocracy on a unidimensional scale. Of course, we realize that democracy is much more complicated than this. But we feel nonetheless that important information can be captured in a single dimension and we want to know how you view the subject.

We realize that you know more about some of these countries than about others. Do not be concerned by this. Simply enter the score that represents your best estimate.

**Responses:**

- 0: The country you worked on Range (Regional managers (RMs) should insert here the country that they know best within the region they are assigned to work on. Leave this question blank if you are working on numerous countries across multiple regions.)
- 1: Costa Rica Range
- 2: Cuba Range
- 3: India Range
- 4: Nigeria Range
- 5: North Korea Range
- 6: Russia Range
- 7: Saudi Arabia Range
- 8: South Africa Range
- 9: Sweden Range
- 10: Switzerland Range
- 11: United Kingdom Range
- 12: United States Range
13: Venezuela Range

Answer type: Multiple-input. Note for interpretation of data: In the online version of this question the country IDs listed above are recorded in the confidence field because the country_id corresponds to that of the country coded in other surveys. In the Excel version for lateral coders, however, confidence is listed as 99 for all answers and the country_ids are the correct country_ids for any countries that were selected. In both survey formats, countries that were skipped have a score of -999 in the code field. No confidence is recorded for this question in either format.

FREE MARKETS (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzfremrk

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Consider the following statement: “The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society.” How strongly do you agree or disagree?

Responses:

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY INTRODUCTION (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzint2

Project manager: John Gerring

There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy – electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, i.e., how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say “democracy,” what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY SYMPATHY (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzelcdem
**Project manager:** John Gerring

**Question:** The electoral principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

**Clarification:** The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate’s approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, e.g., civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

**Responses:**

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

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**LIBERAL DEMOCRACY SYMPATHY (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag: v2zzlibdem*

**Project manager:** John Gerring

**Question:** The liberal principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

**Clarification:** The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

**Responses:**

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

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**MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY SYMPATHY (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag: v2zzmajdem*

**Project manager:** John Gerring
Question: The majoritarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary rather than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

Responses:
- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

Consensus democracy sympathy (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzcondem

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: The consensus principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

Responses:
- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

Participatory democracy sympathy (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzprtdem

Project manager: John Gerring
Question: The participatory principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

Deliberative democracy sympathy (A)(B)(C)

Tag: v2zzdeldem

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: The deliberative principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

Responses:
0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

**Egalitarian Democracy Sympathy (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag: v2zzegldem*

*Project manager: John Gerring*

*Question:* The egalitarian principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

*Clarification:* The egalitarian principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups – as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics – should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

*Responses:*

0: Strongly disagree.
1: Somewhat disagree.
2: Neither agree nor disagree.
3: Somewhat agree.
4: Strongly agree.

**Post-Survey Questionnaire Comments (A)(B)(C)**

*Tag: v2zzcoment*

*Project manager: John Gerring*

*Question:* Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions.

*Responses:* Text
APPENDIX B: Background Notes


We list the V-Dem project manager who constructed the indicators for that topic and is primarily responsible for their collection, experts on these topics (scholars whose work has influenced our thinking, some of whom were personally consulted in the process of devising these indicators), organizations that collect data on these subjects (if any), and extant studies or datasets that relate to the subject.

CIVIL LIBERTY

Project manager: Sven-Erik Skaaning


Studies, datasets: Annual Reports (Amnesty International); Annual Reports (Human Rights Watch); Arat (1991); Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation); Cederman et al. (2009); Cingranelli & Richards (1999; n.d.); Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit, Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House); Freedom House (2006); Gibney & Dalton (1996); Green (2001); Landman (2004); Landman, Carvalho (2009); Skaaning (2006a, 2006b, 2008); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State).

CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Experts: Sheri Berman (Barnard College), Lena Blomstrand (Head of Civil Society Center, Sida), David Campbell (Notre Dame), Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard), Andrew Green
(independent scholar), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Marc Howard (Georgetown), Jude Howell (Director, Centre for Civil Society, LSE), Jan Kubik (Rutgers), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Susan Stokes (Yale), Lucan Way (University of Toronto), Meredith Weiss (SUNY Albany).

Organizations: Center for Civil Society (UCLA), Centre for Civil Society (LSE), Civil Society Center (Sida, Sweden), National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC), Center for Civil Society and Democracy (Georgetown), Center for Civil Society Studies (Johns Hopkins University).

Studies, datasets: Anheier (2004); Andrew Green (proposal); The Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project,1 Ekiert, Kubik (2001); Helmke, Levitsky (2004); Civil Society Index (CIVICUS); Civil Society Ratings (the Civil Society Center at Sida and Helmut K. Anheier); European Social Survey; Freedom House; Nations in Transit; The U.S. “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” Survey;2 World Values Survey.

Deliberation

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg
Experts: Andre Bächtiger (University of Luzern), John Dryzek (ANU), Jurg Steiner (UNC, Chapel Hill).

Studies, datasets: Bächtiger (2005); Dryzek (2009); Mutz (2008); Ryfe (2005); Steiner et al. (2004); Thompson (2008).

Direct Democracy

Project manager: David Altman
Experts: Shaun Bowler (UC Riverside), Anita Breuer (Cologne), Todd Donovan (Western Washington), Markus Freitag (Konstanz), Archon Fung (Kennedy School of Gov, Harvard), Elisabeth Gerber (Michigan), Sara Hobolt (Oxford), Simon Hug (Geneve), John Matsusaka (USC), Maija Setälä (Turku), Caroline J. Tolbert (Iowa), Adrian Vatter (Zurich).

Organizations: Centre for Democracy (C2D), IRI-USA.

Studies, datasets: Suchmaschine für direkte Demokratie; National Conference of State Legislatures (US only).

Elections

Project manager: Staffan I. Lindberg

1 www.ccss.jhu.edu/index.php?section: content&view: 9&sub: 3
2 www.uscidsurvey.org/
Experts: Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University, Bremen), Jörgen Elklit (Aarhus U., Denmark), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Susan Hyde (Yale), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Judith Kelly (Duke), Gerry Munck (USC), Andrew Reynolds (UNC), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Rakesh Sharma (IFES).

Organizations: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Carter Center, IFES, National Democratic Institute (NDI), OAS Department of Cooperation and Electoral Observation.

Studies, datasets: Bjørnlund (2004); Carter Center et al. (2005); Elklit, Reynolds (2005); Eriksson (2002); European Union (2007); Gerken (2009); Hyde & Malinov (2009); Kelley, Kolev (2010); Kollman et al. (2011); Lindberg (2009); Munck (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); Project on International Election Monitoring; Schedler (2006).

EXECUTIVE

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Experts: Kirk Bowman (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Carey (Dartmouth), Steven Fish (UC Berkeley), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Fabrice Lehoucq (UNC Greensboro), Gerardo Munck (USC), Anibal Perez-Linan (U. of Pittsburgh), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Matthew Shugart (UCSD).

Studies, datasets: Amorim Neto (1998); the ARCHIGOS project (Goemans, Gleditsch, Chiozza 2009); Banks (2009); Bienen & van de Walle (1991); Bowman, Lehoucq & Mahoney (2005); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) (Elkins et al. 2009); van Cranenburgh (2008); DPI (Beck et al. 2000); the ACLP dataset (Cheibub et al. 2009); Henisz (2000; 2002); the Institutions and Elections Project, IAEP (Regan et al. 2009); Lentz (1994; 1999); Metcalf (2000); Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (dataset); Schemmel (rulers.org); Siaroff (2003); UNDP (2004: 77-84); worldstatesmen.org.

JUDICIARY

Project manager: Jeffrey Staton

Experts: Vanessa Baird (Colorado-Boulder), Rebecca Bill-Chavez (Navy), Dan Brinks (UT-Austin), Clifford J. Carrubba (Emory), Matthew Gabel (Washington U.), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Jeffrey Lax (Columbia), Andrew Martin (Washington U.), Georg Vanberg (UNC).

Organizations: Human Rights Watch; The World Justice Project (American Bar Association); World Bank. See also organizations listed under Civil Liberties.

Studies, datasets: American Bar Association (2007); Bertelsmann (2008); Carrubba, Gabel, Helmke, Martin, Staton (2008); Cingranelli and Richards (2008); Clague et al (1999); Elkins and Ginsburg (2009); Executive Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report (available for 80 countries in 2002); Feld and Voigt (2003); Gwartney and Lawson (2007); Henisz (2000); Howard and Carey (2004); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi
(2007); Keith (2002); La Porta et al (2004); Ríos-Figueroa (2006); Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2009); Tate and Keith (2007); Tate et al (2002); Vera Institute of Justice (2003).

LEGISLATURE

Project managers: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig
Experts: Joel Barkan (University of Iowa), John Carey (Dartmouth), Scott Desposato (UCSD), John Huber (Columbia), Mark Jones (Rice), Lanny Martin (Rice), Robert Mattes (U. of Cape Town), Scott Morgenstern (U. of Pittsburgh), Shaheen Mozaffar (Bridgewater State College).
Organizations: IPU.
Studies, datasets: African Legislatures Project (ALP); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); Fish, Kroenig (2009).

MEDIA

Project manager: Holli Semetko
Experts: Devra Moehler (Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania), Erik Nisbet (Ohio State), Pippa Norris (Kennedy School of Government); Wisdom Tettey (University of Calgary).
Organizations: IREX.
Studies, datasets: IREX Media Sustainability Index (www.irex.org/msi/index.asp); Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index; Index of internet freedom (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University).

PARTIES

Project manager: Allen Hicken
Experts: Stefano Bartolini (EU Institute, Florence), Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley), Kenneth Janda (Northwestern), Mark Jones (Rice), Richard S. Katz (Johns Hopkins University), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Herbert Kitschelt (Duke), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Peter Mair (EU Institute, Florence), Karen Remmer (Duke), Kenneth Roberts (Cornell), Erik Wibbels (Duke).
Studies, datasets: John Carey (dataset); Comparative Manifestoes Project; Michael Coppedge (classification of Latin American parties); DPI (Beck et al. 2000); Kenneth Janda (dataset); Wiesehomeier-Benoit (dimensions of party competition), CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).

POLITICAL EQUALITY

Project manager: John Gerring
Experts: Kathryn Hochstetler (University of New Mexico), Ayesha Jalal (History and Sociology, Tufts), Raúl Madrid (Texas-Austin), Mick Moore (Center for the Future State/Institute for Development Studies, Sussex), Alex Pacek (Texas A&M), Deborah Yashar (Princeton).

SOVEREIGNTY

Project manager: Michael Bernhard
Experts: Karen Adams (U. of Montana), Tanisha Fazal (Columbia), Erik Gartzke (UCSD), Robert Jackson (Boston University), Stephen Krasner (Stanford), Douglas Lemke (Penn State), Kunle Owolabi (Villanova).
Organizations: Correlates of War project.
Studies, datasets: Karen Adams (dataset); Correlates of War (dataset); List of Independent States (Gleditsch, Ward)³.

SUBNATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Project manager: Kelly McMann
Experts: Andrew Barnes (Kent State University), Caroline Beer (University of Vermont), Karen Beckwith (Case Western Reserve University), Dan Berger (University of Chicago), Justin Buchler (Case Western Reserve University), Ernesto Calvo (University of Maryland, College Park), Rebecca Bill Chavez (U.S. Navel Academy), Todd Eisenstadt (American University), Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato), Agustina Giraudy (American University), Brian Grodsky (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Matt Ingram (State University of New York, Albany), Pierre Landry (University of Pittsburgh), Tomila Lankina (De Montfort University), Alfred Montero (Carleton College), Bryon Morasky (University of Florida), Nikolai Petrov (Carnegie Center Moscow), Elizabeth Remick (Tufts University), Karen Remmer (Duke University), Aseema Sinha (Claremont-McKenna College), Oxana Shevel (Tufts Unviersity), Lily Tsai (MIT)
Studies, datasets: Ammons (2001); Bardhan, Mookherjee (2006); Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan (1997); Campbell (2003); Clark, Hoffmann-Martinit (1998); Commonwealth Local Government Forum⁴; Council of Europe (Local democracy reports for member states)⁵; Crook, Manor (1998); Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project; Globalization and World Cities; John (2001); Kaufmann, Leautier, Mastruzzi (2005); McCarney, Stren (2003); Montero, Samuels (2004); Municipal Development Partnership (PDM, seat in

³ //PRIVATEWWW.ESSEX.AC.UK/~KSG/STATELIST.HTML
⁴ WWW.CLGF.ORG.UK
⁵ WWW.COE.INT
Cotonou, Benin); Olowu, Wunsch (2003); Oxhorn (2004); Soos (2002); UN Habitat (various years); World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy, aka the Gold Report.

**VOTING AND REPRESENTATION**

*Project manager:* Pamela Paxton, Megan Reif

*Experts:* Kenneth Bollen (UNC), Drude Dahlerup (Stockholm), Matt Golder (Florida State U.), (Rochester), Melanie Hughes (Pittsburgh); Tatu Vanhanen (University of Tampere, Finland, emeritus).

*Organizations:* IDEA, IPU, U.S. Department of State.

*Studies, datasets:* Cederman et al. (2009); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); IDEA (Global Survey of Voter Turnout); IDEA Quota Database; Moon et al. (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Paxton et al. (2003); Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2008); US Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service (2001); U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports; Vanhanen (2000).

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6 [WWW.PDM-NET.ORG](http://WWW.PDM-NET.ORG)

7 [WWW.CITIES-LOCALGOVERNMENTS.ORG/GOLD/INDEX.ASP?L](http://WWW.CITIES-LOCALGOVERNMENTS.ORG/GOLD/INDEX.ASP?L)