V-Dem
INSTITUTE

HUNGARY

A COUNTRY REPORT BASED ON DATA 1918-2012

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Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to the conceptualization and measurement of democracy. It is co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame. With a V-Dem Institute at University of Gothenburg that comprises almost ten staff members, and a project team across the world with four Principal Investigators, fifteen Project Managers, 30+ Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, Research Assistants, and 2,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science research-oriented data collection programs.

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About V-Dem

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) is a new approach to conceptualizing and measuring democracy. V-Dem's multidimensional and disaggregated approach acknowledges the complexity of the concept of democracy. The V-Dem project distinguishes among five high-level principles of democracy: *electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian,* which are disaggregated into lower-level components and specific indicators.

Key features of V-Dem:

- Provides reliable data on five high-level principles and 39 mid-level indices and components of democracy such as regular elections, judicial independence, direct democracy, and gender equality, consisting of 350+ distinct and precise indicators;
- Covers all countries and dependent territories from 1900 to the present and provides an estimate of measurement reliability for each rating;
- Makes all ratings public, free of charge, through a user-friendly interface.

With four Principal Investigators, two Project Coordinators, fifteen Project Managers, more than thirty Regional Managers, 170 Country Coordinators, several Assistant Researchers, and approximately 2,500 Country Experts, the V-Dem project is one of the largest-ever social science data collection projects with a database of over 15 million data points. The database makes highly detailed analysis of virtually all aspects of democracy in a country, while also allowing for summary comparisons between countries based on aggregated indices for different dimensions of democracy. Users from anywhere are able to use the V-Dem online analysis tools which can be found at the project's website. Governments, development agencies, and NGOs can benefit from the nuanced comparative and historical data when informing critical decisions such as selecting country program priorities, informing program designs and monitoring impact of their programs.

Methodology:

Unlike extant data collection projects, which typically use a small group of experts who rate all countries or ask a single expert to code one country, the V-Dem project has recruited over 2,500 local and cross-national experts to provide judgments on various indicators about democracy. The V-Dem dataset is created by combining factual information from existing data sources about constitutional regulations and de jure situation with expert coding for questions that require evaluation. Experts' ratings are aggregated through an advanced statistical model that takes into account the possibilities that experts may make mistakes and have different scales in mind when coding. In addition, bridge-coders - experts who code multiple countries - are recruited to calibrate the scales of estimates cross-nationally[1].

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[1] For further details and information about the V-Dem methodology, see http://v-dem.net.

Introduction

Hungary is a fascinating Central European country with a compelling political history. In the last century alone, Hungary has been an Empire, a Soviet Republic, and a Parliamentary Democracy. It has seen multiple changes of power within those regime types. Because of these drastic political changes, Hungary's history of democracy is extremely complex. The goal of this country report is to understand the history of Hungarian democracy by analyzing V-Dem data from 1918-2012. By using multiple definitions of democracy, the data shows that Hungary has never been entirely democratic or undemocratic, but has fluctuated over the course of many years. This report will first start with an overview of Hungarian history during the years shown on the V-Dem figures. It will then examine a figure of six different types of democracy (the *electoral democracy index, deliberative component index, liberal democracy index, participatory component index, egalitarian component index,* and *women's political empowerment index*) to fully understand the complexities in Hungarian democracy over three primary time periods. Finally, it will look more closely at egalitarian democracy, deliberative democracy, and freedom of discussion in order to gain a nuanced understanding of Hungarian democracy over time.

A Brief History of Hungary: 1918-2012

Hungary is a country with a rich, complicated past that occupies a truly unique place in modern history. Since the crowning of the first king of Hungary over one thousand years ago, the nation has been under the control of various diverse regimes. Before the twentieth century, Hungary was a monarchy that existed independently, within the Ottoman Empire, and then as half of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. However, centuries of monarchic dynasties ended during World War I. Franz Joseph I, Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, died in November of 1916, and political instability in the wake of his death was a major cause of the empire's decline. During the war, Austria-Hungary suffered extreme losses and eventually surrendered to the allied armies. The monarchy collapsed, and successor states began to occupy parts of the country in every direction (Molnar 2001).

In the midst of this chaos, Count Mihaly Karolyi led a revolution to democratize Hungary. In October 1918, the revolution proved successful, and the Hungarian Independence Party was swept to power under Karolyi's leadership, forming Hungary's First Republic (Deak

1968). Karolyi tried to establish a democracy where different ethnic groups within the Hungarian borders could self-govern under the federal oversight of the Hungarian government. However, these groups- particularly French, Serbian, and Romanian communities- became stronger than the Hungarian federal government, and they soon annexed the territories they occupied (Paxton 2007). After giving up too much land and weakening Hungary's national forces, Karolyi was pressured into handing over power to a Social Democratic government. However, the Social Democrats and Communist Party had merged the day before this agreement, and thus Hungary was proclaimed a Soviet Republic run by Hungarian revolutionary Bela Kun. Kun quickly nationalized all industry and aligned the new Republic closely with Soviet Russia (Molnar 2001).

After a failed coup in response to this regime change, the Communists ordered mass executions of many of their political opponents. This harsh decision reduced domestic support for the regime. Czechoslovak and Romanian forces continued to take Hungarian land, and the Communist army's inability to successfully fight back created a power vacuum in Hungary. Admiral Miklos Horthy took advantage of this situation and established a new national army. The army entered the capital, and a national assembly elected Horthy the regent of a new Hungarian Kingdom (Molnar 2001). Horthy served as the Regent of Hungary for the next twenty-four years. Under his rule, Hungarian foreign policy became increasingly right-wing, and the Hungarian government enacted multiple anti-Jewish laws. These policies drew Hungary to pursue rapprochement with Hitler's Germany. In 1941, Hungary attacked Yugoslavia and entered the war against the Soviet Union. However, Hungary secretly also engaged in peace negotiations with Britain and the United States. Upon discovering this betrayal, Hitler and the Nazis invaded Hungary in 1944. The Arrow Cross Party- essentially Hungarian Nazis-murdered thousands of Jews and sent countless more to Nazi concentration camps. In 1945, Horthy signed an armistice, which allowed the Soviet Army to enter and liberate Hungary (Molnar 2001).

Soon after, a group of Hungarian military agents and anti-fascist resistance forces convened a Provisional National Assembly that was promising for the democratization of Hungary at that time (Litvan 1996). The group elected a provisional government that ruled over Hungary for less than a year. They also worked closely with Soviet forces to help the communist party gain support. After a 1945 election where the communist party received much less support than it anticipated, party leaders changed their tactics. The communists liquidated any political opponents in what is referred to as "salami tactics", where they essentially "sliced up" their opponents. This strategy proved successful when the communist party in the strongly

manipulated 1947 elections became the strongest party in parliament, thus gaining political control of Hungary (Litvan 1996). Matyas Rákosi was appointed Prime Minister, but he soon gave up any pretense of democracy and began ruling the country autocratically. Rákosi worked closely with Stalin and sought to rule with fear and quickly silenced any opposition (Litvan 1996).

By 1953, Rákosi remained the leader of the Communist Party in Hungary but ceded the position of Prime Minister to Imre Nagy. Nagy announced a policy called the New Course, which aimed to close internment camps and end the idea of rule by terror. Nagy was a staunch communist but believed that unity could be achieved without resorting to such extreme measures of policing citizens (Litvan 1996). These changes did not sit well with former Prime Minister Rákosi, now Party Chief, who pushed Nagy out of the party and regained full power. In reaction to this harsh change, Nagy gained popular support, and his followers led an uprising against Rákosi's government in October of 1956. This uprising gained supporters rapidly, and it led to militias and rebellions that caused the demise of Rákosi's rule. However, this success was truncated when Soviet forces invaded Budapest on November 4, slaughtering thousands of Hungarian protestors. They quashed the rebellion and installed Janos Kadar as Prime Minister, forbidding any discussion of the 1956 revolution (Litvan 1996).

Soon after this, a Central Worker's Council formed as an opposition group to Kadar. At first, there were peaceful negotiations between the group and the government, but by December, Kadar and a group of Soviet forces arrested their leaders and began patrolling the streets. Kadar's government also suspended writers' and journalists' unions, who had been vocally anti-Kadar despite Soviet aggression against workers' unions (Felkay 1989). In 1958, Imre Nagy was tried for high treason and executed in secret by the Soviets. Non-Communist nations- including the United States- spoke out against Hungary and pressured it to enact more democratic reforms. In response, the Hungarian government held parliamentary elections, although 99.4% of the votes were cast in favor of Communist candidates (Felkay 1989).

From 1985-1988, Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR announced policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, which were designed to open foreign relations and create a more tolerant society. These changes spilled over into Hungary, and the combination of a more relaxed political atmosphere and deepening economic troubles led to an emergence of civil society organizations in Hungary (Ormos & Kiraly 2001). These organizations included the Hungarian Democratic Forum, Alliance of Young Democrats, and Alliance of Free Democrats, all of which were formed in 1987 and 1988. At the 1988 National Conference of the Communist party, Kadar became party president, but many other prominent Communist leaders were not elected or

reelected to their positions. This upset created room for the Parliament to become a functioning institution with a multi-party system (Ormos & Kiraly 2001). In January 1989, the new Parliament passed laws allowing the right of association and right of assembly. Two months later, formal roundtable talks were held between Communist rulers and emerging civil society groups in Hungary to lobby for democratic changes. The civil society groups emulated countries like Poland that were successful in their negotiations with the USSR, and given the political climate at the time, the Communists recognized the growing power of the new groups. Many of the parties present at the roundtable talks are still influential in Hungarian parliament today, including the SZDSZ Democratic Alliance, the Fidesz Conservative Party, and the MDF, or Hungarian Democratic Forum. By May of 1989, Hungary's border with Austria was opened, and Hungary was officially declared a Republic (Bozóki 2002). In October of that year, a constitutional amendment abolished the one-party system and established the legality of political parties, putting an end to decades of authoritarian rule.

On May 2, 1990, the first freely elected Parliament of the Hungarian Republic enacted a declaration of its commitment to securing multiparty democracy, human rights, and national independence by making October 23, 1956 (the date of Nagy's revolution) a national holiday (Litvan 1996). The next month, a constitutional amendment was passed that introduced a constructive vote of no confidence and deleted sections in the country's constitution about the advantages of state planning and values of democratic socialism (Litvan 1996). Along with these domestic democratic reforms, Hungary also became more involved in the international community, joining NATO in 1999 and the EU in 2004 (Batory 2012). Despite these positive moves toward democracy, Socialist leader Ferenc Gyurcsany was elected Prime Minister in the 2006 general elections. In autumn 2006, riots erupted across the country after Gyurcsany confessed that his administration had repeatedly lied about the state of Hungary's economy (Palonen 2012).

In the past five years, Hungary's democracy appears to be slowly and marginally declining. In 2010, Fidesz- a prominent conservative party- gained two-thirds of Hungarian parliamentary seats, which enabled them to easily enact constitutional reform. In 2011, the government wrote an entirely new constitution. Called the "Fundamental Law", this constitution is dominated by religious- mainly Catholic- references, which represented a major change from the 1989 secular constitution. Some changes in the new constitution include giving the ruling parliamentary party the power to appoint the President of the Court and reducing the number of legal rules that may be reviewed by the Court- both measures that take away

important checks on the ruling majority (Kovas & Toth 2011). These changes can be seen as a move away from democracy.

Over the course of the past century, Hungary has experienced a number of diverse regimes and extraordinary political change. While Hungary is credibly democratic now, changes like the recent constitutional overhaul call into question just how democratic Hungary will be in the future.

Principles of Democracy: Exploring Indices

The figure below shows the development of democracy in Hungary over the past century. It includes six different types of democracy, including the *electoral democracy index, deliberative component index, liberal democracy index, participatory component index, egalitarian component index, and women's political empowerment index.* While these indices all measure distinct aspects of democracy, analyzing them comparatively can provide an overview of what democracy as a whole has looked like in Hungary. All of the indices are measured on a scale of 0-1, and the broad range of scores show the extent of fluctuation in Hungarian democracy over time. In order to effectively analyze all of the principles of democracy shown on this figure, it is helpful to break up Hungary's history into three distinct time periods: 1918-1944, 1945-1989, and 1990-2012.

Figure 1. Development of democracy in Hungary, 1915-2012

The first time period, 1918-1944, represents multiple regimes in Hungary's history, including the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Hungary's First Republic, the Hungarian Soviet Republic, and the resurgence of the Kingdom of Hungary until the Nazi invasion. Despite the fact that many regimes are represented on this figure, democracy in Hungary remained stable during this time period, and each measurement of democracy was relatively equal. The one exception to this is 1919- the year of the Hungarian Soviet Republic- where democracy according to every measurement except the *egalitarian component index* decreased sharply. The decline in democracy in 1919 was caused by factors including Kun's industry nationalization policies and the amount of political turmoil present at this time. However, since the Soviet Republic only existed for 133 days, there was not sufficient time for Kun to make sweeping policy changes that would have long-term effects on the country.

This downward trend was then reversed in 1920, the year Miklos Horthy came into power. Unlike his predecessor, Horthy was elected by a National Assembly, which was a positive democratic achievement. In that year alone, almost all measurements of Hungarian democracy in Figure 1 increased. The one exception to this was the *egalitarian component index,* which decreased and became equivalent to every other measure of democracy. Horthy possessed a large amount of political power during his time as regent, but some of his privileges effectively provided checks on legislative power. For instance, Horthy was able to veto or approve legislation to be submitted to the National Assembly. From 1920-1943, Hungarian democracy was remarkably consistent. These were the years when the Hungarian government

began to align themselves with Nazi Germany and passed multiple laws discriminating against Hungarian Jews. These policy decisions were not properly justified to the Hungarian citizens, which is evident in the time period's low deliberative democracy scores. When the Nazis invaded Hungary in 1944, every single measure of democracy declined dramatically.

After World War II, the Communist era began in Hungary. The first few years, from 1945-1948, show considerable change. Every single democracy score increased from 1945-1946, which was the year the Provisional National Assembly took place and elected an interim government for one year. This National Assembly and its policies engaged many Hungarian citizens in political activity, which explains the jump in the *participatory component index* from 1945-1946. There was a particular emphasis on recruiting more assembly members and setting up district branches. After the extremely manipulated 1947 elections, where the Hungarian Communist Party gained control of parliament, deliberative aspects of democracy decreased considerably and egalitarian aspects of democracy increased. This juxtaposition illustrates how the Communist Party's rise to power was not democratic, but their platform did emphasize socioeconomic equality, hence the increase in egalitarian democracy. In 1949, a new Constitution was written by the Communist parliament. This document put significant political power in the hands of the Working People's Party, and it led to a further decrease in deliberative aspects of democracy. After the 1949 Constitution, democracy in Hungary remained fairly stagnant. This changed slightly in 1953 with Rákosi's "New Course" policies, which temporarily increased electoral and deliberative aspects of Hungarian democracy. Another important trend to notice in this time period is when policies changed but had no tangible effect on democracy. For instance, in response to the international outrage over Imre Nagy's execution in 1958, the Hungarian government held elections to attempt to claim the regime's legitimacy. Though this was the first parliamentary election in years, 99.4% of votes were cast in favor of Communist candidates, and the *electoral democracy* score did not budge in 1958, suggesting that these elections were not actually democratic.

The final period in Hungary's history shows the fall of communism and rise of parliamentary democracy. The most significant increase in Hungarian democracy is from 1989-1990, indicated by a jump in every single measurement of democracy. In particular, the *electoral democracy index* jumped from 0.17 in 1988 to 0.816 in 1991, and the *liberal democracy index* climbed from 0.13 to 0.73 in those same years. This represents the introduction of electoral competition and civil society engagement, increased freedom of expression, and limited executive power. Democracy in terms of female political empowerment and egalitarianism- both of which remained fairly high and even increased during Communism- also experienced significant

increases from 1989-1991. In 1990 there was a freely elected Hungarian parliament and considerable constitutional changes. The new government declared its commitment to democracy, deleted sections in the constitution that explicitly endorsed socialism, and introduced more checks on the executive branch, including a vote of no confidence. Although these changes were extremely symbolic for Hungarian democracy, in practice they did not actually cause an increase in any of Hungary's democracy indicators.

In the past five years, liberal, participatory, and deliberative aspects of democracy in Hungary have all declined. These changes are related to the recent constitutional changes that give more power to the ruling party, a change that specifically accounts for the changes in liberal democracy. As the Principles of Democracy figure shows, Hungary has experienced extreme changes in democracy over the past hundred years. Breaking the figure down into these three major sections helps to understand the nuances of these changes and their causes.

Egalitarian Democracy: The Impact of Communism

Figure 2. Development of the components in the Egalitarian democracy index for Hungary, 1915-2012

Analyzing the *egalitarian democracy index* is a helpful way to look at one particular type of democracy in Hungary. In Figure 1, we saw that the *egalitarian democracy index* consistently scored higher than other forms of democracy in Hungary, especially when the country was under Communist rule. To look more closely, we can examine three elements of this index: the *equal*

distribution of resources index, power distributed by socioeconomic position, and particularistic or pluralistic goods. Although the *equal distribution of resources index* is scaled from 0-1, the other two measurements on the figure are scaled from 0-4. On this figure, a low score indicates less equitable resource distribution, a power system dependent on socioeconomic status, and primarily pluralistic social and infrastructure expenditures. Shown together, they represent a comprehensive picture of egalitarianism in Hungary.

The first major drop in Hungarian egalitarian democracy occurred in 1920, the year the Kingdom of Hungary was reinstated. During the twenty-four years of Horthy's reign before Nazi invasion, egalitarian democracy in Hungary stayed fairly static. The one exception to this was between 1937-1938 when the Hungarian government increased the country's national budget investment in public goods. In these two years, the government invested in Hungary's military and became more active in foreign policy and national defense (Ormos & Kiraly, 2001).

Egalitarian democracy in Hungary improved significantly from 1944-1946. In September 1945, the National Assembly ratified a land reform bill that eliminated feudal estates and redistributed land to landless peasants (Papp 1984). This improved egalitarianism in Hungary since more individuals now had access to land, thus creating more socioeconomic equality. In 1946, the government nationalized Hungary's banks, iron industry, and steel industry in an effort to create an equal distribution of those important resources (Molnar 2001). As the figure shows, these two changes had major effects on the state of egalitarian democracy in the country. The next notable change in egalitarianism democracy occurred in 1968. This was the year that Kadar enacted his New Economic Mechanism policies to decentralize the economic system, shifting away from the extreme Communist policies of the Soviets (Felkay 1989). This had the exact opposite effect of the land reform bill of 1945, as it shifted resources to particularistic goods rather than public goods.

Unlike other measurements of democracy that increased significantly after the fall of Hungarian Communism, egalitarian aspects of democracy decreased in the early 1990s. The biggest change of the 1990s occurred in 1998, the year that Viktor Orban and the right-wing Fidesz party gained control of the Hungarian government. This correlation suggests that policies implemented by the Fidesz party caused more power to be distributed by socioeconomic position and thus decreased egalitarian democracy (Todosijevi 2004).

Deliberative Democracy: Do Citizens Have a Say?

Figure 3. Development of the components in the Deliverative component index for Hungary, 1915-2012

Another principle of democracy that has fluctuated throughout Hungary's past is the *deliberative component index*. Particularly, three measurements factored into this index that are relevant to Hungary's overall democracy are *reasoned justification, range of consultation, and engaged society*, which essentially follow an opposite trajectory to the egalitarian measurements seen in Figure 2. *Range of consultation* and *engaged society* are both scored from 0-5, and *reasoned justification* is scored from 0-3. A low score indicates a lack of public deliberation, unilateral authoritative decisions, and no justification for policy choices. High scores demonstrate a range of policy discussions and grassroots deliberation, elites from various sectors being consulted about policy, and sophisticated justification of policies.

Deliberative aspects of democracy in Hungary have fluctuated over time, and there are four key events that brought about dramatic changes in Hungary's deliberative democratization. First, in 1919, Bela Kun's Soviet government banned public deliberation and made all decisions without consultation. This caused the state of deliberative democracy in Hungary to plummet, which can be seen when the *deliberative component index* as a whole dropped from 0.56 to 0.08 in 1919. Deliberative Democracy in Hungary increased in 1920, but still remained below the levels of 1918.

The next notable change in Hungarian deliberative democracy occurred in 1946 when democracy improved significantly for a year but then decreased dramatically. The increase was a result of the Provisional National Assembly Government who attempted to increase democracy in Hungary, particularly by engaging a wide range of citizens. The Assembly itself included elites from across the political spectrum, as well as actors from relevant sectors of society and business. The *range of consultation* in Hungary thus improved in 1946, but the government resorted back to unilateral decision making after the 1947 elections. Political elites stopped giving the public any justifications for their policy decisions and curbed all opportunities to give counter-arguments. This change led deliberative democracy in Hungary to experience its lowest point in 1949.

Kadar's New Economic Mechanism, introduced in 1968, caused the next big change in deliberative democracy in Hungary. Kadar gave sufficient public justification of his new economic policies and explained these in terms of the public good. This can be seen in the increased *range of consultation* and *reasoned justification* scores. However, this success stagnated for the next fifteen years (Felkay 1989). Finally, like every other form of democracy in Hungary, deliberative democracy increased dramatically from 1989-1990. As the three indicators in Figure 3 suggest, Hungary's new democratic regime encouraged more public deliberation from non-elite groups, consulted leaders of multiple parties, and included extremely qualified justification about policy decisions.

Freedom of Discussion and Media Censorship

Figure 4. Development of media freedom in Hungary, 1915-2012

Lastly, examining the history of media freedom and censorship in Hungary provides insight into Hungarian policies regarding freedom of speech. Media freedom is important to democracy for a variety of reasons. Fundamentally, democratic governments believe that citizens have a right to participate in decisions about the policymakers and policies that affect them. Free media also helps citizens gain awareness of opposing viewpoints on public issues, opening up avenues for informed discussion. Additionally, if media is allowed to operate separately from the government, it can help hold the government accountable (Ferguson 1998). In V-Dem, measures of media freedom are part of the *freedom of discussion, freedom of expression, and electoral democracy indices*. When looking at free speech in Hungary, the *government censorship effort-media* and *harassment of journalists* measurements help tell a story of media freedom in Hungary over time. Both of these measurements are scaled from 0-4. Low scores on both signal that there are direct attempts to censor media and journalists would be assured harassment for offending powerful actors. High scores show a lack of media censorship and ability for journalists to publish unfavorable stories about political actors without being harassed.

The first notable change in media censorship and journalist harassment occurred in 1944, during the German occupation of Hungary. Like many other democratic factors, media

freedom improved following World War II, during Hungary's brief interlude of democracy. However, once Rákosi was in power in 1949, his government gained control of all radio and newspapers (Molnar 2001). This stark change meant that journalists were entirely under the control of the government and could not expose any negativity in the regime. Throughout the 1950s, the only way for Western journalists to cover Hungarian news was to stay in contact with their embassies in Budapest and to read propaganda newspapers (Stone 1996). Tales of journalist harassment were also abundant during this time period. For example, Eugen Szatmari was a fearless Hungarian reporter who worked closely with American journalists. He disappeared in 1950, and his whereabouts were never discovered. During the 1950s, editors who complied with Communist authorities' requests for what to publish- and to not publish- were rewarded with high salaries and benefits, in addition to accessing state printing presses and distribution systems. When Janos Kadar came to power he had a more lenient media policy, which can be seen in the increase in scores on the figure from 1956-1988. Kadar cared more about the state-controlled television than print sources, and he loosened constraints on journalists as long as they did not threaten the state TV's influence.

Hungarian media censorship and journalist harassment both began to improve throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. By the time Hungary was officially a democracy in 1990, both measurements reached scores of around 0.37. However, media freedom has started to decline in the last five years. This change is mainly caused by legislation passed in 2010 that heavily regulates Hungarian media. The 2010 law compels journalists to reveal their sources if asked by authorities, and ordered the creation of a new Media Council whose members all belong to the ruling party. The ruling party also has the right to refuse to renew journalist licenses (Porter 2011). This same year, the Director General of MTI, a Hungarian news agency, declared that the agency's staff must be loyal to the government, and that all public radio and television stations would broadcast the same centrally controlled news. This was a power grab and a way to eliminate checks and balances since the media would no longer be allowed to expose faults or injustices in the government. Although Hungarian media is much less censored than it was during Communism, free media is increasingly threatened, a trend which may continue in the future.

Conclusion

Over the past century, Hungary has experienced almost every type of regime, from monarchy to authoritarianism to parliamentary republic. Democracy in Hungary has ranged from extremely low levels at the height of Communism to very high levels in the 1990s. Examining democracy in Hungary suggests that not every type of democracy is equal and that democracy is a complex concept. For example, even throughout Communist rule when Hungary was not democratic according to most measurements, factors such as women's political empowerment and egalitarianism improved.

Hungary has changed drastically in the past two decades, and the country has experienced notable landmarks from holding free elections to officially joining the European Union. It is impossible to predict the future based solely on past data, but it will nevertheless be fascinating to see how Hungarian democracy changes in the coming years.

Appendix

Indicators Included in Figure 1

Electoral democracy index

Question: To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved?

Clarifications: The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of (representative) democracy – liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association (thick) (v2x_frassoc_thick), suffrage (v2x_suffr), clean elections (v2xel_frefair), elected executive (v2x_accex) and freedom of expression (v2x_freexp_thick); and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices.

Liberal democracy index

Question: To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarifications: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Aggregation: The index is aggregated using this formula:

v2x_libdem= .25* v2x_polyarchy^1.6 + .25* v2x_liberal + .5* v2x_polyarchy ^1.6*v2x_liberal.

Deliberative component index

Question: To what extent is the deliberative principle of democracy achieved?

Clarification: The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels.

Aggregation: The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification (v2dlreason), common good justification (v2dlcommon), respect for counterarguments (v2dlcountr), range of consultation (v2dlconslt), and engaged society (v2dlengage).

Egalitarian component index

Question: To what extent is the egalitarian principle achieved?

Clarifications: The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1) rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; and 2) resources are distributed equally across all social groups. The distribution of resources must be sufficient to ensure that citizens' basic needs are met in a way that enables their meaningful participation. Additionally, an equal distribution of resources ensures the potential for greater equality in the distribution of power.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index (v2xeg_eqprotec) and equal distribution of resources (v2xeg_eqdr).

Participatory component index

Question: To what extent is the participatory principle achieved?

Clarification: The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a

bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies.

Aggregation: This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation (v2x_cspart), direct popular vote (v2xdd_dd), elected local government power (v2xel_locelec), and elected regional government power(v2xel_regelec).

Women Political Empowerment Index

Question: How politically empowered are women?

Clarifications: Women's political empowerment is defined as a process of increasing capacity for women, leading to greater choice, agency, and participation in societal decision-making. It is understood to incorporate three equally-weighted dimensions: fundamental civil liberties, women's open discussion of political issues and participation in civil society organizations, and the descriptive representation of women in formal political positions.

Aggregation: The index is formed by taking the average of women's civil liberties index (v2x_gencl), women's civil society participation index (v2x_gencs), and women's political participation index (v2x_genpp).

Indicators Included in Figure 2

Power Distributed by Socioeconomic Position

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Choices:

0 : Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.

1 : Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.

2 : Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

3 : Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.

4 : Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

Particularistic or Public Goods

Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how "particularistic" or "public goods" are most expenditures?

Choices:

0 : Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.

1 : Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods.

2 : Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.

3 : Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic.

4 : Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

Equal Distribution of Resources Index

Question: How equal is the distribution of resources?

Clarifications: This component measures the extent to which resources – both tangible and intangible – are distributed in society. An equal distribution of resources supports egalitarian democracy in two ways. First, lower poverty rates and the distribution of goods and services (such as food, water, housing, education and healthcare) ensure that all individuals are capable of participating in politics and government. In short, basic needs must be met in order for individuals to effectively exercise their rights and freedoms (see, for example, Sen 1999, Maslow 1943). Second, high levels of resource inequality undermine the ability of poorer populations to participate meaningfully (Aristotle, Dahl 2006). Thus, it is necessary to include not only measures of poverty and the distribution of goods and services, but also the levels of inequality in these distributions, and the proportion of the population who are not eligible for social services (i.e. means-tests, particularistic distribution, etc.). This principle also implies that social or economic inequalities can translate into political inequalities, an issue addressed most notably by Walzer (1983), who argues that overlapping "spheres" of inequality are particularly harmful

to society. To address these overlapping spheres, this component also includes measures of the distribution of power in society amongst different socio-economic groups, genders, etc.

Indicators Included in Figure 3

Reasoned Justification

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Choices:

0 : No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, "We must cut spending."

1 : Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, "We must cut spending. The state is inefficient." (The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.)

2 : Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs."

3 : Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, "We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation."

Range of Consultation

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels

Choices:

0 : No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.

1 : Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.

2 : Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.

3 : Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.

4 : Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.

5 : Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

Engaged Society

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Choices:

0 : Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.

1 : Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.

2 : Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.

3 : Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.

4 : Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

5 : Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

Indicators Included in Figure 4

Government Censorship Efforts- Media

Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

Choices:

0 : Attempts to censor are direct and routine.

1 : Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.

2 : Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.

3 : Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.

4 : The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

Harassment of Journalists

Question: Are individual journalists harassed - i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed -- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

Choices:

0 : No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.

1 : Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.

2 : Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.

3 : It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.

4 : Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

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