Judicial and legislative constraints on the executive in Turkey

March 27, 2017 Weekly Graphs

They would, among other things, abolish the office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, establish the President as the head of the executive branch and create a position of Vice President. The President would be allowed to maintain ties to political parties and have a broad authority over the judiciary system. Hence, the power of the president would increase substantially. This week’s graph takes a look at the Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index and the Legislative Constraints on the Executive Index, both of which also form part of V-Dem’s proposed measurement of Goal 16.6 (See last week’s graph for more information).

By using the Country Graph Tool we can compare the judicial and the legislative constraints on the executive in Turkey. Judicial constraints measure to what extent the executive respects the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent the judiciary is able to act in an independent fashion. Legislative constraints measure to what extent the legislature and the independent government agencies are capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive.

The Legislative Constraints on the Executive Index drastically increased in 1960. Until today, it has stayed on a stable level on the scale with some drawbacks in the 1970s and 1980s, at the time of the coup by memorandum in 1971 and the coup of 1980 in Turkey. The Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index has seen more erratic changes. In the beginning of the 1970s and 1980s the index experienced a radical decrease, but then soon increased again to the previous level. Since 2010 the Judicial Constraints on the Executive Index has again decreased.

To learn more about the judicial and legislative constraints on the executive in Turkey, or in any other country, use the V-Dem Online Analysis Tool on v-dem.net.   

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