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Institutional Order in Episodes of Autocratization[*][†]

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Abstract

Are there patterns in the sequences of institutional change when democracies autocratize? If so, are such patterns distinct for democracies that transition to authoritarianism versus those that avert democratic breakdown? The Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset provides a global sample of all 69 autocratization episodes between 1900-2021. Using this data and pairwise domination analysis, we describe the general order of reforms in 31 variables which make up different types of accountability mechanisms constraining the government. Our findings suggest that institutional decay starts with horizontal accountability, followed by declines in diagonal accountability, and, finally, vertical accountability. This pattern becomes more apparent in countries with low democratic stock and during the third wave of autocratization. This study makes strong contributions to a growing academic literature on patterns of autocratization as well as initiatives among policymakers and practitioners to counteract autocratization.

Keywords: Autocratization, pathways to autocracy, ERT dataset, domination analysis

Introduction

The "third wave" of autocratization has become a major threat to democracies across the world (e.g., Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Boese, Lindberg, and Lührmann, 2021; Boese et al., 2021). With growing concern over this trend, recent studies have developed conceptualizations of autocratization (e.g., Bermeo, 2016; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Waldner and Lust, 2018) and started investigating the exogenous causes of democratic breakdown as well as the conditions that increase resilience to such changes.[1]

One of the limitations of existing studies is that they rarely unpack the *process* of autocratization,[2] or the order in which different aspects of democracy regress. This omission is consequential because the nature of the autocratization process itself may have causal effects, by strengthening the power of executives or by disorienting and disorganizing the opposition, for instance (Haggard and Kaufman, 2021, p. 2). Further, policymakers would benefit from greater clarity about how the process of autocratization unfolds in order to recognize the warning signs of regression. This paper explores three research questions regarding the process of autocratization: When democracies autocratize, are there observable patterns in the sequence of institutional change? Are such configurations distinct for democracies that transition to authoritarianism versus those that avert democratic breakdown? Do such configurations vary by the underlying conditions of autocratizing countries?

As a point of departure, we examine Juan J. Linz's classic study *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (1978) and some recent contributions on the process of democratic backsliding. While some claim that the process of autocratization is highly heterogeneous (e.g. Waldner and Lust, 2018), most contemporary processes of autocratization share one commonality: "democracy rarely dies overnight" (Lührmann, 2021, p. 1017). The sequence of events or the dynamics of the process that are observed across autocratization episodes may help explain the mechanism of destabilization or overthrow of a democratic system (Linz, 1978). Drawing from recent advances in the literature, we seek to identify how the order of change is associated with declines in three types of democratic accountability: the extent to which governments are accountable to citizens (vertical accountability), to state institutions (horizontal accountability), and to the media and civil

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[1]For comprehensive reviews of such studies, see Waldner and Lust (2018) and Hyde (2020).

[2]In this paper, we use the word autocratization to refer to processes of decline in democratic institutions that begins in democracies. Such processes are also referred to as democratic regression (e.g. Maerz et al., 2021) or democratic backsliding (e.g. Bermeo, 2016).

society (diagonal accountability) (Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova, 2020). We also hypothesize that sequences differ by previous democratic experience and across waves of autocratization.

We evaluate these theoretically driven sequences of autocratization using the Episodes of Regime Transformation (ERT) dataset (Edgell et al., 2022), which provides a complete sample of all 69 autocratization episodes between 1900 and 2021. We use pairwise domination analysis—a method adapted from evolutionary biology (Lindenfors, Krusell, and Lindberg, 2019; Lindenfors et al., 2018; Edgell et al., 2021)—to generate descriptive analysis of the general order of regression in 31 variables that make up the different types of accountability in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data (version 12) (Coppedge et al., 2022a).

Our results reveal several novel insights about the autocratization process. First, democracies undergoing autocratization tend to follow a common pattern in the sequence of their anti-democratic reforms: they first reduce horizontal and diagonal accountability and, only later, vertical accountability. Second, this paper demonstrates that there are remarkably few differences in the sequence of autocratization in episodes that result in democratic breakdown and those in which breakdown is averted. However, we also demonstrate that autocratization episodes that begin with reforms to reduce executive oversight, to weaken the legislative's capacity to investigate, or to constrain the election management body's (EMB) autonomy early on in the process of autocratization typically result in democratic breakdown. Third, the indicators of diagonal accountability tend to decline in the early phase of the episode in countries with high levels of democratic stock. Finally, the analysis points to a unique feature of the third wave of autocratization: the indicators of horizontal and vertical accountability are more likely to decline earlier in the autocratization process in the third wave compared with the previous period.

The findings are of high relevance for academic knowledge about the process of autocratization and its driving mechanisms. Our theoretical arguments, as well as empirical findings, advance our understanding of the expected institutional order of autocratization. Our work also demonstrates how (and whether) the sequence of autocratization varies with the outcome of each episode (either democratic survival or breakdown) and the underlying conditions of autocratizing countries. Moreover, our study contributes to policymakers and practitioners seeking to counteract autocratization by identifying early warning signs of democratic erosion. In particular, our empirical results suggest that countries undergoing particular kinds of democratic erosion—in executive oversight, legislative inves-

tigative capacity, and EMB autonomy—in the early phase of autocratization episodes are especially likely to experience democratic breakdown.

In the following sections, we first define autocratization in democracies. Next, we review previous studies of autocratization to identify theoretically derived propositions about the sequence of autocratization and underlying conditions that may shape autocratization processes. Thereafter, we discuss the methodology for analyzing the institutional order of autocratization. Finally, we present our empirical results and summarize the implications of our study.

Determinants of Autocratization

With the number of countries undergoing autocratization rising significantly over the past two decades (e.g., Boese et al., 2021; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019), a series of studies have developed conceptualizations of the phenomenon (e.g., Bermeo, 2016; Boese, Lindberg, and Lührmann, 2021; Cassani and Tomini, 2020; Diamond, 2015; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Runciman, 2018; Waldner and Lust, 2018). Following Lührmann and Lindberg (2019), we define autocratization as "substantial de-facto decline of core institutional requirements for electoral democracy" (1096). Although autocratization as a concept encompasses declines starting at any level and in any type of regime, this paper focuses on processes of autocratization starting in democracies. Those have two possible outcomes: democratic *breakdown* and *survival*.

The existing literature investigates exogenous factors to explain democratic backsliding and breakdown.[3] This body of contributions can be roughly sorted into three areas. First set focuses on how a country's economic situation affects the probability of democratic breakdown. One established discussion and finding is that democracies become more resilient from the risk of breakdown if they reach a certain level of income (e.g., Przeworski and Limongi, 1997; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Epstein et al., 2006). Other studies indicate that positive economic growth is a key predictor of democratic survival or regime stability (e.g., Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom, 2003; Gasiorowski, 1995; Gates et al., 2006). Another group of studies more specifically found that levels of inequality play a critical role in destabilizing democratic regime (e.g., Alemán and Yang, 2011; Boix et al., 2003; Houle, 2009).

A second part of the literature suggests that actors, primarily political leaders and ruling parties, play a critical role in the process of autocratization. Research in this vein argues that exogenous shocks

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[3]The difference between "exogenous" and "endogenous" factors to explain democratic regression is further conceptualized by Gerschewski (2021).

can result in increased mobilization of anti-democratic forces (e.g., Linz, 1978; Capoccia, 2005). The strategic interaction of an anti-democratic opposition and the incumbent creates an opportunity for autocratization. Other studies find that once anti-pluralist parties are in power, they significantly weaken commitments to democratic institutions, procedures, and norms (e.g., Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018). For example, Lührmann (2021) shows how anti-pluralist parties in government contribute to decline in levels of democracy.[4]

A third branch of the literature suggests that the magnitude of effects of either of the above two sets of factors are conditional on intervening variables. For example, some authors find that the types or strengths of democratic institutions are vital for the resilience of democracy. Institutional instability is alternatively derived from presidential systems (Linz, 1990), weak party systems (Huntington, 2006), party-system fractionalization (e.g., Mainwaring, Scully, et al., 1995), or the breakdown of a party brand (Lupu, 2014). Another suggested conditioning factor is a country's experience with democracy, where more democratic "stock" is associated with a lower probability of breakdown (e.g., Svolik, 2015; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring, 2013; Boese et al., 2021). Finally, a changing international environment is suggested as a permitting condition for autocratic leaders to come to power. This worsening (for prospects of democracy) environment may be due to the decline in Western linkages (Levitsky and Way, 2010), declining international support for democracy, or the weakening of international democracy norms (Hyde, 2020).

In this paper, we do not seek to contest the wisdom of these important findings. Rather, we focus on a novel aspect of autocratization: the *process* of autocratization. We examine the order in which different aspects of democracy decline during autocratization and what, if any, association exists between the order of autocratization and the outcome of autocratization episodes (either democratic breakdown or survival).

There are a few exceptions to the above literature that investigate the role that the sequence of autocratization plays in explaining democratic breakdown and survival. One is Lührmann (2021)'s ideal-typical autocratization sequence describing a process where an increase in citizens' discontent with democratic institutions and parties lays the groundwork for anti-pluralist parties rising to power. In turn, these parties dismantle democratic institutions. Similarly, Haggard and Kaufman (2021) suggest that rising levels of political polarization strengthen anti-system parties that proceed to instigate antidemocratic reforms.

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[4]See also Lührmann, Medzihorsky, and Lindberg (2021), who show the relationship between anti-pluralist ruling parties and the onset of autocratization.

There are also a couple of descriptive, comparative case-studies examining the autocratization process. Hellmeier et al. (2021) compare the eight most outstanding autocratizers between 2010 to 2020 and find that the ruling government typically repress the media, academic freedoms, and civil society before they attempts to reform formal institutions like the quality of elections. Laebens and Lührmann (2021) analyze three autocratizers that avoided democratic breakdown and find that accountability mechanisms play a critical role in defending democratic institutions against anti-pluralist leaders' attempts to erode them. Such accountability mechanism includes parliamentary and judicial oversight (horizontal accountability), pressures from civil society and the media (diagonal accountability), and electoral competition between parties and within parties (vertical accountability) (Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova, 2020). The study thus suggests the importance of focusing on accountability mechanisms to understand how institutional change itself creates an opportunity for further autocratization.

Still, we do not have a comprehensive analysis of patterns of institutional decay during autocratization. We thus do not yet know if there is any specific sequence found across autocratization episodes or whether specific sequences influence the likelihood of democratic breakdown or survival. And finally, we do not yet know whether such sequences vary by the underlying conditions of autocratizing countries. These are the issues this paper addresses. The following section therefore looks closely at the process of autocratization to identify theoretical expectations regarding these questions. In line with recent literature, such as Laebens and Lührmann (2021), we describe the decline in the different dimensions of accountability that constrain political leaders to proceed with autocratization.

The Sequence of Democratic Breakdown

In his canonical work, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*, Juan J. Linz details autocratization processes across a wide range of cases to identify generally important sequences of events. In so doing, Linz (1978) provides a descriptive model of common patterns that lead to democratic breakdown. In this section, we condense Linz's depiction into three sequential processes: (1) the emergence of anti-democratic movements, coupled with an increase in violence and repression, (2) aggrandizement of the executive, and (3) dismantling of democratic institutions. We then discuss how these developments are associated with declines in the different aspects of democratic accountability.

Emergence of Anti-Democratic Movements: Erosion of Diagonal Accountability

Linz (1978) finds that autocratization episodes typically start with a crisis of legitimacy for democracy. Such crises often emerge when anti-democratic groups[5] become active in society and question democratic regimes. The anti-democratic forces can be political parties, movements, or organizations that "explicitly reject political systems based on the existence of the authority of the state or any central authority with coercive powers" (Linz, 1978, p. 28). The rise of anti-democratic groups in the opposition may be due to various causes, such as widespread revolutionary movements from the left, economic crisis or stagnation, anti-neoliberal policies or immigration trends. Despite the heterogeneity of causes, Linz (1978) argues that we tend to observe increased political violence, various conspiracies, and even failed coups and unsuccessful revolutionary attempts during this early stage of autocratization, extending the legitimacy crisis of democratic regimes.

Such mounting citizen discontent with democratic regimes is not unique to the period that Linz (1978) observes. Recent studies also find that declining support for democratic norms and parties is an early driver of the autocratization process (Lührmann, 2021).[6] Specifically, a decline of trust in government institutions leads to a reduction in vote share for established parties, opening a window of opportunity for outsider parties (often anti-pluralists) to grow (Petrarca, Giebler, and Weßels, 2022).

Violent repression against anti-democratic forces tends to lead to escalation and contribute to further mobilization (Linz, 1978, p. 57). However, the government often counters anti-democratic mobilization by "accepting limits on the civil liberties for the sake of stabilizing the situation and ensuring the survival of the system" (Linz, 1978, p. 90), while it significantly erodes the regime legitimacy. Thus, "militant democracy" — the use of legal restrictions on political expression or participation to curb extremist actors in democratic regimes[7] — plays a critical role in the early process of autocratization (Capoccia, 2013). In this scenario, autocratization sequences tend to begin with violent attacks by the anti-democratic forces, followed by the democratic incumbent's attempts to restrict citizens' rights or even to use repression against anti-democratic forces. To prevent an escalation of the conflict, the government also seeks more control over information by censoring the media. Accordingly, we are likely to observe erosion in non-institutional democratic constraints in the first phase of institutional decay, namely those associated with diagonal accountability.

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[5]Linz (1978) calls such actors the "disloyal opposition" to the democratic regime.

[6]Lührmann (2021) especially highlights that contemporary autocratizers typically come to power through popular vote, not military coups, which gives citizens a vital role in autocratization processes.

[7]The term originally introduced by Karl Lowenstein (1937).

Executive Aggrandizement: Erosion of Horizontal Accountability

The second phase Linz (1978) identifies as leading towards breakdown is an executive enlargement or "aggrandizement (Bermeo, 2016)," which the current literature typically refers to as weakening of horizontal accountability. In this second phase, increased public support for anti-democratic forces first translates into the emergence of "anti-pluralist parties." Once these parties increase their presence in the parliament, the government typically faces growing difficulty in ensuring coalition support and reaching a consensus in any policy area (Linz, 1978, p. 66). This type of political crisis opens up for political leadership to propose constitutional amendments, grant emergency powers, suspend sessions of the legislature, intervene, suspend or interfere with regional or local governments, and/or reshuffle the top-level military command in order for the government to take all "necessary" decisions (Linz, 1978, pp. 69–71).

Moreover, the government's use of violence against undemocratic forces is often legitimized through the legal process. The judiciary deals leniently with the government as they feel sympathetic to the motives of the government agencies engaging in violence or hostility rather than their victims (Linz, 1978, p. 57). Thus, judicial decision tend to land in favor of the government.

Recent studies especially highlight that the conflict within the government becomes salient once the polarization between anti- and pro-democratic forces at the elite levels elevates (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer, 2018; Somer, McCoy, and Luke, 2021). Polarization may create an opportunity for the government to justify changes to concentrate its power in both the judiciary (i.e., assigning judges in favor of the government) and the legislature (i.e., creating a new legislature with the majority seats taken by the ruling parties) by portraying the opposition as threatening (Haggard and Kaufman, 2021, p. 2). Such increased polarization and the aggrandizement of the executive are observed in both scenarios: pro-democratic incumbent facing the increasing influence by anti-democratic oppositions or anti-democratic forces in power with pro-democratic oppositions resisting the government. The first scenario includes the early phase of classic episodes, like the rise of Fascism in the Weimar Republic or the military uprising in Spain in 1936. Later includes the contemporary autocratization episodes like Hungary or Turkey, where the elected anti-pluralists strategically used polarization to strengthen the concentration of power in the executive. This concentration of power is equivalent to what is typically referred to and can be observed empirically as an erosion of horizontal accountability.

Approaching Democratic Breakdown: Erosion of Vertical Accountability

Linz (1978, pp. 81–82) sketches five scenarios for the last stage. The first scenario leading to breakdown is the unconstitutional displacement of a democratically elected government by a military coup. In the second scenario, the anti-democratic government incorporates part of the political class of the previous democratic regime (often professional politicians). Such regimes form royal dictatorships with a military-bureaucratic character.

The third alternative is that the democratic government is terminated without a successful power transition, resulting in civil war. A fourth option is the establishment of a (non-military) authoritarian regime excluding all leading political actors of the preceding democratic regime that lacks any form of mass mobilization in support of its rule.

The final scenario Linz (1978) portrays is that well-organized anti-democratic forces with a mass base in society take over the democratic government. According to Linz (1978), typical cases of this pattern are the Fascists in Italy and Germany. However, this scenario also parallels much of the recent literature suggesting that democratically elected authoritarian-minded leaders typically head gradual institutional decays leading to the breakdown of democracy (e.g., Bermeo, 2016; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Waldner and Lust, 2018). This includes more overt violations of the democratic procedure such as manipulating election results, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering voter registration, or packing the electoral commission.

In any of the scenarios above, the observable implications are significant declines in the quality of core democratic institutions that are typically thought to ensure vertical accountability.

In sum, and following the theoretical intuitions from Linz (1978)'s work, we expect to see the institutional order of autocratization as Figure 1 presents.

Figure 1. Expected Sequence of Autocratization

The main hypothesis we seek to evaluate is:

H1: Autocratization starts with declines in diagonal accountability, followed by declining horizontal accountability, and finally declines in vertical accountability.

Linz (1978) does not provide any expectations about whether these sequences are likely to differ by the outcome of autocratization episodes: democratic breakdown or survival. The underlying assumption is that the survival cases do not experience a decline in all three accountability mechanisms. In particular, in cases where democracy survives, the autocratization process should stop before leaders significantly erode vertical accountability mechanisms. Accordingly, observable autocratization processes should be the same in cases of both democratic breakdown and survival, with cases of survival stopping short of the last phases of autocratization. Ultimately, it is an open empirical question whether there are differences between autocratization processes in cases that survive and cases that ultimately break down. We examine these differences in our analysis.

Expectations From Sample Heterogeneity

In addition to the expectations derived from Linz (1978)'s theory of democratic regime breakdown, there are reasons to formulate at least two theoretical propositions based on expected sample heterogeneity. Among others, Waldner and Lust (2018) noted that the sample of autocratization episodes is highly heterogeneous. Sample heterogeneity is typically a clue to varying background vulnerabilities that can shift the extent to which cases are susceptible to probabilistic causes of autocratization. Based on the existing literature, two factors seem particularly salient to shift underlying vulnerabilities to processes of democratic breakdown: previous democratic experience and the wave of autocratization.

Length of Previous Democratic Experience

There is an established finding in the literature that new democracies are more vulnerable to breakdown compared to established democracies (e.g., Svolik, 2015; Boese et al., 2021). Arguments about the origin of democratic resilience vary, but they generally propose that resilience has to do with reinforcing mechanisms. Some argue that particular institutions, such as party systems deeply rooted in society (Linz, 1978) or judicial processes that require a bold procedures for changing constitutions (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring, 2013; Reenock, Staton, and Radean, 2013; Ginsburg and Huq, 2018; Weyland, 2020), create bulwarks that make it difficult for the ruling government to derail democratic institutions.

Other arguments suggest that the iteration of elections builds incentives for actors to accept the rules of the game (Lindberg, 2006) and that the everyday experience of living under democracy promotes democratic attitudes (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015). Regardless, the expected outcome is that a longer experience with democracy should be associated with greater resilience to the government's attempts that violate democratic norms (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2016; Persson and Tabellini, 2009).

Accordingly, we expect that formal democratic institutions in countries with longer democratic experiences are more resilient to autocratization. We therefore intuit that, in such cases, the government is especially likely to target non-institutional constraints represented by diagonal accountability before attempting to change formal institutions. In H1, we hypothesized that the general order of autocratization would tend to start with the decline of diagonal accountability. However, if we compare the cases with high and low democratic experiences, we expect to find that elements of diagonal accountability are more likely to decline earlier in the process in the cases with high democratic experience compared to the cases with limited democratic experience.

Thus, the second hypothesis follows below:

H2: In countries with high democratic stock, it is more likely that autocratization will begin with declines in diagonal accountability compared to countries with low democratic stock.

Waves of Autocratization

A growing body of literature distinguishes between different waves of autocratization, similar to Huntington's (1993) formulation of waves of democratization.[8] One consistent finding in this research is that episodes of autocratization in the first (roughly 1920s to 1940s) and second (roughly 1960s into 1970s) waves were often swift processes dominated by coups, the installation of one-party regimes, and foreign invasions (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). The current, third wave of autocratization (beginning around 1994) is instead characterized by gradual processes where (often elected) incumbents undermine democratic institutions one step at a time (e.g., Bermeo, 2016; Haggard and Kaufman, 2021; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019).

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[8]Lührmann and Lindberg (2019, p. 1102) defines an autocratization wave as "the time period during which the number of countries undergoing democratization declines while at the same time autocratization affects more and more countries."

One prominent characteristic of the third wave of autocratization is that their autocratization processes tend to start once anti-pluralist parties are elected as heads of government, while the earlier waves are likely to start when democratic-incumbent represses anti-democratic movements. This difference may come from the characteristics of these "anti-pluralist" forces in the third wave. In the contemporary period, anti-pluralists tend not to position themselves as "anti-democratic" or use violent tactics at the beginning of their movement. For example, Hugo Chávez and the populist leaders emulated his strategies, like Evo Morales in Bolivia and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, came into power by actively advocating a superior model of democracy. Such movements were even endorsed by prominent politicians and journalists (Hawkins, 2016). Since the contemporary anti-pluralists are not always seen as a serious threat to the democratic regime (Kaltwasser and Taggart, 2016), they are allowed to take office without facing repression. This means that the first phase of the general order of autocratization (decline in diagonal accountability) is likely to be skipped. Once anti-pluralists come into power, they immediately implement several reforms that fragment democratic constraints.

The decline in the diagonal accountability may, however, also be observed in the third wave of autocratization in the later stage of the process. Once anti-pluralist leaders enter the office, they tend to repress civil society groups or media that vocally oppose the government (e.g., Hellmeier et al., 2021; Mechkova, Lührmann, and Lindberg, 2017). One expected difference between the pre-third wave and during the third wave is that the decline in horizontal accountability is likely to be observed before the decline in diagonal accountability. Thus, we expect that for autocratization episodes in the third wave, the sequence of institutional decay is more likely to start from the decline of horizontal accountability:

H3: In the third wave, autocratization sequences are more likely to start with declines in horizontal accountability compared to the first and second waves.

Lastly, we consider the variation in the order of the institutional decay during the third wave of autocratization. We expect anti-pluralist incumbents to start anti-democratic reforms immediately after they are in power. However, as we discussed in the previous section, if the resilience of democratic institutions is high, they are likely to target non-institutional accountability mechanisms first before eroding the formal institutional constraints or horizontal accountability. Thus, if we compare the episodes with high and low democratic experiences during the third wave, we expect to find that

elements of diagonal accountability are more likely to decline earlier in the process in the cases with high democratic experience compared to the cases with limited democratic experience.

Thus, the last hypothesis follows below:

H4: During the third wave of autocratization, autocratization sequences in countries with high democratic stock are more likely to start with declines in diagonal accountability compared to countries with low democratic stock.

Research Design

The sample consists of episodes of autocratization starting in countries classified as democracies from the Episodes of Regime Transformation(ERT) dataset (version 4.0) (Edgell et al., 2022). The ERT builds on Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) in defining autocratization episodes as periods of substantial and sustained decline of democratic attributes and similarly uses the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) from the V-Dem dataset (version 12) (Coppedge et al., 2022a). However, the group behind the ERT has developed a more sophisticated operationalization of autocratization episodes.[9]

To measure the decline of different aspects of democratic attributes, we use indicators forming three accountability indices developed by Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020). These indices measure diagonal accountability with 13 indicators, horizontal accountability with 7 indicators, and vertical accountability with 11 indicators (see Table A3 of the Appendix for all indicators).[10] These indicators also overlap with the critical components of the electoral and liberal democracy indices.[11] Accordingly, the accountability indicators also capture the essential elements of democracy.

The ERT contains 69 completed episodes of autocratization in democracies from 1900 to 2021 (see Appendix Table A1 for a complete list of cases). Another 12 episodes of autocratization were ongoing (censored) by the end of 2021 and are therefore omitted from our analysis. The ERT also codes the outcome of each episode, which allows us to evaluate if the order of institutional change is different

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[9]See Maerz et al. (2021) for details. While autocratization episodes include cases where autocratization started from electoral or closed autocracy, we only include episodes starting in democracies.

[10]Given our interest in the temporal ordering of reforms, we omit the elected officials' index, variables for whether the legislature questions officials in practice, whether the legislature is bicameral, and internet censorship from the original indicators introduced by Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020) in our analysis. These variables all exhibit limited within-country variation in our sample.

[11]11 indicators are from the EDI, including the component indices for suffrage, clean elections, freedom of expression, or association. 8 indicators are from the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), including the component indices for equality before the law and individual liberty, judicial and legislative constraints on the executive.

in countries that averted breakdown and stayed democratic and those that ended as autocracies. Of the 69 autocratization episodes, 62 resulted in a democratic breakdown while only 7 survived. We do not expect the general order of decline in accountability to vary by the outcome of each episode. However, we compare the institutional order across the two outcome categories (democratic breakdown and survival) to evaluate whether we find novel insights about the relationship between the sequence and outcome of autocratization.

To evaluate the second hypothesis, we compare cases with relatively longer and shorter previous democratic experiences. For this analysis we draw on a recently developed measure of democratic stock (Edgell et al., 2020).[12] To avoid concerns about endogeneity, we divide the sample based on the level of democratic stock at the start of each episode. We do not have a theory of what counts as "high" or "sufficient" democratic experience. Therefore, we consider episodes with democratic stock below the sample average to have *low* democratic stock and episodes with stock above the average to have *high* democratic stock.

To evaluate the third hypothesis, we compare the episodes before and during the third wave of autocratization. We take the delimitation identified by Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) where the third wave began in 1994.

Lastly, to evaluate the fourth hypothesis, we compare episodes during the third wave with low democratic stock and those with high democratic stock. The list of countries by waves and the level of democratic stock is in Table A2 of the Appendix.

Empirical Approach

To determine the order of institutional decay during autocratization episodes, we use pairwise domination analysis, a methodology which explores the temporal relationship between ordinal variables developed by Lindenfors, Krusell, and Lindberg (2019) and Lindenfors et al. (2018). The method has been adapted from evolutionary biology, and it compares pairs of ordinal indicators to assess which are dominant within the overall indicators of interest (in this case, the indicators measuring democratic accountability). The interpretation and visualizations of the results were further developed by Edgell

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[12]The stock measure offers calculations based on any democracy index. Since our theory proposes that strong judicial constraints make political leaders less likely to be able to erode democratic institutions, we use the stock measure based on the LDI, which includes indicators for judicial constraints on the executive. Due to the missing data for the democratic stock, 9 cases are dropped from this part of the analysis.

et al. (2021), who used it to analyze the order of institutional change in episodes of liberalization. We adopt their approach here and apply it to episodes of autocratization.

By definition, we expect to observe that indicators generally move from higher to lower values during the process of autocratization. Thus, we infer that a *domination indicator*, whose value is greater than the paired indicator over the observation period, declines later in the autocratization episode compared with the indicators it dominates. Using the R package *seqR* (Krussell, 2017), we compare the observed values of all unique pairs of the 31 selected ordinal indicators measuring the three types of accountability. We then sum the number of indicators that an indicator dominates (d) or is dominated by (r), which compose a *domination table.* To aid with interpretation, following Edgell et al. (2021), we also calculate a *domination score* based on the difference in these two values ($score = r - d$), with lower values indicating that the variable dominates many other variables and thus declines later in the autocratization process. Then, we use this score to illustrate the general order of institutional decay as well as to test similarities in these scores across different episode outcomes (survival vs. breakdown) and underlying conditions (high vs. low democratic stock or pre-third wave vs. third wave) with a simple bivariate linear regression. We also use their residuals to find the variables that deviate from this trend across episodes.

This empirical approach requires some important assumptions. First, similar to Edgell et al. (2021), we assume that 50 percent is substantial enough to constitute domination. Since we aim to identify the most common path(s) of autocratization, we highlight those relationships that occur a majority of the time over the episodes. In addition, empirically, the 50 per cent threshold establishes a clear pattern of dominance. For a given pair of ordinal indicators, X and Y, when $X > Y$ more than 50 per cent of the time, it is rarely the case that $X < Y$ more than 20 per cent of the time because $X = Y$ is also a common pattern. We also show that our main conclusions are robust when we increase the domination threshold to two-thirds of the observations (see Table A13 - A15).

Second, because the same kind of process can play out quickly in one country and slowly in another, the method does not consider the time elapsed between institutional changes. The methodology achieves this by collapsing duplicate country-year observations, when values of all 31 variables are constant, into a single observed 'state.' This approach resolves the problem that stable states could overwhelm changes in terms of numbers in a country-year matrix. We report comparable results using country-year data in Appendix (Tables A10 - A12).

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Third, the method requires the ordinal scale to be consistent between observations on the same indicator (Lindenfors, Krusell, and Lindberg, 2019; Lindenfors et al., 2018). The V-Dem data largely satisfies this assumption as the project's extensive work has been addressing differential item functioning of expert rating using various tools (Marquardt et al., 2018; Marquardt and Pemstein, 2018; Pemstein et al., 2022).

Fourth, the ordinal scales between indicators should be comparable. An ordinal level on one indicator should correspond to the same level on all other indicators in the analysis (e.g., ordinal level 1 should correspond to a 1 on everything else). This implies that the indicators should have the same observable ranges and level of measurement. For this reason and following Edgell et al. (2021), we rescaled 6 variables relating to media and civic participation (by min/max) and suffrage (by quintiles) into V-Dem's standard 0-4 ordinal scale for comparability.

Finally, the analysis here does not account for exogenous variables, such as economic recession, pandemics, migration crisis, that may affect the course of autocratization. While we are aware of importance of such exogenous conditions, we rather focus on the process of internal reform in this study. This is because such internal processes have not received sufficient attention in previous studies and these processes are likely to influence how policymakers respond to ongoing changes in democratic regimes. However, we recognize that unobserved confounders may at least partly drive the results of our domination analyses.

Results

Figure 2 shows the general order of institutional decay in the full sample of episodes based on the domination scores for the indicators of the three accountability indices. Higher values of the score suggest that the indicator declined earlier in the autocratization process, while lower values of the score mean that the indicator declined later in the process. The figure demonstrates the average values of domination score for the indicators of each accountability index and the 99% confidence limits obtained by the basic nonparametric bootstrap.

For the full sample of episodes, horizontal accountability has the largest average domination score, indicating that it tends to be an earlier decliner across all autocratization episodes. Then, diagonal accountability has the second-largest score. Therefore, the most common institutional order of change tends to be (1) horizontal accountability, (2) diagonal accountability, and (3) vertical ac-

countability. This partly contradicts H1, which suggested that institutional decay would most often start from diagonal accountability but also proposed that vertical accountability would be the last category to decline.

Second, Figure 3 demonstrates the *difference* in the domination scores for the indicators of three accountability indices across different categories of episodes. For example, we subtract the domination scores for each indicator in the breakdown episodes from the scores in the survival episodes. If the difference is 0, the order is the same in both categories of episodes. But if the difference is negative, the score is larger for breakdown cases meaning that the decline of the indicator happens earlier in the breakdown episodes compared with survival cases. If the difference is positive, then the score is smaller for breakdown cases meaning that the decline of the indicator happens later in the breakdown episodes compared with survival cases.

First, the institutional order of autocratization in episodes that lead to democratic survival yields a slight difference from the breakdown episodes (Figure 3, upper left). The score for horizontal accountability is lower in the survival episodes. This indicates that, on average, the decline of horizontal accountability is more often coming later in the episodes leading to democratic survival compared with the breakdown episodes. The upper-right panel in Figure 3 shows that the institutional order of autocratization episodes yields several differences depending on democratic stock. The difference in the domination score for diagonal accountability is positive, indicating that the score for diagonal accountability is higher in the episodes with high democratic stock. Thus, the decline in diagonal accountability happens earlier in episodes taking place in countries with high democratic stock. This is in accordance with our theoretical expectation: autocratization sequences are likely to start with declines in diagonal accountability if levels of democratic stock are high (H2). In addition, compared to the episodes with low democratic stock, horizontal accountability declines at later stages in the episodes with longer democratic experience.

The results also show that the order of institutional decay tends to vary depending on the wave of autocratization (Figure 3, lower-left panel). The scores for vertical and horizontal accountability are higher in the episodes in the third wave. This indicates that both horizontal and vertical accountability tend to decline earlier for the episodes of the third wave compared with the episodes before the third wave. Meanwhile, the indicators of diagonal accountability on average tend to decline later in the third wave compared with episodes before it. This is in accordance with our theoretical expectations in H3.

Figure 2. Order of Institutional Decay in Autocratization Episodes

Note: The figure shows the distribution of domination scores for indicators in each of the three accountability indices in entire episodes and the 99% confidence limits. The indicators with lower scores decline later in the autocratization process while the indicators with higher scores decline earlier in the process.

Lastly, the lower-right panel in Figure 3 shows that, the institutional order slightly differs by the democratic stock during the third wave of autocratization. The direction of the difference is consistent with the upper-right panel comparing the order by democratic stock for the entire sample. The difference in the domination score for diagonal accountability is positive, indicating that the decline in diagonal accountability happens earlier in episodes taking place in countries with high democratic stock during the third wave. This is in accordance with our theoretical expectation in H4.

Figure A3 in Appendix further shows the distribution of the average first values of indicators for three accountability mechanisms. An absence of substantial difference in the first values between waves indicates that the observed difference in the institutional order is not derived from the initial conditions of the autocratization episodes by waves. In addition, the first values for diagonal accountability indicators are, on average, larger in the third wave than before. It indicates that diagonal accountability tends to decline later in the third wave, not because they declined before the autocratization episode starts. But it is because the order of institutional decay is different in the third wave of autocratization.

Breakdown and Survival in Detail

Next, we further analyze the institutional order of autocratization by focusing on the indicators that compose the three accountability mechanisms. First, Figure 4 plots the domination scores for each

Figure 3. Difference in Order of Institutional Decay by Episode Outcome, Democratic Stock, and Wave

Note: The figure shows the distribution of the difference in domination scores of the indicators in the three accountability indices across different categories of episodes and the 99% confidence limits. A score of 0 means that there is no difference in the institutional order between the categories.

of the 31 indicators, comparing episodes with a democratic breakdown (horizontal axis) to those that survived the autocratization process (vertical axis). Indicators developing comparatively earlier or later for both outcomes appear in the upper-right and the lower-left quadrants, respectively. The shaded area represents the estimated 99 percent confidence interval from a bivariate linear regression between domination scores for survival and breakdown episodes. For example, the indicator for suffrage is almost on the estimated line of the lower-left quadrant, meaning that suffrage declines in the end of the autocratization process in both survival or breakdown episodes. "Freedom of discussion for men," on the other hand, falls outside of the confidence intervals, meaning it declines rather early in episodes that have experienced a democratic breakdown compared with episodes that have survived.

This figure yields three additional and novel insights about the institutional order of autocratization. First, the results reveal a remarkable consistency in the ordering of reforms during autocratization, regardless of its outcome. The fitted linear regression shows a strong correlation between domination scores for the episodes that resulted in democratic breakdown or survival, with a coefficient of 0.88 ($p < 0.01$) and an adjusted R^2 of 0.79 (Model 1, Table A8).

Second, we demonstrate that some variables distinguish episodes that lead to breakdown from ones that survive. They are the ones with the greatest and statistically significant deviations from the regression diagonal. Notably, executive oversight by the legislature, legislature investigates in practice,

Figure 4. Pairwise Domination Scores in Autocratization Episodes by Episode Outcome

and EMB autonomy decline relatively earlier in democracies that eventually break down (upper-right quadrant).[13] This seems to indicate that democratic breakdown depends on incumbents that can swiftly derail safeguards of democracy that provide counter-balancing power to the executive and guarantee independent election administration. Meanwhile, election free and fair and print/broadcast media critical decline relatively earlier in the survival cases (upper-left quadrant).[14]

Democratic Stock in Detail

Figure 5 again plots the domination scores for all the 31 indicators but now compares episodes with low democratic stock (horizontal axis) to those with high democratic stock (vertical axis). Similar to the

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[13]Executive oversight ($e = -11.35$), legislature investigates in practice ($e = -7.70$), and EMB autonomy ($e = -7.42$) have the highest residual values (Table A9).

[14]Election free and fair ($e = 12.73$) and print/broadcast media critical ($e = 10.31$).

first model comparing the outcomes of the episode, we find the strong similarities in the autocratization process across episodes with low and high democratic experiences.[15]

However, there is a notable difference in the institutional order of decay between the episodes with high and low democratic stock. The variables making up diagonal accountability, such as government censorship effort, freedom of academic and cultural expression, CSO repression, and freedom of discussion for men and women, decline earlier in episodes with high democratic stock compared to episodes with low democratic stock (see also Table A9).[16] Meanwhile, the variables relating to horizontal and vertical accountability decline relatively early in the cases with low democratic stock. These variables include high court independence (horizontal accountability), election other voting irregularity (vertical accountability), and EMB autonomy (vertical accountability).[17]

Thus, the results reveal that institutional decay is likely to start with the erosion of diagonal accountability in the episodes with high democratic stock, while it is likely to start with the erosion of horizontal and vertical accountability in the episodes with limited democratic experience. These results corroborate the underlying theoretical intuitions for H2. If an incumbent wants to derail democracy in a country with a long history of democracy, where institutions of horizontal checks and balances and electoral integrity are strong, he would probably do best to begin by attacking more "vulnerable" aspects of democracy, such as civil society, academic freedom, and media freedom.

Waves of Autocratization in Detail

Figure 6 plots the domination scores comparing episodes in the pre-third wave of autocratization (horizontal axis) to those in the third wave (vertical axis). The results confirm the general consistency in the ordering of democratic regression across the waves of autocratization.[18]

There is also a notable difference in the institutional order of decay between the two subsets of episodes. The variables composing horizontal and vertical accountability decline relatively earlier in the third wave of autocratization compared to previous waves.[19] Meanwhile, the variables associated with

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[15]The regression coefficient is 0.92 ($p < 0.01$) and an adjusted R^2 of 0.81 (Model 2, Table A8).

[16]Freedom of academic and cultural expression ($e = 13.00$), CSO repression ($e = 10.55$), and freedom of discussion for men and women (both $e = 8.62$) (Table A9).

[17]Election voter registry ($e = -14.45$), election other voting irregularities ($e = -10.49$), election free and fair ($e = -12.30$), and EMB capacity ($e = -8.08$).

[18]The regression coefficient is 0.88 ($p < 0.01$) and the adjusted R^2 is 0.77 (Model 3, Table A8).

[19]Election other voting irregularities ($e = 16.00$), high court independence ($e = 13.59$), lower court independence ($e = 12.47$), and executive respects constitution ($e = 10.82$) (Table A9).

Figure 5. Pairwise Domination Scores in Autocratization Episodes by Democratic Stock

diagonal accountability, including Print/broadcast media perspectives, CSO entry and exit, freedom of academic and cultural expression, declined earlier in the pre-third wave compared to the third wave.[20]

These results indicate that the erosion of horizontal accountability (and certain aspects of vertical accountability) happens earlier during the third wave of autocratization than in the pre-third wave period. This finding is in accordance with our expectations in H3: in the third wave, autocratization sequences are especially likely to start with declines in horizontal accountability. Further, the erosion of diagonal accountability happens later in the third wave of autocratization compared with before. This result may suggest that anti-pluralists tend to come to power without facing repression during contemporary autocratization episodes. However, once in office, anti-pluralists almost immediately reduce executive constraints by the legislature and judiciary. Only later do they repress

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[20]Print/broadcast media perspectives ($e = -10.82$), CSO entry and exit ($e = -9.23$), and freedom of academic and cultural expression ($e = -8.47$).

Figure 6. Pairwise Domination Scores in Autocratization Episodes by Wave

non-institutional actors and reform electoral procedures.[21] Such findings align with previous research showing that democratic resilience is substantially weaker in the third wave of autocratization (Boese et al., 2021).

Conclusion

In this article, we examined the order of institutional changes that characterize autocratization. Previous studies evaluated the factors that influence the onset of autocratization episodes or democratic breakdown. However, past research has rarely unpacked the *process* of autocratization: the order in which different aspects of democracy decline. To address this gap, we revisit existing theories capturing

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[21]The detailed analysis comparing the episodes among the third wave of autocratization (high vs. low democratic stock) is not included because the sample size is very small (N= 35), and it has limited capacity to make a general implication.

observable patterns of democratic breakdown and analyze the autocratization process in a systematic way. We utilize new data on autocratization episodes and a unique methodological approach, pairwise domination analysis, to understand the order in which autocratization processes unfold.

Our research yields several important insights. We first find that autocratization generally follows a common pattern: aspects of horizontal and diagonal accountability decline first, followed by declines in vertical accountability. However, we also find that democratic breakdown is especially common when executive oversight, legislature investigation, or EMB autonomy decline early in the autocratization process. These findings generate two plausible inferences. First, the substantial similarity in the patterns of reforms could suggest that exogenous factors may matter more than institutional ordering when explaining the outcomes of autocratization. Alternatively, our findings could mean that minimal changes in the sequence of reforms have substantive effects on the propensity for democratic breakdown. For example, democratic breakdown is especially common when incumbents swiftly reduce checks on the executive and guarantees for independent electoral administration. If the latter inference holds, earlier reforms to executive oversight, legislative investigations, and EMB may provide essential warning signs about the trajectory of autocratization.

Our empirical results also indicate that underlying conditions in autocratizing countries yield different sequences of autocratization, each of which may be more or less vulnerable to democratic breakdown. First, in episodes with high democratic stock, institutional decay tends to start with the erosion of diagonal accountability. In contrast, the level of judicial constraints or EMB autonomy tends to decline earlier in countries with low democratic stock. These empirical findings suggest that leaders in countries with solid democratic institutions start their anti-democratic reforms with more vulnerable institutions, such as those protecting the rights of civil society, academics, and the media. Second, our findings show that the decline of horizontal and vertical accountability tends to be observed in the earlier phase during the third wave of autocratization. In detail, the erosion of high court independence and/or election irregularities happens earlier during the third wave compared with episodes observed before. Such findings may corroborate studies that stress the erosion of democratic institutions as a central characteristic found in the third wave of autocratization (e.g., Bermeo, 2016).

Future research needs to examine whether these differences in ordering by the different outcomes or underlying conditions are causal and whether they hold up to models accounting for exogenous forces. Our research using the domination analysis provides a starting point to study independent effects of the order of the autocratic reform on the course of the autocratization process.

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Appendix

Table A1. List of the Autocratization Episodes (1900-2021)

	Country	Start	End	Outcome
1	Argentina	1930	1931	Democratic breakdown
2	Argentina	1966	1967	Democratic breakdown
3	Armenia	1993	2008	Democratic breakdown
4	Austria	1931	1938	Democratic breakdown
5	Bangladesh	2002	2007	Democratic breakdown
6	Belarus	1995	2001	Democratic breakdown
7	Belgium	1914	1915	Democratic breakdown
8	Belgium	1940	1941	Democratic breakdown
9	Benin	2018	2021	Democratic breakdown
10	Bolivia	2006	2020	Democratic breakdown
11	Burkina Faso	2014	2015	Democratic breakdown
12	Chile	1972	1974	Democratic breakdown
13	Czech Republic	1930	1940	Democratic breakdown
14	Denmark	1940	1944	Democratic breakdown
15	Ecuador	2007	2013	Averted regression
16	El Salvador	2015	2021	Democratic breakdown
17	Estonia	1932	1935	Democratic breakdown
18	Estonia	1991	1992	Democratic breakdown
19	Fiji	1987	1988	Democratic breakdown
20	Fiji	2000	2001	Democratic breakdown
21	France	1939	1941	Democratic breakdown
22	France	1965	1965	Averted regression
23	Germany	1923	1939	Democratic breakdown
24	Honduras	2006	2010	Democratic breakdown
25	Hungary	2010	2021	Democratic breakdown
26	India	1971	1975	Preempted democrtic breakdown
27	India	2000	2021	Democratic breakdown
28	Ivory Coast	2019	2021	Democratic breakdown
29	Latvia	1934	1939	Democratic breakdown
30	Lesotho	2015	2017	Averted regression
31	Lithuania	1924	1927	Democratic breakdown
32	Luxembourg	1940	1941	Democratic breakdown
33	Madagascar	1997	2002	Democratic breakdown
34	Malawi	1999	2004	Democratic breakdown
35	Maldives	2012	2016	Democratic breakdown
36	Mali	2007	2012	Democratic breakdown
37	Mali	2017	2021	Democratic breakdown
38	Malta	1958	1959	Democratic breakdown
39	Moldova	1998	2006	Democratic breakdown
40	Moldova	2012	2017	Averted regression
41	Netherlands	1940	1941	Democratic breakdown
42	Nicaragua	2006	2021	Democratic breakdown
43	Niger	1996	1996	Democratic breakdown
44	Niger	2009	2010	Democratic breakdown

Continued on next page

45	North Macedonia	2000	2000	Preempted democrtic breakdown
46	North Macedonia	2005	2012	Democratic breakdown
47	Norway	1940	1943	Democratic breakdown
48	Palestine/West Bank	2006	2008	Democratic breakdown
49	Papua New Guinea	2007	2013	Democratic breakdown
50	Peru	1990	1992	Democratic breakdown
51	Philippines	2001	2005	Democratic breakdown
52	Philippines	2016	2021	Democratic breakdown
53	Poland	1926	1931	Democratic breakdown
54	Serbia	2010	2021	Democratic breakdown
55	Solomon Islands	2000	2001	Democratic breakdown
56	South Korea	2008	2014	Averted regression
57	Spain	1936	1940	Democratic breakdown
58	Sri Lanka	1970	1982	Democratic breakdown
59	Sri Lanka	2004	2006	Democratic breakdown
60	Suriname	1980	1981	Democratic breakdown
61	Thailand	2005	2007	Democratic breakdown
62	Turkey	1980	1981	Democratic breakdown
63	Turkey	2005	2021	Democratic breakdown
64	Ukraine	1997	2004	Democratic breakdown
65	Ukraine	2010	2014	Democratic breakdown
66	Uruguay	1933	1934	Democratic breakdown
67	Uruguay	1963	1974	Democratic breakdown
68	Venezuela	1998	2007	Democratic breakdown
69	Zambia	2010	2019	Democratic breakdown

Notes: To be considered sustained and substantial, the default ERT data requires that the EDI decrease by at least 0.01 in the initial year and by at least 0.10 (10 percent of the total scale) throughout the episode (Maerz et al., 2021). Episodes terminate due to prolonged (5-year) periods of stasis, any substantial one-year (0.03) or five-year (0.10) improves, or a transition to electoral autocracy. Survival encompasses two sub-categories in the ERT data: averted regression and preempted democratic breakdown. We do not distinguish between these sub-categories in the analysis given that the number of episodes in which democracy survives is so small. Recent autocratization cases, including Brazil and Poland, are considered censored (or unfinished) cases.

Figure A1. The three waves of autocratization (1900-2021)

Figure A2. Distribution of democratic stock in autocratization episodes (1900-2021)

Note: The figure shows the distribution of the starting values of democratic stock based on the LDI (scaled by 0-1) among autocratization episodes. The mean value is 0.21.

Table A2. Autocratization Episodes by Conditions

	Before the Third Wave (1900-1993)	During the Third Wave (1994-2021)
High Democratic Stock	Belgium (1914-1915) Belgium (1940-1941) Chile (1972-1974) Denmark (1940-1944) Fiji (1987-1988) France (1939-1941) France (1965-1965) Luxembourg (1940-1941) Malta (1958-1959) Netherlands (1940-1941) Norway (1940-1943) Sri Lanka (1970-1982) Suriname (1980-1981) Uruguay (1933-1934) Uruguay (1963-1974)	Benin (2018-2021) Ecuador (2007-2013) Fiji (2000-2001) India (2000-2021) Papua New Guinea (2007-2013) Philippines (2001-2005) Philippines (2016-2021) Solomon Islands (2000-2001) Sri Lanka (2004-2006) Venezuela (1998-2007)
Low Democratic Stock	Armenia (1993-2008) Estonia (1932-1935) Estonia (1991-1992) Germany (1923-1939) India (1971-1975) Latvia (1934-1939) Lithuania (1924-1927) Poland (1926-1931) Spain (1936-1940) Turkey (1980-1981)	Bangladesh (2002-2007) Belarus (1995-2001) Bolivia (2006-2020) Burkina Faso (2014-2015) Ivory Coast (2019-2021) Lesotho (2015-2017) Madagascar (1997-2002) Malawi (1999-2004) Maldives (2012-2016) Mali (2007-2012) Mali (2017-2021) Moldova (1998-2006) Moldova (2012-2017) Nicaragua (2006-2021) Niger (1996-1996) Niger (2009-2010) North Macedonia (2000-2000) North Macedonia (2005-2012) Serbia (2010-2021) South Korea (2008-2014) Thailand (2005-2007) Turkey (2005-2021) Ukraine (1997-2004) Ukraine (2010-2014) Zambia (2010-2019)

Notes: 9 cases are not included as the information about democratic stock is missing.

Figure A3. Distribution of the average first values of three accountability's indicators by pre-third wave and third wave of autocratization episodes

Table A3. Summary statistics of indicators

	Indicator	Variable	Index	Collapsed states Obs	Mean	SD	Country-year Obs	Mean	SD
1	CSO repression	v2csreprss_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.91	0.84	258	2.97	0.81
2	CSO entry and exit	v2cseeorgs_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.67	0.80	258	2.74	0.78
3	CSO participatory environment	v2csprtcpt_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	3.05	1.04	258	3.14	1.01
4	Engaged society	v2dlengage_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.16	0.66	258	2.23	0.65
5	Freedom of discussion for men	v2cldiscm_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	3.05	0.83	258	3.10	0.79
6	Freedom of discussion for women	v2cldiscw_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.98	0.71	258	3.03	0.68
7	Freedom of academic and cultural expression	v2clacfree_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.72	0.75	258	2.79	0.74
8	Media self-censorship	v2meslfcen_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.89	0.86	258	2.95	0.79
9	Harassment of journalists	v2meharjrn_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.13	0.56	258	2.14	0.53
10	Media bias	v2mebias_ord	Diagonal Accountability	203	2.99	0.65	257	3.04	0.62
11	Print/broadcast media critical	v2mecrit_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	3.14	0.71	258	3.20	0.68
12	Government censorship effort — Media	v2mecenefm_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	2.32	0.97	258	2.41	0.94
13	Print/broadcast media perspectives	v2merange_ord	Diagonal Accountability	204	3.45	0.81	258	3.53	0.76
14	Compliance with judiciary	v2jucomp_ord	Horizontal Accountability	204	2.60	0.75	258	2.64	0.72
15	Compliance with high court	v2juhccomp_ord	Horizontal Accountability	204	2.74	0.67	258	2.77	0.64
16	High court independence	v2juhcind_ord	Horizontal Accountability	204	2.37	0.90	258	2.41	0.87
17	Lower court independence	v2juncind_ord	Horizontal Accountability	204	2.45	0.82	258	2.50	0.80
18	Legislature investigates in practice	v2lginvstp_ord	Horizontal Accountability	202	2.14	0.95	256	2.15	0.92
19	Executive oversight	v2lgotovst_ord	Horizontal Accountability	201	2.06	0.93	255	2.08	0.92
20	Executive respects constitution	v2exrescon_ord	Horizontal Accountability	204	2.53	0.63	258	2.58	0.60
21	EMB autonomy	v2elembaut_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	2.73	0.89	258	2.78	0.84
22	EMB capacity	v2elembcap_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.04	0.74	258	3.11	0.73
23	Election voter registry	v2elrgstry_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.46	0.68	258	3.49	0.64
24	Election other voting irregularities	v2elirreg_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	2.53	0.90	258	2.56	0.88
25	Election free and fair	v2elfrfair_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.29	0.72	258	3.34	0.68
26	Election government intimidation	v2elintim_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.44	0.59	258	3.48	0.57
27	Elections multiparty	v2elmulpar_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.94	0.37	258	3.95	0.33
28	Suffrage	e_v2x_suffr_5C	Vertical Accountability	204	3.95	0.31	258	3.96	0.28
29	Party ban	v2psparban_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.80	0.57	258	3.84	0.52
30	Barriers to parties	v2psbars_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.81	0.61	258	3.85	0.55
31	Opposition parties autonomy	v2psoppaut_ord	Vertical Accountability	204	3.59	0.61	258	3.63	0.58

Notes: Range for all variables is 0-4. The range for the following variables have been rescaled from their original 0-3 or 0-5 (engaged society) ordinal scale by division: media critical (*v2mecrit_ord*), media perspectives (*v2merange_ord*), media self-censorship (*v2meslfcen_ord*), CSO participatory environment (*v2csprtcpt_ord*), and engaged society (*v2dlengage_ord*). Suffrage (*e_v2x_suffr_5C*) has been rescaled from 0-1 proportion quintiles to a 0-4 range by multiplication. The following election-specific variables have been carried forward within the electoral regime (*v2_elecreg*): *v2elmulpar_ord*, *v2elrgstry_ord*, *v2elvotbuy_ord*, *v2elirreg_ord*, *v2elintim_ord*. Given our interest in the temporal ordering of reforms, we omit variables exhibit limited within-country variation in our sample from the original indicators by Lührmann, Marquardt, and Mechkova (2020). Further, the variables for elected head of the executive (*v2ex_elechos*) and legislature questions officials in practice (*v2lgqstexp*) are both variables measured as 1 (yes) or 0 (no), which makes it difficult to see incremental changes. Legislature bicameral (*v2lgbicam*) has an alternative response of 2 (having multiple legislatures), but these values are not ordered. The data for internet censorship (*v2mecenefi*) is only available after 2000. See Coppedge et al. (2022b) for the detail.

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Table A4. Domination table for Figure 3 and 4 (outcome)

		Breakdown			Survival		
Indicator	Index	d	r	score	d	r	score
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	0	23	23	2	11	9
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	0	22	22	0	27	27
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	0	22	22	0	29	29
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	0	20	20	2	12	10
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	0	17	17	1	13	12
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	0	14	14	1	14	13
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	1	14	13	2	9	7
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	1	13	12	2	12	10
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	0	12	12	2	12	10
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	3	11	8	2	11	9
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	3	9	6	2	9	7
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	3	9	6	2	11	9
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	4	9	5	2	8	6
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	4	9	5	8	5	-3
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	6	6	0	7	4	-3
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	6	6	0	2	8	6
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	5	5	0	2	8	6
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	7	6	-1	18	0	-18
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	7	5	-2	2	8	6
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	8	5	-3	7	6	-1
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	10	4	-6	10	4	-6
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	10	4	-6	3	8	5
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	14	3	-11	3	6	3
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	14	1	-13	10	6	-4
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	14	0	-14	17	0	-17
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	17	0	-17	20	0	-20
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	20	0	-20	20	0	-20
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	22	0	-22	23	0	-23
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	23	0	-23
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	23	0	-23
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	24	0	-24	23	0	-23

Notes: Results from pairwise domination analysis of collapsed "states" in episodes of autocratizing democracy, disaggregated by outcome type. Statistics: d= number of indicators dominated; r =number of indicators dominated by; score= domination score (d-r). Results are sorted from low to high on domination score for episodes with democratic breakdown. Unit of analysis is the collapsed state.

Table A5. Domination table for Figure 3 and 5 (democracy stock)

Indicator	Index	High Stock			Low Stock		
		d	r	score	d	r	score
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	0	27	27	0	22	22
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	0	24	24	0	20	20
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	0	21	21	0	19	19
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	0	19	19	0	20	20
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	1	17	16	0	14	14
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	1	15	14	0	13	13
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	1	14	13	6	6	0
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	2	12	10	0	16	16
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	2	11	9	1	11	10
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	2	11	9	0	18	18
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	3	11	8	3	8	5
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	3	11	8	0	20	20
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	4	11	7	6	7	1
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	5	10	5	10	4	-6
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	5	9	4	9	4	-5
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	5	8	3	9	5	-4
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	6	7	1	5	7	2
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	6	7	1	2	7	5
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	7	6	-1	7	6	-1
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	9	6	-3	10	4	-6
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	13	4	-9	7	6	-1
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	13	0	-13	11	4	-7
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	15	0	-15	14	2	-12
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	16	0	-16	8	4	-4
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	18	0	-18	18	0	-18
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	20	0	-20	17	0	-17
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	20	0	-20	10	4	-6
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	21	0	-21	25	0	-25
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	21	0	-21	25	0	-25
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	21	0	-21	24	0	-24
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	21	0	-21	24	0	-24

Notes: Results from pairwise domination analysis of collapsed "states" in episodes of autocratizing democracy, disaggregated by levels of democracy stock. Statistics: d= number of indicators dominated; r =number of indicators dominated by; score= domination score (d-r). Results are sorted from low to high on domination score for episodes with a high democracy stock. Unit of analysis is the collapsed state.

Table A6. Domination table for Figure 3 and 6 (waves)

Indicator	Index	Third wave			Pre-third wave		
		d	r	score	d	r	score
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	0	22	22	0	24	24
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	0	21	21	0	24	24
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	0	20	20	0	17	17
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	0	20	20	0	24	24
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	0	18	18	3	8	5
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	0	17	17	3	10	7
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	0	16	16	7	7	0
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	0	16	16	4	8	4
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	0	15	15	0	19	19
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	1	13	12	3	9	6
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	2	9	7	4	8	4
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	4	8	4	0	15	15
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	5	8	3	5	8	3
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	4	7	3	0	13	13
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	6	6	0	5	7	2
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	8	6	-2	3	8	5
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	9	5	-4	4	8	4
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	10	5	-5	7	5	-2
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	9	4	-5	6	8	2
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	10	5	-5	5	8	3
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	10	4	-6	17	0	-17
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	10	4	-6	7	5	-2
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	11	4	-7	8	5	-3
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	13	0	-13	20	0	-20
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	14	0	-14	21	0	-21
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	17	0	-17	9	2	-7
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	18	0	-18	21	0	-21
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	23	0	-23
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	23	0	-23
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	22	0	-22
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	20	0	-20

Notes: Results from pairwise domination analysis of collapsed "states" in episodes of autocratizing democracy, disaggregated by levels of polarization. Statistics: d= number of indicators dominated; r =number of indicators dominated by; score= domination score (d-r). Results are sorted from low to high on domination score for episodes in the third wave of autocratization. Unit of analysis is the collapsed state.

Table A7. Domination table for Figure 3 (democracy stock for the episodes in the third wave autocratization)

Indicator	Index	High Stock			Low Stock		
		d	r	score	d	r	score
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	0	27	27	0	22	22
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	0	21	21	0	19	19
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	0	19	19	0	14	14
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	0	19	19	0	20	20
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	1	19	18	0	20	20
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	1	18	17	0	20	20
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	1	18	17	0	21	21
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	1	16	15	0	15	15
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	1	13	12	7	6	-1
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	1	13	12	0	19	19
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	2	11	9	1	12	11
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	2	10	8	3	9	6
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	6	11	5	7	6	-1
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	6	7	1	7	8	1
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	7	7	0	4	7	3
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	8	7	-1	10	5	-5
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	8	6	-2	9	4	-5
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	8	6	-2	9	5	-4
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	10	6	-4	10	5	-5
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	10	6	-4	8	5	-3
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	12	5	-7	13	3	-10
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	13	4	-9	8	4	-4
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	13	4	-9	9	6	-3
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	13	0	-13	12	2	-10
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	16	0	-16	11	4	-7
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	20	0	-20	19	0	-19
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	22	0	-22	24	0	-24
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	22	0	-22	17	0	-17
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	25	0	-25
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	25	0	-25
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	23	0	-23	23	0	-23

Notes: Results from pairwise domination analysis of collapsed "states" in episodes of autocratizing democracy, disaggregated by levels of democracy stock. Statistics: d= number of indicators dominated; r =number of indicators dominated by; score= domination score (d-r). Results are sorted from low to high on domination score for episodes with a high democracy stock. Unit of analysis is the collapsed state.

Table A8. Estimating the similarity of domination scores in episodes of autocratizing democracies with (1) democratic breakdown vs. survival, (2) high vs. low democracy stock, and (3) before and after the third wave of autocratization

	Comparison:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Outcome	Dem. Stock	Waves
Coefficient	0.88***	0.92***	0.88***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Constant	0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(1.20)	(1.19)	(1.29)
Observations	31	31	31
R^2	0.80	0.81	0.77
Adjusted R^2	0.79	0.81	0.76
Residual Std. Error (df = 29)	6.66	6.63	7.21
F Statistic (df = 1; 29)	112.98***	126.77***	98.25***

Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors from bivariate linear regression models. The dependent variable (y) is the domination score for 31 indicators in autocratizing democracies that (1) have survive, (2) have a high democracy stock, and (3) occured in the third wave of autocratization. The independent variable (x) is the domination score for those same 31 indicators in episodes of autocratizing democracy that (1) have breakdown, (2) have a low democracy stock, and (3) occurred before the third wave of autocratization. Domination scores calculated using collapsed states. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A9. Residuals from bivariate regressions reported in Table A8

		(1)	(2)	(3)
Indicator	Index	Outcome	Dem. Stock	Waves
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	-17.12	8.62	-6.76
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	-11.35	3.43	-1.17
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	-7.70	0.51	5.00
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	-7.42	-3.62	0.35
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	-4.96	-1.36	-10.82
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	-4.61	-14.45	4.53
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	-4.50	-10.49	16.00
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	-3.53	1.19	-5.36
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	-3.04	3.06	-1.76
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	-3.00	6.70	-7.53
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	-2.65	2.11	-2.71
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	-2.65	1.19	-3.59
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	-2.30	-4.28	0.53
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	-1.76	2.11	-2.71
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	-0.69	-6.53	-4.35
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	-0.62	-7.64	12.47
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	-0.62	1.98	10.82
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	0.61	-4.79	13.59
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	1.58	13.00	-8.47
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	1.65	-8.08	-4.24
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	1.69	6.08	-9.23
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	1.92	-0.25	6.71
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	3.69	3.38	3.47
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	6.00	10.55	-7.65
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	6.00	-0.08	-6.41
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	7.50	-3.91	4.64
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	7.53	5.51	-0.17
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	7.77	-0.85	-1.76
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	9.53	6.66	0.83
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	10.31	2.55	-3.24
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	12.73	-12.30	9.00

Notes: Estimated residuals from bivariate linear regression models of Table A8.

Table A10. Bivariate regressions of domination scores (1) democratic breakdown vs. survival, (2) high vs. low democracy stock, and (3) before and after the third wave of autocratization, based on country-year observations

	Comparison:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Outcome	Dem. Stock	Waves
Coefficients	0.89***	0.95***	0.99***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Constant	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(1.30)	(1.19)	(1.03)
Observations	31	31	31
R^2	0.77	0.82	0.86
Adjusted R^2	0.76	0.81	0.86
Residual Std. Error (df = 29)	7.26	6.60	5.75
F Statistic (df = 1; 29)	96.74***	130.27***	178.26***

Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors from bivariate linear regression models. The dependent variable (y) is the domination score for 31 indicators in autocratizing democracies that (1) have survive, (2) have a high democracy stock, and (3) occured in the third wave of autocratization. The independent variable (x) is the domination score for those same 31 indicators in episodes of autocratizing democracy that (1) have breakdown, (2) have a low democracy stock, and (3) occurred before the third wave of autocratization. Domination scores calculated using country-year observations. $^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Table A11. Residuals from bivariate regressions reported in Table A10

		(1)	(2)	(3)
Indicator	Index	Outcome	Dem. Stock	Waves
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	-17.11	8.82	-5.01
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	-17.00	7.82	-5.98
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	-8.40	2.87	-3.75
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	-7.51	-0.09	2.19
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	-6.30	-11.09	12.04
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	-5.58	-13.27	0.83
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	-4.92	-0.82	-3.15
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	-2.49	1.95	-3.21
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	-2.45	-8.09	-7.01
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	-2.43	-3.77	-1.95
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	-2.19	4.59	-0.83
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	-2.15	-4.73	-0.19
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	-1.79	-4.46	-1.06
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	-1.60	1.91	-1.23
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	-1.60	1.91	-1.23
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	-1.60	0.95	-2.22
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	0.58	-5.27	12.06
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	0.79	13.05	-7.89
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	1.24	1.55	10.07
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	1.36	-6.27	10.06
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	3.90	0.46	7.06
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	4.15	6.77	-2.75
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	4.42	-2.64	2.82
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	5.68	6.14	-4.89
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	6.57	2.27	3.06
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	6.83	5.05	-1.75
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	7.00	-0.05	-7.94
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	8.77	-3.82	1.01
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	10.77	11.73	-4.99
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	11.32	-1.27	-1.04
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	11.76	-12.18	6.85

Notes: Estimated residuals from bivariate linear regression models of Table A10.

Table A12. Domination table for country-year observations by groups of episodes

| | Outcome | | | | | | Democracy Stock | | | | | | Waves | | | | | |
| | Breakdown | | | Survival | | | Low | | | High | | | Pre-third | | | Third | | |
Indicator	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score
Harassment of journalists	0	25	25	0	29	29	0	23	23	0	27	27	0	24	24	0	22	22
Executive oversight	0	23	23	1	13	12	0	19	19	0	21	21	0	24	24	0	20	20
Legislature investigates in practice	0	22	22	1	13	12	0	20	20	0	19	19	0	18	18	0	20	20
Engaged society	0	19	19	0	21	21	0	17	17	0	23	23	0	24	24	0	21	21
Government censorship effort — Media	0	16	16	1	13	12	0	13	13	1	18	17	0	16	16	0	15	15
Election other voting irregularities	1	16	15	2	9	7	0	20	20	3	11	8	5	9	4	0	16	16
High court independence	1	15	14	1	14	13	0	16	16	2	12	10	3	9	6	0	18	18
Lower court independence	1	13	12	1	13	12	0	16	16	2	11	9	3	9	6	0	16	16
Executive respects constitution	1	12	11	1	12	11	1	13	12	1	14	13	3	10	7	0	17	17
Compliance with judiciary	3	11	8	2	13	11	1	11	10	2	12	10	3	9	6	1	14	13
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	3	10	7	2	9	7	5	6	1	1	15	14	0	11	11	4	7	3
CSO entry and exit	3	9	6	1	12	11	4	7	3	3	12	9	0	11	11	4	10	6
EMB autonomy	4	9	5	8	10	2	2	7	5	6	7	1	4	9	5	5	8	3
Compliance with high court	4	9	5	2	13	11	2	8	6	3	11	8	3	9	6	2	11	9
Freedom of discussion for women	6	6	0	17	0	-17	9	5	-4	5	9	4	5	7	2	9	5	-4
Media bias	5	5	0	2	9	7	7	6	-1	7	6	-1	3	9	6	8	6	-2
Freedom of discussion for men	7	6	-1	18	0	-18	8	4	-4	5	10	5	5	4	-1	10	4	-6
CSO repression	8	6	-2	1	10	9	10	4	-6	5	11	6	5	6	1	10	6	-4
Media self-censorship	7	5	-2	2	9	7	4	8	4	7	7	0	4	5	1	6	8	2
EMB capacity	8	4	-4	12	6	-6	7	5	-2	13	3	-10	5	4	-1	12	4	-8
Print/broadcast media critical	10	4	-6	3	9	6	10	4	-6	12	5	-7	7	3	-4	10	5	-5
CSO participatory environment	11	4	-7	12	4	-8	12	2	-10	14	0	-14	8	2	-6	11	4	-7
Election free and fair	14	3	-11	3	5	2	8	4	-4	16	0	-16	15	0	-15	12	4	-8
Election government intimidation	14	0	-14	12	4	-8	14	0	-14	16	0	-16	17	0	-17	14	0	-14
Election voter registry	14	0	-14	18	0	-18	10	4	-6	19	0	-19	16	0	-16	15	0	-15
Print/broadcast media perspectives	17	0	-17	20	0	-20	18	0	-18	18	0	-18	15	0	-15	18	0	-18
Opposition parties autonomy	19	0	-19	19	0	-19	16	0	-16	20	0	-20	18	0	-18	18	0	-18
Party ban	22	0	-22	22	0	-22	23	0	-23	20	0	-20	20	0	-20	23	0	-23
Suffrage	23	0	-23	22	0	-22	24	0	-24	21	0	-21	22	0	-22	23	0	-23
Elections multiparty	23	0	-23	22	0	-22	24	0	-24	21	0	-21	22	0	-22	23	0	-23
Barriers to parties	23	0	-23	22	0	-22	23	0	-23	21	0	-21	21	0	-21	23	0	-23

Notes: Results from pariwise domination analysis in episodes of autocratizing democracy, disaggregated by outicome type, levels of democracy stock or polarization. Statistics: d= number of indicators dominated; r =number of indicators dominated by; score= domination score (d-r). Results are sorted from low to high on domination score for episodes with democratic breakdown. Unit of analysis is country-year.

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Table A13. Bivariate regression of domination scores with (1) democratic breakdown vs. survival, (2) high vs. low democracy stock, and (3) Before and After the third of autocratization using two-thirds threshold

	Comparison:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Outcome	Dem. Stock	Waves
Coefficient	0.92***	0.97***	0.99***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	0.00	-0.00	0.00
	(0.87)	(0.77)	(0.65)
Observations	31	31	31
R^2	0.81	0.86	0.88
Adjusted R^2	0.80	0.85	0.88
Residual Std. Error (df = 29)	4.87	4.27	3.64
F Statistic (df = 1; 29)	122.95***	176.53***	216.74***

Notes: Estimated coefficients and standard errors from bivariate linear regression models. The dependent variable (y) is the domination score for 31 indicators in autocratizing democracies that (1) have survive, (2) have a high democracy stock, and (3) occurred in the third wave of autocratization. The independent variable (x) is the domination score for those same 31 indicators in episodes of autocratizing democracy that (1) have breakdown, (2) have a low democracy stock, and (3) occurred before the third wave of autocratization. Domination scores calculated using collapsed states with a threshold of at least two-thirds for domination. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A14. Residuals from bivariate regressions reported in Table A13

		(1)	(2)	(3)
Indicator	Index	Outcome	Dem. Stock	Waves
Freedom of discussion for men	Diagonal Accountability	-14.92	4.92	-3.99
Print/broadcast media perspectives	Diagonal Accountability	-8.72	-2.28	-7.05
Executive oversight	Horizontal Accountability	-6.81	4.25	1.14
Opposition parties autonomy	Vertical Accountability	-5.95	-2.36	0.82
Freedom of discussion for women	Diagonal Accountability	-4.76	3.03	-3.94
EMB autonomy	Vertical Accountability	-4.68	-2.89	3.01
Legislature investigates in practice	Horizontal Accountability	-4.05	-0.67	3.10
Election other voting irregularities	Vertical Accountability	-2.28	-4.70	8.00
Barriers to parties	Vertical Accountability	-1.51	1.42	-4.18
Party ban	Vertical Accountability	-1.51	5.42	-2.18
Lower court independence	Horizontal Accountability	-0.28	-1.78	3.08
Suffrage	Vertical Accountability	0.33	2.39	-0.24
Elections multiparty	Vertical Accountability	0.33	1.42	2.74
Executive respects constitution	Horizontal Accountability	0.64	3.19	2.09
Government censorship effort — Media	Diagonal Accountability	0.64	4.19	-1.87
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	Diagonal Accountability	1.32	6.11	-3.91
Compliance with high court	Horizontal Accountability	1.40	1.14	0.08
Compliance with judiciary	Horizontal Accountability	1.48	0.17	0.09
CSO participatory environment	Diagonal Accountability	1.68	-4.08	-4.01
High court independence	Horizontal Accountability	1.72	1.22	6.05
CSO repression	Diagonal Accountability	2.24	0.06	0.01
CSO entry and exit	Diagonal Accountability	2.40	3.14	-2.90
EMB capacity	Vertical Accountability	2.92	-8.89	-5.01
Election voter registry	Vertical Accountability	3.20	-7.19	-0.13
Harassment of journalists	Diagonal Accountability	3.35	6.44	5.16
Media bias	Diagonal Accountability	4.08	1.06	-1.95
Media self-censorship	Diagonal Accountability	4.08	-2.89	3.00
Engaged society	Diagonal Accountability	4.11	1.39	-3.74
Election government intimidation	Vertical Accountability	5.28	0.75	1.86
Print/broadcast media critical	Diagonal Accountability	5.84	-4.00	1.96
Election free and fair	Vertical Accountability	8.44	-9.97	2.90

Notes: Estimated residuals from bivariate linear regression models of Table A13.

Table A15. Domination table by groups of episodes using two-third threshold

| | Outcome | | | | | | Democracy Stock | | | | | | Waves | | | | | |
| | Breakdown | | | Survival | | | Low | | | High | | | Pre-third | | | Third | | |
Indicator	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score	d	r	score
Harassment of journalists	0	17	17	0	19	19	0	16	16	0	22	22	0	13	13	0	18	18
Executive oversight	0	15	15	0	7	7	0	9	9	0	13	13	0	11	11	0	12	12
Engaged society	0	14	14	0	17	17	0	14	14	0	15	15	0	21	21	0	17	17
Legislature investigates in practice	0	12	12	0	7	7	0	12	12	0	11	11	0	8	8	0	11	11
Election other voting irregularities	0	9	9	1	7	6	0	11	11	1	7	6	2	2	0	0	8	8
High court independence	0	9	9	0	10	10	0	8	8	0	9	9	1	5	4	0	10	10
Lower court independence	0	9	9	0	8	8	0	8	8	1	7	6	1	7	6	0	9	9
Executive respects constitution	0	8	8	0	8	8	0	7	7	0	10	10	1	8	7	0	9	9
Government censorship effort — Media	0	8	8	0	8	8	0	7	7	0	11	11	0	10	10	0	8	8
Compliance with judiciary	0	6	6	0	7	7	0	6	6	1	7	6	0	7	7	0	7	7
CSO entry and exit	0	5	5	0	7	7	0	5	5	0	8	8	0	8	8	0	5	5
Compliance with high court	0	5	5	0	6	6	0	5	5	1	7	6	1	7	6	0	6	6
Freedom of academic and cultural expression	0	4	4	2	7	5	0	4	4	0	10	10	0	7	7	1	4	3
EMB autonomy	0	4	4	1	0	-1	0	4	4	2	3	1	1	2	1	0	4	4
Freedom of discussion for women	1	4	3	2	0	-2	3	4	1	1	5	4	0	5	5	2	3	1
CSO repression	1	4	3	1	6	5	2	4	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	2	3	1
Freedom of discussion for men	2	3	1	14	0	-14	4	1	-3	1	3	2	0	1	1	3	0	-3
Media bias	3	4	1	2	7	5	2	4	2	3	6	3	1	5	4	2	4	2
Media self-censorship	3	4	1	2	7	5	1	5	4	2	3	1	2	2	0	2	5	3
EMB capacity	4	3	-1	2	4	2	0	4	4	5	0	-5	3	2	-1	6	0	-6
Print/broadcast media critical	4	2	-2	2	6	4	4	4	0	4	0	-4	4	1	-3	2	1	-1
CSO participatory environment	4	0	-4	2	0	-2	3	0	-3	7	0	-7	1	0	-1	5	0	-5
Election free and fair	7	0	-7	2	4	2	3	4	1	9	0	-9	8	0	-8	5	0	-5
Election government intimidation	9	0	-9	3	0	-3	9	0	-9	8	0	-8	11	0	-11	9	0	-9
Print/broadcast media perspectives	9	0	-9	17	0	-17	10	0	-10	12	0	-12	4	0	-4	11	0	-11
Election voter registry	10	0	-10	6	0	-6	7	0	-7	14	0	-14	10	0	-10	10	0	-10
Opposition parties autonomy	12	0	-12	17	0	-17	13	0	-13	15	0	-15	14	0	-14	13	0	-13
Barriers to parties	19	0	-19	19	0	-19	21	0	-21	19	0	-19	14	0	-14	18	0	-18
Party ban	19	0	-19	19	0	-19	21	0	-21	15	0	-15	14	0	-14	16	0	-16
Suffrage	21	0	-21	19	0	-19	22	0	-22	19	0	-19	19	0	-19	19	0	-19
Elections multiparty	21	0	-21	19	0	-19	21	0	-21	19	0	-19	21	0	-21	18	0	-18

Notes: Results from pariwise domination analysis in episodes of autocratizing democracy, disaggregated by outicome type, levels of democracy stock or polarization. Statistics: d= number of indicators dominated; r =number of indicators dominated by; score= domination score (d-r). Results are sorted from low to high on domination score for episodes with democratic breakdown. Domination calculated using a threshold of at least two-third.