About V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. V-Dem’s multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges the complexity of the concept of democracy. The V-Dem project distinguishes among five high-level principles of democracy: electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian, which are disaggregated into lower-level components and specific indicators.

Key features of V-Dem:

- Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 22 lower-level components of democracy such as regular elections, judicial independence, direct democracy, and gender equality, consisting of more than 400 distinct and precise indicators;
- Covers all countries and dependent territories from 1900 to the present and provides an estimate of measurement reliability for each rating;
- Makes all ratings public, free of charge, through a user-friendly interface.

With four Principal Investigators, two Project Coordinators, fifteen Project Managers, more than thirty Regional Managers, almost 200 Country Coordinators, several Assistant Researchers, and approximately 2,600 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science data collection projects with a database of over 15 million data points. The database makes highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects of democracy in a country, while also allowing for summary comparisons between countries based on aggregated indices for different dimensions of democracy. Users from anywhere are able to use the V-Dem online analysis tools which can be found at the project's website. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs can benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such as selecting country program priorities, informing program designs and monitoring impact of their programs.

Methodology:

Unlike extant data collection projects, which typically use a small group of experts who rate all countries or ask a single expert to code one country, the V-Dem project has recruited over 2,600 local and cross-national experts to provide judgments on various indicators about democracy. The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factual information from existing data sources about constitutional regulations and de jure situation with expert coding for questions that require evaluation. Experts’ ratings are aggregated through an advanced statistical model that takes into account the possibilities that experts may make mistakes and have different scales in mind when coding. In addition, bridge-coders - experts who code multiple countries - are recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates cross-nationally.1

1 For further details and information about the V-Dem methodology, see http://v-dem.net.
South Korea

Introduction

This V-Dem data brief illustrates the democratic development of South Korea from 1900 to 2014. The purpose is to provide a concise overview of the V-Dem data collected for South Korea. The historical development of the five V-Dem principles of democracy - electoral, liberal, egalitarian, deliberative and participatory - is analyzed, accompanied by an overview of the female rights index. In addition, the brief delves further into the different components and detailed indicators of the main principles of democracy. We anticipate that this brief will be a useful resource for policy-makers, practitioners and citizen-led democracy assessments.

South Korea officially declared its independence on 13 August 1948, and two days later the country was formally established. The country was under Japanese rule from 1910 until 1945 when Japan was defeated in World War II. Following the Japanese occupation, the country was divided with the United States administering in the south and the Soviet Union in the north, in accordance with a United Nations arrangement. Due to disagreement between the two countries, two separate governments were established in 1948 and both governments declared themselves as the legitimate and true government over the whole country. Following the Korean War, the two governments turned into what we consider to be North and South Korea today.

The history of South Korea is characterized by alternating democratic and autocratic periods of rule. The country's governments are numbered from the First Republic to the current Sixth Republic and vary greatly in their levels of democracy.

The First Republic was initially largely democratic, but became increasingly autocratic over time.

The Second Republic offered a high level of democracy, but was overthrown by the autocratic military regime within a year of taking power. The following Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics were seemingly democratic, but they were generally regarded as extensions of military rule. A gradual democratic stabilization is taking place during the current rule of the Sixth Republic.

Principles of Democracy

The radar chart below in Figure 1, offers a quick overview of the five V-Dem indices of democracy in South Korea at four different points in time: 1905, 1950, 1995 and 2014. All indices in the figure range from 0 to 1, where a score of 0 suggests that a country did not evince the characteristics of democracy relevant to this particular index at this point in time, while 1 corresponds to the best possible situation for this index, according to the V-Dem measures.

In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component of democracy is fundamental and understood as an essential element of the other principles of representative democracy - liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian; without it, we cannot call a regime "democratic". However, we recognize that countries can have "democratic qualities", without being democracies. As a result, the aggregation formulae for all high-level principles of democracy include the measure of electoral democracy. Thus, for example, "Participatory Democracy" is a composite score of the electoral and the participatory components.

Figure 1. Principles of Democracy Indices

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2 All indicators and indices can be found in Glossary of Terms in Appendix I. For an overview of the structure of the indices, please see Appendix II.
In the beginning of the 20th century, the level of democracy in South Korea is nearly nonexistent with scores of 0 on all five high-level indices. A certain degree of democratic development, mainly in terms of the electoral aspect, takes place between 1905 and 1950. Deliberative and participatory democracy, on the other hand, have not experienced much change when one looks at the scores in 1905 and 1950. The largest democratic enhancement across all indices can be noted when comparing 1950 to 1995. The country achieves scores of almost .8 in terms of electoral and egalitarian democracy, suggesting that rulers are generally being held responsible by their citizens through electoral competition, that political and civil society organizations are able to operate freely, and that there is freedom of expression. In addition, the distribution of political power across social groups is largely equal.

The liberal democracy score increases from 2 in 1950 to .6 in 1995, and the deliberative democracy score from around 0 to .6. Hence, the protection of individual and minority rights against the “tyranny of the state” and public deliberation between political elites and the citizens have advanced, although there is still room for improvement. The country is least democratic in the participatory sense, where a score of only .5 is achieved in 1995. The participatory principle of democracy reflects the active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. No substantial improvements have taken place between 1995 and 2014.

In Figure 2 below, we look further into the aforementioned indices and graph the components that go into the five higher level principles indices of democracy: the electoral, liberal, egalitarian, participatory and deliberative aspects. The development of these components in South Korea over more than one hundred years is displayed together with the female rights index³.

³ The scale of each index and indicator is specified within parentheses in the legend of each figure. In all indicators and indices graphed, a lower score corresponds to a less democratic level, while a higher score suggests a more democratic level. Please see Appendix I for more information on each of the indicators and indices.
The democracy components in **Figure 2**, reflect a rather volatile development in South Korea over time. However, a few general trends are evident. The first large improvement in terms of democratic development takes place in relation to independence from Japan in 1948, where a significant improvement is noticed among the different components, although to varying extents. The largest change takes place in terms of egalitarian, electoral and liberal democracy. Great enhancement in terms of *female rights* is also evident. Improvements in terms of public deliberation and political participation are more gradual over time.

Another spike, reflected in many of the components, takes place in 1959-1960, marking the end of the First Republic and the beginning of the Second Republic. The more democratic Second Republic is only in place for less than a year, explaining the drop that followed for the country across many of the components.

In the mid- to late 1980s a steep democratic improvement can be seen across all components. This reflects a period in which millions of citizens, mainly students, carried out massive anti-government protests as part of the June Democracy Movement in 1987. This was the same month that the government announced the Declaration of Political Reforms, including a call for direct presidential elections and a respect of civil rights. Later that same year a referendum approved a revised constitution and direct presidential elections were held. At this point, and in the few years that followed, even into the 90s, South Korea reached .8 or above in all democracy components, except for the *participatory* which presents a score of .6. Since the end of the 90s, the country has remained on approximately the same levels across all components.

In order to track down more specific aspects within these various democratic developments, we further explore each of the six components of democracy to take a closer look at the indicators and indices constituting them.

### The Electoral Component

The V-Dem electoral democracy component index measures the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections; whether political and civil society organizations can operate freely; whether elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and whether the chief
executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections. **Figure 3** displays the four sub-indices that constitute the **electoral component index**.

The indices in **Figure 3**, display a volatile development over time during a period of political instability reflected in the data.

The first general elections, both to the Constitutional Assembly and to the presidential post after the Japanese colonization, are held in 1948. As reflected above, the elections introduce universal suffrage and the direct election of a president by the people. The **clean elections index**, however, suggests that these elections, and the ones that followed over the next 30 years, were plagued by registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. Just before and during independence, a substantial increase occurred in terms of extended freedom of association, indicating that parties, including parties of the opposition, were allowed to organize and to participate in elections to a larger extent than before, and that civil society organizations could organize and operate more freely within the society.

For the 1960 presidential election allegations were made that the election results had been manipulated and that widespread corruption was occurring. This led to the protests that developed into the April Revolution. The election was annulled, and the incumbent president went into exile while the First Republic collapsed. Although the Second Republic was more democratic in nature, it was short-lived and followed by military rule between 1961 and 1963. The events of political instability are displayed in the **freedom of association index**, which shows a significant drop before bouncing back to the middle of the scale. Further political turmoil followed the 1971 elections, in which the re-elected incumbent president Park Chung-hee declared a state of emergency partly due to the threat of the opposition gaining the most seats. He further opened up for a reunification with North Korea, which was never implemented, dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the country’s constitution. When this kind of period of instability occurs, it decreases the quality of elections, freedom of association and the direct election of the executive.

After 1980, stability and a sharp improvement in terms of freedom of association take place and the country reaches a score of over .8. Since 1980, the executive has also been directly elected. During the 90s, elections became increasingly free and fair, and by the turn of the century, the
country had reached a score of .9 on the scale. A slight downward trend has taken place in recent years and could be something to keep an eye on in the future.

The Liberal Component

The liberal dimension of democracy embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the state.” This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties and strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances by the judiciary and the legislature which limit the use of executive power.

The liberal democracy component, displayed in Figure 4, includes three indices: equality before the law and individual liberty, legislative constraints on the executive, and judicial constraints on the executive. The three indices follow a similar development over time, yet on different levels. Following independence, the judicial equality and individual liberty for South Korean citizens have increased substantially. Laws have become increasingly transparent and rigorously enforced, public administration has become more impartial, and citizens enjoy a larger degree of access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion. Similarly, the executive respects the constitution more, and complies with court rulings to a larger extent, and the judiciary is able to act in a more independent fashion. The legislative constraints on the executive captures the extent to which it is capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive. Data exists from 1948 when the legislature was established.

The country experiences an increase in all three indices in 1960, marking the transition from the First Republic to the Second Republic. The drop right afterwards is a consequence of the military rule which followed the short lived Second Republic. At that point, the constraint on the executive by the legislative and judiciary was basically non-existent.

Following the efforts towards democratizations by the June Democracy Movement during the late 1980s, the country experienced great improvements in all three aspects of liberal democracy. Since then, the country has scored above .8 on all indices.
The Participatory Component

The participatory dimension of democracy embodies the values of direct rule and active participation by citizens in all political processes; it emphasizes non-electoral forms of political participation through such channels as civil society organizations and through the mechanism of direct democracy. Figure 5 displays the four sub-indices that compose the participatory democracy component.

![Figure 5. Participatory Democracy Component](image)

Figure 5 displays the indices that make up the participatory democracy component, which scores the lowest compared to the other dimensions in the first two figures. For participatory democracy, the scores of the different indicators vary from near the bottom of the scale to the top, indicating that, in South Korea, some participatory aspects of democracy are much stronger than others.

The country has received low scores on the direct popular vote index throughout the century, suggesting that institutionalized processes by which citizens register their choice or opinion on specific issues in the form of referendums and plebiscites are nearly non-existent.

Civil society participation has been very limited, historically, even after independence. Not until the late 80s did the citizens of South Korea become involved in civil society organizations. After the June Democracy Movement an increase in participation followed, leading almost to a top score of 1.

The country’s historically low scores on the local government and the regional government indices suggest that the ideal of directly elected sub-national bodies autonomous from unelected actors was far from achieved prior to the 90s. However, today it has been partly attained, although certain limitations of their autonomy persist.

The Deliberative Component

The deliberative component of democracy captures the core value that political decisions are guided by the pursuit of the public good and should be informed by respectful and reasonable dialogue at all levels rather than by emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion.
Note, that the indicators displayed in Figures 6, 7 and 8 have different scales, which are specified in parentheses in the legend of each figure.

Public deliberation in South Korea, presented in Figure 6, has been very limited historically, and when the country gained independence this did not change. The wave of democratization in the late 80s, however, did indeed have positive effects on the quality and inclusiveness of the public dialogue of the country.

One of the largest improvements takes place in terms of the breadth of the range of consultation when important decisions are made at elite levels. Before the change, consultation included only groups loyal to the ruling elite, whereas later, it also began to include a select range of society, labor and business representatives.

Another change occurs surrounding the extent to which political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good when important policy changes are discussed. Prior to the 1980s justifications were offered in terms of specific business, party or constituency interests rather than in terms of the common good. Since then, justifications have been based on explicit statements of the common good, for the most part, which benefit society as a whole. This is indicated by a score of close to 4 for the common good measure.

A crucial aspect of public deliberation is the engagement of the society. Before the revolution, the public below the elite levels were almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them. Following the movement towards democratization, deliberation has become actively encouraged. A relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate in the discussions, as reflected by the engaged society indicator.

As suggested by the respect for counterarguments indicator, the development has been slower in terms of political elites acknowledging and respecting counterarguments, since they tend to acknowledge the arguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.

The lowest score for South Korea in terms of public deliberation is for the reasoned justification indicator, reflecting that elites tend to offer one single simple reason when justifying why they expect proposed policies to have positive outcomes, rather than offering a more nuanced and complete justification for their decisions. It is interesting that the highest level of deliberation is reached around the turn of the century, whereas public deliberation actually decreases a few
years later. This suggests the possibility that the country could be facing some challenges in terms of deliberative democracy.

The Egalitarian Component

The egalitarian idea is one in which material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the actual exercise of formal rights and liberties; hence a more equal distribution of resources, education, and health across socioeconomic groups should enhance political equality.

Figure 7 shows the eight indicators which compose the egalitarian democracy component. As is evident from the figure, the developments of the different egalitarian indicators in South Korea vary greatly over time.

Social group equality for civil liberties (orange line) is historically high and, according to its score of close to 4, members of all social groups have enjoyed the same level of civil liberties since the late 1980s.

The country experienced significant improvements in power distributed by social group (black line) and educational equality (blue line) following the end of the Japanese occupation and the move towards independence in the mid-40s. The country achieved the highest level of educational equality in 1990, as the data suggests that less than five percent of South Koreans face challenges in exercising their basic rights as adult citizens due to a low quality of education. The country reached a score above three in the power distributed by social group indicator, which indicates that either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others, or that different social groups alternate in power.

Equality in terms of health develops more gradually over time, as is evident in the health equality indicator (purple line). In the 90s the country reached a level of equal healthcare quality. The score of 4 indicates that the share of South Korean citizens who cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens due to a lack of access to good, quality healthcare is less than five percent.

The end of the more autocratic First Republic in 1960 seems to have had the largest positive influence on power distributed by socioeconomic position (red line) and particularistic or public goods (yellow line). The development of a more equal power distribution between the wealthy and the poor, however, slows down and ends up with a score below 3 in 2014, suggesting that
wealthy people still enjoy much more political power than the average citizen or the poorer population. A quite discrete downward trend can be seen in the figure, suggesting that the country might be moving towards a slightly less equal power distribution in this aspect.

The particularistic or public goods indicator measures whether most public expenditures target specific groups, parties or corporations, or the society as a whole. According to the figure, social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs. Since the turn of the century, most social and infrastructure expenditures have been public-goods but a significant portion is particularistic.

A closely related aspect of equality is measured by the indicator means-tested vs. universalistic (light blue line). It captures whether welfare programs are means-tested (e.g. cash-transfer programs) or benefit all members of society (e.g. education, national healthcare schemes, and retirement programs). In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, welfare programs that benefit everyone and do not stigmatize certain unprivileged groups, such as poor people, are more democratic from an egalitarian perspective than means-tested programs which only target these particular groups.

The development towards more universalistic welfare programs in South Korea has been rather sluggish, with the greatest enhancement taking place following the revolution. In recent years, the country has received a score of close to 4, suggesting that most welfare state policies are universalistic, although a significant portion is still means-tested.

The distribution of power by gender (green line) is the aspect of equality in which South Korea performs the worst, reflected by a score between 2 and 3 which indicates that men still have more political power than women.

Female Rights

Equality between women and men is indivisible from democracy at all levels, and is broadly recognized as a pre-condition for truly representative and responsive governments. The V-Dem female rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in the open discussion of political issues, to participate in civil society organizations, the freedom of movement, the right to private property, the access to justice, the freedom from forced labor, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power. Figure 8 displays the seven indicators that constitute this index for Sweden.
The female rights index is comprised of seven distinct indicators, included in Figure 8. The different aspects of female rights are strengthened at different points in time. The independence from Japan resulted in top level scores in terms of property rights (yellow line) and the freedom from forced labor for women (orange line). Virtually all women have enjoyed both rights ever since.

South Korean women reach full freedom of domestic movement (black line) ten years later, with a score of 4 on the indicator. Women’s access to justice (green line) expands more gradually over time, but since the June Democracy Movement in 1987, secure and effective access to justice for the women of South Korea has almost always observed.

The development of freedom of discussion for women (purple line) follows a similar path, except for a drop in 1970. Since the late 1980s, however, women's right to discuss is virtually fully respected, meaning that freedom of speech by South Korean women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted. Female rights have been fully achieved in almost all aspects since the revolution, although women are still struggling to achieve the same political power that men have (light blue line).

Concluding Remarks

This data brief depicts the democratic development of South Korea from 1900 to 2014, based on data from key V-Dem indices and indicators. Overall, the data reflect the volatile history of South Korea with alternations between more and less democratic governments. The majority of the indices and indicators reflect independence in 1948 and the June Democracy Movement in 1987, as well as the democratic reforms which followed these events. Since the late 1980s, the country has had scores between .8 and 1 in all democracy components, except for the participatory aspect which has almost always been scored between .6.

The history of less democratic regimes is captured by the low level of the clean election indicator, which achieves just above .2 up until the democracy movement in the 80s. Hence, the country struggled with serious electoral challenges of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and electoral violence for a large part of the 20th century. The score of above .8 since the 90s, however, reflects South Korea’s great improvements over time in this regard.
The country also showed high scores in some aspects of democracy even before the democracy wave during the late 80s. The equality before the law and individual liberties shows scores of .6 in the beginning of 1950s and social group equality for civil liberties a score of 3 out of 4 in 1910. Since the 1980s, female rights has advanced to very high levels, with the exception that women of South Korea still do not hold as much political power as their male counterparts.

Appendix I. List of variables.

This is a list of all the indices and indicators included in the country brief. It contains the question and the question alternatives as well as information of aggregation, scale, data release and citation. These can also be found in the V-Dem codebook.

Variables included in Figure 1.

Electoral democracy index (D) (v2x_polyarchy)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the sum of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr),
clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (de jure) (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way interaction between those indices. This is half way between a straight average and strict multiplication, meaning the average of the two. It is thus a compromise between the two most well known aggregation formulas in the literature, both allowing “compensation” in one sub-component for lack of polyarchy in the others, but also punishing countries not strong in one sub-component according to the “weakest link” argument. The aggregation is done at the level of Dahls sub-components (with the one exception of the non-electoral component). The index is aggregated using this formula:

\[ v2x\text{\_polyarchy} = 0.1* v2x\text{\_suffr} + 0.1* v2x\text{\_el_frefair} + 0.1* v2x\text{\_accex} + 0.1* v2x\text{\_frassoc\_thick} + 0.5* v2x\text{\_suffr} * v2x\text{\_el_frefair} * v2x\text{\_accex} * v2x\text{\_frassoc\_thick} * v2x\text{\_freexp\_thick}. \]

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2x_freexp_thick v2x_EDcomp_thick

*Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)*

* Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).*

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**Liberal democracy index (D) (v2x_libdem)**

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

*Clarifications:* The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

*Aggregation:* The index is aggregated using this formula:

\[ v2x\text{\_libdem} = 0.25 * v2x\text{\_polyarchy}^{1.6} + 0.25 * v2x\text{\_liberal} + 0.5 * v2x\text{\_polyarchy}^{1.6} * v2x\text{\_liberal} \]

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2x_liberal v2x_polyarchy

*Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)*

* Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).*

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**Participatory democracy index (D) (v2x_partipdem)**

*Project manager:* Jan Teorell

*Question:* To what extent is the ideal of participatory democracy achieved?

*Clarifications:* The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. To make it a measure of participatory democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

*Aggregation:* The index is aggregated using this formula:

\[ v2x\text{\_partipdem} = \]

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Deliberative democracy index (D) (v2x_delibdem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell  
Question: To what extent is the ideal of deliberative democracy achieved?  
Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To make it a measure of not only the deliberative principle but also of democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.  
Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:  
\[ v2x_{\text{delibdem}} = 0.25 \times v2x_{\text{polyarchy}}^{1.6} + 0.25 \times v2x_{\text{delib}} + 0.5 \times v2x_{\text{polyarchy}}^{1.6} \times v2x_{\text{delib}} \]  
Scale: Interval  
Sources: v2xdl_delib v2x_polyarchy  
Data release: 4, 5.  
Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Egalitarian democracy index (D) (v2x_egaldem)

Project manager: Jan Teorell  
Question: To what extent is the ideal of egalitarian democracy achieved?  
Clarification: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality. To make it a measure of egalitarian democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.  
Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:  
\[ v2x_{\text{egaldem}} = 0.25 \times v2x_{\text{polyarchy}}^{1.6} + 0.25 \times v2x_{\text{egal}} + 0.5 \times v2x_{\text{polyarchy}}^{1.6} \times v2x_{\text{egal}} \]  
Scale: Interval  
Sources: v2x_egal v2x_polyarchy  
Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)  
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
Variables included in Figure 2.

Electoral component index (D) (v2x_EDcomp_thick)
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: To what extent is the electoral principle of democracy achieved?
Clarification: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to achieve responsiveness and accountability between leaders and citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections. This is presumed to be achieved when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and the chief executive of a country is selected (directly or indirectly) through elections.
Aggregation: The electoral component index is operationalized as a chain defined by its weakest link of freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, and elected executive. The index is thus aggregated using this formula:

\[ v2x_{EDcomp\_thick} = v2x_{frassoc\_thick} \times v2x_{suffr} \times v2x_{el\_refair} \times v2x_{accex}. \]

Scale: Interval
Sources: v2x_frassoc_thick v2x_suffr v2xel_frefair v2x_accex
Data release: 3, 4, 5.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Participatory component index (D) (v2x_partip)
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?
Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.
Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x_iccpart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec), and elected regional government power (v2xel_regelec).
Scale: Interval
Sources: v2x_iccpart v2xdd_dd v2xel_locelec v2xel_regelec
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Egalitarian component index (D) (v2x_egal)
Project manager: Jan Teorell
Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?
Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy addresses the distribution of political power across social groups, i.e., groups defined by class, sex, religion, and ethnicity. This perspective on democracy emphasizes that a formal guarantee of political rights and civil liberties are not always sufficient for political equality. Ideally, all social groups should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does
not exist, the state ought to seek to redistribute socio-economic resources, education, and health so as to enhance political equality.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including indicators of power distribution according to socioeconomic position (v2pepwrses), power distribution according to social group (v2pepwrsoc), social group equality in respect for civil liberties (v2clsocgrp), equal access to education (v2peedueq), equal access to health (v2pehealth), power distribution according to gender (v2pepwrgen), share of budget allocated to public/common goods (v2dlencmps), and the share of welfare programs that provide universal rather than means-tested benefits (v2dlunivl).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2pepwrses v2pepwrsoc v2clsocgrp v2peedueq v2pehealth v2pepwrgen v2dlencmps v2dlunivl

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### Liberal component index (D) (v2x_liberal)

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the liberal principle of democracy achieved?

**Clarification:** The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power.

**Aggregation:** This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equality before the law and individual liberties (v2xcl_rol), judicial constraints on the executive (v2x_jucon), and legislative constraints on the executive (v2xlg_legcon).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2xcl_rol v2x_jucon v2xlg_legcon

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

### Deliberative component index (D) (v2xdl_delib)

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

**Clarification:** The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidaary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion.

To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good
Female rights index (D) (v2x_gender)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: To what extent are woman’s political rights protected?

Clarifications: Political rights index focuses on the ability of women to participate in discussions of political issues, participation in civil society organizations, freedom of movement, the right to private property, access to justice, freedom from forced labor, representation in the ranks of journalists, and an equal share in the overall distribution of power.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for CSO women’s participation (v2csgender), female journalists (v2mefemjrn), freedom of domestic movement for women (v2cldmovew), freedom of discussion for women (v2cldiscw), freedom from forced labor for women (v2clslavef), property rights for women (v2clprptyw), access to justice for women (v2clacjstw), and power distributed by gender (v2pepwrgen).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2csgender v2mefemjrn v2cldmovew v2cldiscw v2clslavef v2clprptyw v2clacjstw v2pepwrgen

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 3.

Freedom of association (thick) index (D) (v2x_frassoc_thick)

Project manager: Allen Hicken, Michael Bernhard, Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban (v2psparban), barriers to parties (v2psbars), opposition parties autonomy (v2psoppaut), elections multiparty (v2elmulpar), CSO entry and exit (v2cseeorgs) and CSO repression (v2csrepress). Since the multiparty elections indicator is only observed in election years, its values have first been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2psparban v2psbars v2psoppaut v2elmulpar v2cseeorgs v2csrepress

Data release: 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different aggregation formula for the thinner index v2x_frassoc)

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Clean elections index (D) (v2xel_frefair)

Project managers: Staffan Lindberg, Jan Teorell
**Question:** To what extent are elections free and fair?

**Clarifications:** Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy (v2elembaut), EMB capacity (v2elembcap), election voter registry (v2elrgstry), election vote buying (v2elvotbuy), election other voting irregularities (v2elirreg), election government intimidation (v2elintim), election other electoral violence (v2elopeace), and election free and fair (v2elfrfair). Since the bulk of these indicators are only observed in election years, the index scores have then been repeated within election regime periods (as defined by v2x_elecreg).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elirreg v2elintim v2elopeace v2elfrfair

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Share of population with suffrage (D) (v2x_suffr)**

**Project manager:** Svend-Erik Skaaning

**Question:** What share of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

**Clarification:** This question does not take into consideration restrictions based on age, residence, having been convicted for crime, or being legally incompetent. It covers legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto). The scores reflect de jure provisions of suffrage extension in percentage of the adult population as of January 1 in a particular year. The adult population (as defined by statute) is defined by citizens in the case of independent countries or the people living in the territorial entity in the case of colonies. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%. Universal male suffrage only is coded as 50%. Years before electoral provisions are introduced are scored 0%. The scores do not reflect whether an electoral regime was interrupted or not. Only if new constitutions, electoral laws, or the like explicitly introduce new regulations of suffrage, the scores were adjusted accordingly if the changes suggested doing so. If qualifying criteria other than gender apply (such as property, tax payments, income, literacy, region, race, ethnicity, religion, and/or ‘economic independence’), estimates have been calculated by combining information on the restrictions with different kinds of statistical information (on population size, age distribution, wealth distribution, literacy rates, size of ethnic groups, etc.), secondary country-specific sources, and – in the case of very poor information – the conditions in similar countries or colonies.

**Aggregation:** v2elsuffrage/100

**Responses:** Percent

**Scale:** Interval

**Source:** v2elsuffrage

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Elected executive index (de jure) (D) (v2x_accex)**

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** Is the chief executive appointed through popular elections (either directly or indirectly)?
**Clarifications:** This index attempts to measure whether the chief executive is elected, either directly elected through popular elections or indirectly through a popularly elected legislature that then appoints the chief executive.

Note that a popular election is minimally defined and also includes sham elections with limited suffrage and no competition. Similarly, “appointment” by legislature only implies selection and/or approval, not the power to dismiss.

This index is useful primarily for aggregating higher-order indices and should not be interpreted as an important element of democracy in its own right.

**Aggregation:** There are six different chains of appointment/selection to take into account in constructing this index, all of which are scaled to vary from 0 to 1. First, whether the head of state is directly elected \((a=1)\) or not \((a=0)\). Second, the extent to which the legislature is popularly elected \((b)\), measured as the proportion of legislators elected (if legislature is unicameral), or the weighted average of the proportion elected for each house, with the weight defined by which house is dominant (if legislature is bicameral). Third, whether the head of state is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of state \((c1=1,\text{ otherwise } 0)\). Fourth, whether the head of government is appointed by the legislature, or the approval of the legislature is necessary for the appointment of the head of government \((c2=1,\text{ otherwise } 0)\). Fifth, whether the head of government is appointed by the head of state \((d=1)\) or not \((d=0)\). Sixth, whether the head of government is directly elected \((e=1)\) or not \((e=0)\). Define \(h Osw\) as the weight for the head of state. If the head of state is also head of government \((v2exhoshog==1)\), \(h Osw=1\). If the head of state has more power than the head of government over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, then \(h Osw=1;\) if the reverse is true, \(h Osw=0\). If they share equal power, \(h Osw=0.5\). Define the weight for the head of government as \(h Ogw=1-h Osw\). The formula is:

\[
v2x_{accex} = \text{hosw} \times \max(a1, b \times c1) + \text{hogw} \times \max(a1 \times d, b \times c1 \times d, a2, b \times c2)
\]

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:**
- \(v2lgeello\)
- \(v2lgelecup\)
- \(v2lgdomchm\)
- \(v2exaphos\)
- \(v2expathhs\)
- \(v2exaphogp\)
- \(v2expathhg\)
- \(v2exdfcbhs\)
- \(v2exdjcbhg\)
- \(v2exdfdmhs\)
- \(v2exdfshg\)
- \(v2exhoshog\)

**Data release:** 4, 5 (release 1, 2, and 3 used a different, preliminary aggregation formula)

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Variables included in Figure 4.**

**Equality before the law and individual liberty index (D) \(v2xcl\_rol\)**

**Project manager:** Jan Teorell

**Question:** To what extent are laws transparent and rigorously enforced and public administration impartial, and to what extent do citizens enjoy access to justice, secure property rights, freedom from forced labor, freedom of movement, physical integrity rights, and freedom of religion?

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for rigorous and impartial public administration \(v2clrspect\), transparent laws with predictable enforcement \(v2cltrnslw\), access to justice for men/women \(v2clacjstnm, v2clacjstw\), property rights for men/women \(v2clprptym, v2clprptyw\), freedom from torture \(v2cltort\), freedom from political killings \(v2clkill\), from forced labor for men/women \(v2clslavem, v2clslavef\), freedom of religion \(v2clrelig\), freedom of foreign movement \(v2clfmove\), and freedom of domestic movement for men/women \(v2cldmovem, v2cldmovew\).

**Scale:** Interval
Sources: v2clrspct v2dtrmslw v2clacjstm v2clacjstw v2clprptym v2clprptyw v2cltort v2clkill v2clslavem v2clslavef v2clrelig v2clfmove v2cldmovem v2cldmovew

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Legislative constraints on the executive index (D) (v2xlg_legcon)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice (v2lgqstexp), executive oversight (v2lgotovst), legislature investigates in practice (v2lginvstp), and legislature opposition parties (v2lgoppart).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2lgqstexp v2lgotovst v2lginvstp v2lgoppart

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Judicial constraints on the executive index (D) (v2x_jucon)

Project manager: Jan Teorell

Question: To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution (v2exrescon), compliance with judiciary (v2jucomp), compliance with high court (v2juhccomp), high court independence (v2juncind), and lower court independence (v2juhcind).

Scale: Interval

Sources: v2exrescon v2jucomp v2juhccomp v2juncind v2juncind

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 5.

Civil society participation index (D) (v2x_cspart)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major CSOs routinely consulted by policymakers; how large is the involvement of people in CSOs; are women prevented from participating; and is legislative candidate nomination within party organization highly decentralized or made through party primaries?

Clarifications: The sphere of civil society lies in the public space between the private sphere and the state. Here, citizens organize in groups to pursue their collective interests and ideals. We call these groups civil society organizations (CSOs). CSOs include, but are by no means limited to, interest groups, labor unions, spiritual organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, charities, and other non-governmental organizations.
The core civil society index (CCSI) is designed to provide a measure of a robust civil society, understood as one that enjoys autonomy from the state and in which citizens freely and actively pursue their political and civic goals, however conceived.

**Aggregation:** The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for candidate selection – national/local (v2pscnslnl), CSO consultation (v2cscnsult), CSO participatory environment (v2csprtcpt), and CSO women’s participation (v2csgender).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2pscnslnl v2cscnsult v2csprtcpt v2csgender

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**Local government (D) (v2xel_locelec)**

**Project managers:** Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

**Question:** Are there elected local governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the local level?

**Clarification:** The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected local governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected local governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the local level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which local governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the local level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, local governments remain subordinate to the regional and national governments.)

**Aggregation:** First, local government elected (v2ellocelc) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by local offices relative power (v2ellocpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2ellocelc v2ellocpwr

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd_dd)**

**Project manager:** David Altman

**Question:** To what extent is the direct popular vote utilized?

**Clarification:** Direct popular voting refers here to an institutionalized process by which citizens of a region or country register their choice or opinion on specific issues through a ballot. It is intended to embrace initiatives, referendums, and plebiscites, as those terms are usually understood. It captures some aspects of the more general concept of direct democracy.

The term does not encompass recall elections, deliberative assemblies, or settings in which the vote is not secret or the purview is restricted. Likewise, it does not apply to elections for representatives.

**Aggregation:** This index measures how easy it is to initiate and approve a direct popular vote and how consequential that vote is (if approved)? Ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process (v2ddlegci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigcip), (c) time-limits to circulate the signatures (v2ddgrgpci), and (d) the level of government (national and/or subnational). Ease of approval is measured by quorums pertaining to (a) participation (v2ddgrgpci), (b) approval (v2ddbindci), (c) supermajority
(v2ddspmjci), and (d) district majority (v2dddistci). Consequences are measured by (a) the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlegci), and (b) the frequency with which direct popular votes have been approved in the past (v2ddciniyr).

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2ddlegci v2ddsigcip v2ddgtrtci v2ddgrgpci v2ddlevci v2ddbindci v2ddthreci v2ddspmjci v2dddistci v2ddlegci v2ddciniyr

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Regional government (D) (v2xel_regelec)**

**Project managers:** Kelly McMann, Jan Teorell

**Question:** Are there elected regional governments, and – if so – to what extent can they operate without interference from unelected bodies at the regional level?

**Clarification:** The lowest score would be reserved for a country that has no elected regional governments. A medium score would be accorded a country that has elected regional governments but where those governments are subordinate to unelected officials at the regional level (perhaps appointed by a higher-level body). A high score would be accorded to a country in which regional governments are elected and able to operate without restrictions from unelected actors at the regional level (with the exception of judicial bodies). (Naturally, regional governments remain subordinate to the national government.)

**Aggregation:** First, regional government elected (v2elsrgel) is recoded so that 0=none elected, 1=only executive elected, 2=only assembly elected, and 3=both elected. This new construct is then scaled to vary from 0-1 and multiplied by regional offices relative power (v2elrgpwr) scaled to vary from 0-1.

**Scale:** Interval

**Sources:** v2elsrgel v2elrgpwr

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Variables included in Figure 6.**

**Reasoned justification (C) (v2d1reason, _dos, _ord, _mean)**

**Project managers:** Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

**Question:** When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

**Clarification:** Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

**Responses:**

0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]
2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs.”

3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation.”

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Respect counterarguments (C) (v2dlcountr, _dos, _ord, _mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Engaged society (C) (v2dlengage, _dos, _ord, _mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

Responses:

0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Common good (C) (v2dlcommon, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

Responses:

0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.

1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.

3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.

4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Range of consultation (C) (v2dlconslt, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

Responses:

0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 7.

**Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C)** (*v2pepwrse, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean*)

*Project manager:* John Gerring

*Question:* Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

*Clarification:* All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

*Responses:*

0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.
3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C)** (*v2clsocgrp, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean*)

*Project manager:* Svend-Erik Skaaning


Question: Do all social groups, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

Responses:
0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Health equality (C) (v2pehealth, _dos, _ord, _mean)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

Responses:
0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
3: Relatively equal. Basic healthcare is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens’ ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
4: Equal. Basic healthcare is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Particularistic or public goods (C) (v2dlencmps)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg
**Question:** Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

**Clarification:** Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as "pork," "clientelistic," or "private goods."

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

**Responses:**

0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.

1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is public-goods.

2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.

3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) is particularistic.

4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

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**Power distributed by social group (C) (v2pepwr soc, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)**

**Project manager:** John Gerring

**Question:** Is political power distributed according to social groups?

**Clarification:** A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does not include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

**Responses:**

0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.

3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another – but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
4: All social groups have roughly equal political power or there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Educational equality (C) (v2peedueq, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)**

**Project managers:** Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

**Question:** To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

**Clarification:** Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

**Responses:**

0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

**Data release:** 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

**Citation:** V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrge, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)**

**Project manager:** John Gerring

**Question:** Is political power distributed according to gender?

**Responses:**

0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.

1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.

2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.

3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.

4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

**Scale:** Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

**Cross-coder aggregation:** Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).
Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C) (v2dlunivl, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean l)

Project managers: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.
A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.
The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

Responses:
0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. ¼ or 1/3) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., ¼ or 1/3) are means-tested.
5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Variables included in Figure 8.

CSO women’s participation (C) (v2csgender, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Clarification: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women’s interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

Responses:
0: Almost always.
1: Frequently.
2: About half the time.
3: Rarely.
4: Almost never.
**Freedom of discussion for women (C) (v2cldiscw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)**

*Project managers:* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

*Clarification:* This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

*Responses:*

0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.

1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.

2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.

3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

*Scale:* Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

*Cross-coder aggregation:* Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see *V-Dem Methodology*, posted at V-Dem.net).

*Data release:* 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

*Citation:* V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

**Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)**

*Project managers:* Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

*Question:* Do women enjoy the right to private property?

*Clarification:* Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.
This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

Responses:
0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Power distributed by gender (C) (v2pepwrgen, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project manager: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

Responses:
0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom of domestic movement for women (C) (v2cldmovew, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific social groups, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – freedom of movement.

Do not consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

Responses:
0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Freedom from forced labor for women (C) (v2clsavelf, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the relative freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

Responses:

0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at V-Dem.net).

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).

Access to justice for women (C) (v2clacjsttw, *_dos, *_ord, *_mean)

Project managers: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.
This question does not ask you to assess the relative access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.

Responses:
0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.
2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

Scale: Ordinal, converted to interval by the measurement model.

Cross-coder aggregation: Bayesian item response theory measurement model (see V-Dem Methodology, posted at

Data release: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

Citation: V-Dem codebook (see suggested citation at the top of this document).
## Appendix II. Overview of the structure of the indices.

### Structure of Aggregation – Indices and Indicators

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