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## **Appendix to Part 4 (Resources for Democratic Politicians and Political Parties)**

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### **Austria – Freedom Party (FPÖ)**

#### 2006: Cabinet exit

The Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) had met all conditions put forward by the Christian Democratic party, and was in government with them, holding important ministries such as finance and justice (Heinisch and Hauser, 2016, p. 76). However, the new leader, Haider, took the party in a new direction, being more clearly anti-Semitic. He visited Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and did other things that did not go over well with the electorate (Art, 2017, p. 585). This created serious divisions within the party, that also went public (Heinisch and Hauser, 2016, p. 78).

After low poll numbers and negative media coverage, the FPÖ brought down its own leadership, and thus the government in 2002 (Heinisch and Hauser, 2016, p. 79). From the subsequent early election in 2002, the FPÖ still held government position, although now only three ministries. They started blocking neo-liberal policies and returning to protest-party rhetoric. In 2005, the FPÖ split into FPÖ and BZÖ, and the BZÖ remained in government office while the FPÖ did not.

#### 2019: Cabinet exit


In May 2019, just a week before the EP election, German newspapers published a video showing the FPÖ leader and Austrian vice chancellor, Heinz-Christian Strache together with another FPÖ member asking the niece of a Russian oligarch to take over Austria's biggest tabloid, and tilt the election in their favour, in exchange for government contracts. In the video, Strache is heard saying that he wants to “*build a media landscape like [Viktor] Orban*”.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48348651>

However, the “niece” was an actress, and there were hidden cameras capturing the event. The FPÖ response was to quickly replace Strache and try to reframe the issue by asking questions about who was behind the scheme.<sup>2</sup>

The videos resulted in Strache resigning, chancellor Kurz was removed by a vote of no-confidence, a care-taker government took over, and the FPÖ lost more than a third of their support. Leading up to snap elections, there is a strong opposition against including the FPÖ in government, from both within the ruling party and across the country.<sup>3</sup> The leading ÖVP formed cabinet with the green party instead of the FPÖ in early 2020.<sup>4</sup>



## Austria – Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)

### 2013: Parliament exit

When the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) split in 2005, Haider formed the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ), taking with him most of the FPÖ government team. BZÖ was now in


<sup>2</sup> <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/27/austrians-vote-sunday-with-major-corruption-scandal-background/>

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/austrian-elections-exit-polls-collapse-far-right-support-sebastian-kurz-victory>

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.parlgov.org/explore/aut/cabinet/>

government and FPÖ was not (Heinisch and Hauser, 2016, p. 79). The BZÖ presented itself as a market-liberal, more acceptable alternative to the FPÖ, which managed to gain them some support (Heinisch and Hauser, 2016, p. 86).

In 2008, the party leader Haider passed away which left the BZÖ in disarray. After his passing, the party lost a lot of support and eventually fell out of parliament all together.




### **Belgium – Flemish Block (VB)**

#### 2010 and 2014: Vote loss

The Flemish Block (VB) have been subjects of a *cordon sanitaire* since the late 1980s. In the 1980s and 1990s, personal tensions and disagreements about strategy created two factions within the party (Lucardie, Akkerman, & Pauwels, 2016, pp. 209-210). Still, the party performed fairly well at the polls. They generally adopted a “whip” role, exerting influence on governing parties and policies while in opposition. The hardliners of the party welcomed the *cordon sanitaire*, as it would ensure the party’s “purity” and prevent it from having to compromise on its principles. The aim was “policy purity, not policy influence”, and the possibility to play the victim due to political isolation has, if anything, led to an increase rather than a decrease in support (Lucardie, et al., 2016, p. 216).

In the election of 2010, the VB lost a substantial number of votes to the relatively new party New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), which is also characterized as Flemish nationalist and anti-establishment, but not xenophobic (Lucardie, et al., 2016, p. 210). The vote loss entailed that they lost their credibility as a “whip” (Lucardie, et al., 2016, p. 217). Furthermore, the party leader resigned in 2008 and left the party in 2011 as he felt the other faction of the party had gained control over the party. Along with him, several party members left for the N-VA. After a new leadership change in 2014, the support for the party increased again (Lucardie, et al., 2016, p. 210).



## **Bulgaria – Ataka**

### 2013 and 2014: Vote loss and parliament exit

The Attack Party (Ataka) was formed under the leadership of the controversial TV journalist, Volen Siderov, in 2005. They ran on a platform of being strongly anti-NATO, anti-EU, anti-IMF, and pro-Russia. The party and the leader Siderov was also quickly labeled racist due to his statements about Romas, Muslim minorities and conspiracy theories about Judaism, as well as populist due to his anti-establishment rhetoric (Lansford, 2017, p. 205).

After the election of 2009, Ataka was the biggest supporter of the GERB government, backing all of their moves in hopes of obtaining political gains (Pirro, 2014, p. 251).<sup>56</sup> However, Ataka's leader Siderov was a steady source of scandals and controversy. For example, in 2011, his stepson called for his resignation after Siderov separated from his wife. The stepson was subsequently expelled from the party. In 2014, he was charged with hooliganism and assault after being involved in in-flight altercations and a second incident at Varna airport (Lansford, 2017, p. 205). In 2015, he was involved in demonstrations with students in a theatre, and was escorted away by police. The same year, he was also arrested for involvement in a brawl outside a shop in Sofia.<sup>7</sup>

Before the 2014 election, polls showed that Ataka would only receive 5 percent of the votes, which is the same as the parliamentary threshold. When asked about this, Siderov said that the low polls were due to a "media blackout", and that Ataka was deliberately given a negative image by the media to smear the party. He also stated that he was wrongfully portrayed as an extremist and dangerous person.<sup>8</sup>

In 2016, the United Patriots (UP) coalition was formed, consisting of Ataka, NFSB, and VMRO, all right-wing nationalist parties. The UP entered government in 2017 as junior partners, providing NFSB and VMRO with minister posts. Following a few scandals involving photographs and Hitler salutes, tensions within the coalition arose and made it difficult to cooperate. In 2019, the UP was officially disbanded following a vote by NFSB and VMRO to expel Ataka leader Siderov and two other Ataka MPs. NFSB and VMRO continued their collaboration, and kept their minister posts.<sup>9</sup>

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
<sup>5</sup> <https://balkaninsight.com/2010/09/27/who-is-who-political-parties-in-bulgaria/>

<sup>6</sup> <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/10/03/bulgarian-parliamentary-elections-a-final-look-at-the-parties-and-the-polls/>

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-nationalist-arrest/bulgarian-nationalist-leader-arrested-over-fracas-with-students-idUSKCN0T61GQ20151117>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22462455>

<sup>9</sup> <https://sofiaglobe.com/2019/07/25/bulgarias-ultra-nationalist-united-patriots-coalition-officially-disbanded/>




**Bulgaria – National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB)**

2017: Replacing Ataka in cabinet

The National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) entered cabinet in 2017 as part of the United Patriots (UP) coalition which consisted of Ataka, NFSB and VMRO. Ataka was later excluded from the coalition (see above). NFSB kept their minister posts.

The scandals surrounding Ataka seems to have driven voters towards NFSB, which was also a nationalist right-wing party, but haunted by less scandals. I.e. a more comfortable alternative for far-right voters.

## National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB)




## Denmark – Danish People’s Party (DF)

### 2015: Reluctance to join government

The Danish People’s Party (DF) has never taken part in government, despite gaining over 20 percent of the votes in the 2015 general election. One of the main reasons for this is simply that they do not want to be part of the government. Being in opposition is part of their strategy and has proven a successful way for them to gain votes (Juul Christiansen, 2016, pp. 106-108). The DF party leader, Krisian Thulesen Dahl, has said in interviews that many Danes may believe that the DF would have more influence through cabinet positions, but “...influence is not necessarily greatest there. So if we decline minister posts it evokes respect with the voters, I think” (Lindroth, 2016, p. 107). In another interview, he commented that the DF has “a different political culture ... partly the anti-elitism, plus it’s just not in our genes that we only aim for entering cabinet” (Lindroth, 2016, p. 107). They put forward “non-negotiable” conditions for entering cabinet, but also said that they did not expect the other parties to agree to them (Juul Christiansen, 2016, p. 106).

### 2019: Vote loss

In the 2019 election, the DF lost over half of their seats in parliament (from 37 to 16). There are several explanatory factors to the loss of support. It could for example be due to the fact that they were accused of misusing EU funds, because they refused to enter government in 2016, and/or because they faced fierce competition from the new parties New Right (nationalistic, anti-immigration, anti-EU) and Hard Line (ethno-nationalistic utilitarian) (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2019, pp. 3-4). DF lost votes to the Social Democrats, who had reduced the retirement age and taken on a stricter immigration policy, and to New Right and Hard Line, who were even more harsh on immigration. While international media has speculated that the Social Democrats had copied the DF's immigration policies to starve them out, there are others who argue that the Social Democrats would have benefited more if the DF had not lost that many votes. Since they seemed to be supported by a majority of the Danish people, DF decided turned to stricter immigration policies (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2019, pp. 9-10). All-in-all, it may have been a combination of the EU fund scandal, emergence of more extreme parties, and (ironically, seeing this was their strategy) a



reluctance to enter government in 2016 which may have resulted in their decrease in support amongst the Danish population.

## **Finland – True Finns (Ps)**

### 2017: Cabinet exit

Following the 2015 election, the then EU-sceptic, and hard-on-immigration party, the True Finns (Ps), was the second largest party in Finland, as well as a junior government partner. The Ps leader,



Timo Soini, tried to nudge the party towards the mainstream as they joined the government. After 2015, the government finalized legislation on gay marriage, signed off on the Greek bailout, and accepted Syrian and Iraqi refugees, all of which were decisions that the Ps originally opposed.<sup>10</sup>

In March 2017, Soini decided to step down, and the party elected Jussi Halla-aho as their new leader. Halla-aho is an anti-immigration hardliner that has been known for making racist statements, and his appointment as party leader meant a radicalization of the Ps, leading Prime Minister Sipilä (Center Party, Liberal) to break up the coalition. “*Discussions are over. Our proposal: There is no basis for continuing cooperation with Finns party*”, he wrote on Twitter.<sup>11</sup>

Following the election of Halla-aho as the new party leader, internal conflict grew within the Ps, and the party split into two groups in June 2017. The former party leader Soini, together with several Ps ministers, formed the faction called “the New Alternative” and stayed in government. The Ps, with Halla-aho as party leader, were no longer a government party.<sup>12</sup> They are, however, at the time of writing still the second largest party in Finland (as to vote share).<sup>13</sup>


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<sup>10</sup> <https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/06/14/finlands-populist-party-has-cracked-in-two>

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/12/finnish-prime-minister-seeks-to-break-up-coalition-government>

<sup>12</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-finland-government-populists/finland-dodges-government-collapse-after-nationalists-split-idUSKBN1941IZ>

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3125/>



## France – National Front (FN)

### 2007: Vote loss

Before the election of 2007, the National Front (FN) and party leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, seemed to have much in their favor. The economy was stalled, there was high unemployment, citizens were angry over proposed social and economic reforms, and several scandals of political corruption were unveiled (Shields, 2010, p. 32). How can a populist party not benefit greatly from circumstances like these? Instead, the FN experienced a vote loss compared to the previous election. This may have been the consequence of two elements: A failed de-demonization strategy, and the introduction of an unexpected rival.


*“De-demonization is the strategy through which the FN seeks to achieve governmental credibility and political respectability, while simultaneously preserving its radical right-wing populist potential for voter mobilization”* (Ivaldi, 2016, p. 234). Trying to de-demonize the party has been a continuous strategy for short-term vote maximization and for broadening the support base in the long run. Between the 2002 and 2007 elections, in an attempt to de-demonize the party image, the FN scrapped some of the radical policies they had in their previous manifesto, focused more on socioeconomic issues rather than national identity, and claimed to be a center-right party seeking collaborations while also toning down their anti-establishment rhetoric (Ivaldi, 2016, pp. 228-230, 237). Meanwhile, the

mainstream parties radicalized, leaving the FN not only de-demonized, but also normalized almost to the point of part of the establishment (Ivaldi, 2016, p. 241). Furthermore, the other parties all ran on platforms emphasizing change. This left Le Pen unable to paint his opponents as indistinguishable parts of the same establishment (Shields, 2010, pp. 33-34).

For the first time, FN also faced another right-wing candidate in the presidential election. In a time when the policies of FN were a little fuzzy (as they underwent change to broaden the support base), the new candidate, Nicolas Sarkozy, was very clear on his stance. He was the anti-Le Pen. He campaigned on hardline policies about law and order, authority, national identity, immigration control, hard work, lower taxes, etc. The emergence of this new candidate severely damaged the Le Pen brand (Shields, 2010, pp. 35-36).

#### 2007: New leadership and new de-demonization strategy

The huge vote loss in the 2007 election incentivized FN to re-emphasize their radical positions as Marine Le Pen took over the leadership. Marine steered the party towards a new, office-seeking direction, which FN had not actively sought before. In 2014, Marine even expressed a willingness to form government with the socialist President Hollande. The new party elite of the FN consisted of younger and more pragmatic individuals, which polished the language and paid more attention to avoiding holocaust denials and overly racist statements. In 2002, Jean-Marie Le Pen called immigration a deadly threat to Europe. Under Marine, the frame changed to a claim that assimilation to French values is of outmost importance (Ivaldi, 2016, pp. 234-237). Whilst the new strategy of de-demonization may have gotten a push by the 2008 economic crisis and other factors, it can definitely be said to have been more successful than their first try.




## Netherlands – Party for Freedom (PVV)

### 2012: Vote loss

After the early election in 2010, the Party for Freedom (PVV) acted as a support party for the liberal/Christian democratic government. According to a signed agreement, they would vote in favor of government motions on immigration, security, elderly care, and finance, and obtain from voting in favor of any vote of no confidence (Akkerman, 2016, p. 151).

Unexpectedly, the PVV then started to engage more in co-operations with other parties, and appeared more willing to compromise to achieve results (Akkerman, 2016, p. 151). However, it is possible that this new compromising strategy was not appreciated by their voter base, since they lost five percent units of votes in the 2012 election, as compared to the 2010 election. The PVV radicalized again after the 2012 election (Akkerman, 2016, pp. 151-153).

The PVV has yet to gain cabinet office, but according to the party leader, Gert Wilders, they are content with indirectly influencing policy, and are unwilling to trade anything for office. In 2014, he said: *“At the moment, the PVV has 0.0 power, but a lot of influence. You do not need power to have a lot of influence”* (Akkerman, 2016, p. 159).



## Norway – Progress Party (FrP)

### 2013: Vote loss and cabinet entry

In the 2009 election, the Progress Party (FrP) gained 22.9 percent of votes. In 2013, that number had decreased to 16.3.<sup>14</sup> The loss of support was due to several different factors. One of the main reasons was due to a statement by FrP in 2009 where they said that they would not support any government that did not include them. This message was not popular among the public leading to a loss of electoral support. Furthermore, the issue ownership of their key issue was slowly being taken over by the larger mainstream parties, as FrP had pushed both Høyre and Arbeiderpartiet towards a more restrictive immigration policy (Ravik Jupskås, 2016, p. 184).

In 2011, the terror attack on Oslo's government districts and the linked mass shooting at the Labour Party youth camp on Utøya, that killed 77 people and injured hundreds, took place (Carle, 2013, p. 395). This had a profound effect on Norwegian politics and the society at large. The terrorist Anders Behring Breivik was a member of FrP and a debate started concerning whether the party should partly be held responsible for what happened by contributing to a malicious

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.parlgov.org/explore/nor/election/2009-09-14/>

debate. Mainstream parties agreed not to emphasize the association between Breivik and FrP, but the link contributed to a fall in the support for the FrP (Allern and Karlsen, 2014, pp. 653-654). In the aftermath of the attacks, Siv Jensen, the leader of the FrP, distanced herself from Breivik when she called him an “extremist” and his actions “repulsive”. She also proclaimed that she would “tone down her criticism of Muslims”, and that “I think we have already changed our behavior, and we will not be the same again” (Carle, 2013, p. 399).

The initial crisis of lost support was handled by adopting an anti-establishment agenda and re-launching the party as a “protest movement” in 2010. FrP also worked on cross-party cooperation with non-socialist parties, and tried to establish an image of themselves as being “serious, responsible, and thorough”. This strategy proved successful. Despite the association with Breivik and the large loss of support, the FrP was invited to cabinet by the mainstream parties which explained the invitations as being due to a change in leadership and the cross-partisan negotiations on climate policies (Lindroth, 2016, p. 164; Ravik Jupskås, 2016, p. 184). So, although they lost a substantial number of votes, the Progress party still managed to get into the cabinet in the 2013 election.

#### 2020: Cabinet exit


In January 2020, Siv Jensen, leader of FrP, made clear to the press that FrP had decided to leave the government in which they had participated as a junior partner to the conservative Høyre. The exit was a result of the tensions following the decision by the Høyre to bring home a Norwegian woman and her two children from an ISIS camp in Syria.<sup>15</sup> This decision proved to be the last drop after a period of tensions between the two parties in government. The FrP had struggled to get any of their policies through, as the minority government was dependent on the approval of the socialist majority in parliament (Lindroth, 2016, p. 165). “*There have been too many compromises at the expense of the electorate, and we do not deliver to our voters*”, said Odd Eilert Persen (FrP) to NRK.<sup>16</sup>

Solberg has thanked the FrP for their collaboration, and hope for continued “close and constructive” collaboration outside of government, for the sake of the future of Norway. While Jensen has said that it is appropriate that Solberg continues as Prime Minister, she has also proclaimed that the FrP will become a tougher party moving forward.

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<sup>15</sup> <https://www.nrk.no/norge/frp-gar-ut-av-regjering-1.14867637> (there are also sources in English, see for example BBC and the Guardian.)

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.nrk.no/norge/fylkesleiarane-rasar-1.14861103>



## **Poland – Law and Justice Party (PiS)**

### 2007: Prime Minister office loss


The Law and Justice Party (PiS) and the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO) were collaborating partners between 2001 and 2005, and there was an expectation leading up to the 2005 election, that they would govern together if they won and that the Prime Minister would be chosen from the party that received the most votes. PiS obtained the largest number of votes (and won the presidential elections) but decided to form a government with a few other small parties instead of with the PO. PiS and PO shared ideological stands, but had competing narratives, which combined with the perceived betrayal by PiS, turned PO into the main opposition party (Harper, 2010, p. 21; Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 417).

In 2007, the PiS Prime Minister, Kaczynski, sacked his Deputy Prime Minister, after he became a suspect in a bribery scandal. General disarray followed in government, and Kaczynski eventually fired all non-PiS ministers and declared the coalition as terminated. Since he needed a majority in parliament to govern, he decided to dissolve parliament and to hold an early election. A decision that was approved by the parliament (Szczerbiak, 2008, pp. 419-420).

Leading up to the 2007 election, PO ran with the argument that they were the most effective way of getting rid of the PiS government (who by now had more opponents than supporters), while PiS ran a polarizing campaign with the main slogan “either with us or against us” (Szczerbiak, 2008, pp. 416, 421). A TV debate just nine days before the election, in which Tusk (PO) clearly outperformed a surprisingly low-performing Kaczynski, has been described as the turning point during the election campaigns. PiS tried other tactics to obtain support, such as to run on an anti-corruption platform using the arrest of a PO member charged with bribery to claim that PO was part of the problem. However, PO managed to turn this around by using the attacks as evidence that PiS was relying on intimidation tactics towards their opponents (Szczerbiak, 2008, pp. 422-423).

PiS did manage to increase their vote share in the 2007 election. However, PO received substantially more votes than PiS, and continuously claimed to be the best antidote against the still mostly unpopular government. After the election, PO formed a coalition government with a smaller party (Harper, 2010, p. 16; Szczerbiak, 2008, p. 415). In 2010, the PiS leader, Kaczynski, died in an airplane crash, decreasing PiS’s chances of success in the 2011 election. However, in the 2015 election, the PiS managed to recover and regained executive office with Beata Szydło as Prime Minister.






### **Romania – Greater Romania Party (PRM)**

#### 2008: Vote loss and parliament exit


Between the 2004 and 2008 elections, Romania shifted from having a system of proportional representation to a First-Past-the-Post system in which each district elects one candidate for the Chamber of Deputies and one for the Senate (Marian and King, 2010, p. 7). The change proved disadvantageous for the Greater Romania Party (PRM) who failed to reach the national electoral threshold in the 2008 election (Marian and King, 2010, p. 13). While PRM proclaimed that the new rules were adopted in a conspiracy to prevent them from gaining legislative representation, studies have shown that only a small percentage of voters voted strategically (i.e. not for PRM), and that PRM would have failed to reach the threshold even if the old rules were still in place. The loss of votes can thus rather be regarded as a continuation of a longer trend (Andrada-Maria, Irina, & Silviu-Dan, 2012, p. 311; Marian and King, 2010, p. 16).



### **Slovakia – Slovak National Party (SNS)**

#### 2010: Cabinet exit and vote loss

SNS lost a large amount of votes to their coalition partner, Smer-SD, who offered a “nationalism-lite” instead of the “full-fat” variant of SNS (Haughton, Novotná, & Deegan-Krause, 2011, p. 397).




## **United Kingdom – the UK Independence Party (UKIP)**

### 2017: Vote loss

During the 2015 UK general election, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) gained a significant number of votes due to their push for a hard Brexit, and from using a rhetoric which presented large-scale immigration as a threat towards working-class jobs. A vote for UKIP was a vote for Brexit, as well as a protest against the domestic liberal and social policies associated with the main parties (Johnston, Rossiter, Manley, Pattie, & Hartman, 2017, p. 103).

In 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU, and UKIP declared victory. However, this meant that a year after the Brexit referendum, UKIP now lacked a clear purpose. Consequently, Nigel Farage, the leader of UKIP, decided to leave the party, saying that he had achieved his political ambition. Conservatives picked up the Brexit mantle, and UKIP voters now saw a Conservative government as the best guarantee for the type of Brexit they wanted. This, combined with a lack of media attention for UKIP, made voters move from UKIP to the Conservatives in droves (Heath and Goodwin, 2017, p. 350; Johnston, et al., 2017, p. 104; Prosser, 2018, pp. 1228, 1233). In an attempt to capitalize on the new support for the Conservatives, Theresa May decided to call for a snap election. As a result of the 2017 snap election, UKIP lost its only seat in parliament. However, the Conservatives also lost seats, leading to a hung parliament, albeit now UKIP-free (Norris and Inglehart, 2019, pp. 375-376).

### United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)



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